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Taking a strikingly interdisciplinary and global approach, Postcolonialism 
Cross-Examined reflects on the current status of postcolonial studies 
and attempts to break through traditional boundaries, creating a truly 
comparative and genuinely global phenomenon. Drawing together the field 
of mainstream postcolonial studies with post-Soviet postcolonial studies and 
studies of the late Ottoman Empire, the contributors in this volume question 
many of the concepts and assumptions we have become accustomed to in 
postcolonial studies, creating a fresh new version of the field. The volume 
calls the merits of the field into question, investigating how postcolonial 
studies may have perpetuated and normalized colonialism as an issue 
exclusive to Western colonial and imperial powers. The volume is the first 
to open a dialogue between three different areas of postcolonial scholarship 
that previously developed independently from one another:
 • the wide field of postcolonial studies working on European colonialism,
 • the growing field of post-Soviet postcolonial/post-imperial studies,
 • the still fledgling field of post-Ottoman postcolonial/post-imperial 
studies, supported by sideways glances at the multidirectional conditions 
of interaction in East Africa and the East and West Indies.
Postcolonialism Cross-Examined looks at topics such as humanism, 
nationalism, multiculturalism, nostalgia, and the Anthropocene in order to 
piece together a new, broader vision for postcolonial studies in the twenty-first 
century. By including territories other than those covered by the postcolonial 
mainstream, the book strives to reframe the “postcolonial” as a genuinely 
global phenomenon and develop multidirectional postcolonial perspectives.
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Forty years after the rise of the postcolonial theories in the Anglophone 
academy and the subsequent transformation of scholarly discourses around 
the globe, the question arises of whether the postcolonial paradigm actu-
ally helps us understand the world, particularly the globalized world of 
the twenty-first century. The sheer number of monographs and antholo-
gies that have appeared in the last decade1 suggests a continued interest 
in (though not necessarily the continued relevance of) postcolonial schol-
arship. Moreover, as Arif Dirlik pointed out, the impact of postcolonial 
studies reaches far beyond the field as such—if something like “as such” 
exists—and “postcolonial criticism has infiltrated discourses that have 
origins quite independent of postcolonialism” (Dirlik 1999, 149). There 
is certainly no shortage of critique of “the postcolonial” and postcolonial 
studies either. Over the decades, the field has faced criticism from various 
quarters, with Neil Lazarus even accusing much of postcolonial scholar-
ship of “culturalism” and of being “ungrounded” (Lazarus 2013, 324f.). 
In this spirit, critical of the growing provincialism of postcolonial studies, 
scholars have time and again called for a renewal of postcolonial studies 
and expressed a desire to push the field in different directions. While the 
“materialist-poststructuralist opposition” still persists (Bernard, Elmarsafy, 
and Murray 2015, 4), from around the turn of the century scholars began 
to consider the present—despite the unaltered “possibility of a return to 
colonialism in a new guise”—as already “post-postcolonial” (Dirlik 2003, 
424; see also Koschorke 20172). Critique has also centered around the obvi-
ous ideological and normative aspects of postcolonial approaches (Cooper 
2005, 4; Divine 2008, 5; Albrecht 2012b), and a now oft-quoted PMLA 
roundtable discussion even posed the question of “The End of Postcolonial 
Theory” (Yaeger 2007, 633). However, despite this and other prophecies 
over the years predicting its demise, the field remains extremely prolific in 
terms of research output and exceptionally creative in its engagement with 
contemporary and historic manifestations of colonialism and imperialism. 
As Madina Tlostanova, one of the contributors to this volume (Chapter 9), 
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reasserted more than a decade after Dirlik: “Postcolonial theory has become 
in the last two decades a well-established and integral element of […] think-
ing on otherness, ethnicity, race and gender, as well as queer and ecological 
projects both in the west and in the non-west” (Tlostanova 2012, 130).
Yet, one can also examine the success story and the infiltration of con-
temporary thought with postcolonial tenets and ideas from another angle. 
To begin with, from a reverse point of view, it actually seems odd that 
mainstream postcolonial studies have managed to establish and normalize 
colonialism as an issue exclusive to Western colonial and imperial powers 
and their non-Western victims. It would be worth investigating how and 
why this selective framework of exploration and explanation could become 
so successful in the first place. “Postcolonial theory” can be defined “as 
that branch of contemporary theory that investigates, and develops propo-
sitions about, the cultural and political impact of European conquest upon 
colonized societies, and the nature of those societies’ responses” (Ashcroft 
2012b, xv). But how do we actually explain this strange consensus on the 
history of European or Western colonialism and why it is deemed to be the 
foundation of postcolonial critique? In the postcolonial “master narrative,” 
as the anthropologist Philip Carl Salzman dryly stated some time ago, “most 
of world history disappears” (Salzman 2008, 244). Indeed, a recent publica-
tion labels the “world” it allegedly deals with The Postcolonial World (Singh 
and Kim 2017). Ironically though, the cover picture, part of a world map 
designed by Indian visual artist Reena Saini Kallat (cf. Figure 2 in Lionnet, 
Chapter 3), shows areas of the world to which this book on The Postcolonial 
World does not even get close—such as the Soviet/Tsarist Empires and the 
Ottoman Empire and other Islamic empires. If one would draw an actual 
map of this kind of Postcolonial World, there would be large gaps. The 
postcolonial paradigm is at once all-encompassing and highly reductive. It 
is all-encompassing in the sense that postcolonial scholars share “a commit-
ment to tell a more inclusive, more truly global story” (Brennan 2013, 143), 
and “promise […] that the theoretical modes of postcolonial studies have 
the potential to chart the worldwide contemporary condition” (Parry 2012, 
341). It is reductive in the sense that its key concepts, which are applied to 
this worldwide condition, came into being on the basis of this very restric-
tive framework of the West and the formerly colonized non-West.
The phrase “postcolonial mainstream” is not meant to lump together 
the wide and manifold field of postcolonial studies and wrongfully make 
it uniform. “Postcolonial mainstream” points to nothing other than the 
one feature that contributions to postcolonial scholarship have in common, 
namely that, diverse as they may otherwise be, the matrix on which they are 
mapped is the assumption that colonialism and post-colonialism3 are tanta-
mount to Western colonialism and post-colonialism. Postcolonial scholars 
define the characteristics of their field as “a common political and moral 
consensus towards the history and legacy of western colonialism” (Young 
2016, 5; my emphasis). This self-confinement to an overall unidirectional 
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discursive framework results, amongst other things, in a stubborn reverse 
division of the world into West and non-West. A division that, within an 
unaltered binary framework, only reverses prestige and value. While post-
colonial scholars, at least from the 1990s onwards, strived to soften the 
deep division “between colonizing perpetrators and colonized victims” so 
customary for earlier phases of postcolonial studies “by introducing con-
cepts of ‘hybridity’ (Homi Bhabha) or intermediary ‘contact zones’ (Mary 
Louise Pratt),” they certainly did not question “the guiding fundamental 
oppositions between identity and alterity” (Osterhammel 2017, 64). The 
postcolonial reverse division and revaluation of the world—despite its com-
plex deconstructive, poststructuralist, and/or culturalist guise—is therefore 
still in place. What’s more, “dichotomous models” such as the postcolonial 
self-confinement to a unidirectional West/non-West framework “in essence 
[…] presume a mono-motivational anthropology and in turn a mono-causal 
methodology” (Osterhammel 2017, 64). Against this backdrop, my own 
chapter in this volume (Chapter 10), which takes up questions posed by 
Sheldon Pollock and Katherine Fleming, develops the alternative concept of 
a multidirectional post-colonial framework. This critical endeavor should 
not be misunderstood as an attempt to trivialize or justify colonial enter-
prises and does not suggest that “this was and is the case everywhere in 
the world.” A multidirectional post-colonial framework is also not just a 
matter of methodological questions; it is not about a mere broadening of 
the geo-political and geo-historical realm of investigation. Instead, it aims at 
unthinking this division of the world, both customary and reverse, and all 
that this division entails. The critique of many of the contributors to this vol-
ume is likewise fundamentally different from previous interrogations of the 
postcolonial paradigm. Its difference lies in its targeting of key assumptions 
and categories of the field, beginning with the supposed normality of colo-
nialism and post-colonialism as Western colonialism and post-colonialism.
There has been fundamental criticism of postcolonial studies before4 but 
in a different way. Neil Lazarus—along with Benita Parry and a few oth-
ers, one of postcolonialism’s toughest critics—dedicated much of his “work 
since the 1990s” to a “contestation of particular ideas and assumptions 
predominant in postcolonial studies.” In his seminal study The Postcolonial 
Unconscious, Lazarus would “call into question concepts and theories that 
have seemed to [him] to lack accountability to the realities of the contempo-
rary world-system that constitutes their putative object” (Lazarus 2011a, 1). 
Moreover, in a subsequent essay, he likewise criticizes postcolonial schol-
ars for their “tendency to cast colonialism as a political dispensation and 
to refer it, in civilizational terms, to ‘the west’ (or, in some versions, ‘the 
north’)” (Lazarus 2012, 120). In fact, “the postcolonialist idea of ‘the west’ 
as the super-agent of domination in the modern global order strikes [him] as 
being deeply misconceived” (117). However inspiring as his critique consist-
ently is, as he does not call for a widening of the postcolonial horizon to the 
neglected areas of the globe, he goes in a different direction to that proposed 
4 Monika Albrecht 
by this volume. Lazarus argues against the inclusion of post-Soviet nations 
(other areas of the world he does not discuss) in postcolonial scholarship 
on the basis of the assumption that “colonialism,” whatever else it may 
have included, “as an historical process involved the forced integration of 
hitherto uncapitalized societies, or societies in which the capitalist mode of 
production was not hegemonic, into a capitalist world-system” (120). At 
the same time, though, by advocating a replacement of “the West” by the 
Western capitalist world-system, he confirms the idea of colonialism and 
post-colonialism as Western colonialism and post-colonialism.
To suggest, as I do, that other political and economic systems produced 
comparable conditions to those of Western colonialism does not imply a min-
imization of the capitalist world-system “as the pre-eminent force shaping 
social development over the course of modern history” (Lazarus 2012, 121). 
It does imply, though, that excluding other systems of colonialism or impe-
rialism deprives post-colonial studies of the opportunity to compare, for 
instance, colonial practices, or forms of resistance to them, in a way that 
may considerably differ from comparisons within the familiar areas of the 
postcolonial map. As I will argue in the following text, it is not just a mat-
ter of a conceptual assignment of colonialism to the West (instead of to the 
Western economic system, as Lazarus suggests), but of an actual assign-
ment of colonialism to the West that led to the “epistemological dead end” 
(Berman 2011, 173) of the postcolonial paradigm and the circular reasoning 
that emerges from its assumptions.
This does not relieve future analyses of colonial and post-colonial phe-
nomena from the obligation to apply a solid economic framework to their 
arguments. By “solid economic framework,” I mean one which takes the 
material base of colonialism and its beneficiaries seriously, adequately 
gets to grips with the economic exploitation of one group by another, and 
avoids mystification of the materialist reality. A mystification which Lazarus 
rightly ascribes to large parts of postcolonial studies (Lazarus 2011a, 17). A 
starting point could be, for instance, the work of economic historians of the 
Ottoman Empire such as Şevket Pamuk, who analyzed the “penetration of 
capitalism into the Ottoman Empire” (Pamuk 1988, 127). As Selim Deringil 
argues, in the wake of the penetration of Western capitalism, the Ottomans 
clearly began to adopt an increasingly “colonial stance toward the peoples 
of the periphery of their empire” (Deringil 2003, 313).
While there has been fundamental criticism before, there is scattered evi-
dence that in the present situation some of postcolonialism’s discontents 
tend to just leave the field behind, arguing for instance that “postcolonial 
studies stressed the importance of ‘othering’ and put the category of differ-
ence in the center of historical analysis. We believe that it is time to go a step 
further” (Rohland 2018). As I will show in the following introduction, the 
thought pattern of “going a step further,” which suggests a new approach 
but leaves untouched or even builds on previous achievements, may be 
problematic in the case of the postcolonial paradigm. Considering the fact 
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that “postcolonial criticism has infiltrated” many contemporary discourses 
and disciplines (Dirlik 1999, 149), the misguidance generated by the post-
colonial paradigm should not be underestimated. As Robert Young put it, 
rejoicing what is in my view anything but a favorable outcome: “Postcolonial 
critique has been so successful that by the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury the concepts and values of postcolonial thought have become estab-
lished as one of the dominant ways in which Western and to some extent 
non-Western societies see and represent themselves” (Young 2016, ix). 
As indicated also by others,5 the postcolonial mainstream has successfully 
ensured that its premises can now be considered more or less accepted far 
beyond the field of postcolonial studies. Indeed, the postcolonial paradigm 
is a prime example for Michel Foucault’s claim that “the discourse” not 
only “makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits 
the other ways in which the topic can be constructed” (Hall 1992, 201; my 
emphasis). The just quoted keywords “othering” and “difference” are fine 
examples of this idea. If not confronted and addressed properly as highly 
problematic, these concepts in all their ideological ramifications may very 
well reassert themselves, sneaking in via the backdoor. Before going a step 
further, it might therefore be appropriate to take a moment as I will in the 
section Towards multidirectional perspectives of this introductory chapter 
to unthink the theoretical assumptions underpinning the postcolonial field, 
particularly those that make an inadequate foundation to build on. I intend 
to illustrate, for instance, in sufficient detail, why the concept of “othering” 
in its present unilateral usage is misleading and why thinking in categories 
of “difference”—instead of “similarities” (Rohland 2018)—contributes to 
a reverse division of the world, rather than serving to improve our under-
standing of it.
While the influence of postcolonial studies on a wider public, academic 
and otherwise, would—and should, actually—be subject to further exami-
nation, in the volume at hand there can be no more than passing references 
to this important issue. However, Dirk Uffelmann’s contribution to this 
book (Chapter 7) introduces a case study from the field of post-Soviet 
postcolonialism that highlights how “postcolonial theory” can serve the 
political objectives of “some contenders in the debates” and “their overt 
or hidden nationalist agendas.” Against the backdrop of this observation, 
Uffelmann considers “postcolonial theory itself, or rather certain modes 
of appropriation of it, as either programmatic promotion or subcutaneous 
practice of postcolonial nationalism” (Uffelmann, Chapter 7). An approach 
so deeply rooted in political ideology, as the postcolonial paradigm is, can 
certainly be used in various ways. For instance, it has often been noted 
that Said’s Orientalism “does nothing to reshape Arab stereotypes of the 
West” but, on the contrary, feeds into a “politics of resentment against 
the West” (Makiya 1993, 319, 317). Moreover, in terms of limiting the 
other ways in which a particular issue can be constructed, scholars from 
various disciplines are beginning to remind us that significant authors have 
6 Monika Albrecht 
been forgotten, as their work fell victim to the dominant position of the 
postcolonial discourse (Osterhammel 2017, 64), and that “the intellectual 
enthusiasm for difference […] has eclipsed many of the questions dealing 
with relations of similarities” (Kirsch 2017, 274). But, the worst aspect of 
this trend and its wider impact is that many critical questions do not seem 
to arise anymore. As the historian Wolfgang Reinhard indicated a few 
years ago, what we mostly find in dealings with issues of colonialism and 
imperialism is “a particular way of thinking and writing about them which 
already produced both effective new bans of thinking and likewise effec-
tive new imperatives” (Reinhard 2010, 25). Essentially, this boils down to 
a major impediment to any serious research. One of the aims of this study 
is to counter this harmful trend and strive for multidirectional perspec-
tives on the colonial past and the neocolonial present, without postcolo-
nial blinkers.
“an episteme centred on ‘western-ness’”
Unlike Lazarus, I believe that the confinement to Western or European 
colonialism and imperialism is at the root of many of the problems of the 
postcolonial mainstream. What sounds like an “Easy Think concept”6 is, 
in fact, a hub from where the entire construct of postcolonial thought 
needs to be reconsidered, from scratch. The conceptual roadblocks which 
the field generates could hardly have come into being if it was not for 
the remarkably reductionist framework at its foundation. The same goes, 
incidentally, for the ostensible alternative approach of the “decolonial 
option,” which may claim “a different lineage to the postcolonial” (Howe 
2013, 162) but quite conventionally relies on well-known postcolonial 
reference points such as “1492,” what is seen as the birth of modernity, 
and the concept of race. And, despite the “perceived difference and dis-
tance from postcolonialism” and its “strategic rejection” by scholars of 
decoloniality (Williams 2010, 88), the purported alternative suffers from 
the same conceptual roadblocks—and that applies, in particular, to the 
double standard prevailing in large parts of postcolonial critique (Albrecht 
2012b),7 for the “Big Bad West” (Narayan 1997a, 136) and for its per-
ceived victims. This double standard is characterized by either a systematic 
avoidance or a whitewashing of any kind of potentially dubious issues. 
Critics of almost everything Western usually have no problem with phras-
ing in a neutral or even approving way when they talk, for instance, about 
Islamic empires. A typical phrasing would be: “Arab armies unified by an 
Islamic ideology […] fashioned an empire that stretched from the Iberian 
Peninsula of contemporary Spain and Portugal to the Western edge of what 
is today Pakistan” (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008, 18). A cross-check 
that describes British, French, Dutch, Belgian, or German imperialism 
and colonialism with the euphemism “fashioning an empire” immediately 
reveals the double standard in this quote. When “colonialism” is framed 
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as “the logic and dynamics of European subjugation and exploitation of 
their overseas spheres of influence” (Krobb, Chapter 5; my emphasis), the 
danger of reverting to the pattern of the postcolonial double standard is 
always present. Due to the infiltration of contemporary thought by post-
colonial tenets, this double standard seems to create a momentum of its 
own. As the example by Gottschalk and Greenberg shows, the mecha-
nisms of this double standard are often evident in the choice of words: 
From Wikipedia to the Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, phrasings 
such as “the Ottoman Empire’s territorial possessions in the Balkans” 
(Robarts 2009, 499) are to be found. These word choices seem to indicate 
a basic acceptance of sorts, that grants the Ottoman Empire what it denies 
the Great European Powers: namely, an entitlement to these “European 
possessions” in the first place. Again, this is of course not to justify in 
retrospect Europe’s own overseas “possessions” but rather to point to the 
general double standard in postcolonial thought: We hesitate to speak of 
“colonial possessions” of the British, French, or Dutch, and rightly so, 
because the evocation today is “illegally obtained possessions.” We can-
not speak of “German South-West Africa” anymore, as the name evokes 
the illegitimacy of German colonial rule. Scholars aware of the pitfalls 
of postcolonial thinking tend to avoid phrasings such as “the Ottoman 
possessions” and rather speak, for instance, of the “Ottoman Empire’s 
European presence” (Krobb, Chapter 5). Can we even innocently speak 
of the “Ottoman Middle East” (Krobb, Chapter 5) on the grounds that—
once conquered—the Middle East became the Empire’s legitimate posses-
sion? Can we just ascribe, say, to the island of Crete the epithet “Ottoman 
Crete,” thereby contributing to the naturalizing of its conquest—and 
ignoring the frequent and numerous revolts, all fierce and bloody, of the 
indigenous people of the island throughout the centuries?8
The most obvious and widespread predicaments of the postcolonial 
paradigm are its double standards and the corresponding unbalance in 
reasoning. Another concern is the sweeping generalizations which occur 
frequently in the work of the postcolonial mainstream. From this perspec-
tive there seems to be, as Lazarus likewise criticizes, “only one kind of 
‘western’ thought […]: Eurocentric, colonising, logocentric, rationalist” 
(Lazarus 2011b, 15). Moreover, the majority of this field tends to assume 
that beneath the “many and manifest differences” in Western thought, the 
“thinkers are unified at the deepest levels by structuring assumptions deriv-
ing from an episteme centred on ‘western-ness’” (Lazarus 2011b, 15f.). 
Predominant in postcolonial studies is indeed a belief in this Foucauldian 
episteme centred on ‘western-ness” while quite often its core idea is also 
psychologically framed as a seemingly unalterable social psychologi-
cal potential of the West. And, as a result, literally everything the West 
brought forth, from colonial atrocities and racism to enlightenment and 
human rights, is considered to be inextricably linked to “western-ness,” 
to a “Western consciousness”(Said 1978, 8), a “colonialist mentality” 
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(Zantop 1997, 4, 14), or, as Lazarus put it elsewhere, an “untranscendable 
horizon governing thought—its forms, contents, modalities, and presuppo-
sitions so deeply and insidiously layered and patterned that they cannot 
be circumvented, only deconstructed” (Lazarus 2011a, 127). When Walter 
Mignolo equates “coloniality” with the “darker side of Western modernity” 
(Mignolo 2011; my emphasis), this sounds also suspiciously like something 
inextricably linked to “the West” and therefore impossible to cast off. A few 
years ago Russell Berman pointed out how mainstream postcolonial schol-
ars jumped from a valid observation to a false inference: from the observa-
tion of a “hypocritical failure” by Western politicians to apply “their own 
stated ideals” to “colonial subjects” to the inference that “those very same 
categories of humanism, liberty, and democracy” were gravely problematic 
in themselves, that “these values were […] carrying a specific internal logic 
that generated imperialist inflections” (Berman 2011, 168f.). The concept of 
humanism in the tradition of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment—John 
Noyes’ concern in the volume at hand (Chapter 2)—is certainly in this sense 
a victim of the postcolonial perspective in that it is likewise considered to be 
intrinsically linked to this “Western-ness.” This also signifies that it is not 
simply ideologically tainted—as such it could become subject to ideology 
critique (Lazarus 2011a, 126). When humanism is like any other creation 
of the West linked to “Western-ness,” there is no way to unearth some-
thing like an original idea of humanism, let alone its positive and utopian 
potential. Therefore, it is only logical that critics like Achille Mbembe want 
to do away with Western humanism altogether and create a completely 
new version. Despite the fact that a relationship between colonialism and 
such Western ideas “was never concretely shown” but “simply assumed 
or asserted” (Howe 2013, 164),9 this general rejection is the fate of many 
other Western ideas. As Neil Lazarus suggests, what “has been fundamen-
tal to postcolonial studies” is “the suggestion that the ‘grand narratives of 
emancipation and enlightenment’ […] are not merely arguable or suscepti-
ble to criticism, but have become definitively obsolete” (Lazarus 2011a, 14; 
emphasis in the original). As Françoise Lionnet (Chapter 3) and Hala Halim 
(Chapter 4) remind us in the volume at hand, more stimulating than to fol-
low postcolonial scholars could be to turn to the theorists and writers of the 
generation of decolonization—to those grounded in narratives of enlighten-
ment and emancipation, since their “writing provides insights that allow us 
to capture the unstable, shaky quality of the ‘human’ across planet Earth” 
(Lionnet, Chapter 3).
What is more, one look over the fence that mainstream postcolonial stud-
ies erects so diligently around the West and its formerly colonized non-
West could have shown innumerable manifestations of “colonial patterns 
of thought” or “colonialist mentalities” and other phenomena, allegedly 
unique to the West, that exist throughout “the rest” of the world. And inter-
estingly, many writers seem to be largely unfazed by postcolonial restric-
tions when they create fictitious colonial settings and use them to negotiate 
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their own post-colonial worldview. In this respect, the novels Dirk Göttsche 
discusses in the volume at hand (Chapter 12) are certainly proof of the valid-
ity of Neil Lazarus’ assertion “that the ‘world’ has to date typically been 
more adequately registered, and rendered, in ‘postcolonial’ literature than 
in postcolonial criticism” (Lazarus 2011a, 36; emphasis in the original). 
As Göttsche shows, Abdulrazak Gurnah juxtaposes “complaints about 
European imperialism” and “criticism of Arab hegemony” and thereby 
creates a more comprehensive picture of a complex colonial world. M.G. 
Vassanji’s novel, likewise, presents as a matter of course an “Indian sense 
of cultural superiority that echoes European colonial attitude” (Göttsche, 
Chapter 12). Regarding the real world, in the volume at hand Benedikts 
Kalnačs discusses “the compatibility of Soviet and Western narratives” of 
colonialism in the aftermath of Soviet “occupation of the independent Baltic 
countries” (Kalnačs, Chapter 14). The wealth of examples in Epp Annus’ 
recent book (2018) and chapter in this volume (Chapter 13) likewise reveals 
the similarity of “Soviet colonial discourses” and that of Western colonizing 
powers. A striking example is Joseph Stalin’s “toast to the Russian people” 
as “the leading people” in which he “positioned all other nations within the 
Soviet bloc in a subordinate position” and codifies the Russians as “essen-
tially more worthy” (Annus, Chapter 13). The same pattern of thought 
that Achille Mbembe calls in the African context “denial of humanity” via 
“attribution of inferiority” (Mbembe 2002, 253), Bruce Masters evinces in 
the context of the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic empires. He states that 
the more or less peacefully living together of Muslims, Christians, and Jews 
only worked out when the “social inferiority of non-Muslims” was not called 
into question. When it was questioned, this often put an end to the fragile 
peaceful coexistence (Masters 2001, 23). In fact, as the historian Norman 
Naimark put it, “Islamic ideology unambiguously proclaimed the inferiority 
of non-Muslim peoples” (Naimark 2002, 19). When the Tanzimat reforms 
of the nineteenth century “abrogated the old laws governing Christian-
Muslim relations at the expenses of Muslim privilege” (Masters 2001, 132), 
one outcome was riots and massacres of minorities in various regions of the 
Ottoman Empire (Sharkey 2017, 146–152; Masters 2001, 130–168). If one 
aims the spotlight merely at the West and its victims, it seems as if, in John 
Noyes’ phrasing in this volume, an “exclusionary concept of the human” 
(Noyes, Chapter 2) is unique to this very West and its systems of thought. If 
one allows a comparative glance at the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic 
empires, it becomes obvious what a remarkably “exclusionary concept of 
the human” for instance the Islamic dhimma system was. The dhimma was 
the political system “which regulated the Muslim community’s relations 
with religious minorities” both prior to and during the time of the Ottoman 
Empire (Soifer 2009, 24). Indeed, being a non-Muslim during Islamic impe-
rialism or the Ottoman Empire, as Peter Mackridge put it, meant “living as 
second-class subjects of a Muslim-dominated empire” (Mackridge 2009, 
44; see also Zelepos 2014, 18).
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Against the backdrop of this wider post-colonial horizon, one cannot help 
but wonder how the idea of “Western-ness” as a kind of Foucauldian epis-
teme that generates both colonial patterns of thought and the correspond-
ing practices could become so convincing for many in the first place. Not 
only is this episteme considered to be the cause of all colonial and imperial 
wrongdoing but also as something that undermines still relevant concepts, 
like emancipation, enlightenment, or humanism, regardless of the dubious 
coalitions these concepts may have formed over the centuries. I deliberately 
use the term “coalitions” because if one thinks in terms of “inextricably” or 
“intrinsically linked” phenomena, the idea of “de-linking” does not seem to 
be an issue, and humanism becomes, like any other Western achievement, 
a part of the problem. Similarly, Russell Berman speaks of “complicity” of 
“reason and knowledge” “in structures of power” instead of inextricable 
links, emphasizing that “such complicity is not at all the whole story, nor 
perhaps even the most important part of it” (Berman 1998, 17). In this spirit, 
the chapter by John Noyes in this volume (Chapter 2) illustrates how one-
sided the previously outlined aspects of predominant postcolonial thought 
are (see also Noyes 2015). However, as Noyes rightly points out, “the ques-
tion of humanism will become more, not less urgent,” not least regarding 
globalization (Noyes, Chapter 2) and, as I will add in the final section of this 
introduction, climate change. The prevailing fields of postcolonial studies 
have inherently, as it were, no productive solution to offer. Except suggest-
ing that the West should pass the baton on to formerly colonized people, 
as if this highly essentialist idea would automatically guarantee the occur-
rence of, say, a new concept of humanism that is completely untainted and 
free of dubious elements. However, once postcolonial roadblocks like the 
one above are cast off, colonial atrocities, injustice, and exclusion are (once 
again) open to genuine political critique. In particular, this critique may 
pose questions of socio-economic exploitation and deal with the beneficiar-
ies and losers on all sides in the colonial and post-colonial world.
Unthinking of postcolonial core premises may, in this sense, entail a revival 
of the term “neocolonialism”—which incidentally has the advantage that it 
brings out the socio-economic hierarchies of the post-colonial world more 
effectively than the term “postcolonialism.” Because one thing should have 
become clear by now: My critique of the postcolonial mainstream is not 
meant as an attempt to relativize any kind of colonial wrongdoing. There is 
no doubt about the tremendous injustice of colonial endeavors and no pos-
sible justification for violence against any people, exploitation of their natural 
and cultural resources, or for the contemporary post-colonial asymmetries 
Reinhart Kößler discusses in this book (Chapter 6). However, it makes a dif-
ference whether one speaks of a “Western consciousness” (Said 1978, 8), 
which brought all these misdeeds about and continues to do so, or if a soci-
ologist like Reinhart Kößler, trained to look at the bigger societal picture, 
speaks, for instance, of “social inequality in Namibia” as “an outflow of a 
specific form of colonial rule that was predicated on the results of the genocide 
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and enhanced further, after the termination of German control, under South 
African rule (1915–1990)” (Kößler, Chapter 6; my emphasis). It makes all 
the difference whether one assumes that the Germans suffer from an a priori 
“colonialist mentality” (Zantop 1997, 4) or, if one investigates, for instance, 
striking examples of “the German discourse on Ottoman space” cognizant 
that these examples are “one specific vector in a multi-directional constella-
tion” (Krobb, Chapter 5). It makes a difference whether someone looks for 
continuities in the “political unconscious of a society” (Zantop 1997, 4) or 
if one speaks of continuities or colonial heritage in terms of “persons who 
played roles both in the genocide and in Nazi Germany” (Kößler, Chapter 6; 
my emphasis). The difference lies in the respective causality underlying the 
argument, one that is interested in political and social facts such as, in the 
example of Kößler, in double perpetrator roles, and another one that takes 
as its point of departure the darkness of a (socio)psychological premise. A 
premise which automatically, as it were, generated the colonial calamity and 
forever and a day will always do so. It is hard to say whether the postcolonial 
grounding in the assumption of a Foucauldian “episteme centred on ‘western-
ness’” or in its social psychological pendant is more counterproductive to 
dealing with colonial and neocolonial issues.
The latter seems all the more dispensable when it operates tacitly or 
expressly with the Freudian concept of the return of the repressed and trans-
fers it to the “collective unconscious” of Western societies (Zantop 1997, 9). 
A metaphysics of sorts, which seems to assume that something is preserved 
in the unconscious of an entire people and will inevitably and incessantly 
reappear. In a somewhat different context, the historian Dominick LaCapra 
offered an unorthodox but more reasonable and interesting application of 
the Freudian concept to the social realm. LaCapra suggests that “any fea-
tures of society deemed desirable must be recurrently rewon, and less desir-
able ones pose a continual threat that reappears in different guises over 
time” (LaCapra 1998, 3). LaCapra seems to have positive achievements, 
such as humanism, in mind, which those who consider them desirable need 
to wrest from those who are, say, perfectly comfortable with a Profit over 
People attitude (to quote the title of a 1999 study by Noam Chomsky). 
One can even go a step further in this line of thinking and assume that 
people with such an attitude, those motivated by profit, may not be driven 
by an innate or inherited “colonialist mentality” or “Western conscious-
ness.” It should be bad enough to imagine that certain people just prefer 
to make a profit out of neocolonial structures and neocolonial exploitation 
of neo-subordinate people. Again, it makes all the difference whether such 
behavior and attitudes are framed as the result of a “collective unconscious” 
or as a conscious choice. What may, from a distant postcolonial point of 
observation, look like the result of a “Western consciousness” then turns 
out to be a deliberate choice of something that is simply deemed desirable 
by someone. The fact that it seemed less desirable by others is disregarded 
in the postcolonial paradigm.
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However, there is another reason why speculation about a “political 
unconscious of a society” or a “colonialist mentality” may be considered to 
be dubious. Namely because, in effect, this leads to the very circular reason-
ing one finds in wide areas of the postcolonial mainstream: a mode of quod 
erat demonstrandum critique that takes for granted beforehand what it then 
claims to explore. Indeed, it is the goal of large parts of postcolonial studies, 
in particular literary studies, to “find” traces of the “colonialist mentality” 
that scholars assume to exist anyway. This kind of reasoning only confirms 
and reproduces premises on which the argument is based in the first place 
(Albrecht 2012b, 100f.; Albrecht 2013, 52; Albrecht 2014b, 443f.). With 
this in mind, it is not without irony that Edward Said claims: “Once we 
begin to think of Orientalism as a kind of Western projection onto and will 
to govern over the Orient, we will encounter few surprises” (Said 1978, 95; 
my emphasis). Indeed, once one puts on the postcolonial-tinted spectacles, 
everything looks postcolonial-tinted.
“as if colonies and empires had existed nowhere else”(1)
In contrast to the postcolonial confinement to the West and its formerly 
colonized non-West, like Philip Carl Salzman, who has noticed the absence 
of “most of world history” in the postcolonial “master narrative” (Salzman 
2008, 244), a handful of scholars refused to yield to the alleged normality 
of the mainstream postcolonial perspective. Over the last few years, these 
scholars have pointed to this astonishing contradiction that is not recog-
nized as contradictory by the dominant discourse. Russell Berman observed 
that “studies of colonialism and empire during recent decades have con-
cerned nearly exclusively the non-European colonial territories of Western 
European powers […], as if colonies and empires had existed nowhere else” 
(Berman 2011, 165; see also Albrecht 2014a, 55). What is more, scholars 
outside the field of postcolonial studies are increasingly inclined to disregard 
the normative postcolonial confinement to the West and are beginning to 
reject the notion of the West as the sole colonizing power, pointing to traces 
of similar phenomena in other areas of the globe. An almost random exam-
ple is a recent observation in the field of archaeology: As Kostis Kourelis, 
an archaeologist of Byzantine settlements and rural landscapes, maintains, 
the “Greek countryside is speckled with grand monuments testifying to 
the robust activities of two colonizing forces emanating from Venice and 
Istanbul” (Kourelis 2014, 199). Other archeologists likewise began to call 
“for an approach that views Greek history as part of wider imperial histo-
ries” (Davis and Davies 2007, 8). In postcolonial studies, by contrast, there 
seems to be a tacit consensus that the inclusion of these and other empires, 
as colonizing powers, is not even up for debate. However, one can argue 
that tacit constraints like these generate academic and political practices, 
practices that help to produce and naturalize the foundations of mainstream 
postcolonial studies.
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A single volume, like the one in hand, cannot cover all areas of the globe 
that could have been addressed. However, this book is unique in that it envi-
sions the post-colonial world as all-inclusive. This volume is the first to open 
a dialogue between three different areas of scholarship, areas which previ-
ously developed in a way that was largely independently from one another: 
the wide field of postcolonial studies working on European colonialism, 
the growing field of post-Soviet postcolonial/post-imperial studies, and the 
still fledgling field of post-Ottoman postcolonial/post-imperial studies. The 
argument for this new way of studying empires is strongly supported by 
Dirk Göttsche’s thorough examination of literary representations “of the 
long history and multi-layered conditions of interaction between (different 
groups of) Africans, Indians, Arabs and Europeans in East Africa and across 
the Indian Ocean” (Göttsche, Chapter 12), as well as by Françoise Lionnet’s 
references to the same Indian Ocean universe (or East Indies) and the West 
Indies (Chapter 3), and Hala Halim’s discussion of Afro-Asian solidarity in 
the writings of Egyptian poets and intellectuals (Chapter 4). At this point, a 
word on the issue of comparability. It is not just mainstream postcolonial stud-
ies that ignore “the Ottoman version of colonialism” (Kechriotis 2015, 70). 
Although there is a clear trend in recent years towards “comparative empires” 
(Mikhail and Philliou 2012, 722), some historians are—although for differ-
ent reasons—still hesitant when it comes to thinking of this empire as a 
colonial power.10 For one thing, it is undoubtedly necessary to take account 
of the differences “between village and town, between center and periph-
ery, and between different periods of Ottoman rule” (Bryant 2016, 13). 
Beyond that, however, the volume at hand is not the place to address histo-
riographical questions in the strict sense. Rather, it strives to open up new 
visions of the colonial past and the neocolonial present. In this volume, 
Gregory Jusdanis poses several of these very questions that get to the heart 
of the matter when mainstream postcolonialism is cross-examined against 
the backdrop of global imperial and colonial histories: “What do we gain by 
expanding the definition of postcolonialism to study a host of nations from 
Albania to Azerbaijan?” “Does it make sense to include Balkan, Baltic and 
Caucasian countries into the postcolonial fold?” “Can we consider Greece a 
postcolonial nation?” (Jusdanis, Chapter 11). At the starting point of these 
questions lies the observation that—at least as far as the experience of colo-
nized people, occupied people, or people who perceived state power as foreign 
or occupant—the Ottoman Empire or the Soviet Empire shares certain char-
acteristics with the simultaneously existing Western Empires. I quoted some 
of them above as manifestations of “colonialist mentalities” of non-Western 
rulers. This volume certainly provides many more examples of this phenom-
enon—a phenomenon which should not actually be so astonishing but is 
made so by decades of postcolonial politics. The result of which is a natural-
ization of a reductionist view on the colonial and post-colonial world. When 
Benedikts Kalnačs reports that the ideology of the Soviet occupiers would 
strive to implement the beginning of their rule in 1940 “as the beginning of 
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history for the Baltic nations” (Kalnačs, Chapter 14), this is reminiscent of 
a familiar mode of re-writing of history. In the case of Western imperial-
ism and colonialism, the construction of the colonized as what the anthro-
pologist Eric Wolf famously called the People Without History (Wolf 1982) 
is the result of such a re-writing. Likewise, instances in which the Soviet rul-
ers showed “little appreciation of the uniqueness of the local environment” 
and drew up plans to restructure it in accordance with their own visions 
and needs (Kalnačs, Chapter 14) seem all too familiar. There are numerous 
other phenomena comparable to those in Western empires. For instance, 
in the area of the colonized or dominated population’s opposition against 
the foreign rule. These cases are particularly remarkable because people in 
the countries of East-Central and of South-Eastern Europe, unlike those in 
Western colonies, “rebelled against an empire that was neither Western nor 
capitalist” (Jusdanis 2011, 110). In the case of the Ottoman Empire, they 
are also remarkable because, as Vangelis Kechriotis put it, we have to ask 
questions about “the implications that Christian subordination to Muslim 
rule could have in terms of colonial mentality” (Kechriotis 2015, 71). At 
any rate, similarity or comparability of these and other phenomena in impe-
rial and colonial situations challenges the master narratives of the postcolo-
nial mainstream and “allows us […] to see particular phenomena as part of 
larger historical processes” (Mikhail and Philliou 2012, 744).
The fields of post-Soviet and post-Ottoman postcolonial/post-imperial 
studies emerged only in recent years. Scholars, working on the so-called suc-
cessor states to the Soviet Union, began to develop a new branch of postco-
lonial studies around the turn of the millennium (Moore 2001). And, while 
they rightly lament that their work is still largely “peripheral to the discipline” 
of mainstream postcolonial studies (Kołodziejczyk and Şandru 2016, 1), 
the amount of work already undertaken in this field is quite impressive. 
As Violeta Kelertas pointed out more than 10 years ago, it was even then 
not a question of “whether postcolonialism fits […], but how it applies in 
the wider context of post-Soviet nations” (Kelertas 2006, 2; emphasis in 
the original). However, when Benedikts Kalnačs situates this expansion in 
the sphere of European internal colonialism, it is important to note that 
he goes beyond previous discussions of intra-continental colonial enter-
prises—discussions, for instance, on the “Inclusion of ‘Poland’ in the Study 
of German Colonialism,” in terms of “Eastern European space that would 
involve the creation of German settlement colonies there” (Kopp 2011, 33). 
This earlier widening of the colonial and post-colonial map remained in 
the unidirectional pattern of the West (Germany in this case) against its 
colonized non-Western victims (Poland in this case). Kalnačs’ reference to 
“discussions of European internal colonialism” in the Baltics, conversely, 
keeps the overlapping layers of experience of the Baltic peoples and their 
“painful relations both with the East and the West” in mind, which is due 
to the “centuries-long presence of foreign rulers” (Kalnačs, Chapter 14)—
from the “Crusaders from the German territories” in the Middle Ages 
and the eighteenth-century “westward expansion of the Russian empire” 
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(Kalnačs 2016, 23f., 28) to, more recently, “half a century of Soviet (and, 
for a short but significant period of time, also Nazi) rule.” He also looks at 
the time since 1990, considering the “re-establishment of the independence” 
the subsequent beginning of “Western neocolonialism […] in the guise of 
global capitalism and neoliberal economics” (Kalnačs, Chapter 14). More 
general, as Dirk Göttsche points out, there seems to be “certain structural 
affinities between the multi-layered conditions of colonialism in East Africa 
resulting from its Indian Ocean connections and the super-imposed colo-
nialisms of the Baltics, of regions of the former Habsburg Empire and the 
Ottoman Empire” (Göttsche, Chapter 12). Like other scholars from East-
Central Europe, Kalnačs is well aware that Soviet colonial and imperial rule 
in the Baltics may, in parts, differ from that of Western colonial rule in, say, 
India or Africa. However, his focus on the various layers of Baltic colonial 
and imperial experience brings out the similarities between these very dif-
ferent kinds of rules and opens mainstream postcolonial studies to larger 
historical processes and shifting colonial attitudes. Moreover, when Kalnačs 
suggests, with Bogdan Ştefănescu (and Epp Annus in this volume, Chapter 
13), that it is more appropriate to “look for structural relationships between 
colonizer and colonized” (Kalnačs, Chapter 14), this widening in terms of 
comparability of colonial/imperial experiences goes a step further. It aims at 
assumptions about these very relationships, that are fundamentally different 
from those developed by the postcolonial mainstream.
Neil Lazarus argues that “the assimilation of ‘post-Soviet’ criticism to 
‘the postcolonial’ is [not] a good idea” because he perceives a “premature 
(if understandable) anti-Marxism” on the side of post-Soviet postcolonial 
scholars (Lazarus 2012, 117). While this may in parts very well be the case, 
it can equally be observed that many scholars from East-Central Europe are 
not so much against a Marxist or socialist worldview but rather critical of 
the colonialist attitudes of the Soviet occupiers towards the people in their 
occupied territories. However, critique that arose from this specific colonial/
imperial experience generates invaluable insights which greatly help to lay 
bare errors in mainstream postcolonial reasoning. Again, there is a world 
of difference between the assumption of a “Western consciousness” (Said 
1978, 8), or a “colonialist mentality” (Zantop 1997, 4, 14), or a colonial 
pattern of thought that, naturally, as it were, leads to colonialism and all that 
it entails (Zantop 1997, 9),11 and the basic premise by Annus and Kalnačs 
that people can “fulfill the function of the colonizer” (Annus, Chapter 13). 
The latter avoids the inescapability that comes from the psychoanalytically 
inflected assumptions or their poststructuralist guises in mainstream post-
colonial scholarship. This allows for critique of colonialism and neocolo-
nialism, which no longer appear to be a kind of original sin of the West 
but, sincerely, as ideology and practice. Just like, say, settlers in the former 
colony German South-West Africa, or Ottoman-Turkish settlers in Anatolia 
after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, “Russian settlers arrived at the 
Baltic shores for any number of reasons—many came in search of a better 
life […]. Yet, en masse, Russian-speaking settlers functioned as colonizers in 
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the eyes of the locals” (Annus, Chapter 13). Without a doubt, as Reinhart 
Kößler states in this volume (Chapter 6), in the African case this very set-
tler colonialism was “predicated on the wholesale expropriation of African 
land” and “the creation of a ‘society of privilege’.” In effect, this led to 
colonial and post-colonial asymmetries (Kößler, Chapter 6). Post-Soviet and 
post-Ottoman conditions may be partly similar and partly different from 
these African conditions. Nevertheless, on a conceptual level, it is of funda-
mental importance to distinguish between the mainstream postcolonial view 
on the colonizer/colonized relationship and the views of Benedikts Kalnačs 
and Epp Annus. They propose one should “understand ‘colonizer’ and 
‘colonized’ as structural positions that refer to the subject’s location within 
the colonial matrix of power” (Annus, Chapter 13). The latter allows for 
the assumption that “such positions get actualized in certain situations, but 
might be deactivated in some others” (Annus, Chapter 13). Florian Krobb, 
despite his focus on German colonial fantasies in the texts he investigates, 
seems to think in a similar direction. The basic prerequisite of his argument 
is that “Germans found themselves on all sides of constellations and argu-
ments, […] assuming a diversity of roles” (Krobb, Chapter 5).
It is in this line of thought that premises long-forgotten—or rather made 
forgotten by normalization strategies of the postcolonial mainstream—
become thinkable again. Is it, for instance, necessarily the case, as Susanne 
Zantop and many others assume, that the historical contingency of living at 
the time of European colonialism as a citizen of a colonizing nation leads to 
something like a “colonialist mentality” (Zantop 1997, 4, 14)?12 In my view, 
this must be answered in the negative (cf. Albrecht 2014b, 447–455). Or, 
regarding the issues John Noyes discusses in this volume (Chapter 2), one 
may take it even a step further and ask: Was it the same person who on one 
day conceptualized the idea of humanism and on the next day stepped on 
board of a vessel and set off on a colonizing enterprise? Following the above 
outlined postcolonial dead-end logic, it would actually make no difference. 
If colonizer and colonized are, by contrast, considered to be structural 
positions, this allows for a de-linking of humanism and colonial atrocities. 
This implies the assumption that colonial atrocities are not “built” on, but 
rather came into being, despite an existing idea of humanism. An idea which 
may or may not have been familiar to “the adventurer and the pirate, the 
wholesale grocer and the ship owner, the gold digger and the merchant,” 
who, according to Aimé Césaire, made up “the decisive actors” of colonial-
ism (Césaire 2000, 33). The “affinity between the imperialist subject and 
the subject of humanism” (Spivak 1996, 210) may not be near as close as 
Gayatri Spivak assumes. In this spirit, it is also quite unlikely that characters 
such as the British colonial soldier on the frontispiece of this volume plun-
dering and carrying Indian treasures away in a big sack—the contribution 
of the German graphic artist and painter A. Paul Weber (1893–1980) to 
the issue of The White Man’s Burden (1939/1940)—gave much thought to 
intellectual currents such as humanism.
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“as if colonies and empires had existed nowhere else” (2)
Another empire that disappeared from the global map at the same time 
as, say, imperial Germany, the Ottoman Empire, had attracted inter-
est from a postcolonial perspective at about the time of the emergence of 
post-Soviet postcolonialism. As before, this interest was not amongst post-
colonial scholars, but in this case, historians working on the nineteenth cen-
tury. Özgur Türesay speaks of a “recent historiographical turn” when the 
Ottoman Empire, too, is “seen through the lens of postcolonial studies” 
(Türesay 2013, i). Some scholars feel that there are good reasons to refer 
to the Ottoman Empire as a colonizing power (Deringil 2003, 313), at least 
regarding parts of the time period that Edward Said so diligently shields 
(I shall return to this later in this section). However, the handful of scholars 
who currently make up this field13 share the fate of post-Soviet postcolo-
nial scholars, as they are being ignored by the postcolonial mainstream. In 
the case of the Ottoman Empire, although it was “a polity that existed for 
over six centuries and that ruled on three continents” (Mikhail and Philliou 
2012, 475), and despite the fact that it “covered a huge geography until its 
last days” (Deringil 2003, 313), it is usually cast as the classical territory 
of “orientalism” (Adamson 2005, 362; Said 1978, 60 and passim): “the 
Orient that Orientalism proclaimed, the region par excellence of Orientalist 
interaction, desire, and meaning-making” (Krobb, Chapter 5). However, 
as the historian Selim Deringil pointed out 15 years ago, the study of the 
Ottoman Empire likewise “presents fruitful challenges to any student of 
colonialism and postcolonialism” (Deringil 2003, 313). Today it is most 
likely that historians will follow this path. Not too long ago, “the Ottoman 
Empire was still considered to be an incommensurable and incompatible 
empire—so different as to be a freak among history’s other states.” By now, 
there has been “an enormous historiographical pendulum swing” and “the 
name of the game” is now “comparative empires” (Mikhail and Philliou 
2012, 742f., 722).
On the surface, it is not that clear why the postcolonial mainstream 
abstains from a critical analysis of Islamic imperialism. After all, as Gregory 
Jusdanis in this volume reminds us, the fall of Constantinople took place in 
1453. In the same century, the postcolonial calendar starts with “the cata-
clysmic moment summoned up by the various ‘1492s’—that is, the conquest 
of the ‘new’ world, the expulsion of the Moors, and the Inquisition” (Stam 
and Shohat 2012, 373). The conquest of Constantinople, the capital of the 
Byzantine Empire, by the invading Ottoman army of Sultan Mehmed II on 
May 29, 1453 is one of the major events that disappears in the postcolonial 
version of world history: as does the subsequent domination over south-
eastern Europe, the Middle East, and beyond. What is more, the Ottoman 
Empire and the Western Empires co-existed from the fifteenth century to the 
heyday of Western colonialism in the nineteenth century and to the dissolu-
tion of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century. These and other 
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Islamic empires have also been linked through movement of people and 
a network of trade relations (Masters 2001, 68–80, 116–121, 141–145). 
They are also linked in their involvement in slave trade. As the Senegalese 
anthropologist Tidiane N’Diaye points out in his study on The Muslim Slave 
Trade in Africa, another blind spot on the mainstream postcolonial map, 
the Arabic slave trade lasted three times as long as the transatlantic trade 
and claimed a multitude of victims (N’Diaye 2010, 12). After the end of 
Ottoman rule, in the various parts of its former territory, a process started 
which Eyal Ginio and Karl Kaser refer to as “de-Ottomanisation” (Ginio 
and Kaser 2013, 3 and passim). A process that reminds one of what (in 
the title of a 1994 essay collection) the Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o 
famously called Decolonising the Mind. For the people in the Balkans, for 
instance, this process included “the attempt to disassociate themselves from 
what they regarded as an era characterized by Oriental backwardness and 
oppressive foreign rule.” People in “the Middle Eastern countries” likewise 
“perceived the Ottoman rule as a foreign domination that suppressed the 
Arab lands” and thus after the dissolution of the empire “underwent a trou-
blesome process of being colonized, de-colonized and then having to define 
their positions in a post-colonial world” (Ginio and Kaser 2013, 3).
As implied above, one of the reasons, if not the primary reason for the 
remarkable neglect of the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic empires in the 
postcolonial mainstream, can be traced back to Edward Said’s Orientalism. 
With this study, Said managed to turn the respective parts of the world, his 
“Orient,” into a protected and uncriticizable area (Albrecht 2019). If he 
mentions the existence of the Ottoman Empire at all, it does not appear as 
a political power. According to Said, it was “Islam” and not the Ottoman 
Empire which was “in many ways” for Europe “a real provocation” in 
the centuries leading up to the eighteenth century (Said 1978, 74). Like an 
eighteenth- or nineteenth-century Ottoman chronicler who would record 
the victorious outcome of a battle in the manner of: “Then God gave victory 
to Islam,”14 Edward Said does not speak of Ottoman rulers and their armies 
who conquered a huge territory in southeastern Europe and the Middle East. 
For Said, it was “Islam” that “could boast of unrivaled military and politi-
cal successes” (Said 1978, 74). Even more important in regards to the neces-
sary critique of Orientalism is Said’s consistent focus on a historical event 
which constitutes one of the cornerstones of his own period of investigation: 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt. First of all, in his view, the impact of the 
Empire on the European history—in his words the “trauma” of “Islam”—
lasted only “until the end of the seventeenth century” (Said 1978, 59). Here 
he refers to the second—and like the first of 1529, unsuccessful—Siege of 
Vienna in 1683. According to Orientalism, from the end of the eighteenth 
century until its end in the early twentieth, the Ottoman Empire consist-
ently holds the role of the victim of Western powers. In so doing, Said sug-
gestively rewrites history and styles Napoleon’s short Egyptian campaign 
(1798–1801) as the beginning of the European colonization of the entire 
 Introduction 19
“Orient.” Based on these historical distortions, there is no need to address 
the Ottoman Empire as a political power for his period of investigation.
Said’s idiosyncratic representations of history can be found in numerous 
vague allusions inside and outside the study. For instance, when Said indi-
cates in an interview in 1996 that the “period of imperialism” in the Middle 
East begins “with the conquest of Egypt by Napoleon” (Said 2004, 268), or 
when he suggests in the afterword of the German translation of Orientalism 
that “modern imperialism in the Orient since Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign 
two hundred years ago continues to the present day” (Said 2009, 411). Most 
historians see things differently, specifically that the Ottoman Empire was 
“in the unique position of being both a member of the Concert of Europe 
and the object of European imperial designs” (Minawi 2016, 9). As Efraim 
and Inari Karsh point out: “Even at the weakest point in their modern his-
tory, during the First World War and in its immediate wake, Middle Eastern 
actors were not hapless victims of predatory imperial powers but active 
participants in the restructuring of their region” (Karsh and Karsh 1999, 2). 
Moreover, “in the century or so between Napoleon’s conquest in the Middle 
East and World War I, the Ottomans embarked in an orgy of bloodletting 
in response to the nationalist aspirations of their European subjects”; and 
“such violence” was not “confined to Ottoman Europe” (Karsh 2008, 125). 
More recent research even unveiled the involvement of the Ottoman Empire 
“in the late nineteenth-century colonial expansion in Africa”—the Ottoman 
Scramble for Africa is what the historian Mostafa Minawi calls it—which 
challenges “the perception of the European powers as the sole agents of 
change on the global stage” (Minawi 2016, xiv). Indeed, representatives of 
the Ottoman Empire joined those of the European countries and the USA 
when Chancellor Otto von Bismarck invited the players in the power strug-
gle of the time to the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884–1885 (Albrecht 
2012a, 365).15 Although, as Minawi suggests, this was a “daring move for 
the empire,” “Istanbul used the Act of Berlin as a tool to assert itself as also 
legally entitled to colonies in Africa well beyond Libya” (Minawi 2016, 9). 
These examples show how distorted the picture of the Ottoman Empire is in 
Edward Said’s Orientalism. Nevertheless, this study decisively contributed 
to the fact that, from a postcolonial perspective, this empire is not being 
perceived as an imperial or colonial power. And four decades of postcolo-
nial studies after Orientalism has effectively protected the “Orient” from a 
critical analysis of its imperial or colonial history.
Illuminated in this way, the example of the Ottoman Empire given above 
shows another way in which the normalization of the postcolonial view and 
its confinement to Western or European colonialism and imperialism came 
into being. Specifically, this came about by actively excluding large territo-
ries, like post-imperial Greece, “the first independent successor-state to the 
Ottoman Empire” (Philliou 2008, 670; see also Osterhammel 2009, 587). 
However, in Greece, for a long time the most commonly used term of 
periodization for the five centuries of Ottoman presence was τουρκοκρατία 
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(Turkish domination). Moreover, for the Greek terms τουρκικός ζυγός or 
τουρκική δουλεία (Turkish yoke or slavery), “incidentally, analog terms are 
to be found in all other languages of southeastern Europe” (Helmedach 
et al. 2014, 15f.; see also Milosević 2011, 73). This is certainly not to sug-
gest that Ottoman rule in Southeastern Europe must be seen as one long 
history of continuous tyranny (Lauer and Majer 2014, 1). Moreover, terms 
like “Turkish yoke” are nowadays often dismissed as outdated, merely 
associated with “conventionalist historiography” (Şenişik 2011, 5). The 
“Turkish yoke” is considered to be a product of nineteenth-century nation-
alism and, by extension, is considered by many as “responsible for the most 
odious crimes” (Jusdanis 2011, 3).16 But whatever may hold true of these 
assumptions, as a general attitude they seem to bring about shortsighted 
questions. Pinar Şenişik, in her discussion of Cretan revolts, for instance, 
wonders “what made the Cretan Christians decide to sacrifice their lives 
or ‘willingly to die’ in the so-called ‘nationalist liberation struggle’ for an 
abstract entity, or an ‘imagined community’” (Şenişik 2011, 9). The focus 
on the nation—with or without Benedict Anderson’s renowned trope—as 
the alleged single goal, desire, and pursuit makes one forget that these strug-
gles were not only for something, and maybe not even primarily. Quite 
clearly, the strugglers also strived to free themselves from something—from 
state power perceived as foreign, as occupant, or for some as a “yoke.” 
In discussions on decolonization or struggles against European colonizers, 
this from is taken very seriously. No one would assume that, say, African 
resistance fighters caught nationalism like a disease. Rather, post-colonial 
independent nation–states in the literature often appear to be a by-product, 
produced by the fight for freedom from a colonial yoke. It is only fair to 
assume that Ottoman subjects, likewise, may have had an interest in freeing 
themselves from something—for instance, from “the subordinate political 
and social position” they were facing as “non-Muslims within the Ottoman 
reality” (Shirinian 2017, 12). The classic novel by Níkos Kazantzákis about 
the 1889 upheaval on the island of Crete against Ottoman rule is, after all, 
not entitled “Nation or Death.” It instead follows a leitmotif of the novel 
and in the reality of the revolts, Freedom or Death.17
A difficult relationship: Postcolonial studies and 
Islamic empires
In decades of mainstream postcolonial studies, it did not seem logical to 
anyone to analyze Kazantzákis’ post-Ottoman novel Freedom or Death 
from a postcolonial perspective. It was, rather, necessary to cast off much of 
the unnecessary postcolonial baggage in order to make a fresh start in this 
direction (cf. Albrecht 2019). As for the postcolonial mainstream, however, 
it is striking that—if the issue of the Ottoman or other Islamic Empires is 
touched upon at all—the kind of criticism that postcolonial studies oth-
erwise considers its task is conspicuously absent. Robert Young revives 
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old myths that contemporary historiography has long abandoned, namely 
the myth “of equitable relations between different communities, different 
people living in the same place, tolerating each other’s differences” (Young 
2012, 32). As pointed out above, most historians draw quite a different 
picture of the reality of non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire. While 
from today’s perspective some hope to find tolerance in the Ottoman and 
other Islamic rule, historians emphasize that those who were dominated 
by the Islamic conquerors had to pay a high price for the putative “living 
peaceably together” (Young 2012, 32). Historians therefore warn against 
a perpetuation of the myth of the relatively harmonious coexistence of dif-
ferent ethnic groups during the Ottoman empire (Reinkowski 2011, 29ff; 
Sharkey 2017, 39). In contrast, the anthropologist Robert Hayden and the 
historian Timothy Walker have developed a more suitable term for the phe-
nomenon in question, which they call “antagonistic tolerance.” This con-
cept implies that “there is ‘tolerance’ in the Lockean sense, of enduring the 
presence of the other but not embracing it, so long as one group is clearly 
dominant over others” (Hayden and Walker 2013, 399, 402). And, such 
tolerance only “perdures as long as one group has clear dominance over 
another” (Bryant 2016, 5).
Before I further discuss the difficult relationship between the postcolonial 
mainstream and Islamic empires, a more general note on criticism directed 
against such empires. For reasons which may very well have to do with the 
infiltration of public and academic discourses with postcolonial thought, 
it appears to be often problematic in this day and age to even touch upon 
issues concerning the Muslim world. And, the number of contemporaries 
who strive to ensure that it also remains this way is considerable. When the 
editor of the reputable Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies gener-
ously allows a contributor to equate a transfer of “critique of imperialism 
onto imperial Islam” (that is, what the chapter in hand advocates) with 
“neoconservative discourse” (Sayyid 2013, 130f.), it would seem appro-
priate to make clear, first of all, that there are well-founded and different 
opinions in this regard. To begin with, this equation seems to be an all too 
transparent strategy: Place oneself on the prevailing side of the interpreta-
tion monopoly by denoting the mere posing of undesirable questions as a 
dubious endeavor. This is not only mere political rhetoric, far removed from 
evidence-based scholarship; it also reveals a kind of imagination in which 
there is no room for both a critique of the Ottoman or Islamic empires 
and of the Western empires alike. The same lack of imagination is dem-
onstrated by the vague indication that any discussion of Islamic imperial-
ism inevitably joins “the contemporary polemics of the place of Islam and 
Muslims in the world” (Sayyid 2013, 136f.). When the historian Wolfgang 
Reinhard observed that “both effective new taboos of thought and like-
wise effective new imperatives” are nowadays at work (Reinhard 2010, 25), 
one can’t help but think of this article. In a recent interview, the Algerian 
writer Boualem Sansal speaks of a kind of internalized censorship: “Even in 
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Europe, freedom of speech is not worth much when it comes to Islam. The 
mere mention of the term stifles any discussion from the outset, or heads in 
the direction of phrases and platitudes of the politically correct” (quoted 
in Radisch 2016). The historian of religion Kristin Skottki called attention 
to the fact that these taboos and imperatives are not only an obstacle to 
a lively culture of disputes necessary for any society but also detrimental 
to academic research. She pointed out that on the one hand, “few topics 
of historical research are as important and topical as the relationship […] 
between the so-called West and the so-called Islamic world,” but on the 
other hand, that those who want to conduct research on this issue experi-
ence great difficulty these days due to “emotional responses” to their work 
and the “contemporary political climate” (Skottki 2015, 11). Against this 
backdrop, I would like to underline that the aim of the chapter in hand, 
as well as my chapter in this volume (Chapter 10), is not meant as a one-
sided approval to populist critique of Islam or Muslims. It is intended as a 
critical academic discussion, of both Ottoman or Islamic empires and of the 
Western empires. As postcolonial mainstream scholars do not seem to feel 
responsible for it, this discussion is all the more necessary.
Apart from Robert Young’s revival of the myth of equitable relations 
and tolerance, two other ventures into Ottoman or Islamic imperialism 
from inside of the postcolonial and decolonial mainstream, respectively, 
have been produced. Both are in The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial 
Studies, and both ensure that the reverse division of the world is being 
restored, even by way of discussing Islamic imperialism. Walter Mignolo 
adds another proposition to the existing explanations for the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire and implicitly blames the Western logic of colonial-
ity for its “downturn” (Mignolo 2013, 115). The partisanship and dou-
ble standard also in his approach becomes quite clear when he states that 
“the colonial matrix of power” turned the “most refined of people” into 
“the ‘characterless’ European Turks” (Mignolo 2013, 114f). Salman Sayyid 
strongly discourages his readers, on shaky grounds, from dealing with 
Islamic imperialism in the first place.18 One of the main arguments of the 
latter is that Islamic empires and Western empires are simply not compa-
rable, “that empires founded in the wake of Europe’s appropriation of the 
Americas were organized by different logics than previous empires” (Sayyid 
2013, 136; my emphasis). Strictly speaking, this argument would keep the 
option open to make at least Islamic empires subject to the comparative 
critique which existed parallel to European imperialism since Columbus and 
the fall of Constantinople. However, it is obvious that the author intends 
to blur the role of Islamic imperialism, questioning whether it was a serious 
agent, as Edward Said did before. According to Sayyid, the crucial differ-
ence is that European empires were built on a “logic of racism” (Sayyid 
2013, 136), while the Islamic empires were not—they “were not structured 
around a logic of racialization” (Sayyid 2013, 135). He even goes a step 
further and boldly claims that the “articulation of Islam and empire was a 
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historical relationship, not an essential or necessary one” (Sayyid 2013, 136). 
Therefore, overtly implying that a racist “core” may be assumed to be inher-
ent to European empires. Even if we let this slide, the argument is based on 
an idea of “race” and “racism” as exclusively modern European concepts, 
and as such, they are not to be confused with any other forms of racism pre-
sent in other parts of the world. This modern conceptualization of racism 
should also not be confused with that of premodern times—no matter how 
similar the respective phenomena may look.
This understanding of racism seems to be the dominant one. Many schol-
ars still tend to regard it as “anachronistic to identify racism in the pre-
modern European world” (Loomba 2009, 502). However, Ania Loomba 
alerted us to how “narrow” this “understanding of race” actually is, and 
although this conceptualization of race has certainly been successful, it 
has also shut down important discussions. For example, for most of the 
time scholars considered it out of the question to address “caste exploita-
tion in India” “as a form of racism” (Loomba 2009, 502). This “denial 
of comparison between race and caste” (Loomba 2009, 511), not only in 
mainstream postcolonial scholarship but also in adjacent disciplines, is only 
one clear illustration of a restricted view of racism. A view that is not able 
to see the overlaps between “racial ideologies across temporal and spatial 
boundaries” as well as “between the discourse of faith and that of the body” 
(Loomba 2009, 501, 507). I cannot go into detail on this highly illuminating 
paper, which strives to “retheorize the idea of racial difference in a much 
more radical way” than other approaches before (Loomba 2009, 508); it 
may suffice to join Loomba’s warning against “the intellectual and political 
pitfalls of a mechanical insistence on the uniqueness of different racial for-
mations” (Loomba 2009, 510). Interestingly, Anil Bhatti—in his promotion 
of the concept of “similarity” as an alternative to thinking in the category 
of “difference” (I shall return to this in the following section)—likewise dis-
cerns such overlaps between “racial ideologies across temporal and spatial 
boundaries” (Loomba 2009, 501). Bhatti does so when he refers to both 
racism and the “brutal form of systematic exclusion of the dalits (the so-
called ‘untouchables’) in the Hindu caste system” as a result of a “denial 
of similarity” (Bhatti 2017, 10). The ascription in Sayyid’s paper of “rac-
ism” solely to the West, in contrast, once again fits the binary postcolonial 
logic of colonizer versus colonized and confirms a unidirectional concept 
that neither provides for reverse “othering” nor reverse racism. In the real 
world, past and present, there is no shortage of evidence for reverse racisms 
of various kinds. In this respect, writers tend to be largely unimpressed by 
the peculiar postcolonial line of thought19 when they create characters in 
a complex colonial setting. As Dirk Göttsche observes in M.G. Vassanji’s 
novel, “racism is not restricted to the attitude of the Germans and British 
towards their colonial subjects”; rather, “European racism in the perception 
of the colonized is” for instance “replicated in the Indians’ racist percep-
tions of black Africans” (Göttsche, Chapter 12). As a more general note 
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to Salman Sayyid’s weird insistence on racism as an exclusively Western 
trait, it seems also adequate to remember that—regardless which logic may 
be behind “humiliation or violation of the subject people” (Sayyid 2013, 
135)—the effects of imperial or colonial rule may feel the same in the first 
place. It is irrelevant to the outcome whether subject people were humiliated 
or massacred because of a “logic of racism” or for some other reason.
For those who look at the Ottoman Empire or other Islamic empires in 
the hope to find models of peaceful coexistence for contemporary multi-
cultural societies, it may be disappointing to realize that they have fallen 
into a trap of wishful thinking. Regarding the popular Córdoba myth, for 
instance, the historian David Nirenberg pointed out: “Though there is no 
reason why convivencia need designate only harmonious coexistence, it has 
in fact acquired this meaning among certain historians who have romanti-
cized the concept” (Nirenberg 1996, 8). Indeed, there is a “growing unease 
among historians” about this concept of convivencia (Soifer 2009, 20) and, 
in general, as Ato Quayson pointed out, there are really no grounds any-
more for suggesting “that Islamic societies both now and in the past have 
developed highly sophisticated models of tolerance” (Quayson 2012, 367). 
Similarly disappointing in the context of the “current popular nostalgia 
for a multicultural past” (Bryant 2016, 6) may be the observation that at 
closer look, this tolerance, in fact, resembles indifference. That the “far-
reaching and well-attested autonomy of the Christian and Jewish commu-
nities within the Muslim state had as its main reason the simple fact that 
the Muslim subjects, too, were mainly left to their own devices” (Goitein 
1970, 105). Postcolonial scholars who strive to “draw moral and politi-
cal lessons” for instance “from the Medieval Spanish experience” (Soifer 
2009, 20) are running late. Moreover, the misconception of an inherent 
Islamic tolerance can “easily be refuted, not just by pointing out egregious 
examples of intolerance” but also by emphasizing a fact that, following 
Quayson, is simultaneously highly interesting for a comparative glance at 
the experience of colonized or otherwise subordinated people: “All religions 
of the Book (Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) […] instill a sense of privi-
lege that depends simultaneously on a process of the othering of nonbeliev-
ers. […] This infernal dialectical carousel of religious Self and unbelieving 
Other is […] further complicated when the unbeliever also happens to be 
culturally or racially different from the believer” (Quayson 2012, 367). The 
role of Christianity as a source of the justification of the European colo-
nizers’ alleged superiority is already well-researched and recognized in this 
sense. It is important to note, however, that Quayson does not suggest that 
religion as such is the source of all possible tensions and conflicts. Rather, 
he suggests that “religions of the Book […] instill a sense of privilege” in 
their followers (Quayson 2012, 367; my emphasis). A sense of privilege that 
is also characteristic for the followers of certain world views such as the 
Nazi ideology. And, quite obviously, even the socialist worldview—despite 
its commitment to fundamental values such as equality, social justice, and 
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solidarity—likewise did not prevent Soviet colonizers from developing a 
similar sense of privilege, a privilege that erroneously lead them to assump-
tions such as “the Russian people” should be “the leading people” (Annus, 
Chapter 13). There is ample evidence that these patterns are to be found also 
in the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic empires. And, in this spirit, Bruce 
Masters can compare what seems to be, in one case, an outbreak of religious 
separatism and, in the other, a racial conflict: There were nineteenth-century 
riots and violence against Christians and Jews in Aleppo and Damascus 
in the wake of the Tanzimat reforms, and there were riots in New York 
at about the same time against just “freed” African Americans. However, 
both groups were struggling over privileges: “Both groups had historically 
been viewed as subordinate in terms of the politically dominant group and 
both were now enjoying, or about to enjoy, emancipation of sorts” (Masters 
2001, 165f.).
Scholars working on subject areas beyond the familiar postcolonial ter-
ritory could or, rather, should have yielded valuable knowledge to contrib-
ute to the development of a post-colonial paradigm. Their work can help 
to envision new perspectives on the colonial past, the neocolonial present, 
and a post-postcolonial future. In recent historiography on the Ottoman 
Empire, for instance, there seems to be a trend to no longer conceal the 
very features of relations between Islamic rulers and their respective subject 
people that make them comparable to relations of Western colonizers and 
non-Western colonized. In her study on Muslims, Christians, and Jews in 
the Ottoman Empire, Heather Sharkey cites an abundance of revelatory and 
enlightening examples of social and political practices and conditions that 
are likewise conceivable in classic European colonial situations. To begin 
with and on the macro level, “the Ottoman state was unexceptional in its 
use of violence for asserting and preserving the empire” (Sharkey 2017, 65; 
emphasis in the original). On the meso and micro level of institutions and 
social action, examples which allow for comparisons are numerous. If, for 
instance, “many Muslim jurists assessed the compensatory price for a killed 
Christian or Jew at two thirds or half of the price of a Muslim” (Sharkey 
2017, 43), this is hardly evidence of “equitable relations” (Young 2012, 32). 
Rather, this example evokes the manner Western colonizers treated colo-
nized people, as a less valued group or as subhumans. And, not just Germans 
would cringe to learn that, in various instances over the centuries, distinctive 
marks were required by the Ottomans, to create “tangible or visible differ-
ences” between Muslims and non-Muslims—such as “colored buttons for 
Christians (blue) and Jews (yellow)” (Sharkey 2017, 49, 56). Dress codes 
in the Ottoman Empire were modes of maintaining the social hierarchies: 
“Up to the reforms of Sultan Mahmut II (ruled 1808–1839), non-Muslims 
were required to dress differently from Muslims, to make their inferior sta-
tus instantly recognizable. […] In the Ottoman concept of the social and 
political order, the non-Muslim subjects had their assigned place” (Shirinian 
2017, 20f.). Reading these and other studies on the Ottoman Empire and 
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other Islamic empires against the backdrop of “key themes and concepts” of 
postcolonial studies, such as “structures of exclusion/inclusion” or “struc-
tures of othering and representations of difference” (Kołodziejczyk and 
Şandru 2016, 1), one cannot help but see the same patterns that likewise 
structure the societies colonized by Western powers.
At least for “the period prior to the modern one (roughly the sixteenth to 
eighteenth centuries),” by most historical accounts, “difference was a given 
and accepted as such” in the Ottoman Empire. What we find in this period 
is “the near lack of any political will to transform the ‘difference’ into ‘same-
ness’” (Rodrigue 1996). If this conjures up associations of pre-Enlightenment 
Europe, observations like these and their potential consequences for thinking 
about colonial and imperial differences do not seem to play a role in main-
stream postcolonial studies. Moreover, as the cultural anthropologist Rebecca 
Bryant indicated, “we still lack sufficient means to understand how those who 
lived at the time perceived these differences” (Bryant 2016, 14). And, this is 
not the only difficulty scholars face when dealing with past societies. Another 
issue is “our own contemporary inability to conceptualize difference beyond 
‘identity’” (Bryant 2016, 6). But, do we actually know how differences were 
perceived, say, in everyday life in a British or French colony? Again, this is 
not to deny any kind of cruelty present in what has been called colonial dif-
ference. This is just to underline that mainstream postcolonial studies seems 
to place itself outside such considerations—or at least according to Homi 
Bhabha, the field quite simply “insists that cultural and political identity are 
constructed through a process of alterity” (Bhabha 1994, 175). This is a gen-
eralization that Neil Lazarus already dismissed as one of postcolonial studies’ 
“presumptive universalism[s] without empirical warrant” (Lazarus 2011a, 
32f.). Postcolonial scholars take the colonial difference for granted and gloss 
over what they refuse to acknowledge. As the examples of mainstream post-
colonial approaches to the Ottoman and other Islamic Empires presented in 
this section show, these contributions seem to be too occupied with protect-
ing the “Orient” from criticism to be of use for a comparative discussion of 
colonial or imperial differences and similarities.
Towards multidirectional perspectives
The potential of generating new knowledge and multidirectional post- 
colonial perspectives, by including territories other than those covered by 
the postcolonial mainstream, seems to be obvious. Both the Ottoman Empire 
and the Soviet Union—although different from the Western empires and 
colonies with different economic, political, and social ways of organizing 
populations and thus bringing about different experiences of subalternity—
are in other ways absolutely comparable to Western empires. However, the 
customary colonial opposition is between a “civilized metropolis and bar-
baric or primitive periphery” (Račevskis 2006, 166). By contrast, people for 
instance in the Baltic countries considered themselves European and their 
 Introduction 27
Soviet occupiers “barbaric,” echoing the widespread stereotype of “Russian 
cultural inferiority” (Uffelmann 2013, 112). We find a similarly reverse 
pattern in the European Ottoman territories, where people likewise fought 
(and still do so) internal struggles of European vs. non-European identity 
constructions. In Ottoman-occupied Greece, “Greek intellectuals, poets, 
and merchants thought of themselves as culturally superior to their impe-
rial masters” (Jusdanis 2011, 110f.). This feeling, as the chapter by Yannis 
Papadopoulos (Chapter 8) in the volume at hand shows, after the expulsion 
and population exchange of the early twentieth century, increased. Greek 
refugees transferred their feeling of superiority to their compatriots and felt 
that they should “inoculate mainland Greece with their superior European 
values” (Papadopoulos, Chapter 8). In Turkey, at the same time, after the 
ethnic cleansing, as the historian Matthias Bjørnlund reminds us, the Young 
Turk’s nation-building “was through […] a process that required the rewrit-
ing of history and the definition of non-Turks [Ottoman minorities] as the 
Other” (Bjørnlund 2008, 45). What stands out, then, is the role reversal of 
“Europeans” vs. “Orientals.” The crucial difference between the mainstream 
postcolonial view, with its focus on the Western colonial and imperial pow-
ers and a framework extended to other parts of the world, is that the latter 
brings out conditions which are reverse to those assumed in the postcolo-
nial view. Taken seriously and thought through, these phenomena deprive 
postcolonial scholarship of one of its main premises from its formative dec-
ades: What is considered to be the epitome of coloniality, also known as 
“the moral economy of the Occident” (Chambers 2017, 1), can likewise be 
found elsewhere, outside of the usual postcolonial map. The just outlined 
reverse “othering” of the colonizers, by the colonized, is certainly not envis-
aged in the postcolonial mainstream. The idea and notion of “othering” “was 
coined by Gayatri Spivak for the process by which imperial discourse creates 
its ‘others’” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2013, 188; cf. Spivak 1985, 252 
and passim). It detailed processes of differentiation by which the presumed 
superior culture of the colonizer experiences a clear upward revaluation and 
the culture of the colonized is marked as inferior and uncivilized. In light of 
the innumerable cases of reverse “othering” that can be found in a wider 
colonial and imperial horizon, this concept of “othering” of Spivakian prov-
enance actually collapses. Apparently, postcolonial theory, while generating 
this central concept of othering,” came across a well-known “general princi-
ple on the construction of cultural identity” (Polaschegg 2005, 38). Yet, as it 
consistently ignores non-Western colonial and imperial situations, it took it 
mistakenly for a “specific of the West” (Polaschegg 2005, 38; my emphasis). 
As it seems, this central concept of mainstream postcolonial thought is based 
on a misconception. For some peculiar reason, though, this idea of “other-
ing” was particularly successful: This “dichotomous thought has become an 
incredible powerful and orthodoxy-forming standard description of other-
ing” (Osterhammel 2017, 64). Therefore, it has helped “to displace questions 
of inequality, class, and class conflict” (Parry 2012, 348).
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Interestingly, there are postcolonial critics who actually do not seem to 
have any problem with the idea of reverse “othering.” Although, this aspect 
of their work is virtually unknown. The philosopher Uma Narayan, for 
instance, not only stands in the shadow of central stars such as Gayatri 
Spivak or Homi Bhabha,20 but is also usually being allocated in a field more 
convenient to the postcolonial mainstream. She is labeled as an Indian 
scholar, in the familiar group of those who criticize white feminists for uni-
versalizing their issues as “women’s issues.” However, Narayan clearly saw 
that, in the context of British colonialism in India, this revaluation of one’s 
own and the related devaluation of the other culture and society was not 
confined to one side of the colonial divide. Those colonized by the British—
hardly surprisingly, if it was not for the successful infiltration of logical 
reasoning with reductionist postcolonial tenets—likewise insisted on differ-
ence and being different. And, in turn, also revalued their own culture and 
insisted on their superior otherness. While on a political and economic level, 
the colonial situation was an unequal power relation between colonizer and 
colonized, what could simultaneously be found on an interpersonal level 
was a “shared insistence on the ‘Otherness’ of the other culture” (Narayan 
1997b, 402). Cultural difference was, on both sides, considered to be tanta-
mount to cultural superiority. It would be interesting to learn how scholars 
of the “decolonial option,” who insist that it is “the logic of coloniality” 
which translates “differences into values” (Mignolo 2011, xxvii) would 
explain that the “logic” of the colonized brings out basically the same pat-
tern. Reverse “othering” helped colonized Indians, amongst other things, to 
cope with the strains and mental stress of colonial rule—by differentiating 
and distancing themselves from the culture and society of the colonizer, 
or, as Narayan puts it, what happened was an “inverting [of] the colonial-
ist contempt for indigenous cultures into a contempt for the culture of the 
colonizers” (Narayan 1997b, 402). This observation of reverse “othering” 
flips the concept and reveals—just like the examples of reverse “othering” 
by subject people of the Soviet and Ottoman Empires—its one-sidedness. 
This brings to light how misleading this concept of “othering” is in its pre-
sent unilateral usage.
What is more, as Albrecht Koschorke recently put it: “The high regard for 
heterogeneity, difference and hybridity is plagued by the decisive weakness 
that it only seeks to invert the importance of powerful dichotomies, while 
leaving the dichotomous pattern as such untouched” (Koschorke 2017, 
25). A “weakness,” though, which due to widespread acceptance allows 
postcolonial critics to turn the tables and confidently operate with the dou-
ble standard described above. One could, however, assess this “high regard 
for heterogeneity, difference and hybridity” at its roots as an “othering” of 
sorts. Specifically in that, in order to acknowledge and appreciate the other, 
the other “must first be declared to be an other; she/he must to a certain 
extent be made different.” However, in order to achieve and maintain this 
positive othering and revaluation, a “significant cultural effort” is necessary. 
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And, according to Koschorke, the “postcolonial discourse has tended to 
dramatize the experience of being other” (Koschorke 2017, 25f.; emphases 
in the original). Against this background,21 Anil Bhatti and others empha-
size the need to turn to an alternative category or concept of thinking in 
terms of similarities. This is a concept that Koschorke aptly designates 
as a “category of de-dramatization” (Koschorke 2017, 26; emphasis in 
the original).
While preference of thinking in categories of differences supports the 
postcolonial reverse division of the world into West and non-West, “think-
ing about similarity opens different possibilities for dealing with the prob-
lems of complex societies than do methodologies focused on differences” 
(Bhatti 2017, 7). As outlined above, like the postcolonial mainstream, Uma 
Narayan traces the phenomenon of “othering” in the Spivakian sense to 
colonial times. However, unlike the majority of postcolonial scholars, she 
underlines first the “shared insistence on the ‘Otherness’” by both coloniz-
ers and colonized and, second, also its problematic result: “This insistence 
on ‘Otherness,’ on the differences between the cultures that confronted each 
other in the colonial encounter, while not entirely false or fabricated, was 
often exaggerated in that it over-played differences while ignoring both sim-
ilarities and assimilations” (Narayan 1997b, 402). In this spirit, thinking in 
terms of similarities as emphasized by Bhatti and others, we can be alert to 
the pitfalls of postcolonial thinking since—and this is crucial—the “consid-
erations of similarity contain a subversive potential to expose the claimed 
antagonisms and radical incompatibilities of opposition, differences and so-
called ‘clashes’ as nothing more than ideology” (Bhatti 2017, 7). This is also 
valid for the field of mainstream postcolonial studies, where the concept 
of difference is indeed highly ideological and normative in that it simul-
taneously confirms the “different other” as such and radically upgrades 
his or her difference. Gayatri Spivak, for instance, “fetishizing difference 
under the rubric of incommensurability” (Lazarus 2004, 10), throughout 
her career, made no secret of her intentions to devalue basically anything 
Western and upgrade the previously—presumably or actually—devalued 
non-Western (Albrecht 2013, 48, 50). In postcolonial discourse, difference 
became a kind of value in itself, which has necessarily, as it were, to be 
emphasized and safeguarded. The “war for recognition” of “difference,” 
as Zygmunt Bauman likewise rightly observed, is not a struggle for equal-
ity but is concerned with pushing through a recognition of the “superior” 
value of “difference” (Bauman 2001, 145). Indeed, whenever people insist 
on difference—be it colonizers claiming superiority over colonized people 
or postcolonial “different others” and their advocates—the suspicion per-
sists that it is basically a matter of preserving or gaining privileges for one’s 
own people. Just like in colonial times, “different” never really means “dif-
ferent but equal” but ultimately “superior.” The price of this is the ques-
tionable reverse division of the world into West and non-West. However, 
when equality and comparability are brought into play, this puts a stop to 
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the secret ambition of “superior difference” (Albrecht 2008, 270). In this 
sense, concepts of similarity and comparability, as I have outlined here, are 
a major and fundamental challenge to mainstream postcolonialism.
Anil Bhatti’s simple conclusion is that “[w]e can assume that many 
things are similar in this complex world” and “that it is more important to 
get along with one another than it is to understand one another” (Bhatti 
2017, 15). This is close to Richard Rorty’s plea, to return to the old and 
likewise simple idea “that we all share a common humanity” and that the 
goal should be a society in which all human beings are regarded as “full-
fledged member[s] of both the species and the local community” (Rorty 
2008, 70, 71). Neither Rorty nor Bhatti have a “harmonization or the 
levelling of differences” in mind (Bhatti 2017, 7) when they emphasize 
“commonality rather than difference” (Rorty 2008, 72). They only sug-
gest, to take as a starting point of any conceptual endeavor, the fact that 
“different others”—both those marked as inferior and uncivilized by the 
colonizers and those evaluated by postcolonial scholars—have “the same 
tendency to bleed when pricked” as every human being does; “they too 
worry about their children and parents,” and so forth (Rorty 2008, 72). 
Or, as John Noyes reads Fanon’s idea of the human, the starting point 
of any conceptual endeavor may be “the experience of biological life” 
(Noyes, Chapter 2). Françoise Lionnet, in the volume at hand (Chapter 3), 
quotes the Mauritian poet Édouard Maunick who speaks of “red blood 
of the Occident / red blood of the Orient” and Édouard Glissant from 
Martinique, who in his poetry “indexes the universal condition of birth” 
and death (Lionnet, Chapter 3). Uma Narayan, on another level, points to 
the far-reaching similarities between Western and non-Western societies, 
such as social hierarchies, huge economic differences between members 
of society, and structural inequality between men and women (Narayan 
1998, 89f.). By privileging difference over similarities, such comparable 
and similar phenomena have been systematically ignored by the postco-
lonial mainstream. And, although there are theoretical perspectives which 
take account of both “the universality and variety of human ways of life” 
that have, of course, never been really forgotten (Sturma 2005, 15), these 
perspectives were not successful in many areas due to the supremacy of the 
postcolonial paradigm. The initiative to revive the concept of similarity, as 
compiled in the volume Similarity: A Paradigm for Culture Theory (Bhatti 
and Kimmich 2017), by contrast, shows that this theoretical perspective 
belongs amongst the “features of society deemed desirable” which “must 
be recurrently rewon” (LaCapra 1998, 3). A first step in this direction is, as 
the historian Jürgen Osterhammel pointed out, “an overcoming of Said’s 
paradigm” (Osterhammel 2017, 72). If scholars deem “indifference to dif-
ference” desirable (Bhatti 2012), this will not only contribute to dimin-
ishing the current “obsession with ‘difference’” (Smulewicz-Zucker and 
Thompson 2015) but may also revive the idea that difference can, actually, 
be framed in the sense of “different but equal.”
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Analyses such as the work in this book of Göttsche’s and Jusdanis’ 
et al. can help understand the importance of an alternative concept of sim-
ilarity becoming part of a multidirectional post-colonial framework. For 
this reason, it is time to remove the postcolonial shield from the carefully 
guarded areas outside the familiar map of imperial and colonial space and 
to arrive, as Russell Berman suggested, at a “genuinely comparative and 
global discussion of colonialism and empire that would draw on a wide 
diversity of cases” (Berman 2011, 172). Gregory Jusdanis’ comparison of 
“a chronicle of Cuzco’s destruction […] alongside descriptions of the fall of 
Constantinople” (Jusdanis, Chapter 11) should be seen as an early case study 
and implementation of such a “genuinely comparative and global discussion 
of colonialism and empire.” As should Dirk Göttsche’s contribution that, by 
opening the door of the entangled German and Arab imperial histories for 
post-colonial literary studies, strives to contribute to a genuinely compara-
tive discussion in the context of a multidirectional post-colonial framework. 
And so does my investigation of Níkos Kazantzákis’ 1953 novel Freedom 
or Death juxtaposed with a reading of Chinua Achebe’s seminal postcolo-
nial novel Things Fall Apart of 1958 (Albrecht 2019). Jusdanis not only 
draws attention to another part of the globe, a part which has remained a 
blank spot on the mainstream postcolonial map, but also shows that there is 
much to be gained from “unorthodox comparisons” (Jusdanis, Chapter 11) 
of the writings of imperial subjects who could not be any more diverse. To 
begin with, scholars of imperialism and colonialism may develop a feel for 
a wide range of positionalities possible in different imperial and colonial 
settings. In this spirit, juxtaposing accounts of an Amerindian author in the 
early seventeenth century (needing to legitimate himself before his Spanish 
colonizers) and of fifteenth-century Greek historians (self-consciously writ-
ing against the backdrop of a tradition perceived to be superior to that 
of their Ottoman conquerors) greatly helps to understand “colonizer” and 
“colonized” as structural positions, varying, as Epp Annus (Chapter 13) 
and Benedikts Kalnačs (Chapter 14) suggest in this book, in various histori-
cal situations. The “unorthodox comparison” brings out surprising similari-
ties, even beyond the obvious sacking and looting of the cities and violence 
against the population, by both the Ottoman and Spanish conquerors. 
While the history of the Greeks under Ottoman rule may in strictly histori-
ans’ terms differ from that of the Incas under the Spaniards, both conquered 
societies seemingly shared the need to come to terms with the experience of 
conquest and imperial domination.
Discussion of the far-reaching consequences grounded in a properly 
comparative postcolonial perspective is only just starting. But, as Dorota 
Kołodziejczyk and Cristina Şandru pointed out for the post-Soviet context: 
“A more wide-ranging dialogue can emerge as a result, in which recur-
ring political, intellectual and cultural practices can be analyzed at the 
level of cognate ideological constructions and similar functioning mecha-
nisms” (Kołodziejczyk and Şandru 2016, 2). If one strives to reframe the 
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“post-colonial” as a genuinely global phenomenon, postcolonial studies will 
never be the same again. On the table then is the need to develop alternative 
ways of thinking about the colonial and imperial past and the post-colonial 
and post-imperial present. This volume responds to a serious desideratum in 
that it pioneers challenges to the alleged normality of the mainstream post-
colonial perspective. As this chapter has shown, mainstream postcolonial 
studies is not in a position to keep the “promise” to “chart the worldwide 
contemporary condition” (Parry 2012, 341). Unfortunately, though, “the 
power of the postcolonial perspective has” not only “spread across almost 
all the disciplines in the humanities and social sciences” but is also “reach-
ing into almost every domain of contemporary thought” (Young 2012, 22). 
By now it should have become clear that there is, in fact, no reason to cel-
ebrate this quite worrying phenomenon—neither in terms of the spreading 
of reductionist premises by the postcolonial mainstream, nor in terms of 
how its lack of “accountability to the realities of the contemporary world-
system” is concerned (Lazarus 2011a, 1). The outlook on the relation of 
postcolonial studies and climate change in the next section will demonstrate 
this from yet another angle.
Climate change: Outlook on the future of postcolonial 
studies from yet another angle
While the postcolonial mainstream tends to mistake the grand narratives 
of the West—if not for the source of all evil but at least—as a considerable 
part of “the problem,” a few scholars grounded in postcolonial criticism 
began to reconsider and reassess these very grand narratives, and appar-
ently rediscover their merit. Ian Baucom, a scholar of English and postco-
lonial studies, in discussing recent works by historian Dipesh Chakrabarty 
and philosopher Catherine Malabou, predicts that “the more fully postco-
lonial studies, globalization critique (or any other critical humanities prac-
tice), engages the life sciences, the more fully we enter […] the era of a 
new humanism. That humanism may be quite unlike the older humanisms 
[…] but it is a humanism nevertheless” (Baucom 2012, 9). Chakrabarty 
himself, “one of the leading postcolonial theorists of his generation” and 
certainly a critic of the grand narratives of the West throughout his career 
(Baucom 2012, 1), surprised his readers in a much-noticed article in Critical 
Inquiry with assertions such as “in the era of the Anthropocene, we need the 
Enlightenment (that is, reason) even more than in the past” (Chakrabarty 
2009, 211). What is more, while the greatest sin of humanism in the tradi-
tion of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment was and is from a main-
stream postcolonial view its universalism, what we find in Chakrabarty’s 
essay is no longer the familiar “postcolonial suspicion of the universal” 
(Chakrabarty 2009, 220). Instead we find a “reliance on a new universal-
ism: the universalism of species thinking” (Baucom 2012, 9). Indeed, the 
big issue of climate change and recent debates on the new concept of the 
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Anthropocene,22 Gabriele Dürbeck’s concern in this volume (Chapter 15), 
entail a challenge for which the postcolonial paradigm may or may not 
be equipped. The initial question posed in this introductory chapter, of 
whether the postcolonial paradigm actually helps us understand our world, 
therefore arises from yet another angle. Chakrabarty frankly admits that all 
his “readings in theories of globalization, Marxist analysis of capital, sub-
altern studies, and postcolonial criticism over the last twenty-five years […] 
had not really prepared [him] for making sense of this planetary conjunc-
ture within which humanity finds itself today” (Chakrabarty 2009, 199). 
Both Chakrabarty and Baucom agree that “what scientists have said about 
climate change challenges […] the analytic strategies that postcolonial and 
postimperial historians have deployed in the last two decades in response 
to the postwar scenario of decolonization and globalization” (Chakrabarty 
2009, 198). Baucom suggest that “[i]t is to speak […] of a moment in which 
we are compelled to ask whether the governing interpretive protocols of 
postcolonial studies […] are indeed adequate to the planetary conjuncture 
we inhabit” (Baucom 2012, 5).
While in recent years postcolonial ecocriticism has become a prolific field 
(see for instance Huggan and Tiffin 2015), the postcolonial mainstream 
largely avoids dealing with the inescapable fact of climate change and the 
idea of the Anthropocene, which conceptualizes humanity as a whole as 
a planetary geophysical force. Scholars working with the concept of the 
Anthropocene, like atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen, use the word “spe-
cies” to designate life in human and other living forms. However, the very 
idea of a species, or humanity as a whole, is alien to postcolonial lines of 
thought. As for the new universalism of species thinking, it may not only 
be alien to but also irreconcilable with major postcolonial premises—even 
if scholars like Ian Baucom concede that a new universalism can no longer 
be “a Hegelian universalism” and that by no means does it “imply an essen-
tialism” but rather might be understood in terms of an “epistemologically 
blended (or hybrid) universalism” (Baucom 2012, 3, 9). In particular, the 
postcolonial insisting on and celebrating of cultural and anthropological 
differences between humans of this species is hardly compatible with the 
very questions of “human collectivity” that “climate change poses for us” 
(Chakrabarty 2009, 222). On the contrary, this very “species thinking 
sets aside those codes of singularity, incommensurability, and alterity […] 
through which postcolonial history and anthropology, postcolonial literary, 
cultural and political theory have made sense of the world” (Baucom 2012, 3). 
It is also not surprising that postcolonial scholars seem to turn a blind eye 
to the mere possibility that their approaches may, in one way or another, 
be part of the problem when it concerns the occurrence of alarming aspects 
of the present world situation. Chakrabarty may admit that postcolonial 
theories have “not really prepared [him] for making sense of this planetary 
conjuncture within which humanity finds itself today” (Chakrabarty 2009, 
199). What he does not admit is what a powerful counterproductive force 
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the postcolonial mainstream already is in this respect. To begin with, it 
helped on a large scale to debase the very grand narratives of the West, 
towards which some postcolonial scholars of the climate change now (re)
turn and desperately seek help from. Moreover, issues arise also in climate 
change debate, from the postcolonial assumptions which I have already dis-
cussed and criticized in other contexts in this introduction. Three examples 
may illustrate how postcolonial core tenets collide with what is—not least 
on a social political level—necessary to responsibly handle the challenge of 
the climate change: first, the postcolonial preference of issues that concern 
former colonized people over issues that concern all of humanity; second, its 
politics of confinement to the West and its formerly colonized non-West and 
exclusion of other territories; and third, its restricted view on intra-species 
inequalities.
Decades of postcolonial theorizing and politics of empowerment were 
successful in supporting formerly colonized people and their struggle for 
rights and participation in political decision-making. Given the neocolonial 
endeavors, ranging from exploiting of natural resources to dumping con-
taminated waste on indigenous lands, this support was and is absolutely 
necessary and justified. However, there are also problematic cases which 
provide evidence that the postcolonial politics of empowerment entails a 
potentially dangerous element. This element may at any time turn into an 
impediment for the search for solutions to global conditions, conditions that 
affect all of humanity. When postcolonial scholars discovered ecocriticism, 
it became quickly apparent that even “simple” ecological issues (as opposed 
to the global threat of climate change) are often in conflict with postcolonial 
core assumptions: “Ecocriticism has tended as a whole to prioritize extra-
human concerns over interests of disadvantaged human groups, while post-
colonialism has been routinely, and at times unthinkingly, anthropocentric” 
(Huggan and Tiffin 2015, 17). The example of the role of endangered spe-
cies in cultural practices of indigenous groups is one of many where ecologi-
cal goals and postcolonial goals seem to be irreconcilable. Caskey Russell, in 
his discussion of the “Makah Whale Hunt,” points to the danger of protect-
ing dubious traditions and justifying “destructive environmental practices 
by American Indians” and other disadvantaged groups (Russell 2010, 172). 
The Makah people are located in the Northwest of Washington State, and 
their culture is “based upon the hunting and harvesting of whales” (Russell 
2010, 163), upon the killing of the gray whales of the Pacific Northwest. As 
in several other cases, such as the Bald and Golden Eagle in the American 
Southwest, the question arises as to who is entitled to decide what over 
endangered species or anything else that, according to environmentalists, 
belongs to the entire human race. A similar question is, who is entitled to 
decide over necessary measures to prevent or slow down the climate change 
which is a hazard for the whole of mankind? Russell underlines in the 
case of the struggle over the interests of the Makah people: “As with non-
Indians, not all Indians are interested in conservation, recycling, or Green 
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politics” (Russell 2010, 172). In many cases, however, they are interested 
in their agency and in what they perceive as a right to maintain their tra-
ditions. On a more general level, postcolonial scholars are most likely to 
insist on redistribution of political decision-making and to join those who 
charge “the West” of political and academic neocolonialism: “The Western 
Scientist continues to speak for the Earth” (Escobar 2012, 194).
The second example that illustrates how postcolonial core tenets collide 
with the challenges arising from climate change is the postcolonial politics 
of excluding on a conceptual und factual level other territories than the 
West and its formerly colonized non-West. The protective screen over the 
“Orient” generated by Edward Said and strongly strengthened by genera-
tions of postcolonial scholars not only shields the “Orient” from dissident 
scholars but also detracts attention from the fact that many countries of 
the “Orient” today would be more adequately designated as petro-states. 
These countries are providers and producers of fossil fuel and play a cru-
cial role as effective agents, on a large scale, in the production chain of 
climate change. Interestingly, the exclusion of the “Orient” as a target of 
critique in postcolonial scholarship seems to already have an impact on the 
cultural studies debates on climate change and the idea of global anthro-
pogenic agency. Particularly in regards to petro-states, which tend to be 
likewise excluded, in the above-outlined sense, from an interrogation from 
environmental point of view. The translation of Said’s “Orient” into the oil-
producing and exporting countries of the Middle East, would be a first step 
to unthink postcolonial tenets in this regard. However, it is not too difficult 
to predict that a postcolonial mainstream in search of causes of climatic 
change will join the critics of the industrial West—and rightly so—while 
continuing to protect the non-West. The “Orient,” when it comes to serious 
debates on causes and necessary measures, is ignored by the postcolonial 
climate change critic. Postcolonial scholars are, therefore, in the search of 
solutions for global conditions that affect all of humanity, likely to put their 
foot on the brake.
The third example, the postcolonial reverse division of the world into 
West and non-West and the problems related to this “untouched” “dichoto-
mous pattern” (Koschorke 2017, 25)—in particular the sweeping generali-
zation that treats “the West” as a single block—is conducive to perspectival 
distortion, also in regards to the issue discussed here. Without a doubt, 
that which postcolonial scholars call the countries of “the West” (or “the 
North”) “composed 18.8% of the world population, but were responsi-
ble for 72.7 of the CO2 emitted since 1850.” However, as Andreas Malm 
and Alf Hornborg underline, in such figures, “subnational inequalities” and 
“national class divisions” are usually “disregarded” (Malm and Hornborg 
2014, 64). Looking at intra-species inequalities draws attention to the con-
ceptual flaws of the postcolonial division of the world from yet another 
angle. “According to the standard Anthropocene narrative, the Industrial 
Revolution marks the onset of large-scale human modification of the Earth 
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System” (Malm and Hornborg 2014, 63). However, it is important to 
realize that it was not the human species as a whole which brought the 
Industrial Revolution into the world but “capitalists in a small corner of the 
Western world invested in steam, laying the foundation stone for the fossil 
economy: At no moment did the species vote for it either with feet or bal-
lots, or march in mechanical unison, or exercise any sort of shared authority 
over its own destiny and that of the Earth System” (Malm and Hornborg 
2014, 64). Kathleen McAfee, discussing “under what circumstances, and 
at whose hands, did fossil-fuel technologies acquire their epoch-creating 
power” (McAfee 2016, 69), likewise underlines that it was time and again 
the decision-making of a small group of “people in positions of power” who 
“have made the human species into a ‘geological force’” (McAfee 2016, 
69f.). And, what is more, “the same protagonists, as a class, are the great-
est beneficiaries and promoters of today’s fossil-fuel-based world economy” 
(McAfee 2016, 70). Incidentally, there is reason to believe that the overlap is 
considerable between those in positions of power then and now, and those 
who made decisions in and profit out of colonialism and neocolonial exploi-
tation. It is to be feared, though, that in postcolonial debates over climate 
change and its originators, intra-species inequalities will be translated once 
again along the lines of the familiar postcolonial division of the world.
Postcolonial criticism has no explanation for “this planetary conjunc-
ture within which humanity finds itself today” (Chakrabarty 2009, 199). 
However, when Chakrabarty now speaks of “the necessity of thinking dis-
junctively about the human,” the need “to think the human on multiple 
scales and registers” and the “challenge of having to think of human agency 
over multiple and incommensurable scales at once” (Chakrabarty 2012, 2, 
14, 1), this seems to be an all too simple evasion of the fact that for dec-
ades postcolonial scholars would theorize and conceptualize while ignoring 
“the realities of the contemporary world-system that constitutes their puta-
tive object” (Lazarus 2011a, 1). In light of the dimension of the challenge, 
it is actually more than an evasion. Neil Lazarus could not have known 
Chakrabarty’s essay when he accused the majority of postcolonial scholars 
of a lack of accountability to the real world (Lazarus 2011a, 1). To shift 
questions of survival of the species to the abstract level of conceptual think-
ing on “multiple scales and registers,” instead of raising the subject of the 
social and political consequences of these “multiple and incommensurable 
scales” in clear terms, seems to be the epitome of this lack of accountabil-
ity. In light of the climate change, it is much more appropriate to ask, as 
Kathleen McAfee does, if this is “not the worst time to abandon the lessons 
of history, the insights of the humanities, and the tools of social science that 
can help to identify the commonalities within diversity upon which politics 
for radical social transformation can be built” (McAfee 2016, 71).
This book is the outcome of a three-day international and interdisciplinary 
conference funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, which took place in 
the magnificent Herrenhausen Palace in Hanover, Germany, on September 
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27–29, 2017. For me and for several of the participants, it was not a single 
event but rather embedded in the larger project of an informal European 
research group on comparative postcolonial studies. Dirk Göttsche is to 
be credited with taking the initiative to create this research group, with the 
goal to move beyond established concepts as developed in postcolonial stud-
ies and, as he put it in an internal document, to take “postcolonial inquiry 
across Europe to a new comparative and transnational level.” The first con-
ference, entitled (Post)Colonialism across Europe: Transcultural History and 
National Memory, in the fall of 2012, generated a volume with the same title 
(Göttsche and Dunker 2014). Florian Krobb edited the papers of a second 
conference, European Postcolonialisms: Temporalities and Theories, that 
took place in the fall of 2014 at the “Netherlands Institute for Advanced 
Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences” in Wassenaar. This confer-
ence was organized by Isabel Hoving, Sarah De Mul, and Liesbeth Minnaard 
(Krobb 2017). After a conference in the spring of 2015 in Riga, Lettland, on 
Colonial Encounters in Europe: New Approaches to the Internal European 
Colonial Experience, organized by Benedikts Kalnačs, and another one in 
Nottingham, in the summer of 2016, again organized by Göttsche, Memory 
and Postcolonial Studies: Synergies and New Directions (Göttsche 2019), I 
felt it was my turn to take the research group a step further and apply for 
conference funding. The general drive in this research network is to sound 
out geographical locations and historical formations which used to be blank 
areas on the global postcolonial map. This concern drew my attention to 
Southeastern Europe and the European successor states of the Ottoman 
Empire—only to find that it seems to be the right time for this still somewhat 
unorthodox undertaking.
Notes
1 Such as Wilson, Şandru, and Welsh 2010; Lazarus 2011a; Ashcroft, Griffiths, 
and Tiffin 2013; Dwivedi and Kich 2013; Huggan 2013; Chambers et al. 2014; 
Bernard, Elmarsafy, and Murray 2015; Huggan and Tiffin 2015; Kołodziejczyk 
and Şandru 2016; Young 2016; Chambers 2017; Krobb 2017; Singh and Kim 
2017; Watson and Wilder 2018.
2 The English translation (2017) of the original 2015 essay by Koschorke 
(“Ähnlichkeit. Valenzen eines post-postkolonialen Konzepts.” In Ähnlichkeit: 
Ein kulturtheoretisches Paradigma, edited by Anil Bhatti and Dorothee Kimmich 
[Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2015], 35–45) omits the “post-” in 
“post-postkolonialen.”
3 The term “postcolonial” refers to the postcolonial perspective criticized in this 
introduction, while I use “post-colonial” as the most common neutral reference 
to historical chronology. However, there are no generally binding rules for the 
spelling and use of the word.
4 The misjudgment in a German reference book on postcolonial theory that, while 
there is still “criticism” of the postcolonial paradigm, we find hardly any “fun-
damental challenge” anymore (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2015, 7) seems to be 
due to the fact that fundamental critique is not taken seriously as such but rather 
downplayed as a mere “raising of objections” (for instance 296).
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5 Such as Dirlik 1999, 149; Divine 2008, 1; Tlostanova 2012, 130; Bernard, 
Elmarsafy, and Murray 2015, 7.
6 I borrow this term from Timothy Morton (Dark Ecology. For a Logic of Future 
Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016, 66).
7 For a general critique of the double standard as applied in postcolonial studies 
and other fields see Boghossian 2006, 130 and passim; see also Salzman 2008, 
242, 245.
8 Pinar Şenişik discusses six major rebellions, 1827, 1841, 1866, 1889, 1896, 
and 1897, for the nineteenth century alone (Şenişik 2011, 73–82, 101–196, and 
passim).
9 For a critique of the alleged collaboration between Enlightenment and Empire, 
see for instance Berman 1998; for the more complex relations between them, see 
for instance also Stoler 2013.
10 In my own chapter in the volume at hand (Chapter 10), I discuss this issue in 
more detail.
11 For a critique of the causality in this vein in Susanne Zantop’s approach, see also 
Berman 2000.
12 Edward Said laid the foundations of this reverse essentialism, as it were, in his 
“generalizable theory of the occident’s ineluctable, power-based blindness” 
(Osterhammel 2017, 72), and in particular in his often quoted explanation why, 
in his view, “any European” (Said 1978, 203), “every European, in what he 
could say about the Orient, was […] a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally 
ethnocentric” (Said 1978, 204).
13 Such as Makdisi 2002a and 2002b, Deringil 2003, Kühn 2007, Mikhail and 
Philliou 2012, Türesay 2013, Kechriotis 2015, and maybe a few more who 
escaped my notice.
14 Quotes in Bruce Masters, 2001, 157.
15 See the documents on the Congo question (“Aktenstücke betreffend die 
Kongo-Frage, Reichstag. Aktenstück Nr. 290 [Kongo-Frage])” on the website 
Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags und seiner Vorläufer” supported 
by the German Research Council (DFG) (http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/
Blatt3_k6_bsb00018455_00309.html, in particular https://www.reichstagspro-
tokolle.de/Blatt3_k6_bsb00018455_00332.html; accessed 02 August 2018).
16 For a well-balanced discussion of “nationalism’s dualistic nature, its capacity to 
confer benefits to humanity as well as wreak havoc,” see Jusdanis 2001 (quote 
on p. 13).
17 The original Greek title is Ὁ Καπετὰν Μιχάλης (1953); both the American and 
British translations refer to this slogan of the Crete resistance: the American 
(1955) is entitled Freedom or Death, the British (1956) Freedom and Death.
18 For a detailed critique of this article see Albrecht 2019.
19 There are those who deny the existence of reverse racism on the grounds that “if 
black people mark white people as such and ascribe certain attributes to them,” 
this is supposedly not the same as the other way round, but in the case of black 
people, rather a “strategy of differentiation or resistance” (Arndt 2011, 42). 
According to this peculiar logic, racism can be naturally designated as an exclu-
sively “European tradition of thought and ideology” (Arndt 2011, 43).
20 This is also valid for Germany where a reference book and critical introduc-
tion of postcolonial theory lists in its bibliography 39 titles by Spivak, 21 by 
Bhabha, not a single one by Narayan (Castro Varela and Dhawan 2015). A 
similar picture can be found in the indices of the collection of Key Concepts 
in Post-Colonial Studies (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2013) and The Oxford 
Handbook of Postcolonial Studies (Huggan 2013).
21 This is, incidentally, the same background that helped identity politics to become 
so powerful and “culture” to push “economics aside” (Rorty 2008, 74).
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22 The International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS), “the largest and oldest 
constituent scientific body in the International Union of Geological Sciences 
(IUGS),” recently suggested that the planet should still considered to be in the 
epoch of the Holocene, which began after the last major ice age 11,700 years ago 
(decision announced on June 19, 2018 on http://www.stratigraphy.org/index.
php/ics-news-and-meetings/125-formal-subdivision-of-the-holocene-series-
epoch). Nevertheless, the debate on the concept of the “Anthropocene” took on 
a life of its own in many disciplines beyond the sciences and is not very likely to 
disappear.
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In the introduction to this volume, Monika Albrecht acutely points out the 
importance of responding to what she calls a “growing provincialism of 
postcolonial studies.” Postcolonial studies stand under a complex threat 
which is linked to the marginalization of the humanities. While university 
administrators might like the popularity of the topic, there is a sense in the 
wider scientific community that its objects are either past, fleeting, or rela-
tively insignificant; that its concepts are both excessively vague and overly 
sophisticated; and that its methods are obscure at best, faulty at worst. 
Added to this is the intervention provided by decolonial critique, which as 
Walter Mignolo has emphasized, accuses postcolonial scholars of repeating 
the experiential discrepancy between first-world intellectuals and those out-
side this world who are the object of their theoretical musings (see Mignolo 
2011a; Tlostanova in this volume). Much like Arif Dirlik’s early discon-
tent with the experiential dimension of postcolonial theory (Dirlik 1994), to 
which I will return presently, the idea of decoloniality queries the experien-
tial field of intellectuals engaging in postcolonial theory. Mignolo observes 
that it is “easier for European intellectuals to endorse postcolonialism (as it 
is happening in Germany) than decolonial thinking” since:
Decolonial thinking is more akin to the skin and the geo-historical loca-
tions of migrants from the Third World, than to the skin of ‘native 
Europeans’ in the First World. Nothing prevents a white body in 
Western Europe from sensing how coloniality works in non-European 
bodies. That understanding would be rational and intellectual, not 
experiential.
(Mignolo 2011b)
As postcolonial theory moves into its fifth decade (if we take Edward Said’s 
Orientalism as the—albeit highly arbitrary—moment of inauguration), this 
complex threat will have to be taken seriously. Are the objects of postco-
lonial studies or postcolonial theory obscure or outdated, is the evidence 
it draws on convincing, is the experience of marginalized peoples eclipsed 
in its practices? This chapter argues that the experiential discontent raised 
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in the face of postcolonialism’s successes is simply the continuation (and 
political intensification) of a long-standing debate within the European 
philosophical tradition. This should show that the challenges raised by the 
decolonial position are not quite as far from the political questions raised by 
postcolonial theory as they might at first appear. What is more, if we take 
the experiential discontent with theory’s claim to universality back to its 
roots in the Enlightenment rebellion against rationalism (see Noyes 2015, 
119f), we can start to think about how Mignolo’s implicit question, who 
theorizes? (if I may adopt the title of Sisi Maqagi’s short essay of 1990), 
had a political urgency that from the outset complicated the concept of skin 
(in Maqagi’s case by introducing gender inequality). In the African context, 
this urgency has its own genealogy, which, upon closer inspection, allows 
a different perspective on the intellectual streams that run in and out of 
the North American academies (see Noyes 2000, 49–60). What we find by 
looking at the experientialism vs. rationalism debate in its African form is a 
long-standing attempt to think the experiential both in its embodied speci-
ficity and in its claims to what might be called an alternative universality 
(and I am fully aware of how this term hovers on the verge of nonsense). 
More specifically, the African engagement with humanism provides valu-
able insights into the problem of how experiential politics relates to its theo-
retical generalization. What is more, discourses of humanism in European 
and North American academies have much to learn about the concept from 
these African iterations.
The object for investigation in this chapter is what I consider to be a 
decolonized archive of humanism, which has moved through complicated 
channels of transmission from Europe to Africa and back. Consider, for 
example, Frantz Fanon’s complicated relationship with Jean-Paul Sartre, or 
the educational paths of Senghor, Césaire, and so many others. This more 
immediate dialogue is complicated by Ez’kai Mphahlele’s insistence on 
African humanism as a dialogue between the Western tradition and a wide-
spread African tradition whose commitment to humanism is more firmly 
rooted in social practices.1 Or the lesser known work of the institute African 
Americans for Humanism, which in the 1980s made repeated attempts to set 
up dialogue with colleagues in Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, also Zimbabwe 
and South Africa (see Ongere 2014). These channels of transmission caught 
my interest as I began to understand how the struggles for an adequate con-
ception of humanity in South Africa today both mirror and diverge from 
similar struggles in German philosophy of the late Enlightenment. This 
struggle originally unfolded alongside the intellectual opposition among 
European intellectuals to the cultural and philosophical framework of 
European imperialism and colonialism (see Noyes 2015). These European 
intellectuals were a long way away from entertaining mechanisms for allow-
ing the experiential dimension of colonized peoples to enter the discourses 
of their academies. Nonetheless, drawing on a long discussion of embodi-
ment and cognition (reaching back at least to Lucretius’s De rerum natura), 
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they sketched the outlines of a theory that would allow the diversity of 
bodily experience to be thought alongside the universality of human life, 
while taking account of the danger of equating universality with European 
experience.2
The underlying assumptions of this project are the following: Late 
Enlightenment philosophy understood well that one important obstacle to 
the implementation of human rights was a conceptual problem within the 
idea of the human—its inclusive universality is at odds with the recognition 
of cultural difference. This is a fundamental conceptual problem, and I call 
it the antinomy of universal reason (Noyes 2014). Reason is a universal 
human potential which is actualized differently in different cultures, result-
ing in disqualification or at least a destabilization of universal contents of 
reason, perhaps even of the reasoning method itself. And more importantly, 
as Geoffrey Bennington has shown, the solutions to the antimonies have 
political consequences (Bennington 2017). When it comes to humanism and 
the concept of the human, one such consequence concerns racial difference 
and the practical accession to human rights; another concerns religion; yet 
another concerns how gender is mapped onto bodies; and there are others 
still. In South Africa today, the question of humanism provides the grounds 
on which these consequences are largely set out and contested. This is why 
humanism has to be investigated as one of the discontents of postcoloni-
alism—in the hopes perhaps that postcolonialism might be another word 
for critical philosophy, or at least for one particular way of doing critical 
philosophy, or that it might in some way begin to speak with critical theory 
(see Mills 2017).
The experiences of African liberation struggles underlined this point. The 
Cameroonian-South African philosopher Achille Mbembe spoke in 2002 of 
the dilemma of African humanism:
This denial of humanity (or attribution of inferiority) has forced African 
responses into contradictory positions that are, however, often concur-
rently espoused. There is a universalistic position: “We are human beings 
like any others.” And there is a particularistic position: “We have a glo-
rious past that testifies to our humanity.” Discourse on African identity 
has been caught in a dilemma from which it is struggling to free itself: 
Does African identity partake in the generic human identity? Or should 
one insist, in the name of difference and uniqueness, on the possibility 
of diverse cultural forms within a single humanity—but cultural forms 
whose purpose is not to be self-sufficient, whose ultimate signification 
is universal?
(Mbembe 2002, 253)
The question of humanism and embodied knowledge occurred to me in 
March 2016 when I was working as a fellow at the Stellenbosch Institute for 
Advanced Studies. Reading this and similar statements, I was surprised to 
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see the resurgence of African humanism among South African scholars. At 
the time, South African universities were in turmoil, challenged by the stu-
dent movements of #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall, the movements to 
decolonize the universities while at the same time making education accessi-
ble to all. In these two struggles, I saw the political force of the antinomy of 
universal reason today. In “fees must fall,” all humans are equal, all entitled 
to an education, not impeded by the disadvantages of race or class. “Rhodes 
must fall” formed the most serious challenge to the humanist idea, the 
awareness that race was and continues to be the defining factor in determin-
ing the status of humanity in South Africa today. Political outcomes would 
be quite different depending on whether one pursued the universalist or the 
particularist political project. Students in South Africa wanted both, and, so 
I thought, they were right to want both. But how was this to happen? This 
question is what makes the contemporary South African challenge to the 
humanist idea so theoretically compelling, so politically urgent. And in put-
ting this in the context of postcolonial theory, this is where, perhaps, theory 
becomes mainstream, perhaps in damaging ways, perhaps not.
Postcolonial criticism has, from the outset, been troubled by the human-
ist idea. The reasons for this are quite clear, and they are important for an 
understanding of the current interest in African humanism. In many human-
ities fields, the generation of scholars born around the end of the Second 
World War reached maturity in an academic environment that concentrated 
on the timeless conditions of human nature, and this was the same environ-
ment whose Eurocentrism was so strongly contested by the generation of 
African humanists who lived through the first wave of African independ-
ence. This same encounter with the political underbelly of humanism made 
the French post-structuralists, the British New Left, and the German ide-
ology critics militate against the apolitical tendencies they found in many 
of their teachers. And in its peculiar manifestation as Area Studies in the 
USA, the political potential for what had previously counted as humanist 
social inquiry began to take on what looked like quite a sinister bent (see 
Wallerstein 1997). The critical theorists in Germany and the post-structur-
alists in France were seeking to reverse the direction of inquiry which read 
the specificity of narration as a key to the timelessness and placelessness of 
human nature. Timeless and placeless, at least in the sense that everything 
narratologically unfolding in time and space pointed beyond its own speci-
ficity to the unchanging and universally shared aspects of human nature.
The political ambivalence of the humanist idea persists as a rift through 
the center of postcolonial theory. Edward Said provides an instructive exam-
ple of its importance, as well as the necessity of a critical examination of its 
history. In an essay of 1996, he criticizes a concept of the human rooted in 
European culture. This founded a humanism where, “when most European 
thinkers celebrated humanity or culture, they were principally celebrating 
ideas and values they ascribed to their own national culture, or to Europe 
as distinct from the Orient, Africa, and even the Americas” (Said 2006, 22). 
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In the same essay, Said appeals to another concept of the human and 
another humanism characterized by “overlapping territories, intertwined 
histories common to men and women, whites and non-whites, dwellers in 
the metropolis and on the peripheries, past as well as present and future; 
these territories and histories can only be seen from the perspective of the 
whole of secular human history” (Said 2006, 38f.).
Gayatri Spivak goes one step further, querying the methodological prob-
lems of a critical humanism when she links the crisis in postcolonial anti-
humanism with that of structuralism. Structuralists like “Michel Foucault, 
Roland Barthes, and a certain Lévi-Strauss […] question humanism by 
exposing its hero—the sovereign subject as author, the subject of authority, 
legitimacy, and power. There is an affinity between the imperialist subject 
and the subject of humanism.” At the same time, anti-humanism remains 
a negative methodology, since what Spivak calls the “cognitive failures” of 
anti-humanism do not lead directly to “correct cognitive moves” (Spivak 
1996, 210f). Spivak is instructive in her critique of humanism in that she 
repeatedly takes pains to draw methodological consequences in the humani-
ties from what she calls the “double-bind” of humanist arrogance, that is 
“the arrogance of the radical European humanist conscience, which will 
consolidate itself by imagining the other” (Spivak 1999, 171). If, in Spivak’s 
words, “humanism names man (at best the human being) as the master 
of an unexamined subjective agency” (Spivak 1999, 322n15), the ques-
tion remains how one might methodologically activate Said’s more positive 
vision of the human.
This question is intensified by two further factors: globalization and iden-
tity discourse. Regarding globalization, the underlying assumption of my 
inquiry is that the question of humanism will become more, not less urgent 
given the fact that, in Pheng Cheah’s words, “discourses about globaliza-
tion almost always pre-comprehend a certain understanding of the human 
that is continuous with the canonical idea of humanity with which it shares 
cognate terms such as freedom and dignity” (Cheah 2006, 1f.). And second, 
for the most part, the idea of postcolonial humanity comes with the author-
ity of proponents who have a biographical foothold in post-independence 
colonies. We know from the various critiques of postcolonial theory and 
theorists just how fragile this authority is. Spivak herself cautions against a 
simplistic identity politics that grounds theoretical propositions in biogra-
phy, stating in a speech “On Revolution” that “identity politics lays waste 
the democratic possibility of achieving flexibility of the imagination toward 
others” (Spivak 2017). Arif Dirlik’s early critique of the biographical 
authority of postcolonial theorists is interesting since it links my two con-
cerns. Dirlik was expressing a discontent over the fact that the emergence 
of postcolonial theory is enabled by global capital in the way it provided 
pathways to Western education for privileged sectors of the postcolonial 
population while extending these pathways for the even more privileged few 
out of the postcolony and into the metropole, where they could make use of 
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anachronistic institutional mechanisms to criticize the history that brought 
them there (Dirlik 1994).
I’m not sure I want to follow Dirlik very far in this argument. The bio-
graphical critique of postcolonial theory carries the same flaws as its bio-
graphical authorization. What is needed if the theory is to stand as a theory 
is a critique of its conceptual architecture. Such a critique can learn a lot 
by doing just what Said and Spivak point to in their critique of human-
ism—subjecting the struggle of a priori humanism with human diversity to 
historical scrutiny. To do this would take us back to a founding moment of 
anti-imperialism, Herder’s critique of Kant, which went as far as postcolo-
nial theory has gone in the twenty-first century when he showed how the 
fact of diverse world views stands opposite an ideology of unified reason 
and morality in the same way the exploited world stands opposite practices 
of imperialism.3 The resultant critique of the humanist idea was to have far-
reaching consequences. This can be seen for example in Althusser’s essay 
“Marxism and Humanism” (written in 1965), where he writes:
Marx’s theoretical anti-humanism, by relating it to its conditions of 
existence, recognizes a necessity for humanism as an ideology, a condi-
tional necessity. The recognition of this necessity is not purely specula-
tive. On it alone can Marxism base a policy in relation to the existing 
ideological forms, of every kind: religion, ethics, art, philosophy, law—
and in the very front rank, humanism.
(Althusser 1977, 231, emphasis in the original)
This is the core of the paradox of humanism in postcolonialism: In order 
to relate politically to the functionalization of humanism in society as it 
exists in the present moment, it is necessary to develop a discourse of anti-
humanism, which can of course only be possible as a critique of humanism. 
This necessitates the negative methodology to which Spivak alludes. What 
Althusser calls “Marx’s theoretical anti-humanism” is the acknowledgment 
that a just society of humans is only possible as the negative of the human-
ism upon which present injustice has been built. Here’s Althusser again:
There you are face to face with your real object, obliged to forge the 
requisite and adequate concepts, to think it, obliged to accept the fact 
that the old concepts and in particular the concept of real-man or real-
humanism will not allow you to think the reality of man, that to reach 
this immediacy, which is precisely not an immediacy, it is necessary, as 
always where knowledge is concerned, to make a long detour.
(Althusser 1977, 245, emphasis in the original)
The nature of this long detour is the methodological challenge faced by 
postcolonial theory wherever humanism is the topic. Increasingly, there 
seems to be agreement that what is needed is—in Paul Gilroy’s words—a 
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“historical ontology of races,” which “could be especially useful in illumi-
nating all the manifest contradictions—legal, ethical, military—of a civiliz-
ing mission that had to conceal its own systematic brutality in order to be 
effective and attractive.” What a historical ontology of races would take 
account of is the fact that “the entities we know as races derived from the 
very racial discourse that appeared to be their scientific product” (Gilroy 
2005, 7, 8). This would be a first step. However, as Gilroy himself dem-
onstrates, the next step is to attempt what Rahel Jaeggi calls the critique 
of forms of living, in this case those forms of living sustained by the dual 
history of race and humanity, the everyday choices that are not reflected as 
choices (Jaeggi 2018). But it remains to determine just what exactly these 
non-choice choices might look like in this context. It also remains to deter-
mine how to approach the key moment in her analysis, the failure of these 
forms and choices. What does that mean and how are we to recognize them?
This is where it begins to make sense to approach the authority of the 
critic in biographical terms, since it is much easier (and much less ideo-
logically charged) to identify the failing forms of living on the interface of 
race and humanity if you are the one who occupies that interface. This is 
why it is instructive to turn now to the African humanists of the generation 
who witnessed the independence struggles of the decades after 1950. Frantz 
Fanon is exemplary in his understanding of the problem with humanism, 
anti-humanism, and the idea of humanity. His point of departure is the 
same one repeated later by Said. In The Wretched of the Earth (written in 
1961), he repeatedly condemned the European discourses of humanism that 
were used to prop up imperialism. For example:
Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet mur-
der men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their 
own streets, in all the corners of the globe […]. The European game has 
finally ended.
(Fanon 1963, 251)
If we turn to South Africa under apartheid, we find that the same anti-
humanist position provided a powerful starting point for denouncing apart-
heid’s hypocrisies. In the climate of apartheid, anti-humanism seemed to 
make sense. In this spirit, Rory Ryan vehemently denounced intellectual 
humanism in an article written in 1988 as a perpetuation of apartheid, 
claiming that “humanism dovetails with the ideals of a civilizing colonial-
ist patriarchy” (Ryan 1996). In opposition to a hegemonic discourse that 
shamelessly committed gross human rights violations in the name of an 
exclusionary concept of the human, critical debates evoked the specter of 
humanism’s barbarism, that image which the Frankfurt School had raised 
to the status of an icon of late capitalist culture.
On the other hand, the entire self-conception of the South African lib-
eration struggle, from the Freedom Charter to the New Constitution, has 
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been decidedly humanist. Steve Biko sounded remarkably like Frantz Fanon 
when he stated in 1973 that his vision of the confrontation of the races 
leads to “a true humanity where power politics will have no place” (Biko 
1996, 90). Biko speaks of “a quest for a true humanity” which will “bestow 
upon South Africa the greatest gift possible—a more human face” (Biko 
1996, 98). And the importance of ideas of shared humanity in everyday 
discourses of healing and reparation in South Africa today can scarcely 
be overestimated. One of the dominant rhetorical moments in the truth 
and reconciliation commission is Desmond Tutu’s theological discourse of 
common humanity, which Antje Krog describes as an Africanized Western 
Christian humanism that states, “you can only be human in a humane soci-
ety” (Krog 1998, 110). Or, according to the much-discussed philosophy 
of Ubuntu, which states that “I am what I am because of who we all are,” 
humanity is a collectively defined regime of rights (Gaylard 2004). Almost 
everywhere in the national liberation struggles, the old humanism met with 
calls for a new humanism. But what is this new humanism? How is it to be 
distinguished from the old? And what are the paths from the old to the new 
humanism?
It is in this context that I read Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason 
(2013). From Fanon, Mbembe derives the idea that a universalism of human 
experience is to be built on black reason, not the reason of the oppressor 
(Mbembe 2017, 162). Seen this way, black reason is universal reason dis-
torted by being housed in a racially coded body. At this point, the question 
arises how the universal principles of reason are to be derived from acts of 
reason related to the racially coded body. The problem Mbembe confronts 
in unmasking as false the universality claims of Europe’s false humanism 
would have required the critical move Adorno and Horkheimer make in 
their discussion of determinate negation—the dialectic which “discloses 
each image as script. It teaches us to read from its features the admission of 
falseness which cancels its power and hands it over to truth” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer 2002, 18). What exactly remains of the grounds of the specific 
once it has been negated in the universal? Or, as Adorno puts it in Negative 
Dialectics: “The means employed in negative dialectics for the penetration 
of its hardened objects is possibility—the possibility of which their real-
ity has cheated the objects and which is nonetheless visible in each one” 
(Adorno 1973, 52). This would be the key to finding universality in embod-
ied or experiential knowledge. Mbembe’s rhetorical strategies belie his belief 
in embodied knowledge, primarily with his continual recourse to a disem-
bodied and unspecified “we.” How did Mbembe move from the reason of 
black resistance to this disembodied voice, and what exactly makes it more 
credible than Kant’s categorical imperative? Related to this, Mbembe pre-
fers grammatical constructions that obliterate the subject, since this avoids 
a closer analysis of what exactly the subject of race looks like. Repeatedly, 
I found myself asking of his general observations about Western thought: 
Who thought this? In whose eyes did this appear true? In which discourse?
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Contrast this with Fanon’s fascinating images of the new humanism in 
the closing pages of Wretched of the Earth:
Today we are present at the stasis of Europe. Comrades, let us flee from 
this motionless movement where gradually dialectic is changing into the 
logic of equilibrium. Let us reconsider the question of mankind. Let us 
reconsider the question of cerebral reality and of the cerebral mass of all 
humanity, whose connections must be increased, whose channels must 
be diversified and whose messages must be re-humanized.
(Fanon 1963, 314)
This enigmatic statement is of great importance. Fanon opposes the abstract 
idea of humankind with the cerebral mass of all humanity. And opposed to 
the abstract idea of humankind, he asks for practices of reconnecting and 
diversifying this cerebral mass, of re-humanizing its messages, the practice 
of reconnecting the cerebral mass of all humanity. What can this mean? 
If the unity of humanity is biologically—indeed neurologically—founded 
(in the cerebral mass of humanity), and if there is a way to speak of this 
mass as a collective substance, the challenge facing humanity is to develop 
communicative practices of the human that do justice to this unity—that 
are anchored in the experience of biological life and not in the cynical dis-
courses of humanist exploitation.
Here, too, Fanon is instructive. The key to his argument lies in the 
distinction between the motionless movement of Europe and a dialec-
tic identified with the oppressed. The stasis of thought is an intellectual 
activity that generalizes without regard to difference, and Fanon opposes 
it with one that anchors experiences of racial oppression dialectically 
in the knowledge of neurological sameness. To take this approach is to 
acknowledge that difference, race, is a fictional construct with real effects, 
but it is also to ask that one of these effects be a dialectical establishment 
of common grounds starting not with the normative subjectivity of white-
ness but the non-normative experience of living with the forced negation 
of whiteness. This dialectical project cuts to the core of any theory of 
subjectivity.
This claim to a privileged critical perspective enabled by racial oppres-
sion is complicated by Nancy Fraser’s insight that, because capitalism needs 
zones and practices outside its logic in order to function, it creates situations 
that enable the critique of capitalism from within (Fraser 2017, 155). It is 
worth asking if and how race defines zones of practice outside the logic of 
global capitalism that are nevertheless integral to its smooth functioning. It 
is also worth investigating the way an alternative or subversive logic of race 
can undermine its integration into the global economy. Finally, the question 
becomes how to link a humanism based on racially orchestrated suffering to 
the various other sufferings of late capitalism. The rise of the far right gives 
this problem political urgency.
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The African humanists provide several pointers toward a solution. For 
example, Fanon’s linking of humanity with race begins not with a historical 
a priori of human equality, nor with a vague appeal to the universality of 
the human condition, but with the fact of suffering. Suffering is a symptom 
of the lack of justice, and its clinical analysis follows the specific forms of 
suffering at hand.
These insights necessitate methods that negate racial representations 
without essentializing them and that seek universals without proposing uto-
pian models of humanity. The methodological consequences were nicely 
stated by Marx in 1843, when he wrote:
Not only has a state of general anarchy set in among the reformers, 
but everyone will have to admit to himself that he has no exact idea 
what the future ought to be. On the other hand, it is precisely the 
advantage of the new trend that we do not dogmatically anticipate the 
world, but only want to find the new world through criticism of the old 
one. Hitherto philosophers have had the solution of all riddles lying in 
their writing-desks, and the stupid, exoteric world had only to open its 
mouth for the roast pigeons of absolute knowledge to fly into it. Now 
philosophy has become mundane, and the most striking proof of this is 
that philosophical consciousness itself has been drawn into the torment 
of the struggle, not only externally but also internally. But, if construct-
ing the future and settling everything for all times are not our affair, it is 
all the more clear what we have to accomplish at present: I am referring 
to ruthless criticism of all that exists, ruthless both in the sense of not 
being afraid of the results it arrives at and in the sense of being just as 
little afraid of conflict with the powers that be.
(Marx 1843)
In the present context, the object of Marx’s ruthless critique and Adorno’s 
determinate negation is first and foremost race and racism. But I believe it 
should also be extended to the human, humanity, even there where the con-
cept of the human has come to stand in for a utopian vision of South African 
society. Lacking a unitary vision of what humanity looks like beyond race-
based injustice, could there be a methodology for linking race-based injus-
tice to the idea of humanity? The key to this lies in the philosophical debates 
around negation that were emerging in the Enlightenment and that eventu-
ally led to what is called critical theory. Its key moment is the determinate 
negation of manifestations of injustice. What this means is that everything 
hinges on the question of negation and the central place it has to have in 
the humanist project. If we don’t know what the fulfillment of human life 
is, then the only way to discover it is through the determinate negation of 
whatever we can agree on as inhuman or non-human.
In Mbembe’s conception, black reason becomes an originary experience 
of self-interrogation aimed at liberation from the condition of exploitation. 
 Humanism, knowledge, postcolonial theory 61
Blackness names the refashioning of humans into raw material for exploi-
tation (Mbembe 2017, 39–40), but it also names the consciousness of this 
process. Clearly, this is a problematic foundation for critique—first, does 
being black automatically enable critique? If not, why not? What about the 
problematic blurring of boundaries which fictions of race strive so violently 
to uphold, such as described by Jacob Dlamini in Askari (2014), the study 
of how black men and women crossed the line from fighting apartheid to 
fighting to uphold apartheid? Second, if the embodied reason of blackness 
is a path to universality, isn’t this simply a repetition of Kant’s attempts 
to describe what it means to write outside the body? That is, once the 
purported universality of Europe’s false humanism has been unmasked as 
false, since it is tainted with power, how is it possible to argue for a uni-
versalism based on blackness that is somehow different in its claims to 
universalism? What exactly remains of the grounds of the specific once 
it has been negated in the universal? Mbembe’s rhetorical strategies belie 
his belief in embodied knowledge, primarily with his continual recourse 
to a disembodied and unspecified “we.” How did Mbembe move from 
the reason of black resistance to this disembodied voice, and what exactly 
makes it more credible than Kant’s categorical imperative? Related to this, 
Mbembe prefers grammatical constructions that obliterate the subject, 
since this avoids a closer analysis of what exactly the subject of race looks 
like. Repeatedly, I found myself asking of his general observations about 
Western thought: Who thought this? In whose eyes did this appear true? 
In which discourse? His claims constantly hang in the air, undocumented, 
vaguely documented, or falsely documented (the most telling example is 
his supporting a claim that genetics is rediscovering race with an article 
that goes to great lengths to explain how genetics has dismissed race).4 
Finally, the book’s continual homogenization of blackness as resistance is 
matched by an equal homogenization of Western forms of knowledge. The 
gross generalizations about perception and thought work against the thesis 
of embodied knowledge. Here Mbembe misses what is probably his most 
important theoretical and methodological opportunity: What methods are 
open to generalizing experiences of blackness without negating the idea of 
embodied knowledge? And how can embodied knowledge best undermine 
universality’s ruse? This was the project of the first-generation Frankfurt 
School, whose importance for postcolonial theory Amy Allen has recently 
highlighted. As she states in the introduction to her book, the critical 
theory of the first-generation Frankfurt School can counter the relativism 
and normativity of postcolonial theory through their critique of progress 
(Allen 2016, 6). Paradoxically, given the title, there is in Mbembe’s story 
of Western knowledge as good as no critical tradition. Granted, critical 
theory has yet to engage seriously with postcolonial positions, as Allen 
makes clear. But to obliterate the history of critique which accompanied 
the history of exploitation and racism in the West is to fetishize the univer-
sal voice Mbembe criticizes as the voice of exploitation.
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In spite of these flaws, Mbembe’s project remains valuable, since it 
opens the doors to a critical examination of African humanism. Such an 
examination would explore how the concept of the human relates to capi-
talism’s production of the non-human, as what Nancy Fraser calls “pro-
duction’s condition of possibility,” Marx’s hidden abode of production 
(Fraser 2017, 143). Fraser mentions as examples the reliance of produc-
tion on social arrangements outside the market economy (Fraser 2017, 
147), the creation of a realm of nature open to exploitation (Fraser 2017, 
149), and the creation of nations and territories where politics is separated 
from global economies (Fraser 2017, 151). This is where Mbembe’s dis-
cussion of the slave and unfree black labor needs to be brought into dia-
logue with critical theory, enabling an investigation of the naturalization 
of dehumanized humans.
As postcolonial theory is increasingly challenged by theories of embod-
ied knowledge and a renewed interest in critical theory, African humanism 
deserves the more careful attention it is currently receiving. By bringing ideas 
of shared humanity into dialogue with narrated experiences of human differ-
ence, it might be possible to begin to understand how capitalism produces the 
ideal of the human as a by-product of the dehumanization of labor, just as it 
produces abject humans through the global homogenization of experience.
Notes
1 “As a humanist myself, I endorse most of what [Aldous] Huxley, [Harold John] 
Blackham and [Jacques] Maritain say, but insist further that I am an African 
humanist” (Mphahlele 1986, 7).
2 See the examples I review in Noyes 2015, 9–14.
3 We see this for example when Paul Gilroy identifies Kant’s racism as a founding 
moment for a discourse of race in opposition to humanism: “The moment in 
which Kant compromised himself by associating the figure of the ‘Negro’ with 
stupidity and connecting differences in color to differences in mental capacity 
provides a useful symbolic marker. From that point on, race has been a cipher 
for the debasement of humanism and democracy” (Gilroy 2005, 9). The refer-
ence is to the 1764 essay Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the 
Sublime. It is worth noting that Herder was at this time a student of Kant, and 
was beginning to think about the implications of cultural difference for philoso-
phy, taking as his explicit point of departure Kant’s pre-critical philosophy.
4 Referring to an article that appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine in 
2003, Mbembe states: “Genomics, rather than marking the end of racism, has 
instead authorized a new deployment of race” (Mbembe 2017, 21). The article 
is explicit that “there is no evidence that the units of interest for medical genetics 
correspond to what we call races” (Cooper, Kaufman, and Ward 2003, 1168).
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In his 2001 book, The Hybrid Muse: Postcolonial Poetry in English, Jahan 
Ramazani eloquently argues that postcolonial literary criticism tends to 
neglect poetry because it is
a less transparent medium by which to recuperate the history, politics, 
and sociology of postcolonial societies; it is less favorable than other 
genres for curricular expeditions into the social history of the Third 
World; and, consequently, it is harder to annex as textual synecdoche 
for the social world.
(Ramazani 2001, 4)
He goes on to suggest that critics need to be more aware of the “specifically 
literary modes of response and recognition” (Ramazani 2001, 4) charac-
teristic of poetic expression. His argument is equally valid for poetry as 
for other forms of artistic expression rooted in aesthetic experiences that 
blur boundaries, subvert categories, and thus force us to appreciate the 
value of either incommensurable opacities or recognizable commonalities, 
beyond the particularisms of cultural difference. This is indeed what poetry 
does best—put certainties into question rather than encouraging the merely 
oppositional practices, counter-discursive rhetoric, or knee-jerk political 
reactions that are sometimes seen as part and parcel of an all-too-predicta-
ble set of anglophone postcolonial theoretical approaches.
I begin with Ramazani because, like him, I want to foreground practices 
of reading and interpretation that prioritize formal engagement with art and 
literature. Unlike him, however, I consider context an intrinsic category of 
text by virtue of the historical specificity of the generic medium that char-
acterizes either the poetic text or the art object. That medium—the written 
word, the canvas, or the camera, for example—is a concrete material con-
dition of production. Access to it varies according to numerous social and 
cultural factors. It thus provides an unavoidable point of entry into history. 
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Creolizations and migrations
Even when disavowed, these social conditions of possibility of writing or 
art-making will always haunt the embodied reader’s or viewer’s reception 
of the product and the process that brought the object into being. The chal-
lenge when dealing with the new discontents of postcolonial studies is to 
take into account both the particularities of context and the way a text 
might transcend that context and point to something beyond its ostensible 
material realities, toward forms of universalism that may nonetheless be 
elusive, forever receding like the horizon.
One of the signal differences between anglophone postcolonial studies 
and the field of francophone studies is that for the latter, questions of univer-
salism and humanism are always on the horizon of expectation, even when 
the author or artist is developing an oppositional approach to the dominant 
cultural paradigm. Art and literature are seen as crucial means of creating 
community and recognizing what the Martinican poet Aimé Césaire calls
de la fraternité qui ne saurait manquer de venir
quoique malhabile
[of the fraternity that cannot but come
however unsteady].
(Césaire 1983, 292, 293)
The poet of negritude who before Fanon pioneered the recognition of “the 
lived experience of blackness”2 did not seek to carve out a separatist view 
of community, contrary to what some interpreters of negritude argued. His 
praise for an “unsteady” fraternity is part of an approach to humanism 
rooted in the conviction that it can only be valued as a concept when inclu-
sive of all concrete particularisms, and not as a search for disembodied or 
unmarked generalized humanity.3 Such an approach presupposes rejection 
of simplistic oppositions, including that between pure formal analysis and 
contextually inflected readings. The second stanza of the poem “Vampire 
liminaire” (“Liminal Vampire”), published in 1960, from which the above 
lines are taken, reads as follows:
mais sous la marche de ronce du venin
ils ont prévalu leurs yeux intacts au plus fragile
de l’image impardonnable
de la vision mémorable du monde à bâtir
de la fraternité qui ne saurait manquer de venir
quoique malhabile
[but under the brambly advance of the venom4
they prevailed, their eyes intact, at the most fragile point
of the unpardonable image
of the memorable vision of a world to be built
of the fraternity that cannot but come,
however unsteady].
(Césaire 1983, 292, 293; transl. modified)
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The contours of this fraternity in a world still to come, “to be built,” 
remained an important horizon for Césaire, part of a visionary understand-
ing of community that rejects simplistic identitarian exclusions, a fact under-
scored by the Cahier d’un retour au pays natal, with its lyrical embrace of 
subalternity everywhere:
Comme il y a des hommes-hyènes et des hommes-panthères,








(Césaire 1983, 42, 43)
This sentiment is echoed by Édouard Maunick, the Mauritian poet whose 
radiant and still untranslated collections Ensoleillé vif and Paroles pour sol-
der la mer contain homages to Césaire and to Maunick’s own mixed-race 
background, proclaiming
[...] j’ai autant de vivre dans ma mort




sang rouge du Sang 
[I have as much living in my death
as I have gardens in my veins
red blood of the Occident
red blood of the Orient
red blood of Africa
red blood of Blood] (Sunburnt alive). 
(Maunick 1976, 111)
Like Césaire, Maunick knows that his desire to overcome simplistic duali-
ties “par delà nos contraires” [“beyond our differences”] is hampered by 
forces he cannot control, which often keep him on the border of a struggle 
between “mon urgence de conter” [“my urgent need to tell”] and “votre 
oubli d’écouter” [“your forgetting to listen”] (Maunick 1976, 28).
Césaire’s erstwhile Lycée pupil in Martinique, Édouard Glissant, devel-
oped a poetics of relationality that he hoped would articulate an ethics 
beyond negritude, although he too roots his approach in a basic physical 
experience: that of transport in the hold of a slave ship under conditions of 
torture. The image of the boat as matrix recurs in his work; it stands out 
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as a gendered metaphor that conjures the ship’s hold as a womb associated 
with death rather than life:
Cette barque est ta matrice, un moule, qui t’expulse pourtant. Enceinte 
d’autant de morts que de vivants en sursis.
[This boat is your womb, a matrix, and yet it expels you. This boat: 
pregnant with as many dead as living under sentence of death].
(Glissant 1997, 18/6)
While Glissant indexes the universal condition of birth, and indeed the fact 
that for any human, to be born is to be “under sentence of death,” he does 
not pause to reflect on the condition of the maternal or on biological repro-
duction generally. I shall come back to this later since it is an issue shared 
by both postcolonial and creolization theories.
Together, these three poets serve as my point of departure for thinking 
about colonial history, postcolonial theory, migrations, gender, and creoli-
zation. I am not however using their words as synecdoches for the social 
world (pace Ramazani). Rather, these words illuminate a pathway across 
the uneven terrain of colonialism and postcolonial theory. The often-her-
metic quality of their writing precludes its easy instrumentalization; yet the 
writing provides insights that allow us to capture the unstable, shaky qual-
ity of the “human” across planet earth, and to put into question the mere 
dualities of counter-discursive practices articulated by first-wave postcolo-
nial theorists and their successful formula about “writing back.”
Mapping and its discontents
A fundamental goal of the social sciences in their role as enablers of colonial 
expansion and administration has been the mapping of planet Earth and 
its inhabitants. Postcolonial scholars have critiqued the forms of control 
presupposed by the mapping impulse, and they have in turn sought to re-
imagine representations of the globe. Glissant famously mentions the “face 
cachée de la terre” [“the hidden face of the earth”] in his Discours antillais 
(Glissant 1981, 191), the hidden or invisible peoples of the earth whose 
native places are often left out or marginalized by common mapping prac-
tices. Mumbai artist Reena Saini Kallat offers a brilliant critique of colo-
nial mapping in her spectacular and conceptually challenging installation 
featured on the cover of the massive Postcolonial World edited by Jyotsna 
Singh and David Kim.
In a recording of a talk she gave at the Vancouver Art Gallery in 2016, 
Kallat explains that the installation was specifically conceived for the 2011 
Göteborg International Biennial for Contemporary Art in Sweden, the 
theme of which was “Pandemonium: Art in a Time of Creativity Fever.” 
For the curator, Sarat Maharaj, the 2011 biennial was “an occasion to 
mull over the turbulence and turmoil that is today’s world” (press release). 
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Kallat uses linear but knotted electrical wires to convey dynamic migra-
tory flows of energy across the globe and the simultaneous multiplication of 
real and symbolic borders that thwart contact and interrupt transmission. 
Her installation attempts to enact the contradictions inherent in the idea 
of a contemporary borderless world that actually stifles human potential 
locally and causes millions of deaths on clandestine migratory routes, on 
land and at sea. She demonstrates connections and makes their interrup-
tions eloquently visible.
Yet, for me, a scholar born in an island and invested in the study of 
insular or archipelagic spaces, Kallat’s map broadcasts a glaring omission, 
one that is quite common in postcolonial studies: it blithely negates the 
in-between, the islands in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans that link conti-
nents and were the actual stepping stones of colonial expansion. Islands 
often provided European conquerors with solid ground from which to 
launch their continental penetration; in fact, the name Antilles (Antillas, 
Antillen: ant-îles/ante insulae/ante-ilha/fore-islands) or “islands that come 
before the continent” concretizes this role since these were the first colonial 
Figure 3.1  Reena Saini Kallat: Untitled Map Installation, 2011.
Reena Saini Kallat, Mumbai, by permission.
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sites of the “New World” post-1492. By omitting them from the installa-
tion, Kallat (unwittingly?) reveals the deficiencies associated with a vision 
that treats continents as the primary ground for colonial and postcolonial 
studies. By adopting a perspective that is congruent with the oppositional 
“writing back” approach of first-wave postcolonial theorists and peda-
gogues, Kallat ignores the contradictions integral to the Early Modern his-
tory of mapmaking. She falls into the postcolonial trap of what I would call 
hypercontinentalism: East vs. West, North vs. South.
A brief look at a 1689 map by the influential Dutch cartographer 
Johannes van Keulen will clarify my point. His map gives importance to 
landmasses that seldom figure in the anglophone postcolonial imagination: 
the numerous small islands that dot the Indian Ocean between the east coast 
of Africa and the continent of Asia. Here the islands appear much bigger 
in relation to those continents than their actual physical size. This suggests 
how important they were for navigators who used them as refueling stops 
on their journeys across the ocean’s vast expanse.
Figure 3.2  Oost Indien (East Indies), 1689.
Johannes van Keulen, Amsterdam.
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By comparing the two maps and reading the absence of islands in Kallat 
against their exaggerated importance in Van Keulen, we can interrogate 
their use as ancillary bodies that play the role of Trojan horses in the out-
ward expansion of continental peoples, and conversely, as invisible entities 
for postcolonial scholars. This glaring lacuna is a symptom of a long-
standing problem. I bring this up not to detract from the obvious quality of 
Kallat’s work and from the appropriateness of that image for the cover of 
the volume The Postcolonial World. Both her installation and the volume 
crystallize what is central to a field that has been most concerned, since its 
pedagogical origins in Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin’s 1989 The Empire 
Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures, with the 
oppositional relationship between Britain and its (former) colonial subjects 
and with the counter-discursive strategies of appropriation and subversion 
that are central to these literatures.
In Van Keulen’s 1689 map, Indian Ocean islands are meticulously drawn 
and named. Their importance to navigators and other imperial agents is 
thus made tangible beyond the centuries. To ignore that past is to fall into 
the “presentism” that has sometimes been decried as one of the major short-
comings of a form of postcolonial theorizing that, while insisting on concep-
tualizing hybridity and the “third space,” actually disregards the originary 
“third space” of the first global colonial expansions of the early Modern 
period, the inaugural vieilles colonies of the French Empire in the Caribbean 
and the Mascarene archipelagos.
In the Antilles or West Indies, as in the Mascarenes of the East Indies, 
France exploited a number of insular sites that included Saint Domingue 
(Haiti), Martinique, and Guadeloupe in the West, and Isle de France 
(Mauritius) and Bourbon (Reunion) in the East. These, like similar sites 
in Spanish America and Portuguese Asia, were historical zones of contact 
and creolization that produced cultures of resistance and appropriation, 
each with its unique creolized, insular dynamics. What did creolization 
entail then and why would a better, historically grounded understanding 
of this phenomenon add to postcolonial studies? Understood as an unsta-
ble, open-ended practice of adaptation that generates unpredictable syn-
cretisms rather than mere homogeneity, creolization indexes both fantasies 
of intimacy and oppositional encounters, hierarchical exchanges as well 
as transversal ones. Creolization in the strict sense is specific to discrete 
colonial sites, plantation economies, and their histories of violent encoun-
ters. It is a constructive, if controversial, concept for understanding broad-
ranging asymmetrical as well as reciprocal exchanges, contaminations, and 
linguistic variations mediated by (neo)colonial power differentials and the 
circulation of global media.
When following Homi Bhabha in the anglophone context or using the 
vocabulary of entanglement and hybridity that francophone studies learns 
from Glissant, postcolonial theory is actually indexing concepts that emerged 
first in the field of Creolistics or Creole Linguistics. But while doing so, it 
72 Françoise Lionnet 
tends to ignore the epistemological entanglements and the creolized ways of 
being and knowing that predate the “post-” colonial moment and continue 
to influence, in the present, identity-formation in many insular sites in the 
Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Canaries, and the Mascarenes (to name 
only those regions).
It is thus crucial to think through the shortcomings of postcolonialism 
in relation to traditional “Creole” spaces as well as newer continental sites 
of creolized globalization that exhibit similar patterns of creole cosmopoli-
tanism. Creolization, like cosmopolitanism, presupposes patterns of move-
ment and mixing that trouble narratives of homogeneous national identity. 
In my work, I have theorized creolization as the cosmopolitanism of the 
subaltern, and cosmopolitanism as the creolization of the elites (Lionnet 
2012). Comparative approaches to processes of Creole transculturation will 
continue to open avenues for fertile research, whereas inquiry into the diver-
gences and convergences among such concepts as creolization, bricolage, 
métissage, mestizaje, hybridity, diaspora, and cosmopolitanism can help 
refine the specificities of each.
Epistemological entanglements among colonial and native knowledge 
systems have also produced ways of being and knowing that are themselves 
creolized. Their elucidation demands the use of comparative and flexible 
analytical tools that do not disavow the racial and gendered construction of 
the interconnected public, private, and subaltern spheres of modern socie-
ties. The method best suited to the examination of these realities is a practice 
of theorizing that dynamically revises itself as it interacts with its creolized 
objects and weaves vital new meanings out of ossified scholarly paradigms. 
The disciplinary and ethical consequences of such re-articulations of knowl-
edge in and out of the academy are far-reaching. They have the potential 
of radically transforming relations of power across a range of intellectual 
formations, lived realities, and structures of global experience (Lionnet and 
Shih 2011).
Creolization and the representation of disaster
Now let me turn to concrete and contemporary case studies of creolized envi-
ronments emerging out of the violence of ocean migratory routes. Glissant’s 
quote from Poétique de la Relation, used above, indexes the Middle Passage 
and the history of slavery, but it is uncannily appropriate for dangerous 
ocean crossings in our own time. Each small boat that washes ashore on the 
Mediterranean littoral is, like his “barque,” “a womb, […] pregnant with as 
many dead as living under sentence of death” (Glissant 1997, 18/6).
The award-winning collaborative art installation titled “Immigrants” 
created in 2015 by a group of eight high school students from the Apostolos 
Loucas lyceum (or St. Luke High School) at Kolossi, an ancient neighbor-
hood of Limassol, the second largest city in the Mediterranean island of 
Cyprus, echo Glissant’s vision.5 Guided by their art teacher, painter Popi 
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Nicolaou, the students were inspired by the twenty-first-century refugee cri-
sis in the Mediterranean, a crisis that speaks directly to their experiences as 
children of the displaced Greek Cypriot families forced to settle in Limassol, 
in Southern Cyprus, subsequent to the partition of the island nation after 
the 1974 Greek Junta-sponsored coup that led to Turkish invasion and a 
bloody civil conflict. In 2015, the Syrian conflict triggered the departure of 
thousands of refugees in small fishing boats. The plight of this wave of arriv-
als on Cyprus’s shores resonated with a population deeply familiar with 
traumatic histories. Many boats were just empty shells washing ashore, 
some mere capsized wombs, others containing dead bodies. Yet others filled 
with the lucky ones: migrants seeking help, adults with children and babies. 
Some of these refugees found asylum. But the Municipal Council of Limassol 
did not know what to do with the wrecked boats. Budding young artists in 
the community saw the opportunity to use these found objects to address 
a humanitarian crisis that affects so many islands in the Mediterranean. 
They obtained authorization to transform one of the wrecks for their 2015 
annual art project. They arranged life-size figures of adults and children 
in the boat. Bodies were shaped from expanding spray foam. Plaster casts 
of the artists’ own heads served to create the human faces of these “alien” 
migrants, underscoring the shared humanity and geographic proximity of 
all in this ancient mare nostrum, the Mediterranean basin.
This stunning creation raised awareness of the plight of refugees, leading 
to several awards, culminating with the March 2016 prestigious Saatchi 
Gallery/Deutsche Bank Art Prize meant to be used for the winning public 
school’s art budget and to encourage artistic vocations. But above all, the 
award affords international attention and a cultural platform from which 
these insular young artists can share their message of solidarity with their 
continental neighbors, victims like their own families of a bloody and dec-
ades-long fraternal war.
Open boats, with their cargo of bare life and dead souls, communicate 
the affective as much as the political dimensions of tragedies on the high seas 
of those who are no longer protected by custom or law, and whose maritime 
experience corresponds to painful loss and impossible homecoming.
The first image, of the mother and suckling child, boldly signifying on 
the traditional image of the sexualized and proud female form used as 
protective nautical figurehead, crystallizes the ongoing scandal of mass 
drowning in the Mediterranean. Here, the mother’s arms are only power-
less to save the children. Her obvious fertility is a tragic counterpart to 
the overall fate of the migrants. To “read” this installation is to grasp the 
implicit small narratives and explicit significant details of what it means to 
be a migrant, a refugee, crushed under the wheels of history, and stranded 
on unfamiliar shores.
A similar macabre harvest of boats is also found across the Mediterranean, 
especially to the west of Cyprus, between Tunisia and Sicily. There, small 
boats have sadly become part of the southern littoral landscape of the Italian 
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island of Lampedusa, inspiring the work of British Afro-Caribbean artist 
Isaac Julien. His 2007 installation called “Western Union: Small Boats” 
transmutes pain and loss into colorful video images that are as aesthetically 
pleasing as they are ethically powerful.6
The beauty of Julien’s installation has, understandably, raised questions 
about the aesthetic representation and visual exploitation of disaster—a 
question that I have addressed elsewhere in relation to the work of Algerian 
writer Assia Djebar, and that I need not dwell on here (“Le Blanc”). Suffice 
it to say, as African American art historian Sarah Lewis has argued in the 
introduction, titled “Vision and Justice,” to her remarkable 2016 collec-
tion of photographs for the journal Aperture, that to be “an engaged citi-
zen requires grappling with pictures and knowing their historical contexts” 
(Lewis 2016, 11). The Kolossi students’ installation exemplifies this engage-
ment and puts into practice a philosophy of relationality that speaks directly 
to Glissant’s work. Looking with attention and bearing witness to what we 
grasp of our world’s problem should be our main civic work, argues Lewis, 
since it is an activity that can enable us to cross the gulf of indifference 
and ignorance that separates us (Lewis 2016, 12). For Lewis, artists know 
intuitively “what images need to be seen to affect change and alter history” 
(Lewis 2016, 11). The Cypriot teenagers’ installation provides a haunting 
and respectful visual testimony of the historical entanglements that align 
Cyprus’s fate with that of twenty-first-century Syria.
If art can be the way of measuring and taking into account the full poten-
tial of human life in all its diversity, then these works bear witness to our 
collective responsibility toward those whose status as full citizens contin-
ues to be in jeopardy due to continued religious, racial, or ethnic prejudice 
against refugees. These small boats have become, in the words of the art 
historian Jennifer González, “an iconic sign and key metaphor for African 
migration” (González 2011, 119).
What critical vocabulary can best allow us to do justice to these artistic 
creations and performances without reducing them to mere political meta-
phors for our era? I think the language of postcolonial studies falls short 
here, whereas that of creolization studies, developed by the same franco-
phone thinkers who have had an undeniable influence on postcolonial the-
ory, can enable a much more nuanced approach to the multiple dimensions 
of this global crisis.
Poetry: In praise of an “unsteady” humanism
The field of francophone studies, grounded today in works by Aimé Césaire 
and Frantz Fanon (among others), has helped shape postcolonial studies; but 
francophone studies remains a distinct discipline with roots beyond mere 
oppositional practices. It is marked primarily by a complex engagement with 
universalism(s) and the question of rights. Césaire has often been invoked 
to shore up many political projects due to his championing of the ideology 
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of negritude perceived as identitarian resistance against European colonial 
power and discourse; but the poet’s overall oeuvre is a profound lesson in dia-
lectical thinking that allows no space for such oversimplification. His politi-
cal legacy, his support of the system of “departmentalization” in the French 
National Assembly in 1946, similarly coincides with the unconditional desire 
for the formal and fundamental Republican principle of indiscriminate equal-
ity. This principle, however, did not translate into fact on the ground. Césaire 
eventually acknowledged that the goal of bringing the vieilles colonies within 
the purview of a universal (as opposed to ethnically or racially particular) rule 
of law were never met. Faced with these contradictions between the theoreti-
cal and the real—since the Domiens or citizens of the DOMs, the départe-
ments d’outre-mer of France, remained de facto unequal, economically and 
culturally—Césaire nonetheless remained true to his 1935 declaration in his 
essay “Nègreries” that the solution was not to retreat into interiority and 
oppositional localism, but to further develop Antillean singularity:
La jeunesse Noire veut agir et créer. Elle veut avoir ses poètes, ses roman-
ciers, qui lui diront à elle, ses malheurs à elle, et ses grandeurs à elle: elle 
veut contribuer à la vie universelle, à l’humanisation de l’humanité; et 
pour cela, encore une fois, il faut se conserver ou se retrouver: c’est le 
primat du soi.
[Black youth want to act and create. They want their own poets and 
novelists who can speak to their own misfortunes as much as to their 
accomplishments: they want to contribute to universal life, to the 
humanization of humanity; to that end, they need once again to huddle 
and rediscover themselves. That is the fundamental element of identity].
(Césaire 2013, 248)
Emblematic of these visionary ideals of global solidarity, the lines from 
“Liminal Vampire” sum up the core values of an intellectual project that 
simultaneously resists and transcends (as does Frantz Fanon’s) lazy nation-
alism and cultural essentialisms, offering “the memorable vision of a world 
to be built / of the fraternity that cannot but come, / however unsteady.” 
Césaire’s oeuvre, like that of his more radical Caribbean colleague, the 
Guyanese Léon-Gontran Damas, is the defense of an “unsteady” humanism 
by means of a poetic rhetoric that will only lend itself to political appropria-
tion if one ignores its dialectical thrust. Due to such constitutive complexi-
ties, Césaire has both been embraced by Black nationalists and pointedly 
critiqued by, among others, Wole Soyinka, for an unnecessary essentialism 
that only reinforces binary colonial discourses instead of creating revolu-
tionary edge and confident strength (although Soyinka recently revised his 
assessment and delivered an appreciative speech on Césaire7). Critiqued 
by subsequent generations of Caribbean intellectuals, such as the créoliste 
Raphaël Confiant and the feminist Maryse Condé, Césaire became an 
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occasional and convenient straw man. But to return to his poetry now is to 
take the full measure of a thinker who did not subscribe to the binary cate-
gories of postcolonial counter-discourse or contrapuntal analyses. Although 
he never valued his native Creole language as a usable mode of artistic or 
abstract expression, and saw the Créolité movement as a regrettable retreat 
into localism and isolationism that he had denounced in 1935, his practice 
is very much in tune with the forms of creolization born in the New World 
that underwrite the creation of the “new” as well as the revolutionary defor-
mations and transformations of European idioms that are the hallmark of 
his oeuvre. It is only by attending to the “specifically literary [read: aesthetic] 
modes of response and recognition” (Ramazani 2001, 4) characteristic of 
poetic and artistic expression, to use Ramazani’s terms quoted above, that 
one can grasp the nature of the expansive, inclusive ideology that actually 
subtends Caribbean Negritude conceived as a singularity rather than a par-
ticularity that takes its proper place in a universal dialogue of hybridizing 
cultures that cannot be reduced to the bland amalgam implied by the idea 
of the American melting pot, that is, of a hybridity in which constitutive ele-
ments have become indistinct.
In my own work on the concept of métissage, developed in my first book 
(1989)—which was the first comparative study of its kind—I worked on the 
European canon (Augustine, Nietzsche), as well as on African American, 
Caribbean, and Indian Ocean writers. My focus was the genre of self- 
portraiture and its rhetoric of identity, race, gender, and class. It allowed 
me to think about writing and agency: What does it mean to question one’s 
understanding of the self in relation to a dominant discourse of race, gender, 
sexuality, and class, and to do so in an imperial language? The operative 
concept was the idea of mé-tissage, initially spelled with a hyphen, which 
differentiates it from the ubiquitous “hybridity” of postcolonial studies. 
Rooted in a gendered approach to the idea of cultural and textual tissage 
(from the Latin textus), it is a metaphor for a form of mixing that results 
in the creation of the “new”—of a third entity that does not annul the ones 
that came together to produce it. It indexes miscegenation but never the 
bland blending of separate elements. Rather, it is akin to thinking of the new 
in terms of biological reproduction: as a generative force of differentiation 
that drives life itself. My philosophical grounding in the works of Nietzsche 
and Deleuze was important to my articulation of this concept, although I 
preferred to think of the “new” in more gendered ways than Deleuze and in 
terms of the obvious but strangely silenced discourse of biological reproduc-
tion which is the degree zero of the creation of the new as a “third” term. 
To me, this is just another instance of the blindness that accompanies the 
penchant for “disembodied” categories in Western scholarship, and for the 
insufficient attention to gender that still affects a great deal of postcolonial 
theorizing, from Edward Said on (see Lionnet 2011a).
Métissage is a methodological principle grounded in the idea of intersec-
tionality (as defined by Kimberlé Crenshaw at the level of identity) applied 
to analytical practice. It relates text and context, literature, history, and 
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geography, autobiography and fiction in order to expose the fundamental 
hybridity of subjects and spaces. It requires in turn a hybrid or multi-scaler 
approach to the micro and macro structures that are constitutive of our 
disciplinary arrangements.
Métissage and creolization are concepts that best help me work on 
authors and artists who engage with what it means to live in a world that 
has undergone sudden, radical, and sometimes violent transformations 
which produced in turn changes in the relationship between individuals 
and communities, the present and the past, the here and the there. Out of 
such transformations, authors create, with words and images, new worlds 
of meaning. How we approach the deliberate aesthetic dimension of their 
texts while doing full justice to their socio-cultural and political contexts is a 
measure of the respect we give to their labor as writers and artists who keep 
both the aesthetic and the ethical alive in their works.
Notes
1 All translations are mine unless otherwise stated. I have used published transla-
tions whenever possible, but modified them when necessary to underscore the 
meaning I foreground in my interpretation. Translations of Édouard Maunick’s 
poems are by Betty Wilson, as yet unpublished.
2 To echo the influential title of chapter 5 of Black Skin, White Masks.
3 For a useful overview of these questions in relation to Césaire, see Hiddleston.
4 “Venom” refers to the racism Césaire is intent on denouncing.
5 As reported in the news vehicle Cyprus Mail Online: https://cyprus- 
mail.com/2016/03/04/poignant-school-art-project-on-refugees-wins-coveted-
saatchi-prize/. See also Nikolaidou. The photos are from this public blog.
6 After the Arab Spring of 2011, the Italian island of Lampedusa received more 
migrants (>5,500) fleeing Tunisia and Libya than it had local residents (<5,300; 
see https://www.zamyn.org/current/isaac-julien2.html; accessed 07 May 2019).
7 In his keynote address at the African Literatures Conference at SOAS University 
of London, 28th October 2017.
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Arguably the product of comparative literature, Euro-American postcolo-
nial theory is largely in the process of being superseded by Global South 
studies in the same discipline. Thus far, Global South studies, for the pur-
poses of comparatists, remains undefined, beyond gesturing towards the 
task of South-South comparatism, a gesture in and of itself premised on 
postcolonial theory’s critique of Eurocentrism. “I think global South is a 
reverse racist term, one that ignores the daunting diversity outside Europe 
and the United States,” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has recently written. 
“We decide to define what we are not by a bit of academic tourism,” she 
continues, “choosing academics to represent the global South at conferences 
and in journals from countries elsewhere who have class continuity with us 
and thus resolving our own sense of ourselves as democratic subjects resist-
ing definition by race and gender” (Spivak 2018, 166). While the charge of 
“tokenization” (Spivak 2018, 167) has been leveled likewise against Euro-
American postcolonial theory, my wager is two-fold: Global South compa-
ratism can and should find some of its conceptual bearings in postcolonial 
theory; and the postcolonial here is to be epistemologically and temporally 
extended to embrace its prehistory in the liberation moment and thus recoup 
its emphasis on social justice for the purposes of the “New International” 
(Derrida 1994). I demonstrate this wager through the writings of Edwar al-
Kharrat about the Afro-Asian movement.
It is of no small significance that the first of two explicit mentions of the 
1955 Asian-African Conference in Indonesia, or Bandung, as it came to be 
known, in Edward Said’s Orientalism occurs in the context of a citation from 
Anouar Abdel-Malek’s 1963 article “Orientalism in Crisis.” Abdel-Malek, 
the Egyptian Leftist intellectual and political scientist, had argued that “the 
resurgence of the nations and the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
in the last two generations” was what it took to “provoke a prise de con-
science, tardy and frequently reticent, of an exigency of principle become 
an unavoidable practical necessity, precisely due to the decisive influence of 
the political factor, i.e., the victories achieved by the various movements of 
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national liberation on a world scale.” Granted, Abdel-Malek underscores 
other epistemological reasons for the crisis; but what is signal is that he 
largely ascribes that crisis as it plays out in both the Western European and 
the socialist sectors to the agency of the Third World. “But the rebirth of 
the nations and peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, since the end 
of the nineteenth century, and the very rapid acceleration of this process 
due to the victory of the national liberation movements in the ex-colonial 
world,” together with “the appearance of the group of socialist states and 
the subsequent differentiation between the ‘two Europes,’ has shaken the 
edifice of traditional orientalism to its foundations” (Abdel-Malek 1963, 
103–104, 111–112).
Writing in 1963, Abdel-Malek has no doubt about the epistemological 
“time-lag” in Orientalism’s concepts and methodology borne upon it by 
“the revolutions on the three ‘forgotten continents’” and Bandung—his 
article appeared two years after the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries 
in Belgrade and three years before the 1966 Tricontinental Conference 
of African, Asian and Latin American Peoples in Havana, Cuba (Abdel-
Malek 112; see also Young 2001). Some 15 years later, Said would cite 
Abdel-Malek under the rubric of “crisis” in the course of surveying 
Western Orientalist responses in the post-Bandung era. More germane, 
Said’s 1994 “Afterword” to Orientalism explicitly states that, “the earliest 
studies of the post-colonial were by such distinguished thinkers as Anwar 
Abdel Malek, Samir Amin, and C. L. R. James, almost all based on stud-
ies of domination and control done from the standpoint of either a com-
pleted political independence or an incomplete liberationist project” (Said 
1994, 349). Far from nominating himself the fountainhead of postcolonial 
critique, as he is often seen in the Euro-American academy, Said heark-
ens back to an inaugural generation, whose members are all inscribed in 
various overlapping internationalisms. By contrast, the benchmark 1989 
volume The Empire Writes Back obscures this prehistory: The authors 
cursorily dispense with a perceived “limited and pejorative term ‘Third 
World Literatures,’” in favor of the postcolonial defined as “all the cul-
ture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization 
to the present.” Despite attending to “[l]arger geographical models that 
cross [...] boundaries” and “comparisons between two or more regions,” 
the volume overlooks the Afro-Asian and Tricontinental frameworks of 
solidarity which “contested” the centrality of the Metropole (Ashcroft 
et al. 1989, 23, 2, 17, 18; see Halim 2012, 571).
The “pre-” of the postcolonial in my title gestures not towards the prefix 
“post,” sometimes misconstrued as that which comes after colonialism, but 
rather towards an avant la lettre postcolonialism. The intellectual output 
of “the three ‘forgotten continents,’” I posit, constitutes the prehistory of 
what goes in the Western academy by the label “postcolonial.” Granted, the 
Euro-American postcolonial covers a plurality of widely differentiated theo-
retical orientations and has not been spared scathing criticism, including 
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by Leftists. Despite this, addressing the Afro-Asian cultural output as an 
outgrowth of Bandung, I had argued in 2012 that:
One would do well to excavate antecedent archives of postcolonial criti-
cism that evince “in-betweenness” among nonmetropolitan intellectuals 
[…]. It is important to uncover such overlooked genealogies first, to 
refute the allegations of the “complicity” […] of postcolonial criticism 
as practiced in the US academy, which is not self-generating but built on 
earlier anticolonial, Third Worldist, internationalist trends; and second, 
to safeguard against a dismissal of concepts it deploys that have their 
viability as tools for a critique of current realities of globalization and 
neocolonialism.
(Halim 2012, 565)
At the close of the decade, I cannot but insist on the abiding relevance of 
that argument for both geopolitical and intellectual reasons.
In contradistinction to the view in some quarters that the postcolonial 
is passé, I continue to press for recouping it, and doing so with the longue 
durée of its prehistory, for the concerns of our times. Current synergies of 
geopolitical phenomena across the globe that spell its relevance barely need 
to be identified: the rise of the Right, environmental degradation impacting 
the subaltern foremost, the refugee crisis, the return of a barely repressed 
racism, and Islamophobia, among others. Appealing to the internationalist 
pre-postcolonial is imperative to address “the vital question of social justice” 
in the configurations of our day, particularly in the domain of comparatism 
(Halim 2017a, 426). As a promoter of the salutary, anti-Eurocentric turn 
in comparative literature to Global South studies, I reiterate some caveats. 
The project of South-South comparatism would err to overlook the South’s 
overdetermined imbrication with the North in view of the structuring effects 
of global capital, and in the process also lose sight of commonalities, if not 
yet full-fledged solidarities, between the South and oppressed groups in the 
North. The initial articulations of the terms Third World and Global South 
are ideologically diametrical opposites. The term the Third World was pro-
posed in 1952 by the French intellectual Alfred Sauvy along the lines of 
the Third Estate: “This ignored, exploited, scorned Third World, like the 
Third Estate, likewise demands to become something” (Sauvy 1952, 14; see 
Prashad 2007, 11). The Global South began to acquire currency through 
the Brandt Commission—called for in 1977 by the president of the World 
Bank—and its report North-South: A Programme for Survival (1980). The 
report voiced some criticism of the North and used the vocabulary of “soli-
darity” and “disarmament”; but it “advocated large infusions of capital 
from the North to the South to enable” its “modernization” so that “the 
‘South’ had turned from a possible savior of the world to an object of com-
passion that must be saved in order for the world to save itself” (Dirlik 
2007, 13, 14; see also Brandt 1980, esp. 7–48, and Prashad 2007, 235). 
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In the process of scholarly reappropriations of the Global South for more 
progressive ends, its geographic and economic coordinates vis-à-vis the 
North have been subject to debate. “If ‘South,’ unmoored from strict geo-
graphic associations, becomes a marker for power comprised by political 
and economic disenfranchisement,” it is also important “not to diminish the 
usefulness of ‘Global South’/‘Global North’” (Trefzer et al. 2014, 2). For 
my purposes of an anti-Eurocentric comparatism, the analeptic recouping of 
a Third Worldist archive needs to avoid nostalgia and a separatist ethnocen-
trism while simultaneously training its proleptic attention on today’s Global 
South in its multiple relations to the Global North.
Particularly pertinent are the texts of Edwar al-Kharrat (1926–2015), the 
Egyptian experimental writer and critic, because they serve as a reminder of 
various divergent discourses of internationalism which they bring into play 
and modulate the twists and turns of “commitment” so central to Third 
Worldism and to Arabic literature of the immediate post-independence dec-
ades. The present chapter is a companion piece to a 2017 article in which, 
building on a long engagement with al-Kharrat’s corpus, I had argued for 
reading the continuity of anti-colonial nationalism with internationalism in 
relation to Surrealism in his texts. There, I tackled his 2002 monumental 
semi-autobiographical novel Tariq al-Nisr (The Way of an Eagle)—devoted 
to the narrator’s experience in the Trotskyist Left in the 1940s and its after-
math in the early ’50s, with some prolepses—as well as his two semi-auto-
biographical novels, the 1986 Turabuha Za‘faran (City of Saffron) and its 
1990 sequel, Ya Banat Iskindiriyya (Girls of Alexandria). A member of what 
I designate as “the generation of the interregnum”—the heightened anti-
colonial struggle of the 1930s and ’40s, into decolonization in the 1950s—
al-Kharrat was part of a Trotskyist-oriented group in 1940s Alexandria, 
less well-known than the largely Trotskyist, predominantly surrealist Art 
et liberté Cairo-based group of the ’40s (Halim 2017b, 289; see also idem. 
2017a). The Cairene intellectuals derived their name from the 1938 mani-
festo by André Breton and Leon Trotsky “Towards a Free Revolutionary 
Art” against the rise of European fascism, and the groups in the two cities 
were opposed to the totalitarianism of the USSR. The Alexandrian group 
mostly subscribed to Trotsky’s concept of “Permanent Revolution”—
which, versus the Stalinist concept of “socialism in one country” advocated 
a “socialist revolution [that] begins on the national arena, […] unfolds on 
the international arena, and is completed on the world arena”—and al-
Kharrat himself was detained for two years at the end of the ’40s (Trotsky 
2010, 313). Here, I take up the thematics of internationalism in relation to 
Third Worldism and Afro-Asian solidarity in al-Kharrat’s texts, primarily 
his 1998 Tabarih al-Waqa’i‘ wa-l-Junun (Agonies of Events and Madness), 
a series of interconnected vignettes largely about the novelist’s years in the 
Afro-Asian movement.
From the late 1950s, al-Kharrat worked at the Afro-Asian People’s 
Solidarity Organization and later the Afro-Asian Writers’ Association 
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(AAWA), in which latter context he served as one of the editors of the tri-
lingual journal Lotus: Afro-Asian Writings. Within the Afro-Asian forums 
in which he worked and was promoted assistant secretary-general, until 
his retirement in 1983, commitment in a variety of registers, not least 
Soviet, found favor. It is fortuitous, of course, that al-Kharrat’s lifespan and 
career allow us to underscore the historical variety of internationalisms of 
the period, in his case the Trotskyist and the Afro-Asian. But it is not my 
intention to reduce this discussion to an autobiographical ambit, although 
delving into autobiographical materials does have its validity. Rather, I 
argue for attending to the un-registered minutiae of the Afro-Asian—the 
marginalia of actors, such as letters, “grey literature,” accounts of hushed 
debates in the corridors of conferences, obscure memoirs, little-read spin-
off texts relating to the period, published either concurrently in forums that 
received no sponsorship from AAWA or in texts issued after the movement 
had virtually petered out. Recapturing something of the quotidian agency 
of the Afro-Asian affords angles on that movement which qualify official 
narratives (Halim 2017c and 2017d).1 Here, we may also locate dissonances 
and assonances of different internationalist discourses beneath the principal 
Third Worldist Afro-Asian one, and, with an eye towards a more expansive 
Global South comparatism, guard against reifying that moment and fore-
closing more inclusive potentialities. The more pronounced articulations of 
both Trotskyism and things Afro-Asian in al-Kharrat’s texts date to the 
1990s and early 2000s, after the fact of a severe undermining of the latter 
movement, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the 
unipolar system. I venture that these later texts retain an imprint of old ideo-
logical conflicts while, in view of the undermining of the socialist project 
in the time of their writing, also striving to salvage something of a broader 
internationalism beyond ideological differences. The tension between these 
two trends suspends dogmatism and, as also spelled out in al-Kharrat’s criti-
cal texts, in view of his expansive dedication to social justice, makes for one 
version of the abiding relevance of the longue durée of the postcolonial.
The dissonances of two versions of internationalism—the Trotskyist 
one of al-Kharrat’s 1940s militancy and the Afro-Asian one that gathered 
Leftists of various trends committed to Third-Worldist solidarity which 
received some patronage from a USSR that muffled Trotskyism—material-
ize in The Way of an Eagle and Agonies of Events and Madness, precisely 
in the marginalia they recollect. An anecdote that appears in both volumes 
depicts the narrator’s encounter with a member of the Soviet delegation 
to the Emergency International Solidarity Conference with the People of 
Angola, held in Luanda from February 2 to 4, 1976. The man, white-haired 
and emaciated, is unnamed. The narrator remarks that he had met a White 
Russian, Alexi, in detention in Alexandria in the 1940s who uncannily 
resembles him “as to be almost his twin.” When the narrator’s comments 
are relayed via a translator, the elderly man replies that he is a veteran 
of the October Revolution, that as a boy he had fought in the Red Army 
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under the leadership of Leon Trotsky. “He said it,” the narrator observes, 
“in a raucous, nonchalant voice tinged with the death-defying daring of 
the elderly who no longer have anything to fear.” The translator is called 
Enver Valibekov, the narrator wryly informing the reader that the name, 
if returned to its Arabic original, would be Anwar Wali Bey. Valibekov 
relays the words “in a whisper: Trotsky’s name, the mere name, was still 
off-limits across the board of the Party’s cadres, and the general populace all 
the more. But,” the narrator continues, “Valibekov was from the elite, and 
I would sometimes debate with him—in Arabic—when we were alone, with 
no witnesses around, democracy and centralism, and the Trotskyist splinter-
ing which I held to be the original with Stalin as the dissident” (al-Kharrat 
1998, 216–217; see also idem. 2002, 303).
In shining a light on the heavy-handed censorship and brutality in the later 
permutations of the Bolshevik revolution, the episode strips sepia tints off 
the Afro-Asian movement by foregrounding limitations inflected by Soviet 
presence, while reminding the reader of conflicting versions of international-
ism. Granted, the narrator places markers on his ambivalence towards the 
Afro-Asian version of internationalism: “Did we [Alexandrian Trotskyists 
of the 1940s] sell out?” (218). And yet the text constantly appeals to “the 
days of ardor, belief and dedication for the sake of what we saw as Africa 
and Asia’s freedom, for the dignity and prosperity of their peoples. Have 
these dreams been lost, are they truly irrevocable?” (128). The rhetorical 
question is performative in countering neoliberal amnesia with a retrieval 
of Third Worldism even as the uncharacteristic directness of the cri de cœur 
points to the shifts of commitment in al-Kharrat’s corpus in relation to 
unfinished progressive aspirations.
Briefly, for lack of space, commitment is used capaciously in Arab intellec-
tual circles to cover sometimes divergent trends, attendant on decolonization 
and postcolonial thought. The Arab line of descent of iltizam (commitment) 
and al-adab al-multazim (littérature engagée) from Jean-Paul Sartre’s exis-
tentialism, starting 1947, which construed the “ontological basis of Sartre’s 
theses […] superfluous,” acquired different nuances in Egypt and the Arab 
East (Klemm 2000, 55). That line was undermined in the wake of Sartre’s 
prevarication during his visit to Egypt and Israel some three months before 
the June 1967 War and then of his outright pro-Zionist statements in the 
aftermath of that war (Di-Capua 2018). Another strand of commitment was 
socialist realism promoted primarily by Mahmud Amin al-‘Alim and ‘Abd 
al-‘Azim Anis in their 1955 book, Fi al-Thaqafa al-Misriyya. This “made 
a deliberate attempt to appropriate Sartrean iltizam and submerge it in the 
Marxist-Leninist schema,” and had a wide resonance in the Arab world. 
Starting in the mid-1960s, as spearheaded by the Palestinian writer Ghassan 
Kanafani, a new term, adab al-muqawama (resistance literature), emerging 
from the Palestinian situation and conjoining with other struggles, would 
rise to the fore in Arab literary debate. To claim, however, that “resist-
ance literature” supplanted the “defeated concept of iltizam” post-1967 is 
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to oversimplify (Di-Capua 2018, 85, 257). While the Six-Day War dealt a 
blow to the notion of commitment, particularly given its association with an 
establishment now viewed as bankrupt, commitment did survive in diffuse 
ways, in conjunction with resistance literature. Among the earliest forums 
to host Kanafani’s resistance literature was an AAWA conference in Beirut 
in 1967 and the 1968 second issue of Lotus (Halim 2012, 572).
Al-Kharrat was in a curious position in the late 1960s, serving on the edi-
torial board of two signal journals almost diametrically opposed, not least 
when it came to commitment. A few months after the publication of Afro-
Asian Writings (the title under which Lotus was first published) in Cairo, the 
Egyptian capital would witness the launching of Gallery 68, an independent 
journal issued by a collective, in contrast to Lotus’ pyramidal structure in 
which al-Kharrat was assistant editor-in-chief but in effect ran the show per 
AAWA’s guidelines. Gallery 68 was published in response to the defeat in 
the June 1967 War, and, though short-lived, had a far-reaching impact on 
Arab letters. Experimental and avant-garde, it debated socialist realism in 
polemic after the other—with titles such as “We Have Bid [Andrei] Zhdanov 
a Final Adieu”—while including literary translations of Afro-Asian, as well as 
European and American, writers (see Shukri 1969). To draw out al-Kharrat’s 
editorial doubling in the two journals is not to suggest duplicity (even though 
the narrator in Agonies registers and ripostes to such a charge regarding his 
doubling role [see al-Kharrat 1998, 177–180]); there were overlaps in person-
nel and texts between the two journals, al-Kharrat’s own presence in AAWA 
having secured some funding for Gallery 68 (Halim 2017b 305, and idem. 
2018). Rather, my intention is to trace the variations of commitment at the 
end of the twentieth century, when the “Third World as an idea” appeared 
roundly defeated (Prashad 2007, 13).
In implementing Lotus’ editorial policy, al-Kharrat seems to have been 
keen on retaining, at least within his own pronouncements, a carefully 
negotiated position regarding commitment, if with a brief moment of 
ambivalence in which he was also critical of commitment, writ large. That 
moment comes into view in his editorial to what turned out to be the final 
issue of Gallery:
This generation—the ’68 generation—refuses to set foot on trodden 
paths […]. ’68 is not surrealist, not existentialist, nor Marxist, though 
some of us might incline to any one of these in art or criticism, to vary-
ing degrees, and divergent, sometimes discrepant interpretations, but all 
these are well-trodden beliefs and means that may have become dead-
end roads […]. I wish for Gallery to be an open forum, expansive and 
[welcoming of] clashing debate, and that it should hold aloof from a 
stern “iltizam” [commitment] to beliefs and ideologies, other than its 
iltizam to the ethic of searching for some beauty, “the horrifying beauty 
of truth,” and to sincerity in the search.
(al-Kharrat 1971a, 3, 4–5)
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The prescriptive commentary may have come with the territory of a mission 
statement specific to Gallery 68, which contributed to a post-1967 War 
Arab Zeitgeist of “self-criticism” (al-‘Azm 1969); this even if the novelist 
was perhaps also overstating his own position, in a compensatory move, in 
view of his editorial role in that other journal in which commitment was par 
for the course.
Turning to a preface al-Kharrat published in the same year (1971) as co-
editor of the trilingual Afro-Asian Poetry: Anthology, culled from the pages 
of Lotus, we encounter this:
It would have been both unnatural and unexpected for the works of 
these authors, whose countries have just come out of a relentless strug-
gle in which often the poets themselves have taken part, not to reflect 
this often still raging struggle against colonialist and imperialist oppres-
sion […]. We must not forget that some of the greatest of artistic works 
that have entered world heritage were initially militant and at times bla-
tantly propagandist, though time may have given them a classical halo. 
Artistic value, when present in a work, is increased, and not diminished 
by the revolutionary content of a work of art.
(al-Kharrat 1971b XVIII; trans. mod. per al-Khar-
rat n.d. 14; emphasis added)
Within this Afro-Asian framework, al-Kharrat maintained an orientation 
towards the progressive that, I argue, was silently qualified by his 1940s 
Trotskyist militancy and subtly confronted the task of bracketing the pitfalls 
of a “propagandistic” socialist realism (Halim 2018). I detect here echoes, 
for example, from “Towards a Free Revolutionary Art”: “True art, which is 
not content to play variations on ready-made models […] is unable not to be 
revolutionary”; or such statements by Trotsky as “[t]he struggle for revolu-
tionary ideas in art must begin once again with the struggle for artistic truth, 
not in terms of any single school, but in terms of the immutable faith of the 
artist in his own inner self” (Trotsky 1992, 117, 124). While the rejection of 
socialist realism was a fixture throughout al-Kharrat’s corpus, commitment 
would be rearticulated within his upholding of experimentation. His texts 
thus subvert that chestnut Cold War binary of abstract art/modernism art 
versus committed art/littérature engagée (Halim 2017c).
As novelist, poet, and critic, al-Kharrat’s texts have striven for articu-
lations of experimentation and avant-gardism that oppose Eurocentrism, 
authoritarianism, and establishment aesthetics. Noting that the Arabic 
word hadatha does double duty, signifying both modernity and modernism, 
I underscore that al-Kharrat—who uses it, in the sense of literary moder-
nity, to designate “a value [inherent] in the artistic work; the value of per-
petual questioning”—harks back for its lineage to Arab heritage, folklore, 
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sagas, The Thousand and One Nights, and Sufism (al-Kharrat 1993a, 21; 
see Halim 2017a, 441–442). He would locate similar indigenous anteced-
ents for Egyptian Surrealism, including Ancient Egyptian architecture—as 
opposed to viewing it as an offshoot of international Surrealism—which he 
conjoins with “the new sensibility.” A product of President Anwar Sadat’s 
economic liberalization, the dissolution of quasi-socialist policies, and the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the new sensibility—which covers various 
trends including avant-gardist and surrealist—is defined by al-Kharrat in 
contradistinction to a “traditional sensibility” aligned with realism and 
mimetic assumptions. Al-Kharrat’s espousal of Surrealism and the new sen-
sibility, in my view, serves a dual purpose: to riposte to realism, “particu-
larly the socialist realism” promoted by al-‘Alim and Anis, albeit far from 
in service of a reactionary agenda; and to lend “credence to an experimen-
talism that he conceives of as seeking [in his words] ‘a value system that is 
more just, more broadly emancipatory, and more profound in its belief in 
fundamental human dignity’” (Halim 2017a, 446; citing al-Kharrat 1993a, 
33, emphasis added; see also al-Kharrat 2003).
The manifestations of this radical aesthetic in al-Kharrat’s creative texts 
enhance the thematics of solidarity, Afro-Asian or otherwise. His narra-
tives, “non-linear,” linguistically heteroglot, and omnivorously intertextual, 
experimentally push against genre codes (Halim 2017a, 447). Indices of 
generic indeterminacy are often given in titles: The subtitle of City of Saffron 
in Arabic is Nusus Iskandaraniyya, or Alexandrian texts; Iskandariyyati 
Madinati al-Qudsiyya al-Hushiyya (My Alexandria, My City Sacred and 
Untamed) is subtitled Kulaj Riwa’i (A Novelistic Collage); and Tabarih al-
Waq’i‘ wa-l-Junun (Agonies of Events and Madness) is subtitled Tanwi‘at 
Riwa’iyya, meaning “novelistic variations.” Indeed, in contrast to postmod-
ernism’s use of the technique, “pastiche [is] vested in his texts […] with an 
oppositional vitality” which works in synergy with collage and montage 
(Halim 2004, 335; see also Halim 2017a, 447, 456). The two techniques are 
sometimes distilled into story-poem passages embedded in al-Kharrat’s nar-
ratives, to adapt his coinage of the term “transgeneric writing” (al-kitaba ‘abr 
al-naw‘iyya) (al-Kharrat 1994). In such story-poem passages, “something 
in the order of stream-of-consciousness automatic writing unfolds,” with 
a surrealist tenor, often articulating a powerful solidarity with “the wretched 
of the earth” in the heterogeneous overdeterminations of their wretchedness 
(Halim 2017a, 447).
Paeans, visions, nightmares, or daydreams, story-poem passages that pro-
ject a radical solidarity usually erupt epiphany-like, only seemingly uncon-
nected to what precedes or succeeds them, into the narrative. Composed 
of run-on sentences that can go on for over a page, their syntactical fluid-
ity mirrors and compounds their emancipatory impetus. Elsewhere I ana-
lyzed long examples of such passages (Halim 2004, 344–356, esp. 351; 
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Halim 2017a, 448–452, and 454–457); here, for lack of space, I extract the 
core of a story-poem from Agonies translated as literally as possible:
The Prophet Ezekiel had said, an age ago, and perhaps he still says:
“The hand of the Lord was upon me, and carried me out […] and set me 
down in the midst of the valley which was full of bones […] and, behold, 
there were very many in the open valley; and, lo, they were very dry.”
The very many bones very dry under time’s footsteps from Caracalla 
and Diocletian to Sabra and Shatila from Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
Johannesburg from the Amazon forests to the cotton plantations of 
Tennessee, mounds of them in the Khmer Rouge’s archive in Cambodia 
numbered labelled dated with scientific accuracy and rigor Asian alike.
(al-Kharrat 1998, 191)2
The quotation is followed by another citation from the Book of Ezekiel, 
then free association about weapons of oppression in all their historical 
variety and a meditation on religious persecution. The narrator’s own vision 
of bones sweeps across time and space, interconnecting victims of brutality 
affected by a range of orders: monarchical tyranny, religious fanaticism, eth-
nic cleansing, racist regimes, slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, and the 
totalitarian Left. The absence of punctuation, except for a single comma, 
elicits a comparatist reading practice that exercises its agency in furnishing 
connections and is adept at attending to oppression in its myriad forms and 
all-embracing in its identification with the pursuit of justice.
Juxtaposition—through pastiche, collage, montage, and so on—operates 
at different levels in Agonies. Collage, in the immediate, is performed by the 
narrator as he places side-by-side reminiscences of the Afro-Asian move-
ment’s élan and press cuttings from the 1990s. The closing lines of the vol-
ume both cue us to the central theme of the vignettes even as they clinch the 
significance of the title, Agonies of Events and Madness:
On the earth of this good land, its fertility buried, I sit. Wide awake not 
reeling with pain, I write on scattered sheets of paper and collate on 
them press clippings that bear on me the agonies of events—and I resist 
the bouts of madness.
(al-Kharrat 1998, 222)
The “events” that cause the narrator such “agonies” are the depredations 
visited not only on Egypt but on the Global South broadly, after the high 
hopes of the liberation period. Agonies blends and underscores the resem-
blance of cityscapes from different regions to construct a pan-city of the 
Global South, as in this instance, taking off from Luanda:
On the corniche, a few cars sped soundlessly […] while the fronds of the 
imperial palm trees swayed—Luanda, [Alexandrian] Ansushi, Havana? 
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The large, silent houses with high walls and wide windows give onto 
boats, fishermen’s nets spread on them, lying on the crest of the water, 
and the low parapet muffles the din of the world behind it […].
On the 2nd of February, 1997—twenty years and two days after the 
Angola conference—Dr Sha‘ban ‘Abd al-‘Aziz […] wrote: “I read an 
ad in the Ahram about a restaurant that offers Ramadan breakfast […] 
meals that consist of [list of foodstuffs and expensive prices].”
And what of the hungry in Angola and Mozambique, in Somalia and 
Ethiopia, in Burundi and Rwanda, and in Egypt’s villages and alleys 
where they make do with old cheese and ga‘did leaves to this day, or a 
good onion, two falafels and bread?
Africa, Africa—what have we done with independence? What have 
we done to ourselves after independence?
(al-Kharrat 1998, 218–220)
The solidarity labor performed by juxtaposition is paralleled by reflections 
on Third Worldist intercultural dialogue.
The vignette “The Hippopotamus and the Glass of Campari” provides 
metafictional commentary on modern Indian-Egyptian literary interrela-
tions. While the main emphasis is on an India known through the Afro-
Asian movement, the narrator, significantly, traces literary interrelations 
that pre-date it, in which words from the Indian canon haunt him. In 1940s 
Alexandria, the narrator encounters Rabindranath Tagore’s “Gitanjali 
[Song Offerings]. After all these years, the word continues to enchant and 
move me with its rhythmic melodiousness, charged as it has always been 
for me with yearning and passion” (al-Kharrat 1998, 90). Significantly, 
the other Indian writer whom the narrator cites as an influence on him 
is Mulk Raj Anand. Although the narrator was to meet him personally 
later when Anand was active in the Afro-Asian Writers’ Association, his 
first encounter with the writer was in the 1940s through his novel “with a 
strange title,” Coolie:
Once again, I became enchanted, though the magic was of another 
order.
Those were the years of the nationalist revolutionary movement in 
all its intensity, when the horizon loomed vast and radiant and prom-
ised the youth we were no end of high hopes. And it is likely that Mulk 
Raj Anand’s novel, alongside much else, contributed to reinforcing 
my inclination to revolt against oppression, injustice, poverty and the 
obscurantism of traditions and ossified age-old customs. The lives of 
the poor, the untouchables and oppressed in distant Calcutta were very 
close to the lives of the indigent peasants among whom I lived in my 
mother’s village, Tarrana, the setting of Stones of Bobello [al-Kharrat’s 
novel Hijarat Bubillu].
(al-Kharrat 1998, 91–92)
90 Hala Halim 
The text adumbrates a form of anti-colonial internationalism, even a nas-
cent Third-Worldism, outside of and predating the Afro-Asian movement, 
tracing back to the narrator’s Trotskyist militancy and reinforcing his 
awareness of issues of social justice through parallels between the Indian 
and Egyptian situations, particularly the subaltern’s.3 Recollecting meet-
ing Anand at the Fourth Afro-Asian Writers’ Association Conference in 
New Delhi in 1970, the narrator depicts an Afro-Asian poetry reading that 
adapts a local tradition of orality and dwells on the shared etymological 
root of its name:
In that unforgettable November, I witnessed a Mushaira performance—
this is the word for it in both Urdu and Hindi—at which I heard poems 
in Indian languages and English translations of Arabic poems […]. It’s 
as if poetry and India are two intertwined events in my life.
(al-Kharrat 1998, 90)
The narrator’s imaginative solidarity with India elicits its stark contrasts 
between the grandeur of ancient monuments and the wretched indigence of 
the modern population. Whereas such a move verges on an Orientalist gaze, 
this is then empathically subverted: “It would be as if I am comparing the 
edifices of the Karnak Temple to the alleyways of the informal settlements in 
our country” (96). Another moment of self-reflexivity centers on the juxta-
position between elite Indian acquaintances from the Afro-Asian movement 
and the populace at large:
The strange thing is that those [Indians] I got to know amid work in 
the Afro-Asian [Peoples’] Solidarity [Organization]—Indira Gandhi 
with her calm, dignified beauty, modesty and wisdom as she ruled 
a continent-empire, and the venerable lady Rameshwari Nehru, a 
colleague of Mahatma Gandhi’s in the epic of Indian national inde-
pendence […], all of them seem to me closer to the Bombay families 
strewn on the pavements resisting extinction and confronting the 
overwhelming violence of internal storms with the gentleness of a hid-
den, deep-rooted strength: akin to these families, they seem removed 
from the mighty warriors we encounter in legends and myths. But 
then I now wonder: were they really removed from the noble battles 
that alone are worth fighting: the battles for dignity, freedom, the joy 
of life, the beauty of poetry and the dream of justice that can never 
recede?
(al-Kharrat 1998, 98)
Comparable reflections on the icons of the liberation movements and the 
quotidian struggles of unnamed subalterns preoccupy the narrator in a story 
titled “A Man Without a Shadow,” centering on Ernesto “Che” Guevara.
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“A Man Without a Shadow” opens with the narrator coming across 
an invitation to a cocktail party from the Cuban Embassy in Algeria in 
the name of Che in February 1965. He retains no details about the cock-
tail party, which has melded into similar ritualized receptions through 
his work at AAPSO in world capitals that he rattles off—officialdom’s 
flipside of the pan-Global South cityscape of commonality—all “carefully 
polished artificiality and falseness,” hallways sporting “grandiose por-
traits of the president of the state” on the way to banquets on tablecloths 
embroidered by “toiling female hands in the dark backstreets” (al-Kharrat 
1998, 112). But he does recall that Guevara boarded the same flight tak-
ing the Egyptian delegation back to the Cairo of the “waxing revolution-
ary tide and the ‘socialist’ achievements parachuted from above […] a 
guest of Nasserite Egypt” (114). A foil to Che, the presidential portraits 
and parachuted socialism are a built-in safeguard against a suspicion of 
hero-worship of that figure in the text’s parsing of him as an emancipa-
tory legacy on the depredations of which it muses. Nor is it unreasonable 
to detect a drift towards idolatry of Che—“the dreaming revolutionary 
prophet,” his martyrdom compared to Christ’s, and his fascination with 
Don Quixote adduced (117).4 At the airport in Algeria where the mem-
bers of the Afro-Asian delegation huddle together indoors, the narrator 
espies Che, pacing slowly all alone outside under the open sky: “The 
man cast no shadow. A lofty stature as if a hewn statue, as if not of this 
earth” (114).
The casting of no shadow condenses differentiated levels of spectrality. 
It may be interpreted as an intertextual subversion of Mahmoud Darwish’s 
elegy for President Gamal Abdel Nasser, “The Man with the Green Shadow,” 
which allusively counterpoints the Qur’anic prophetic figure al-Khidr and 
signifies the dead leader’s promise of prosperity and rebirth (Darwish 1977, 
574–580). More significantly, the story modulates Che Guevara as a specter 
of “a specter” that once “haunt[ed] Europe” (Marx and Engels 2006, 8). 
There are two intertwined strands: reflections on Che’s public legacy in 
Egypt and internationally, and a quasi-fictional sub-narrative line that jux-
taposes that afterlife against ordinary lives. Registering the mobilizing force 
of Che’s legacy among Egyptian radicals of the 1960s and ’70s in iconogra-
phy and underground political lyrics, the narrator traces its transformations 
with the attrition of a socialist orientation. There are the posters that were 
de rigueur in the rooms of 1970s Egyptian Leftist students likely ending up 
with “bouquinistes” when they sold out; and Mikhail Ruman’s play Laylat 
Masra‘ Jivara al-‘Azim (The Night Guevara the Great Was Killed) in its 
1997 performance “‘purged’ of enthusiasms, allusions, and socialist certi-
tudes now considered—in many dominant milieus—in bad taste, or at least 
a thing of the past” (al-Kharrat 1998, 116). The text dwells on a simulacral 
depletion of Che’s emancipatory afterlife, his spectrality as a commodity—
an Italian wine that bears his name, lapel buttons sporting his image, and 
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expensive Bolivian guided tours to Guevara sites. The narrator reflects, “Is it 
not quite likely that the overwhelmingly powerful advertisement and media 
apparatus works concertedly to ‘revive’ the myth of Che after stripping it of 
all meaning?” (118).
In a radical “counter-conjuration” of that depleted, commodified 
iconicity, the Kharratian text presides over Che’s return as a specter 
the unfinished promise of whom looms on the horizon (Derrida 1994, 
86). The narrator observes the transformations of a working-class girl 
employed in an Alexandrian shop named “Guevara Tailor,” with the sig-
nifier traveling further from the signified when Che is forgotten and the 
shop sign is painted over with “Gavara Tailor.” The narrator invokes the 
presence of
Guevara whose picture has now been removed from the shop.
The man who lived his entire life without a shadow, lightly, who left 
no trace on terra firma, as if walking on water, with certitude and thirst, 
or on clouds—here he is, at the end of time, acquiring density and cast-
ing behind him on the sand a long long shadow, as always happens at 
sunset when he walks towards the silvery slate of a still sea the tranquil 
waves of which wait, patiently await, from before time.
(al-Kharrat 1998, 120)
The Kharratian text—published just four years after Specters of Marx 
(1994), and responding likewise to the “new world order”—has more than 
an affinity with Jacques Derrida’s statement that “[a]t bottom the specter is 
the future, it is always to come, it presents itself as that which could come 
or come back” (Derrida 1994, 39).
By conjoining reflections on the abiding legacy of the iconic figures of 
liberation movements and also of the unnamed “saints,” the text brackets 
the suspicion of idolatry and shifts attention instead to the transhistorical 
value of revolt against oppression:
I believe that what has remained of Che is what remains of Lumumba, 
Amílcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto, of thousands, nay throngs of 
nameless “saints” throughout time.
What remains of them, as I see it, is the secret [sirr: also sacrament] 
of revolt against oppression and the yearning for justice and fraternity. 
Are these mere threadbare words?
Do such citations and reflections contravene the assumptions of the 
art of the “novel” and the creativity of “narrative”?
So let it be.
Yet again, I claim they do not.
(al-Kharrat 1998, 117)
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The reverse side of the passage about bones, al-Kharrat’s meditation dovetails 
figures of a specific historical period with myriads who revolted without a trace 
“throughout time.” It is thus in tune with Jacques Rancière’s reflections that
[t]here is history insofar as men do not ‘resemble’ their time, insofar as 
they act in breach of ‘their’ time, in breach of the line of temporality 
that puts them in their place by obliging them to ‘use’ their time in some 
way or other […] it is because of these points of orientation, these jumps 
and those connections that there exists a power to ‘make’ history.
(Rancière 2015, 46, 47)
The ever-lengthening shadow of Che and al-Kharrat’s statement of a com-
mitment that does not “contravene the assumptions of […] art,” reaf-
firmed amid celebrations of a triumphant capitalism and “globalization” 
towards the end of the 1990s, also speak to Derrida’s contemporaneous 
conception of “The ‘New International.’” This is “a link of affinity, suf-
fering, and hope, a still discreet, almost secret link, as it was around 1848, 
but more and more visible.” The New International designates “what 
calls to the friendship of an alliance without institutions among those 
who, even if they no longer believe or believed in the socialist-Marxist 
International […] continue to be inspired by at least some of the spirits of 
Marx or Marxism […] in order to ally themselves, in a new, concrete, and 
real way” (Derrida 1994, 85, 86).
At the close of the second decade of the new millennium, heeding res-
onances between protests in the Arab world and in the Global North, the 
longer durée of the postcolonial continues to hold potential for the project of 
Global South comparatism. It allows comparatists to historicize the relation-
ship between the Third World and the Global South even while the postco-
lonial affords them conceptual frameworks that have an enduring relevance. 
The pre-postcolonial retains the emphasis on the economic and on class in 
intersection with other no less vital overdeterminations such as race, gen-
der, and religion. As such, the pre-postcolonial enables an anti-Eurocentric 
engagement with the conjunctions of South and North more robustly attuned 
to what al-Kharrat would call “the dream of justice that can never recede.”
Notes
1 I draw here on points I made in a presentation I gave at the 2017 American 
Comparative Literature Association meeting in a seminar organized by Monica 
Popescu (McGill University) and Kerry Bystrom (Bard College Berlin). I thank 
Jennifer Wenzel (Columbia University) for asking me to elaborate on this. See 
Halim 2017c.
2 The Coptic calendar begins with the first year of the Roman Emperor Diocletian’s 
reign on account of his mass persecution of Egyptian Christians. See the chapter 
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titled “Diocletian’s Column” in al-Kharrat’s Rama wa-l-Tinnin (Rama and the 
Dragon), likewise punctuated with similar internationalist story-poem passages. 
Al-Kharrat 1993b, 251–274, and idem. 2002b, 233–256.
3 This is part of an ongoing project in which I explore Indian thematics in Egyptian 
literature, which cannot be abridged here.
4 For lack of space I cannot elaborate on the Christian resonances in al-Kharrat’s 
radical thematics, on which see Halim 2017a, 456–457.
Bibliography
Abdel-Malek, Anouar. “Orientalism in Crisis.” Diogenes, vol. 44 (Winter) (1963): 
103–140.
Al-‘Azm, Sadiq Jalal. Al-Naqd al-Dhati Ba‘d al-Hazima. Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘a, 1969.
Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. The Empire Writes Back: Theory 
and Practice in Postcolonial Literatures. London: Routledge, 1989.
Brandt, Willy. North-South: A Programme for Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1980.
Darwish, Mahmud [Mahmoud]. Diwan Mahmud Darwish, vol. 1. Beirut: Dar 
Al-‘Awda, 1977.
Derrida, Jacques. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, 
and the New International, translated by Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge, 
1994.
Di-Capua, Yoav. No Exit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018.
Dirlik, Arif. “Global South: Predicament and Promise.” The Global South, vol. 1, 
no. 1 (2007): 12–23.
Halim, Hala [Youssef, Hala Youssef Halim]. The Alexandria Archive: An 
Archaeology of Alexandrian Cosmopolitanism. Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
California, Los Angeles, 2004.
Halim, Hala. “Lotus, the Afro-Asian Nexus, and Global South Comparatism.” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 32, no. 3 
(2012): 563–583.
Halim, Hala. “Scope for Comparatism: Internationalist and Surrealist Resonances 
in Idwar al-Kharrat’s Resistant Literary Modernity.” In: Arabic Humanities, 
Islamic Thought: Essays in Honor of Everett K. Rowson, edited by Joseph E. 
Lowry and Shawkat M. Toorawa. Leiden: Brill, 2017a, 425–468.
Halim, Hala. “Intermediality and Cultural Journalism: Ahmed Morsi.” Alif: Journal 
of Comparative Poetics, vol. 37 (2017b): 288–312.
Halim, Hala. “Third Worldist and Internationalist Thematics in Edwar al-Kharrat’s 
Fiction.” Presentation at the American Comparative Literature Association 
annual meeting, Utrecht, the Netherlands, 2017c.
Halim, Hala. “Afro-Asian Third-Worldism into Global South: The Case of Lotus 
Journal.” Global South Studies (22 November 2017d).
Halim, Hala. “Commitment’s Vicissitudes: Edwar al-Kharrat as Writer and as 
Editor of Lotus.” Presentation at “Thinking the Global South” symposium, 
Latin American Studies and the Department of Comparative Literature, Penn 
State University, 2018.
Al-Kharrat, Edwar [Idwar]. “Limadha ’68? Wa Limadha Kana Yajib an Tastamirr? 
Wijhat Nazar Shakhsiyya Jiddan.” Gallery 68 (February 1971a), 4–5.
 The pre-postcolonial and its enduring relevance 95
Al-Kharrat, Edwar [El-Kharrat, Edward]. “Preface.” In: Afro-Asian Poetry: 
Anthology, edited by Edward al-Kharrat and Nihad Salem. Cairo: Permanent 
Bureau of Afro-Asian Writers,1971b, XV–XVIII.
Al-Kharrat, Edwar [Idwar]. Al-Kitaba ‘Abr al-Naw‘iyya. Cairo: Dar Sharqiyyat, 
1994.
Al-Kharrat, Edwar. “al-Shi‘r al-Ifriqi al-Asyawi Dhahira Asila Wadihat al-Ma‘alim.” 
In: Mukhtarat min al-Shi‘r al-Ifriqi al-Asyawi. Beirut: Dar al-Adab, n.d.
Al-Kharrat, Edwar. Al-Hasasiyya al-Jadida. Beirut: Dar Al-Adab, 1993a.
Al-Kharrat, Edwar. Rama wa-l-Tinnin. Cairo: Dar Wa Matabi‘ al-Mustaqbal, 
1993b [1979].
Al-Kharrat, Edwar. Tariq al-Nisr. Cairo: Markaz al-Hadara al-‘Arabiyya, 2002a.
Al-Kharrat, Edwar. Rama and the Dragon. Translated by Ferial Ghazoul and John 
Verlenden. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002b.
Al-Kharrat, Edwar. Tabarih al-Waqa’i‘ wa-l-Junun. Cairo: Markaz al-Hadara 
al-‘Arabiyya, 1998.
Al-Kharrat, Edwar. “Kull Minna Multazim.” In: Tahawwulat Mafhum al-Iltizam Fi 
al-Adab al-‘Arabi al-Hadith, edited by Muhammad Barrada. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 
al-Mu‘asir, 2003.
Klemm, Verena. “Different Notions of Commitment (Iltizam) and Committed 
Literature (al-Adab al-Multzim) in the Literary Circles of the Mashriq.” Arabic 
and Middle Eastern Literatures, vol. 3, no. 1 (2000): 51–62.
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. The Communist Manifesto. New York: 
International Publishers, 2006.
Prashad, Vijay. The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World. New 
York: The New Press, 2007.
Rancière, Jacques. “The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian’s Truth.” In/
Print, vol. 3, no. 1 (2015 [1996]): 21–52.
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Random House, 1994 [1978].
Sauvy, Alfred. “Trois Mondes, Une Planète.” L’Observateur, vol. 118 (14 August 
1952), 14.
Shukri, Ghali. “Wadda‘na Zhdanov ila Ghayr Raj‘a.” Gallery 68 (February 1969): 
67–70.
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “How Do We Write, Now?” PMLA, vol. 133, no. 1 
(2018): 166–170.
Trefzer, Annette, Jeffrey T. Jackson, Kathryn McKee, and Kristen Dellinger. 
“Introduction: The Global South and/in the Global North: Interdisciplinary 
Investigations.” The Global South, vol. 8, no. 2 (2014): 1–15.
Trotsky, Leon. Art and Revolution, Ed. Paul N. Siegel. New York: Pathfinder, 1992.
Trotsky, Leon. The Permanent Revolution & Results and Prospects, translated by 
John G. Wright and Brian Pearce. Seattle: Red Letter Press, 2010.








The current geo-political order in the Middle East, the fragility of the politi-
cal institutions of the states, and the paltry status of international borders in 
the region that was once known as the Fertile Crescent must emphatically 
be regarded as a postcolonial scenario, and a post-imperial one at that. The 
artificial international borders that separate communities and simultane-
ously force others—groupings of considerable cultural and religious diver-
sity—into unloved shared statehood were to a large extent imposed by the 
victorious powers upon the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty 
of Sèvres, one of the Banlieue treatises that created the new world order 
after the end of World War I (cf. Gencer 2006, 2).1 With respect to the 
Middle Eastern scenario, World War I itself can be regarded as an eruption 
of conflicts between multiple forces from inside and outside the Ottoman 
Empire, which ruled over much of the area in question. These conflicts and 
constellations can well be located in the context of a colonialism that mani-
fested itself in the form of imperialist competition for dominance over the 
world’s territory outside the Great Powers’ own mainland and their attempt 
to manage in reality and accommodate in discourse the frictions that the 
diversity of cultures in the desired regions posed. If this analysis is accepted, 
then it is incumbent on practitioners of postcolonial studies to examine the 
pre-history of the current region through the lens of their discipline.2 This, 
after all, was the Orient that Orientalism proclaimed, the region par excel-
lence of Orientalist interaction, desire, and meaning-making. And the era in 
question, the years immediately prior to and leading into World War I, is, 
after all, the time when colonialism, and its political extension imperialism, 
manifested themselves in the most strident way.
Relationships between diverse cultures and populations, and between the 
various political players in the region, are so multi-layered and complex that 
virtually any detail lends itself to postcolonial investigation on several levels 
and may be framed in concomitant terms. In a process of modernization 
according to European ideals, and in a bid to adopt European standards 
so as to avoid surrender to the dictates of the Great Powers, traditional 
mechanisms and attributes of Ottoman interaction with its diverse popu-
lations were superseded by European concepts of efficacy, homogeneity, 
and organization that bear the hallmarks of modern colonial reasoning and 
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practice. The phenomena that form the subject of the following investiga-
tion represent but one aspect, and highlight one moment in time, in the 
complex dynamics of the Turko-German relationship and their positioning 
vis-à-vis their colonial “other,” and they focus on but one of many discur-
sive strategies of framing this relationship and these aspirations. Germans 
found themselves on all sides of constellations and arguments and expressed 
themselves in a variety of media, assuming a diversity of roles and espousing 
a multitude of interests. This is illustrated by the debate surrounding one of 
the most sensitive yet highly emblematic issues in this context, namely the 
Ottoman campaign against the Armenian population, rightly recognized as 
genocide. Identifying the German position as either complicit or resistant 
to this (cf. Hasfeld and Pschischholz 2017) is highly reductive, as it ignores 
how implicated even the alleged advocates of suppressed communities, such 
as missionaries, were in colonialist practices—by virtue of assuming the 
right to impose their own moral standards and criteria, and by virtue of 
silencing the voices of the victims by assuming the right to speak on their 
behalf. The following investigation is cognizant that it focuses on one spe-
cific vector in a multi-directional constellation. It does not claim that the 
discursive mechanisms identified were dominant in projecting aspirations 
onto a field of activity and thereby designating it as colonial—yet applying 
the concept of proxy (surrogate) colonialism to the scenario might help to 
identify one of the elements that indeed constituted the complexity.
Ottoman space as colonial space
At any given moment in time, in any given location, a plethora of factors 
overlap, collide, and fuse. The early years of the First World War were a 
period when German colonialist and imperialist designs and desires vis-à-vis 
the Near and Middle East revealed themselves in a salient way. The ‘oriental 
question’ engaged the German public like no other question of the age, and 
in political theory as well as practical agitation (Klosterhuis 1994; Rühle 
2009), activities aimed at incorporating the Middle East into the German 
view of the world and theater of activity were plentiful and varied. While 
literary engagement with oriental themes continues to spawn probing criti-
cal engagement (Kontje 2004; Polaschegg 2005), the complex interdepend-
ency between the psychological mechanisms, individual and collective, that 
produce “Orientalism,” the political and economic interests that sustain 
hierarchies and stereotyping, the medial presentation and its capacity to 
generate knowledge and attitude, and the cultural significance and global 
consequences of the evocative framing of an entire region, its populations 
and cultures, including religions, remain largely unexplored—as for exam-
ple evidenced by a recent purely phenomenological survey of Orientalist 
image production from antiquity to contemporary computer games (Kramer 
2009). The currents that create such images, it might be argued, are the 
result of two dominant complimentary trends—imperialist politicizing and 
Orientalist fantasizing. In framing the region’s precarious status at the most 
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pivotal of historical moments in colonialist terms, these two principles col-
laborated and collided. The resultant concepts and images are then concur-
rently stable/intransigent and fluid/precarious. Tropes adapted to changing 
historical circumstances, but, in turn, the understanding of historical con-
stellations could also be determined by applying criteria derived from solidi-
fied views. German Orientalism—neglected by Said—developed in parallel 
to French and British Orientalisms, yet concurrently exhibited distinctive 
traits due to Germany’s specific standpoint and outlook. Any investigation 
of German colonial discourse requires an identification of constants and of 
specifics, as well as demanding a contextualization of factors in a complex 
temporal, spatial, and discursive grid. The discourse in the vicinity of World 
War I, and a concentration on Syria as a particularly contested region, pro-
vides a nodal point to which a multitude of discursive threads flow and 
which, in turn, might possess distinct exemplary quality.
The Ottoman Empire occupies a special place in the annals of German 
imperialism. The European interest manifested itself in fields such as eco-
nomic and infrastructural projects, monopolizing the excavation and inter-
pretation of the region’s ancient heritage, as well as territorial acquisitions 
in all corners of the Ottoman world between the Caucasus and the Sudan. 
Once chunks had been cut out of the vast area ruled by the Sublime Porte 
(Algeria in 1832, Tunisia in 1881, Egypt in 1882, Libya in 1912), once 
nationalist movements in the Balkans had diminished the Ottoman Empire’s 
European presence, a complete division of Ottoman territory amongst the 
Great Powers, or the conversion of parts of it into satellite states, remained 
a distinct possibility for decades. German ambitions stopped short of con-
quest; yet while alternative avenues of incorporating the Ottoman Middle 
East into its own orbit dominated German thinking, strategic considera-
tions did include the possibility of seizure (Fieldhouse 2006, 45). German 
policies were based on the geostrategic objective of creating an overland 
connection across the Balkans and Anatolia to outflank British maritime 
superiority. This corridor was intended as the spatial axis for the expan-
sion of, for example, agricultural and infrastructural activities. Since the 
territory in question marks an extension of lands already in the purview of 
German strategists as an area of expansion, the German approach bears the 
hallmarks of adjacent or border colonialism in distinction to the creation of 
an overseas empire.3 Yet, since the shaping of thinking towards the Middle 
East and the acquisition of African and Pacific possessions unfolded in par-
allel, German engagement with the Middle East is inextricably linked to the 
overall culture and discourse of coloniality—arguments, approaches, aims, 
and attitudes towards the distant and towards the adjacent colonial space 
stand in a relationship of mutual production, confirmation, and accelera-
tion. The Ottoman scenario, and subsets within it, is but one constituent of 
a global colonialist and imperialist nexus.
Syria, incorporating in the usage of the time upper Mesopotamia, Lebanon, 
and Palestine, attracted particular interest and desire in Germany since it was 
here, on the margins of the remaining Ottoman sphere of influence, that the 
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Baghdad railway galvanized attention and propelled a sense of opportunity 
and departure. Parts of Syria were viewed as the periphery of a periphery, 
i.e. the ultimate border in this theater of expansion, a laboratory for adjacent 
colonialism in the second degree. From a German perspective at the height 
of Imperialism, the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire were culturally, 
economically, and politically the most desired and contested areas, since stra-
tegically they occupied the in-between position between France’s, Britain’s, 
and Germany’s spheres of influence, politically between surrogate colonial-
ism (German dominance executed through the Ottoman intermediary) and 
direct rule (as practiced by German military commanders seconded to assist 
the Turkish army and often acting as if in charge of their turf),4 economically 
between a (presumed) richness of resources and an (alleged) potential for the 
“cultivation” of barren lands, and geographically because the Levantine coast 
formed the bridge to Africa, and Mesopotamia the bridge to India, i.e. the link 
between the adjacent and the overseas.
Imperialism erupted during World War I. Since the antagonistic position-
ing of the Great European Powers was a global, geo-political act, involving 
the colonial world and the strategic deployment of colonial resources, this 
conflict was also the event when colonialism, the logic and dynamics of 
European subjugation, and exploitation of their overseas spheres of influ-
ence reached new dimensions both in material and ideological respects. 
German pamphletism during the first three years of the war—until chang-
ing fortunes transformed the discursive landscape—bespeaks enthusiasm 
and optimism, unbridled celebration of achievement and aspiration. In 
many respects, the pronouncements read like colonialist-imperialist fan-
tasies. As sources, they illustrate strategies to engage the German public 
in the project of commitment beyond the Bosporus and to channel interest 
and energy into a worthy object which could replace overseas colonial aspi-
rations with more plausible and realizable options. Furthermore, they illus-
trate strategies to prepare discursively the terrain for German impregnation 
and to accommodate the obstacles that the actual reality presented. For 
this very purpose, they draw on colonialist arguments and employ strat-
egies that were familiar from overseas colonial contexts—well-rehearsed 
tropes of justifying German interest and intervention. Publications devoted 
to explaining the war to the German public, such as those in the new 
propagandist series Der Deutsche Krieg [The German War], and in more 
established instructive series such as the Deutsche Orient-Bücherei, Der 
Orient, and Der Neue Orient [German Orient Library, The Orient, The 
New Orient], propagated German engagement and defended its rationale. 
Der Deutsche Krieg, for example, edited by the Orientalist Ernst Jäckh, 
devoted about a quarter of its almost one hundred volumes to the Middle 
East. Publications comprised interventions by academics, pronouncements 
by representatives of interest groups such as the German Oriental Mission, 
contributions by military and political strategists, as well as commentary 
by economists and politicians. Increasingly, eyewitness accounts appeared, 
authored both by military personnel who shared their impressions of exotic 
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locations with the German public after returning from their tours of duty, 
and by journalists embedded in German armies or shown around differ-
ent parts of the Ottoman Empire with the aim of impressing on them the 
economic and infrastructural advances Turkey had made under German 
tutelage. The Deutsche Orient-Bücherei, also edited by Ernst Jäckh, issued 
25 volumes between 1915 and 1917 of a less rousing nature than Der 
Deutsche Krieg; these covered topics as diverse as geology and Islamism, 
and stretched geographically from Jewish settlements in Palestine to the 
ethnography of the Caucasus. All of these publications map Ottoman space 
as the object of a kind of German engagement that shows distinct hallmarks 
of colonialism. The years after Turkey’s declaration for the Central Powers 
in November 1914 witnessed the culmination of the German–Ottoman 
discourse; the war was heralded as an opportunity to bring all kinds of 
aspirations to fruition and to pave the way for the implementation of the 
most ambitious plans.
German interest in Turkey, Ottoman space, indeed in the Middle East 
in general, had entered a new phase after the foundation of the German 
Empire; now, a literary or archaeological “Orientalism”5 became subsumed 
into grander designs about Germany’s position in the world. Publications 
imagined Asia Minor as “a field for German colonialization” and a “colo-
nial Empire of the future, both materially and ideally” (Kaerger 1892; 
Springmann 1915). The arguments that directed German attention towards 
this region are the same that determined the debate with regard to other over-
seas and adjacent expansion spaces, for example as areas to absorb German 
population surplus (Schuchardt 1909). Concrete plans for German settle-
ment colonialism concentrated on a corridor on either side of the Baghdad 
railway and on model colonies, including Jewish ones, in Palestine—both of 
course within the legal framework of the Ottoman state, yet inspired by the 
explicit objective to subject the area in question to German modes of land 
use and to institute German commercial structures.
In many respects, Syria during the early years of the war provides a multi-
layered scenario for the investigation of concerns guided by postcolonial 
perspectives. Syria is a region within Ottoman reach that represents, like 
few others, a quintessential site of colonialist expansion: a frontier between 
an inner and an outer circle, between inside and outside, a region where 
cultural imbalance exerts both demand and opportunity of equalization.6 
It is perceived as an in-between space where civilization overlaps with 
migratory cultures berated as unstable, even barbaric. It is an area where 
the colonial conflict of cultures that was deemed to justify, even demand, 
European intervention appears strikingly manifest, particularly against the 
background of the cultural significance of the region known as the Fertile 
Crescent as the alleged birthplace of Western civilization and monotheistic 
religion. Hugo Grothe invokes the constant ebb and flow of the “struggle 
between [sedentary] agriculture and nomadism” and deduces from former 
glory the measure of future magnificence of this “dormant world.” In his 
view, Germans are called upon to awaken the culture of ancient Babylon 
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and the richness of the lands between the “paradisiacal rivers” Euphrates 
and Tigris (Grothe 1908, 18–19). Historical greatness bestows a particular 
responsibility on Germans who, in their self-stylization as a Kulturnation, 
must possess the desire to “assist in the development of this historical land” 
which, after all, had eventually “brought forth our European culture,” the 
culture of “Prophets and Thinkers” (Zabel 1916, 20). At present, though, 
the area marks the border between a heartland of sorts and a rather non-
descript beyond: Here, “the province of Kurdish and Arab nomads and 
semi-nomads begins” (Grothe 1908, 31). Historical imperatives attach to 
the prospective development an inevitability that permits Germans to fancy 
themselves as servants of destiny. The tasks assigned to the self-appointed 
fulfillers of history are, then, the pacification of the unruly and the cultural 
homogenization of the diverse—a colonialist program indeed.
The Fertile Crescent that describes both the outlines of ancient civiliza-
tions and the border with the savage world as the “stamping ground of Arab 
hordes” is also delineated by the actual and projected routes of the various 
railway lines that form the centerpiece of German investment, as for exam-
ple the fold-out map in Hugo Grothe’s brochure of 1913 illustrates (Grothe 
1913, 26; map after 64).
Figure 5.1  Map 1913.
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This semi-circle between Baghdad and Medina demarcates a frontier 
similar to that in Southern Africa and the North American West—a frontier 
that exudes the same imperative of breaching, pushing back, and thereby 
driving anachronistic lifestyles out of the world of modernity. Not only do 
the routes of the existing and projected railway lines, first among them the 
Baghdad and Hejaz railways, trace the semi-circle of the Fertile Crescent; 
as extensions of a mainline artery from Vienna to Istanbul and from there 
across Anatolia and the Taurus mountains to Mesopotamia, Palestine, and 
Arabia, they furthermore connect the peripheries to the various centers and 
thus bring the frontier into the orbit of the German vision of continental 
connectivity. They are, in a narrow sense of colonization, also envisaged as 
the axis of settlement activities, the vectors of expansion and, in an imperial-
ist gesture, the nodes of military activity.
Professing community of interest
On a historiographically most obvious level, the German discourse on 
Turkey is integrated into a geo-political imperialist matrix which is defined 
by the Reich’s positioning in a global arena vis-à-vis its main rivals on the 
world stage, by carving out its own niche and forging calculated alliances, 
and by discrediting and outmaneuvering competitors. The Ottoman dis-
course is not only distinguished by the fact that the object is a sovereign 
empire, quite different in character from even the most stable polities in 
Germany’s African sphere of interest, but also by the position of Turkey 
at a crossroads of the geo-political ambitions of all the European Great 
Powers. The pursuit of German desires and designs necessitated a self-
stylization as friend and partner predestined to forge a special relationship 
distinct from that of rivals in colonial space, France and Britain, who had 
carved chunks for themselves out of Ottoman territory over the decades. 
When Turkey joined the Central Powers, this stance took on a crucial sig-
nificance in diplomacy and propaganda. The colonialist desires needed to 
be explained as consensual and mutually beneficial: “The German Reich is 
the only state amongst the Great Powers that has not enriched itself at the 
expense of Turkey” (Schäfer 1915, 17). Similar sentiments are expressed 
in many publications devoted to affirming a strategic alliance: “It has no 
desire whatsoever to annex any part of Turkey” (Mittwoch [1914], 12). 
Instead, the writers profess that Germans had become the Ottomans’ 
“most reliable and selfless friend” (Schäfer 1915, 18). The argument con-
tinues that Germany was “the only major colonial power not to have 
conquered any area with a consolidated [“geschlossene”] Muslim popu-
lation” (Grothe 1914, 40). The protestations of respect for the majority 
religion in Ottoman space of course suppress the vehement agitation and 
violent campaign against Arab slave traders in East Africa that was very 
much based on a defamation of Islam as promoting and practicing slavery. 
This notion integrates itself into a line of argumentation by which 
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Germany convinced herself of being the colonial world’s truest friend and 
most understanding mentor.
The belated ascension of Germany to the concert of Grand Powers is 
exploited here in a bid to claim a moral high ground based on the argument 
that Germany entered the colonial arena without a history of self-interest 
and that her approach would be just, “scientific,” humane, progressive, and 
beneficial to the recipients of German tutelage. In pursuit of this argument, 
the protestations of equality as comrades-in-arms and as communal agents 
of progress, and the colonialist attitude that casts the Turks as in need of 
guidance and domination, i.e. as an inferior partner, had to be reconciled 
as compatible. Just as in overseas colonial scenarios, the German Middle-
Eastern imagination could build on a powerful tradition of collective con-
victions, first and foremost amongst them the doctrine that Germany would 
be the predestined, most congenial, most attentive, most altruistic partner 
and mentor of all ostensibly inferior cultures.7
While much of German writing on Turkey at the beginning of World 
War I advocated the Waffenbrüderschaft [brotherhood-in-arms] between 
the German and Ottoman Empires and explained the strategic concept of 
unleashing a Jihad against all enemies of the Central Powers, the arguments 
and the geo-political considerations are couched in colonialist language and 
sentiment, and imperialist goals are only too obvious beneath the protesta-
tions of altruism that permeate the publications. The Ottoman Empire lies 
at the heart of geo-political fantasies with “incredibly appealing magnifi-
cence” (Grothe 1914, 38) that rival the fantasies of a German Mittelafrika 
to incorporate the area of the former Boer republics and parts of the 
Portuguese and Belgian African possessions, thus achieving a connection 
between German South-West’s Caprivi strip, Cameroon, and East Africa 
(cf. Wedi-Pascha 1992; Tschapek 2000). Wedged, as it were, between the 
British sphere of influence in Egypt and India, and the Russian expansion 
space of “Transkaukasien,” Ottoman space is constructed as a site of impe-
rialist possibility in the German imagination, for example by incorporating 
Turkestan and India in geo-political schemes and by “shaking hands with 
the Emir of Afghanistan” (Grothe 1914, 37–38), to create a continental 
counterweight to Britain’s mastery of the Indian Ocean and Russia’s con-
tinent-straddling hinterland. The extension of the Hejaz railway through 
Sinai to Egypt and from there to East Africa was contrived to rival even the 
most ambitious British Cape-to-Cairo fantasies.
While such fantasies connected the area in question to actual colonial 
possessions, the vision could only be implemented through colonialism 
by proxy: “The German enterprise could only flourish if protected by a 
strong Turkish ally. Strengthening Turkey’s military and administration 
prepared the ground for her economic interests,” most notably the exploi-
tation of “raw materials and agricultural products [“Bodenprodukte und 
Rohstoffe”]”—as Eugen Mittwoch explains with impeccable colonial-
ist logic (Mittwoch [1914], 12–13). It is in pursuit of such goals that the 
 Accommodating “Syrien im Krieg” 107
Ottoman world requires modernization, for which the slogan “transfor-
mation into a cultured nation [“Umwandlung in einen Kulturstaat”]” pro-
vides an elated code. The “natural communality of interest [“natürliche 
Interessengemeinschaft”]” is thereby revealed as a euphemism for German 
self-interest (Grothe 1913, 25); the civilizing mission is a tool, an instrument 
in the service of colonialist goals.
This situation explains the rhetoric and the instructions for interac-
tion. Turkey was to be granted “residual independence [a “Rest von 
Selbständigkeit”]” (Mittwoch [1914], 4). At the same time, though, the 
advice to German actors was to display respect for their collaborators. 
While clearly indebted to the self-image of the benign enabler, the advice 
also serves as a manual for effective operation in colonial space: “In pur-
suit of a peaceful conquest of the oriental market, and in our role as 
military advisors, we have to be mindful not to act as bossy chaperones 
[“herrischer Vormund”]” (Blanckenhorn 1916, 9). What is propagated 
instead could be defined as surrogate rule, a kind of leadership or tutelage 
that might not even be perceptible as such because it is exerted by domes-
tic agents: “Only leaders [“Bildner”] from their own midst will achieve 
the desired profound and lasting impact” (Grothe 1913, 40–41). This 
surrogate colonialism, imagined and designed in Germany’s image to suit 
Germany’s aims, must prove itself in a scenario where the requirement 
for intervention and for consolidation is at its acutest—on the border, 
during conflict.
Inside Ottoman space, the region of Syria, extending from northern 
Mesopotamia to modern-day Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine, epitomizes 
colonial challenge. The discourse reveals the strategies employed to mas-
ter the complexities that characterize this specific colonial situation. First 
and foremost among the Syrian characteristics were the cultural diversity 
between ancient, partly Europeanized Levantine cities, the nomadism and 
tribalism of the Syrian and Mesopotamian deserts and the Arabian pen-
insula, the fledgling modernization of the proto-Zionist Jewish settlement, 
and the technological modernity associated with ambitious infrastructural 
projects accelerated by the war economy. These conditions determined con-
crete German initiatives and the attendant rhetoric. The sources reveal a 
strategic acknowledgment of heterogeneity, diversity, and unruliness; they 
bespeak the desire to control this situation so as to render it suitable for inte-
gration into the orbit of Germanic globality. The discourse aims at “accom-
modating” Syria, at subsuming its complexities. According to the German 
discourse, what Syria requires, apart from general modernization, is sta-
bilization and harmonization that makes it fit into the unified whole of a 
Turkish Empire which functions as an extended nation-state. In this respect, 
too, the ideal resembled that of German colonialism where the overseas pos-
sessions were visualized as extensions of the motherland, or even heightened 
forms of it since the new territory is not lumbered by the inevitable compli-
cations created by historically rooted conditions.
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“Kulturarbeit” and other strategies of accommodation
Amongst the last writings to appear during the war to celebrate the Turko-
German Waffenbrüderschaft were two reports about a trip through Syria 
undertaken by two German journalists in late 1916 on the invitation of 
the military governor of the region, Djemal Pasha. One of the authors, 
Wilhelm Feldmann, was the Istanbul correspondent of the Berliner 
Tageblatt at the time. The other, Max Uebelhör, was editor-in-chief of the 
German-language daily newspaper Osmanischer Lloyd, an organ estab-
lished in 1908 to ensure German media presence at the Bosporus. His 
previous career has a distinctly colonial tilt.8 This connection might well 
explain the appointment of a complete journalistic novice to a politically 
important position in the German Reich’s global strategy in 1916. By high-
lighting achievements which testify to the strength of the Turko-German 
position close to frontlines, both reports advertise themselves as part of 
the war effort. By praising the realization of many of the aspirations that 
guided German plans for this particular colonial scenario over the last dec-
ade or more, they reveal their indebtedness to a wider agenda. The reports 
came at a time when the military advance on Sinai had become stuck and 
the British campaign to capture the Levantine parts of Syria had already 
gathered momentum. The reports thus represent a snapshot of a minute 
moment in time, a historical crest.
Both books possess an obtrusively panegyrical character, praising the 
military commander of the region, Djemal Pasha—the ostensibly least 
German-friendly of the Young Turkish leaders—for having transformed the 
region under his command into exactly what the German commentators 
propagated, the central element of which was deemed to be the “intellectual 
education [“geistige Erziehung”] of large proportions of the Ottoman popu-
lation to adhere to a European work ethic [“Arbeitsleistung im europäischen 
Sinne”]” (Grothe 1914, 17). There is no doubt as to what German commen-
tators expect of their Turkish mentees, the coveted implementers of their own 
ideals. The list is long and the fields of application are many, yet at the core 
is efficient governance to accomplish “utilization [“Nutzbarmachung”]” of 
the available resources and to propel the prescribed modernization:
an administration that, from the top right down to the smallest local 
branches, is solid, decisive, and at the same time reasonable and just; 
the suppression and punishment of all favoritism within the adminis-
tration [“Beamtenwillkür”], in particular amongst police and tax col-
lectors; reliable remuneration of all civil servants; orderly generation 
of revenue; reasonable laws commensurate with regional conditions 
regarding property and tariffs; the creation of infrastructure, railways, 
secure roads, reliable postal services; irrigation and drainage; hygienic 
measures etc.
(Blanckenhorn 1916, 61–62)
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In other words, the frontier is to be turned into a mirror image of what 
defines those who prescribe their metropolitan blueprint of order to the 
peripheral chaos. The Ottomans are chosen to be molded into beacons 
(“Träger”) of a decidedly German concept of statehood, an “enlightened,” 
benevolent, and progressive authoritarianism where the leadership deter-
mines what befits the welfare of their subjects. This includes minority rights, 
enclaves of semi-autonomy, political structures that take account of cul-
tural diversity under the umbrella of a centralist rule—a replicated Reich in 
accordance with the federalist fabric of the homeland and based on research 
that informs those responsible about the needs of their wards.
The key to the success of the envisaged Kulturarbeit is the creation of an 
elite that embraces the ideals specified by Hugo Grothe: “A class of produc-
tive [“arbeitsfähig”] individuals needs to be educated,” leaders to safeguard 
the unity of the Empire [“Reichseinheit”] by “respecting the desires for 
local self-determination and by allowing for the specific civilizatory require-
ments of the various populations [“Zivilisationsbedürfnisse der einzelnen 
Völker”]” (Grothe 1913, 19–20, 5, and 40–41). The aim of strengthening 
individual parts of the territory and educating an elite of experts and admin-
istrators in the German image informs proposals such as the establishment 
of institutes of higher learning in Beirut, Damascus, and Haifa, since in “that 
way every one of the three major parts of Syria will receive its own center 
of European higher education [“dann bekäme jeder größere Landesteil, 
jedes Drittel Syriens seinen Sammel- und Ausgangspunkt westeuropäischer 
Hochschulbildung”]” (Blanckenhorn 1916, 21). These are to serve as the 
outposts of the outpost; from here the transformation of the actual border 
will emanate, for example “the education of desert dwellers in the ways of 
modern agriculture.” This is recognized as “one of Djemal Pasha’s favourite 
projects, who has realized that, in order to ensure the successful requisition 
[“Gewinnung”] of the area for Turkey, the native population [“eingeborene 
Bevölkerung”] needs to be mobilized to partake in the project of coloniza-
tion” (Feldmann 1917, 43). If Djemal is cast as proxy, then his regional 
experts become proxies of the second degree, the prospective colonists—or 
be they former nomads—proxies of the third degree.
The war effort facilitates the realization of such plans by accelerating the 
conducive measures. The reports of 1917 praise the results achieved in the 
briefest period of time. They relate to their German readers that the recipe, 
as proposed by Grothe just before the war, “to transfer German military dis-
cipline [“Drill”] from the Turkish army into the schools” (Grothe 1913, 5), 
has been implemented somewhat by default through the necessities of mar-
tial conditions and has generated unforeseeable successes. According to the 
two reporters charged with communicating “Syrien im Krieg” to German 
audiences, the region is already saturated with reminders of German influ-
ence and intervention, as is evidenced by the names of experts credited with 
the notable achievements of Djemal Pasha’s reign. His advisor in matters 
concerning the transformation of urban space is Professor Max Züricher, 
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“director of the Prussian academy in Rome, an artist much appreciated by 
Djemal”; Heinrich August Meißner from Leipzig is chief engineer of the 
Hejaz railway with its sidetrack towards the Sinai intended as launchpad 
for the projected attack on British Egypt; an agricultural “model institution 
[“Musteranstalt”]” is run by a “Dr. König from Württemberg”—and so 
the list continues (Uebelhör 1917, 12–13, 27, and 8–9). The transformation 
has thus already begun and been accelerated by the war effort, and it will 
eventually achieve pacification of the (potentially) unruly element and stabi-
lization of volatile (liminal) conditions. As envisioned, it is along the railway 
lines and under German tutelage that progress spreads:
The revitalization of the ‘desert’ depends on making the Bedouins sed-
entary. The first step towards this difficult task has been undertaken 
near our large base camp [“Etappenstation”]. A settlement for colo-
nists [“Kolonistendorf”] is being built here according to German plans, 
roughly half an hour away from the actual military base. The preva-
lent style of housing will be a single-family home, or farm, just like at 
home, but adapted to local conditions [“In der Kolonie selbst wird das 
Einfamilienheim oder der Einfamilienhof vorherrschen, wie auch bei 
uns, hier allerdings den anderen Verhältnissen entsprechend”].
(Uebelhör 1917, 17–18) 
Here, too, bellum omnium pater est: Feldmann mentions an experiment 
whereby German soldiers are charged with teaching Bedouins “how to live 
in permanent homes” (Feldmann 1917, 42).
The educational institutions and model projects are hailed not only 
as the foundations of modernization but also as the nucleus of commu-
nity building, which in turn facilitates nation-building; their policies are 
described as integrative, conciliatory, and entirely “modern,” as they super-
sede divisions of gender and culture. The industrial school under German 
leadership is attended “by young Turks from all classes and provenances” 
(Turks here includes members of other ethnicities); an ethos reminiscent of 
Reformpädagogik informs the operation of a girls’ school in Beirut where 
“young girls of all creeds [“Glaubensbekenntnisse”]” are taught in an 
atmosphere of “light, air, and plenty of healthy exercise.” Other institutions 
mentioned include one where “the neglected art of carpet weaving is being 
revived” and a “soup kitchen [“Volksküche”] to benefit Lebanon’s poor”—
revival of tradition and social inclusion are pillars of community-building 
(Uebelhör 1917, 8–10). Revival thus unfolds on a plethora of levels—it 
includes community-building through welfare, old trades, and making the 
desert fertile, and thereby re-creating a culture reminiscent of ancient cul-
tures, just designed and implemented under decidedly modern auspices.
All of these measures are components in a wider campaign to achieve 
cohesion, to convert the anarchy characteristic of “barbaric” or “transi-
tory” civilizatory attainment and integrate it into a political superstructure. 
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The Holy War declared by the Sultan is another element meant to serve 
this overriding purpose of unification: “Jihad traditionally served to rally 
all available forces [“alle verfügbaren Kräfte heranzuziehen”] and to unite 
Turkey’s diverse peoples and tribes through the common bond of Islam.” 
While obviously a strategic move to gain allies behind enemy lines, the pam-
phlet’s rhetoric betrays a transplantation of concepts central to German 
ideals of statehood and community to the periphery. Mittwoch’s slogan 
“Religion und Vaterland” [Religion and Fatherland] clearly echoes the 
motto “Mit Gott für König / Kaiser und Vaterland” [With God for King 
and Country], which, printed on medals and adopted as the maxim for 
organizations, encapsulated official patriotic mentality like few other for-
mulas. Similarly, the expression “die türkischen Völker” [the peoples of 
Turkey] is used in analogy to “die deutschen Stämme” [German tribes]— 
expressing the sentiment that internal diversity and overall unity are com-
patible concepts (Mittwoch [1914], 5, 22, and 7). The war is praised as a 
decisive formative event not only as regards infrastructural and economic 
development, as well as social and political cohesion, but also with respect 
to the community-building capacity. The German axiom of Burgfrieden 
out-of-area (internal truce between rivaling political parties and interest 
groups) is credited with bringing about the very internal pacification that 
much of the pre-war rhetoric had conjured up: “All internal strife, all dif-
ferences between Turks and Arabs, between rebellious Bedouin tribes and 
central government, between Sunni and Shiites are obsolete” (Mittwoch 
[1914], 29). Again, the chief representative of the German ethos is cred-
ited as the protagonist of this very ideal: “The blending [“Mischung”] of 
religions is one of Djemal Pasha’s favorite notions”—ostensibly extend-
ing to the Christian, Jewish, Druze, and other denominations and religions 
(Feldmann 1917, 27). The ubiquitousness of this narrative, its neat fit into 
German fantasies of ordering the world in their image, created a dynamic 
that left little room for dissenting voices such as that of Johannes Lepsius, 
director of the German Orient Mission, who alerted the German public 
to the fate of the Armenian people including deportations to camps in the 
Syrian desert—the very location that was concurrently being framed as the 
heroic border of German imperialist desire and civilizatory achievement in 
the dominant discourse (Lepsius 1916).9
For the literary expressions of German solidarity with the South-African 
Boers’ struggle against the British Empire, the term has been coined of a 
Heimatliteratur “out-of-area” (Parr 2014)—with the Boers serving as the 
collective targets for the projection of the German self-identification in colo-
nial space. Here, in the Ottoman-Syrian scenario, one can witness a similar 
projection at work, manifest in the ideal of surrogacy, realized through the 
transplantation of metropolitan ideals to colonial space and the participa-
tion of proxies in the construction of ideality out-of-area. The pinnacle 
of what is good and right in colonial space is a replica of idealized met-
ropolitanism: “With its meticulous cleanliness, its comfort, and its quiet, 
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competent leadership, the Empress Augusta Viktoria Hospice [in Jerusalem] 
appeared to us Germans and to the Turks as a beacon of the orderly and 
organized [“wohlgeordnet”] solid German Empire” (Uebelhör 1917, 21). 
Not only is the replication of ingenuity, expertise, humanitarianism, and 
of a German ethos hailed as a driving force in the process of creating a sur-
rogate in colonial space, the act of impregnating the terrain is also given a 
spiritual, quasi-religious dimension that is intimately married to the colonial 
ethos. Commenting on the graves of a German soldier who was a member of 
the motorized corps [“Kraftfahrerstaffel”] and thus an embodiment of tech-
nological modernization, and a nurse, an embodiment of the Kulturarbeit 
of caring and nurturing, Feldmann remarks: “These two graves are well 
cared for, a place of veneration for Germans and Turks. One has mighty 
views across the wonderful land that our allies are about to breathe new life 
into [“in dem unsere Bundesgenossen jetzt neues Leben wecken wollen”]” 
(Feldmann 1917, 37). Even after death, the site asserts its mastery over all 
that is surveyed from its vantage point. In the land that is surveyed, contra-
dictions are reconciled and the colonialist aporia is resolved between the 
strangeness of the colonial “other” and the impetus to remedy the foreign 
terrain’s deficiencies by transplanting the familiar onto the strange.
Encounter with an icon: Embodying German coloniality
Wilhelm Feldmann reports a curious meeting that took place just after 
crossing the Taurus range and entering the pivotal, ambivalent, and desired 
Syrian threshold space. This encounter epitomizes German identity for-
mation out-of-area by staking claims and demonstrating entitlement. His 
guide identifies a “slim sheikh” as “a German who is known as Abdullah 
Naufel Effendi” (Feldmann 1917, 21. Subsequent quotations ibid.). 
The description of this German with the Arab name and appearance— 
obviously an instance of hybridization (or camouflage)—is reminiscent of 
Karl May’s figurations of colonial actors whose temporary, strategic mim-
icry is intended to epitomize a uniquely German ability to master colonial 
conditions by way of partial nativization, i.e. by strategic immersive com-
petence (cf. Krobb 2017b). The person in question is one of Germany’s 
colonial icons, the hero of one of the most significant historical episodes for 
the formation of a German colonialist conscience: Karl Neufeld, “famous 
‘Prisoner of the Mahdi’.”10 At the time, he was on his return journey from 
the Gulf of Aden, where, as part of the so-called (Othmar von) Stotzingen 
mission, he had (unsuccessfully) attempted to stir Jihadist revolt against the 
British at a point of utmost strategic importance for their maritime suprem-
acy (Strohmeier 2016). Through this iconic figure and his itinerary, the 
subsequent brief remark connects colonial space to its center, the metropo-
lis that attributes meaning and guides its agents; it positions Neufeld at 
the heart of the present endeavor and evokes a proud and heroic German 
tradition of colonial adventure and engagement: “He was just returning 
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from the Hejaz and continued on to Berlin—presumably a short, rather 
comfortable journey for this curious man, who had been through so much. 
Several of our Turkish travel companions renewed [!] their old acquaintance 
with Neufeld here in Mamureh” (Feldmann 1917, 21). Neufeld epitomizes 
German engagement with colonial space—its strategies (the intimacy and 
authoritative knowledge that temporal immersion generates) and ethos (the 
resilience and confidence displayed during his 15-year ordeal). The mere 
evocation of his name has a glorifying, stabilizing, and consolidating effect. 
This seemingly casual encounter integrates the current propaganda nar-
rative into a well-established story of colonial attainment that orders the 
world according to domestic needs. The designation of Neufeld’s journey as 
“comfortable,” and the appellation of his acquaintance with the journalist’s 
Turkish travel companions (the surrogates) as long-standing, integrates the 
area traversed between the Gulf of Aden and Berlin into a unified terrain of 
tiered concentric circles (an empire based on the logic of layered adjacent 
colonialism). It also integrates the present moment into a historical contin-
uum of colonialism. The icon of Germany’s colonial aspirations and myths 
embodies a (imaginary, symbolical, invoked) coalescence of the realms of 
the Central Powers, Turkey, its fringes, and German colonial space in its 
entirety, including those regions where projections reigned in the absence of 
legal possession.
The German world order is imposed on this region and upheld by loyal 
and congenial representatives. This narrative of projection and surrogacy is so 
persuasive because the specific and the general overlap and intersect consist-
ently; their linkage complements and sustains the colonial matrices that struc-
ture the German discourse on Ottoman space, and in particular the Syrian 
arena: Axes and horizons on either side of the tracks, centers and margins, 
models and followers, order and anarchy, progress and anachronism (the 
“barbaric” lifestyle of nomads), direction and disorientation, Germans and 
their allies against the adversary that any colonial situation depends on for 
justification and momentum—all of these elements are fused in the narra-
tive devoted to accommodating Syria. The colonialist narrative claims that 
contradictions can be surmounted, that Syria fits neatly into the fantasy of 
a global Germany. In a novel that bears the geographic designation of the 
area at stake here in its title, Von Bagdad nach Stambul [“From Baghdad to 
Istanbul,” 1882/1892], Karl May—the author who did more than anyone 
else to anchor the Middle East in the German colonialist imagination—lets 
one of his characters assert that “the Turk has as much entitlement to defend 
his dominions as the Prussian has to hold on to Saxony, Hanover, and Silesia” 
(May 1992, 387). This statement asserts the analogy between the homeland 
and its imagined replica in removed-adjacent space. He also suggests a lineal 
development between acquisition, be it through dynastical inheritance, con-
quest, or treaty settlement, and an integrative process of nation-building, of 
forming stable and successful large political entities. The Pax Turcica of old 
was thus to be revived, in the image of an imagined, idealized Pax Germanica.
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Notes
1 Cf. from oppositional viewpoints and with hardly any mention of German 
involvement even before the war: Fieldhouse (2006); Salt (2008).
2 Fruitful contributions to mapping the field are, e.g., MagShamhraín (2009); 
Marchand (2009); Dunker (2011).
3 German colonialism extending into adjacent territory is mostly studied with 
respect to regions bordering the Prussian heartland, such as Silesia, the Baltics, 
and, importantly, Poland (cf. Kopp 2012). Habsburg’s continental dominions 
and protectorates, as well as their literature, have also been configured in post-
colonial parameters (most recently Ruthner 2018).
4 Criticism of German heavy-handedness for example concerned the former Chief 
of Staff of the German army, Erich von Falkenhayn, since 1917 commander of 
Turkish forces in Palestine. Guhr (1937) recalls his opinion that it is the most 
urgent task “to educate the Turkish with firmness to follow orders and instruc-
tions as is the case in the German forces” (183–184). Another German officer 
recalls the reaction of local Turkish commander Halil to the suggestion to give 
Herzog Adolf Friedrich zu Mecklenburg a command over Turkish troops on the 
Persian border: He displayed a “distinct aversion against the Prince and could 
not be talked out of his suspicion that the duke, formerly gouvernor of Togo, 
aimed at acquiring a new colony for himself in Persia” (Gleich 1921, 126).
5 As for example discussed by Todd Kontje in the chapter “Romantic Orientalism 
and the Absence of Empire” (Kontje 2004, 61–132).
6 On the significance of the notion of frontier for nineteenth-century thinking cf. 
Osterhammel (2009), Chapter VII: Frontiers, 465–564, esp. 514–521.
7 Thus it outlines the self-image of armchair colonialists before the German acqui-
sition of her own overseas empire. Cf. Zantop 1997; cf. also Krobb 2014.
8 For a time, he had worked as a private tutor to the Silesian Princes of Pless who 
counted one of the pioneers of African exploration, Carl Claus von der Decken, 
amongst their ranks. Between 1914 and 1917, the Pless family seat in Silesia 
served as headquarters for the German High Command.
9 German indifference, or even collusion in the Armenian genocide, is explored by 
Dadrian (1996).
10 The quotation references Neufeld’s report about his time held captive by the 
Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa Abdullahi (A Prisoner of the Khaleefa. 
Twelve Years Captivity in Omdurman, 1899). On the centrality of the events 
in the Sudan from the 1870s to the 1890s for the German colonial outlook cf. 
Krobb (2017a), esp. 427–437.
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On June 15, 2017, Christian-Matthias Schlaga, the German Ambassador 
to Namibia, addressed the annual meeting of the German School Society 
in Windhoek. In his speech, the Ambassador deemed it appropriate to deal 
with the ongoing negotiations between the Namibian and the German gov-
ernment. The negotiations concerned the genocide that had been perpe-
trated by German colonial troops from 1904 to 1908, in what was then 
German Southwest Africa. At the incongruous venue of a private school 
society meeting, clearly addressing an audience that represented German 
speakers—today less than one percent of the Namibian population of some 
2.3 million people—Schlaga told his listeners that from the point of view of 
German diplomacy, the negotiations hinged on three main points:
(1) to find a common language to address the events of 1904–1907.1 
This will center around the way the concept of ‘genocide’ will be used; 
(2) Germany is prepared to apologize for the crimes perpetrated in the 
German name during this period of time. In this, it remains important for 
Germany that this apology will be accepted by Namibia as the final point 
of the political-moral discussion. We shall therefore talk about the req-
uisite details of an apology; (3) construction of a joint memorial culture 
and financial support for the development in particular of those regions 
in Namibia in which the communities affected at the time live today.
Furthermore, Schlaga stressed that “the Federal Government sees no legal 
basis for the demand for reparations” and insisted that legal action “will not 
lead to pacification. On the opposite—it leads astray.”2
Both in form and content, the Ambassador’s speech can be considered a 
template of what I address here as postcolonial asymmetry. By this term, I 
wish to address a central feature in a postcolonial and transnational rela-
tionship that plays out in an exemplary way around the conflict over the 
memorialization of the colonial genocide in former German Southwest 
Africa (1904–1908). This issue exposes Germany as a postcolonial soci-
ety, while at the same time the entangled history between both countries 
addresses unfinished business in the Namibian postcolony.
Postcolonial asymmetry
Coping with the consequences of genocide 
between Namibia and Germany
Reinhart Kößler
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Postcolonial asymmetry
To make this case, a short look at some structural features of the postco-
lonial relationship is in order. After a very brief recap of the historical facts, 
I will trace the issue of dealing with the genocide and its consequences, both 
on the Namibian and German sides, with special emphasis on recent devel-
opments and on the official German approach as exemplified by Schlaga’s 
intervention.
Outlines of asymmetry
Relations between Namibia and Germany are asymmetrical for a number 
of reasons. These do not all dovetail immediately with the issues raised by 
the debate on postcolonialism. Issues include the enormous difference that 
exists between the population of Namibia and Germany, Namibia with just 
over two million and Germany with more than 80 million. The even greater 
gap in the size of the economy presents another asymmetry—Namibia’s 
Gross National Income was around €11 billion in 2016 (see Trading 
Economics 2017), which contrasts Germany’s 3.1 trillion (see Statista 
2017). Namibia’s annual per capita income was €5092.03, Germany’s was 
€37,997. This places Namibia among the upper-middle-income countries. 
However, this favorable position conceals one of the most unequal societies 
worldwide. It would probably be rash to attribute these conditions directly 
or wholesale to the consequences of colonialism. Again, such figures may 
be interpreted, for present purposes, on two levels: Whereas to Germany, 
simply by size and economic clout, Namibia is of marginal importance, the 
opposite is true for Namibia’s relationship to Germany, which is enhanced 
by the country’s much commented-on position as the largest per capita 
recipient of German Overseas Development Assistance. Again, this rela-
tively large commitment is attributed, on the official German side, to a 
hazily motivated “special responsibility” (cf. Kössler 2015, 74–78; Kössler 
and Melber 2017, 45–48; see infra).
The resulting differences are eye-catching. Whereas German events of 
medium importance, more in regard to the mutual relations of the two 
countries on official and sometimes also on non-official levels, receive lively 
interest in Namibian media, this is hardly reflected in German news. Banner 
headlines in Namibia are matched by silence or curt notes in the back pages 
of German newspapers and websites. To many Namibians, it is hard to real-
ize or countenance the fact that their lives are of very little relevance to most 
Germans or even barely noticed by them.
In terms of postcolonial asymmetry, inequality in Namibia also features 
when it comes to the heritage of settler colonialism. The extent of inequality 
may be gauged from the fact that, in terms of human development as com-
pared to its ranking by Gross National Income (UNDP 2016), Namibia loses 
a dramatic 18 ranks globally. Again, this extremely skewed social structure 
is exacerbated further when we look at language groups. According to avail-
able data, the small group of Namibian German speakers appears extremely 
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privileged. They enjoy a Human Development Index which is comparable to 
that of Canada or Sweden, whereas the country at large would resemble India, 
South Africa, or Morocco; for the northern regions of the country, as well 
as Khoekhoegowab speakers,3 the Human Development Index equals Papua 
New Guinea, Sudan, or Congo (cf. Kössler 2015, 42–43). Furthermore, gross 
inequality is prevalent in the central and southern regions, precisely those that 
have undergone a history of settler colonialism, in contradistinction to the 
northern regions where colonialism took the form of indirect rule. In the south 
and center, settler colonialism was predicated on the wholesale expropriation 
of African land as an integral aspect of the genocide, and generally by the 
creation of a “society of privilege” in the wake of this cataclysm (Zimmerer 
2001, 94). In this way, the prevalent pattern of social inequality in Namibia is 
an outflow of a specific form of colonial rule, one that was predicated on the 
results of the genocide and enhanced further, after the termination of German 
control, under South African rule (1915–1990).
These structural features mean that the consequences of the genocide 
form a daily presence in the lives of Namibians hailing from the south 
and center of the country. Land takes on special importance in this, less 
for its limited economic value than its symbolic meaning. The wholesale 
restructuring of the landscape after the expropriation of Africans reduced 
them to the status of chattel labor, with a marginal existence at best on the 
land. In addition, this dispensation excluded Africans from places of ritual 
importance such as ancestral graves or communal centers which even today 
remain vital for asserting and reproducing traditional communities.
While Namibians from the center and the south will find it hard to evade 
the consequences of genocide in their everyday lives, Germans are generally 
not even aware of this crime that has been perpetrated in the German name; 
frequently people in Germany are not even aware that Germany once was a 
colonial power. More recently this colonial amnesia has been punctured by 
postcolonial initiatives. In recent years, these initiatives have linked up with 
representatives of affected communities that have campaigned for many 
years for an official recognition of German responsibility for the genocide, 
along with an adequate apology and consequent reparations (cf. Kössler 
2015, ch. 10).
The following overview of the events will also show that the genocide 
affected Germany much more deeply than is generally acknowledged. This 
was genuinely entangled history, in the sense that what happened in the col-
ony deeply affected also the metropole—and of course, vice versa (cf. Conrad 
and Randeria 2013, 39–48). Therefore, prevalent ignorance on the German 
side also means that Germans ignore a vital part of their own history.
The genocide in its time …
It is now widely understood that in 1904–1908, the German colonial army 
(Schutztruppe) and the German authorities perpetrated the first genocide of 
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the twentieth century. The genocide was the decisive aspect of the Namibian 
War (Wallace 2011, ch. 6), a complex series of events centered around 
the anti-colonial resistance by Ovaherero and Nama. In August 1904, the 
attempt to crush resistance of Ovaherero in a decisive battle at Ohamakari 
(Waterberg) resulted in a mass flight of the latter into the waterless Omaheke 
steppe, which was sealed off by German troops. Tens of thousands died of 
hunger and thirst. In his infamous proclamation of October 2, 1904, the 
commanding general Lothar von Trotha openly asserted his determination 
to eliminate all Ovaherero from the colony. Even though this proclamation 
was rescinded, after heated discussion in Berlin some six weeks later, Trotha 
reaffirmed his intention, in a further proclamation on April 22, 1905, this 
time directed against Nama. In a second phase of genocide, survivors were 
herded into concentration camps, where they died in droves. Genocide is not 
simply mass killing. In terms of the UN convention of 1948 (cf. Gellately 
and Kiernan 2003, 381–384), this crime also includes the destruction of a 
group’s means of continuing their life. Therefore, a further dimension of 
genocide concerns the Native Ordinances of 1907, which provided above 
all for the wholesale expropriation of “insurgent” groups of their lands 
(Zimmerer 2001, 68–94). These measures created serious impediments to 
reconstructing their communal nexuses for the survivors of the genocide 
and laid the basis for the large-scale white settlement. The white settlement 
occurred both during German rule and after 1915, under the South African 
dispensation. Eventually, this led to Apartheid.
The colonial war and genocide were followed closely by the German 
public. In contradistinction to other cases of genocide during the twentieth 
century, it can be considered a public genocide (cf. Kössler 2015, 59–61, 
88–96). Atrocities were communicated freely on picture postcards, novel-
ists found divine justification for the killing off of Africans, and the offi-
cial account by the Great General Staff extolled the “annihilation” of the 
Ovaherero in the Omaheke (Krieggeschichtliche Abteilung 1906, 207). The 
Namibian War, at an important juncture in German history, intervened 
directly in German politics. When in late 1906 the majority in the Reichstag 
appeared reluctant to vote for another loan for the war effort, Chancellor 
Bülow used this opportunity to call the snap elections of January 1907, and 
in doing so, engineered a thorough realignment of political parties (Bülow 
Bloc). These elections are known, referencing a derogatory term for Nama, 
as “Hottentot Elections”—the campaign focused on the war effort and its 
supposedly patriotic challenges. A broad bourgeois coalition advanced anti-
socialist, chauvinist, and colonialist agendas, and years later, in 1916, Rosa 
Luxemburg recalled a “pogrom atmosphere” (1916, 83; see Sobich 2006). 
Regardless of countervailing voices from the left, which also denounced what 
was happening in the colonies, the campaign marked a coalescence of a range 
of colonialist, extreme nationalist, anti-Semitic, and pan-German currents. 
Eminent historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler identified that “fatal lines of conti-
nuity run further into German history right to 1945” (Wehler 1995, 1079). 
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This fateful tendency was underwritten by a host of organizations, including 
those dedicated to imperial expansion, amongst them the German Colonial 
Society (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft). All of these formed elements of a 
burgeoning radical, right-wing nationalism (cf. Nipperdey 1998, 600–609). 
Lines of continuity include, besides a few persons who played roles both 
in the genocide and in Nazi Germany, the pursuit of broad settlement pro-
jects pursued by Germany during both World Wars. Scholarly endeavors 
like “race science,” without yet presaging the horrific forms this branch of 
“scholarship” was to take some three decades later, clearly saw a boost dur-
ing the Namibian War, as did geography and its preoccupation with space 
(see Zimmerer 2005, 2011).
In this way, “properly intelligible colonial history in the stricter sense 
(direct territorial annexation) needs to be resituated in a much wider context 
of expansionism” (Eley 2010, 71). Thus, it has been argued that “between 
the founding of the Empire in 1871 and the outbreak of war in 1914, no 
single event has changed the political complexion of the Empire more than 
the acquisition of colonies,” as this initiated Germany’s fateful “quest for 
expansion” (Pogge von Strandmann 2009, 28). Therefore, it is hard to 
overestimate the impact both of incisive events in the colonial sphere, like 
the Namibian War, and of the colonial strategy at large, for the course of 
German history—regardless of persistent endeavors to depict German colo-
nialism as a mere “short-lived adventure” (Gründer and Hiery 2017, 24).
… and how it is remembered in the present
German history during the first half of the twentieth century, with all its 
aspects of extreme violence and barbarism, has been shaped decisively by 
the colonial dimension. It is not by accident, therefore, that the cataclysm 
of 1945 signaled not only the end of old-style expansionism, laying colonial 
dreams to rest, but also occasioned an epistemic break: Effective colonial 
amnesia did not mean a cognitive lack of knowledge. Rather, Germany’s 
colonial past was hardly in the public mind and was not engaged with in a 
proactive way.
Such amnesia4 is closely related to the fact that, seemingly, the life-world 
of people living in Germany is largely severed from visible (post)colonial 
contexts and references: They can afford to be non-cognizant and unaware 
(cf. van Laak 2005, 9). In contrast, Namibians, certainly from the south 
and center, hardly can evade the presence of a colonial past. However, 
some change in German memorial practices in relation to colonialism, and 
in particular to Namibia, has occurred in the wake of the 2004 centenary 
of the battle of Ohamakari, the emblematic event marking the genocide in 
Namibia. That year was marked by activities relating to the centenary that, 
in number and intensity, came as a surprise for many (cf. Zeller 2005). 
Significantly, at that time an Internet search for topics on German colo-
nialism would lead mainly to right-wing websites run by small groups of 
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colonial traditionalists (Geyer 2006).5 This virtual hegemony was broken by 
small non-profit organizations and often also individuals volunteering their 
unpaid labor. One further component in the ensuing small-scale campaign 
was the presence of the Left party in parliament. Here, individual deputies 
have consistently pushed the issue of an apology for the genocide and of 
appropriate redress, which were increasingly being brought up by repre-
sentatives of affected communities in Namibia.
The asymmetry addressed above may explain why much of the initia-
tive emanates from Namibia. Here, communities affected by the genocide 
have re-assembled and re-organized under difficult circumstances. Memory 
of the genocide remains a vital dimension in their lives (see Biwa 2012; 
Kössler 2015, Chs. 7 and 8). However, only after independence was it pos-
sible for these groups to come forward with demands about what should 
be done concerning the pain and injustice suffered by their forebears and 
trauma and disruption they still experience today. The gruff rebuffs expe-
rienced from the first attempts by Ovaherero to engage Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl and President Roman Herzog on the occasion of their respective visits 
to Namibia during the 1990s prompted the filing of a lawsuit in the USA 
in quest for compensation for the losses sustained through the genocide. 
In 2004, Ovaherero were at the forefront of activities, exercising and in 
parts also claiming what could be perceived as a “monopolisation of the 
victim status” (Melber 2005, 141). Victim competition (c. Chaumont 1997) 
appeared as a real and potentially alarming prospect.
Civil society bonds
Over the following years, the situation changed mainly in two ways. (1) 
There was considerable realignment in Namibia. An alliance was forged 
between the section of Ovaherero who showed allegiance to the late 
Paramount Chief Kuaima Riruako, for long a leading campaigner of the 
genocide issue, and the great majority of Nama groups whose traditional 
leaders now organized in a formal way. Riruako succeeded in seeing a 
motion through the National Assembly which mandated that the Namibian 
government, jointly with the affected communities, engage Germany in 
negotiations about the consequences of the genocide. (2) After several 
years of complicated negotiations, the first group of 20 skulls was repat-
riated to Namibia in 2011 (cf. Biwa 2012, ch. 5; Kössler 2015, ch. 12). 
This initiated much closer links between Namibian activists who formed 
part of the massive delegation of some 70 people to accompany the skulls 
and various groups of activists based in Germany. Delegates saw them-
selves ignored, hurt, and dishonored by the approach taken by the German 
government in its efforts to deny the event official recognition. This culmi-
nated in a diplomatic éclat when the representative of the German Foreign 
Office walked out of the official handing over ceremony. Many delegates 
felt that under such serious stress, they had been sustained particularly by 
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the solidarity of German civil society. Subsequently, quite stable links have 
developed that have made for the relatively regular presence of Namibian 
activists in Berlin. These activists have made public appearances and par-
ticipated in forms of protests, such as vigils and demonstrations. This 
brought the issue of colonial heritage visibly into the center of the former 
colonial metropole.
These activities remain strictly separate from the two governments. On 
the Namibian side, the alliance between Ovaherero and Nama groups men-
tioned before has moved to a very critical attitude towards the Namibian 
government. A rift emerged when they saw themselves excluded on the 
occasion of the second repatriation of human remains in February 2014. 
The repatriation occurred at very short notice, apparently to avoid the pub-
licity that had been created in 2011. These tactics prompted harsh protests 
under the slogan of “Not about us without us” (cf. Kössler 2015, 308–313), 
which since has become a watchword in relevant activities. At the same 
time, a long-standing split among Ovaherero, between adherents to the 
Paramount Chief on the one side and of the Royal Houses on the other, has 
become increasingly pronounced in the stances taken towards the govern-
ment’s approach and activities, as will be seen in connection with the cur-
rent negotiation process.
Playing on postcolonial asymmetry: The official 
German approach
Until July 10, 2015, consecutive German governments of various political 
hues were consistently at pains to avoid terming what had happened in 
Namibia during 1904–1908 as genocide. On that day, a spokesperson of the 
Foreign Office let it be known in a seemingly informal fashion that hence-
forth, this would change. However, at the time of writing this chapter, this 
shift has not been reflected in any written statement (Kössler and Melber 
2017, ch. 3). Once it became known that formal negotiations between the 
two governments over the consequences of the genocide would be initiated, 
it also emerged that the German government intended to make the terms of 
the incumbent apology for the genocide one of the central objects of nego-
tiation. This approach is also reflected in the speech by Ambassador Schlaga 
quoted in the opening paragraphs of this chapter.
In responding to Schlaga’s statement and similar earlier pronouncements 
by German diplomats, Dr. Zedekia Ngavirue, the Namibian Special Envoy 
leading negotiations with the German government, pinpointed one basic 
problem in this approach. He took note of official German reference to the 
healing of wounds which was linked to the refusal to talk about reparation. 
Ngavirue concluded that the German side believed “that this could happen 
through a prescription by a doctor from Berlin.” However, Ngavirue sug-
gested the contrary, that “we feel that the issue of reparations cannot be 
resolved by a prescription of a doctor in Berlin” (Pelz 2017).
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This quip summed up the gist of some one-and-a-half year’s negotiations 
in a polite and succinct manner. The German approach is based on the idea 
that an apology for the genocide, which is universally considered to be pre-
requisite for reconciliation as a step towards a constructive engagement of 
the past, should itself be an object of negotiation. This proposition needs to 
be analyzed on two levels, concerning (1) the normative issues implied in an 
apology and (2) the way in which this approach harks back to the overall 
structural situation of postcolonial asymmetry.
On the normative level, the idea of a negotiated apology as pursued by 
the German Foreign Office runs counter to established concepts of transi-
tional justice, in particular, deep apology. According to Bentley (2016, 27), 
after serious transgression, such an apology, “if accepted is a useful tool by 
which one can be embraced back into the fold.” As a “classic example,” he 
cites “post-war West German contrition facilitating the state’s normalisa-
tion into the ‘international community’.” Obviously, here as in everyday 
life, the risk of refusal is attendant on rendering such an apology. A catalog 
of conditions on which deep apology is widely considered to hinge may put 
the issue into perspective (for the following, see Kössler 2015, 257–259; 
Bentley 2016, 22–33). The speaker should
 • represent the state (President, Chancellor, Bundestag);
 • identify with the collective represented;
 • address in the first instance the victim group;
 • articulate the (counterfactual) wish to undo the transgression and 
its consequences (which implies reparation, or in German terms, 
Wiedergutmachung), and consequently not to repeat such action;
 • finally, forgiveness should be asked.
Such verbal action is entirely possible without prior negotiation. If genu-
ine, it flows out of an understanding of a fundamental injustice and of 
the suffering wrought by the atrocity of genocide. As one emblematic 
instance of such an apology, even though performed, not spoken, one 
may cite Chancellor Willy Brandt’s gesture in front of the memorial of 
the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, when he spontaneously fell on his knees 
(cf. Teitel 2006, 105). From such vantage points, it is hard to understand 
negotiating about the wording of an apology for genocide. The present 
impasse can be considered, at least in part, as a result of the insistence 
of German diplomacy on doing just that. As has emerged in responses 
from various Namibian sides, an outright German apology would have 
set a different tone and prevented misgivings about the circumstance. 
More than three years after the verbal acknowledgment of genocide, and 
many months into the negotiation process, such an apology has still not 
been made.
If respect is “an underestimated factor in international relations” (Wolf 
2008, 2017) and indeed vital in conflict mediation (cf. Solarin 2017), 
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withholding an apology is clearly not conducive towards achieving a solu-
tion to what remains an acute conflict, at least with respect to Namibia. 
Additionally, concrete actions by German diplomats have demonstrated 
a less than thorough knowledge of the field they engage in, and thereby 
also a lack of respect. One instance where this has led to open conflict 
may suffice.
On the occasion of his visit to Namibia in pursuit of the negotiations 
in November, German Special Envoy Ruprecht Polenz met a delegation of 
the affected communities of the genocide in the German Embassy. When 
Polenz responded to claims by delegates for descendants of survivors of 
the Namibian genocide to be treated the same way as had been done with 
survivors of the Holocaust and their descendants, the situation exploded. By 
this, they motivated their claim for reparation and also for being part of the 
negotiations in their own right. As reported by the Embassy,
the German Special Envoy expressed his deeply felt conviction that every 
human life is of equal value, and every loss is, thus, equally deplorable. 
Out of respect for all victims, the German Special Envoy rejected the 
notion to compare one genocide—like what happened in Namibia—
with other crimes against humanity. This, the Special Envoy stressed, 
does apply in particular to any comparison with the Holocaust because 
of substantially different motives driving the German Nazi leadership 
when persecuting all Jews all over Europe and implementing the indus-
trialized mass killing of human beings to annihilate Jews only because 
they were Jews.
(German Embassy 2016)
Thus, Polenz first rejected drawing any comparison, only to do just that and 
assert the singularity of the Holocaust and to use this singularity to counter 
the claims of the Namibian delegates. Regardless of the questionable mer-
its of such reasoning (cf. Kössler and Melber 2017, 88–90), this response 
by the Special Envoy betrayed an astonishing lack of awareness about the 
discourse of his counterparts. For a long time, Namibians have articulated 
concern about a differential treatment precisely regarding the German 
approach to the Holocaust. As the long-serving Foreign Minister Theo-Ben 
Gurirab once stated: “We are blacks and if there should be a problem … on 
this account, this would amount to racism” (qu. Veit 2001). The response of 
the delegates to Polenz’s statement was therefore not altogether surprising: 
They tried to march out of the meeting room but, on account of security 
regulations, were hindered in doing so by the Ambassador. In the heated 
atmosphere, delegates felt they were being physically threatened (New Era, 
Windhoek, 25 November 2016)—a response that may be linked to perva-
sive feelings of fear reported when black Namibians enter “German” terri-
tory.6 Obviously, this also applies to the Embassy, which is guarded by a 
tight security checkpoint.
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The decisive point, however, was made by Ida Hoffmann. Speaking 
for the Nama Genocide Technical Committee after the incident, Hoffman 
stated: “In our view and knowledge, death, suffering and destruction in one 
place and against one group is just as painful and destructive as the suffering 
of the next group.”7
The pronouncements and actions of the German diplomats betrayed dis-
concerting ignorance of the terrain they were dealing with. Respect, as men-
tioned before, would also require making an effort to be informed about 
the attitudes and sensitivities of one’s counterparts. Thus, the late Hans-
Dietrich Genscher (2014, 58) stressed the need “to take your contracting 
partner … seriously” and “to get a picture of the situation and of what 
moves this man or this woman?” Furthermore, Genscher’s counsel was not 
to be “selective” in terms of values and principles. Within the given context, 
Genscher occupies a special place on account of his role in the Namibian 
independence process.
Exclusion and legitimacy
Genscher’s admonishments may sound slightly banal but the negotiation 
process about the Namibian genocide has been marked largely by the non-
observance of such principles. Pitfalls are aggravated by the intricate con-
stellation of participants, particularly in Namibia, which have led to serious 
conflicts between the Namibian government and decisive parts of the affected 
communities. Issues revolve around the claim of the government to be the 
democratically legitimated sole representative of the Namibian people and 
the counter-claim that the government is not in a position to adequately 
represent the affected communities. Because of these perceived defects of the 
Namibian government’s representation of the affected groups, important 
sections of these groups call for equal representation at the negotiating table 
in the sense of a “trialogue” instead of a mere “dialogue.”
This demand is motivated by a range of arguments that can be summa-
rized as follows: The National Assembly motion carried in October 2006 
saw the Namibian government in a mediating role, while the main negoti-
ating party would be the affected communities. Furthermore, Ovaherero 
and Nama are claimed, in terms of the UN Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples of 2007, to be indigenous peoples—they form a minority 
today in Namibia, at least partly because of the population losses sustained 
through the genocide (United Nations 2008). In the Class Action Complaint 
filed with a US District Court in January (2017), specific mention is made 
of the Declaration’s Article 18, which gives indigenous peoples the explicit 
right “to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their 
rights, through representatives chosen by themselves.” A further argument 
for separate representation of affected communities at the negotiating table 
concerns a direct consequence of the colonial drawing of boundaries as well 
as of the genocide—the presence in neighboring Botswana and South Africa 
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of Ovaherero and Nama, whose ancestors hailed from Namibia, among 
whom many were refugees from the colonial war and genocide.
Leaving aside the details of the conflict between relevant affected com-
munities and the Namibian Government, it is still clear that the issue of the 
participants in the negotiations points directly to at least two important 
dimensions of Namibia’s postcolonial situation: The construction of the 
independent nation–state, and indeed, the national liberation movement 
that preceded it, was predicated on the territorial context created by German 
colonial conquest and delimitation with adjacent powers Great Britain and 
Portugal; this has bound together diverse groups who have undergone quite 
divergent experiences under colonialism. This divergence concerns the gen-
ocide itself and the expropriation of land, both of which were limited to 
the center and south (cf. Kössler 2007). Whereas the Namibian govern-
ment of late has stressed a purported national unity in anti-colonial resist-
ance from the very beginning (cf. Kössler 2015, 315, 325), Ovaherero and 
Nama spokespersons have insisted on regionally divergent experiences 
and on the fact that an explicit intention to annihilate was directed by the 
German Imperial Government through General von Trotha, specifically at 
Ovaherero and Nama. According to this reasoning, they then form the pri-
mary victim (survivor) groups, while it is not denied that others, such as 
Damara and San, have suffered as well. One further argument supporting 
the demand for an autonomous role for affected communities has recently 
been voiced, pointing to the original process of colonization (e.g. Hoffmann 
2017). At that time, it is pointed out, the state or territory of Namibia 
did not exist, and the colonizers dealt with the individual African poli-
ties. The chiefs of those polities were the signatories of Protection Treaties. 
Therefore, where the consequences of German colonial rule are concerned, 
these polities should also be respected as subjects in their own right (cf. 
Jaguttis 2005, 2010).
All these considerations go to the root of the postcolonial state as a 
continuation of the colonial state. This is true of the issue of territory and 
the principle of territoriality. It also applies to the pervasive concern with 
sovereignty and national unity. While not denying the importance of these 
principles, for which many of those now involved in campaigning for a just 
dispensation in the genocide issue have struggled themselves, the counter-
argument insists that denial of actual difference amounts to discrimination, 
which, by implication, might actually jeopardize the goal of unity.
While the insistence of the Namibian government on its right as the sole 
representation of Namibians seemingly speaks to basic tenets of democracy, 
the arguments for indigenous rights still need to be considered. A standard 
argument put forth by African governments denies the problems which are 
addressed by the relevant international conventions to which these govern-
ments themselves are party. In this vein, the relevance of the concept of 
indigenous people to the African continent is contested. The notion is consid-
ered a construct, largely due to external intervention by Non-Governmental 
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Organizations (cf. Pelican 2015, 136–138). However, as the Namibian case 
among others can demonstrate, serious issues are couched in terms of indig-
enous rights which otherwise tend to be marginalized.
Again, German representatives took a rather low-key approach to the 
issue, pointing to the legal situation which in their view precludes any-
thing outside government-to-government negotiations (Polenz 2017). The 
counter-argument, that during the negotiations about the compensation of 
Holocaust survivors, non-governmental entities such as the Jewish Claims 
Conference had been involved, had in part triggered the confrontation 
between Polenz and the delegation of affected communities in November 
2016 mentioned previously (Hockerts 2001). Closer inspection of the evi-
dence yields indications that German diplomacy has been more active in this 
regard than appears at first sight. Thus, Ambassador Schlaga came out quite 
clearly on several occasions in Windhoek, while negotiations were still not 
taken up, with statements that repudiated any idea of a direct involvement 
of the affected communities.8 When conflict between the Namibian govern-
ment and the affected communities demanding direct representation at the 
negotiating table had reached a heating point in mid-2016, Special Envoy 
Ngavirue summed up the situation in an interview with a local newspaper: 
“The position is not that the government doesn’t want [the affected commu-
nities], but it is that they want to negotiate directly with the Germans, which 
the Germans have declined and deemed impossible” (Windhoek Observer, 
16.7.2016).
In the same interview, the issue of the legitimacy of the final outcome of 
the negotiations remained inconclusive. That is, it is still unclear how a very 
relevant group among the affected communities, very likely their majority, 
who still clamor for an autonomous role in the negotiations, will relate to 
an outcome of negotiations from which, according to their reading, at least, 
they have been excluded.
The other central issue that has been debated publicly, as well as obviously 
during the negotiations so far, is the demand for reparations. Remarkably, 
for all their arguments about representation and exclusions, the Namibian 
participants are of one mind in this regard.
The quest for reparation
As has been mentioned, “reparation” is germane to the concept of deep 
apology. There is little doubt that an apology for mass murder, or geno-
cide, necessarily entails material redress. At first sight, there is little disagree-
ment between the negotiating governments, or indeed in Namibia about 
this. However, considerable divergences exist when it comes to the reasons 
on which these expectations are founded, and especially to the forms that 
such compensation will take. Some point to specifically (southern) African 
concepts of justice, which involve the transfer of property, such as cattle, to 
indemnify victims and their families (cf. Hinz and Patemann 2006). Again, 
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this dovetails with the idea of just compensation, which is inherent in the 
concept of deep apology.
Official German responses to the demand for reparation have been con-
sistently negative. In some cases, such as in speeches by conservative MPs 
in the Bundestag, this refusal has been garnished with references to the ele-
vated level of German ODA Namibia has enjoyed since independence. As 
representatives of affected communities have argued for a long time, such 
assistance has not reached the areas in southern and central Namibia where 
most descendants of genocide victims and survivors reside; they see further 
discrimination in privileging the northern region with development pro-
jects. A more systematic argument concerns the fundamental difference that 
exists between development cooperation and reparation, or compensation 
for damages that have been caused by unjust action. Whereas the former 
is based on a voluntary act and regularly is subject to government nego-
tiations where both sides agree on priorities, concrete projects, and con-
comitant monitoring, this does not apply to reparations. These stem from 
a legitimate claim, made on account of past gross injustice. For this reason, 
the German side in the negotiations has consistently stressed the “politico-
moral” dimension, as opposed to the legal one where they claim no provi-
sions apply to Namibia.
Given pending legal proceedings, this may still be a moot point. As indi-
cated, some lawyers also ground a Namibian claim for reparations in the 
protection treaties upon which German colonial rule had been founded, 
and in which, according to this view, Namibian polities had been recog-
nized, explicitly and implicitly, as subjects of international law (cf. Jaguttis 
2005, 2010). In this case, the Geneva and Hague Conventions, which at 
the time formed part of existing ius in bello, might actually apply to the 
Namibian War and make it possible to adjudicate transgressions and their 
consequences. Interestingly, General von Trotha had explicitly noted that 
in his view, “it goes without saying that war in Africa cannot be waged 
according to the Geneva Convention” (Pool 1991, 274).9 It should also be 
noted that throughout the nineteenth century, the process of colonization 
was paralleled by an exclusion of “uncivilized” polities from the realm of 
international law to which they had formerly been considered parties (see 
Kleinschmidt 2013). With such considerations, the denial of a legal stance 
to the posterity of genocide victims and survivors forms part of the dis-
criminatory structure of international law, which is more deeply marked by 
colonialism than is generally noted (cf. Dhawan 2010).
It may be argued, therefore, that the refusal by German authorities to 
even consider the merits of Namibian claims is steeped in colonial atti-
tudes or otherwise takes advantage of structural realities that have roots 
in colonialism. In the case given, such an approach is also suggested by the 
way German officialdom dealt with the Collective Claim brought to the 
District Court in New York. It took almost a year and the pending threat 
of a default judgment for Germany to be represented when a preliminary 
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hearing had been set for the third time on January 25, 2018 (The Namibian, 
Windhoek, 25 January 2018). While this case remains sub iudice, it has 
transpired that German diplomacy has retracted once again from naming 
the genocide as such and shifted to the designation of what happened as 
“atrocities” (Kössler and Melber 2018a). Responses to a leaked German 
concept for infrastructural improvements in Namibia in the context of the 
government negotiations pointed to continued unilateralism in the German 
approach (New Era, Windhoek, 02 February 2018).
Conclusion
Recent developments around the issue of the Namibian genocide have par-
ticularly shown the consequences of what has here been called postcolonial 
asymmetry. While there is a distinct urgency in Namibia about this issue, 
it remains marginalized in Germany. Accordingly, the German govern-
ment, through its Foreign Office, can continue with its long-term strategy of 
avoiding historical responsibility and pursuing a policy marked by a narrow 
understanding of national interest (see also Roos and Seidl 2015). This is the 
case even after the taboo on naming the genocide has been overcome. The 
casual way this happened made it possible for the Foreign Office to pursue 
tactics that have contributed greatly to the present impasse of the negotia-
tions. These tactics revolve around what have become the twin issues, the 
formula of an apology and the demand for reparations.
During the final days of August 2018, the third repatriation of human 
remains from Germany to Namibia once again threw into relief the prob-
lems dealt with in this chapter (see also Kössler and Melber 2018b). While 
officials from both sides were at pains to underline good relationships, the 
unsettled questions were clear: the unanswered demand for reparation, the 
carefully treading language of German officials when it came to mention-
ing the genocide, and above all their reluctance to offer a clear apology by 
a sovereign instance of the state, which would go beyond individual state-
ments of remorse.
Notes
1 There are divergences in dating the end of the Namibian War and the genocide; 
1907 is officially declared as the end of the war by the Imperial Government, 
whereas 1908—the date used by most of the affected communities in Namibia—
refers to the closing of the concentration camps on May 28, 1908.
2 Ansprache des Deutschen Botschafters in Namibia Christian-Matthias Schlaga: 
Jahreshauptversammlung Deutscher Schulverein, 15 June 2017; translation R.K.
3 These include Nama as well as Damara.
4 The finding of colonial amnesia has been challenged recently (cf. Schilling 2014; 
Bürger 2017), but I see only reason to re-assert the concept of a punctured 
amnesia.
5 See also the statement on the website “Freiburg postcolonial” (http://www.
freiburg-postkolonial.de/Seiten/einleitung.htm; accessed 14 September 2018).
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6 Personal observations, informal talks, especially after the experience of the del-
egation to Berlin in 2011 (Windhoek, February/March 2012).
7 Media Conference Statement by Hon. Ida Hoffmann Chairperson: Nama 
Genocide Technical Committee (01 December 2016); Also. The Namibian, 
Windhoek. Namibian Sun. Windhoek, 02 December 2016.
8 See: Ovaherero & Nama Resistance Order against German Arrogance and 
Neo-Imperialist Tendencies Towards the Namibian Government and Its 
People. Issued by: Adv. Vekuii Rukoro. Ovaherero Paramount Chief; Chief 
Dawid Frederick, Chairman: Association of Nama Traditional Leaders. Place: 
Otjinene, Omaheke Region, Namibia. Date, 3 October 2015; http://genocide-
namibia.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Statement-delivered-to-the-Press-
by-Paramount-Chief-Adv-Rukoro.pdf. Die republikein (Windhoek) 21, no. 
10, 19.8.2017: 2015.
9 Note that Lothar von Trotha’s diary is still kept out of the public domain by the 
von Trotha Family Foundation, who admit researchers at their own discretion.
Bibliography
Bentley, Tom. Empires of Remorse. Narrative, postcolonialism and apologies for 
colonial atrocity. London and New York: Routledge, 2016.
Biwa, Memory. Weaving the Past with Threads of Memory: Narratives and 
Commemorations of the Colonial War in Southern Namibia. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis. Cape Town: Department of History, University of the Western Cape, 2012.
Bürger, Christiane. Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte(n). Der Genozid in Namibia und 
die Geschichtsschreibung der DDR und BRD. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2017.
Chaumont, Jean-Michel. La concurrence des victimes. Génocide, identité, 
reconnaissance. Paris: La découverte and Syros, 1997.
Conrad, Sebastian, and Shalini Randeria. “Einleitung: Geteilte Geschichten.” In: 
Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- 
und Kulturwissenschaften, (2nd enl. ed.), edited by Sebastian Conrad, Shalini 
Randeria, and Regina Römhild. Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2013, 32–70.
Dhawan, Nikita. “Justifying Colonialism/Decolonising Justice: The (Im)Possibility 
of Undoing Discontinuity between Recht (Law) and Gerechtigkeit (Justice).” In: 
The Division of the Earth: Tableaux on the Legal Synopses of the Berlin Africa 
Conference, edited by Dierk Schmidt. Köln: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walter 
König, 2010, 99–101.
Eley, Geoff. “Germany and Its Colonies: Margins and Metropole.” 
Werkstattgeschichte 55 (2010): 63–71.
Gellately, Robert and Ben Kiernan eds. The Spectre of Genocide. Mass Murder in 
Historical Perspective. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich. “Germany’s Role in Namibia’s Independence.” In: 
Namibia’s Foreign Policy: Historic Contexts, Current Dimensions, and 
Perspectives for the 21st Century, edited by Anton Bösl, André du Pisani, and 
Dennis U. Zaire. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, 2014, 51–58.
German Embassy. Press Statement, Meeting of the German Special Envoy, Mr. Ruprecht 
Polenz, with the Chairperson of the “Nama Genocide Technical Committee,” the 
honorable [sic] Mrs. Ida Hoffmann, Windhoek, 26 November 2016.
Geyer, Steven. “‘Die Diener wurden häufig frech.’ Schönredner der deutschen 
Kolonialverbrechen geben im Internet den Ton an—mit Empfehlung seriöser 
Medien.” Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 April 2006.
132 Reinhart Kößler 
Gründer, Horst and Hermann Hiery. “Zur Einführung.” In: Die Deutschen und ihre 
Kolonien. Ein Überblick, edited by Horst Gründer and Hermann Hiery. Berlin: 
be.bra verlag, 2017, 9–24.
Hinz, Manfred O. and Helgard K. Patemann. “Okupiona Omahoze—Wiping the 
Tears: Anthropological and Legal Anthropological Remarks.” In: The Shade 
of New Leaves. Governance in Traditional Authority: A Southern African 
Perspective, edited by O. Manfred Hinz and Helgard K. Patemann. Berlin: LIT, 
2006, 471–488.
Hockerts, Hans Günter. “Wiedergutmachung in Deutschland: Eine historische 
Bilanz 1945–2000.” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49 (2001): 167–214.
Hoffmann, Ida. “Speech on occasion of the Colloque: Le génocide des Herero et 
des Nama.” Mémorial de la Shoa et Institut historique allemand, Paris, 26–27 
February 2017, in the presence of the author.
Jaguttis, Malte. “Koloniales Unrecht und Völkerrecht der Gegenwart.” In: Genozid 
und Gedenken, edited by Henning Melber. Franfurt/M.: Brandes and Apsel, 
2005, 121–140.
Jaguttis, Malte. “Paths to a Hearing of the Herero Case Under International Law: 
Beyond the Patterns of Colonial Self-Description?” In: The Division of the Earth: 
Tableaux on the Legal Synopses of the Berlin Africa Conference, edited by Dierk 
Schmidt. Köln: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walter König, 2010, 76–84.
Kleinschmidt, Harald. Diskriminierung durch Vertrag und Krieg: Zwischenstaatliche 
Verträge und der Begriff des Kolonialkrieges im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert. 
Munich: Oldenbourg (Historische Zeitschrift): Supplement [New series 59], 2013.
Kössler, Reinhart. “Facing a Fragmented Past: Memory, Culture and Politics in 
Namibia.” Journal of Southern African Studies 33, no. 2, 2007: 361–382.
Kössler, Reinhart. Namibia and Germany. Negotiating the Past. Windhoek: 
University of Namibia Press and Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2015.
Kössler, Reinhart and Henning Melber. “Genocide Negotiations between 
Germany and Namibia Hit Stumbling Blocks.” The Conversation, 10 January 
2018a. (https://theconversation.com/genocide-negotiations-between-germany-and-
namibia-hit-stumbling-blocks-89697; accessed 14 September 2018).
Kössler, Reinhart and Henning Melber. “Namibian Genocide Victims’ Remains Are 
Home. But Germany Still Has Work to Do.” The Conversation, 04 September 
2018b. (http://theconversation.com/namibian-genocide-victims-remains-are-
home-but-germany-still-has-work-to-do-102655; accessed 14 September 2018).
Kössler, Reinhart and Henning Melber. Völkermord—Und was dann? Die Politik 
deutsch-namibischer Vergangenheitsbearbeitung. Frankfurt am Main: Brandes 
and Apsel, 2017.
Krieggeschichtliche Abteilung I des Großen Generalstabs. Die Kämpfe der deutschen 
Truppen in Südwestafrika. Auf Grund amtlichen Materials bearbeitet von der 
Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung I des Großen Generalstabes. Erster Band: Der 
Feldzug gegen die Hereros. Berlin: Mittler, 1906.
Luxemburg, Rosa. Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie (Junius-Broschüre). In: Gesammelte 
Werke, Vol. 4, edited by Rosa Luxemburg. Berlin (GDR): Dietz, 1974.
Melber, Henning. “How to Come to Terms with the past: Revisiting the German 
Colonial Genocide in Namibia.” Afrika Spectrum 40, no. 1 (2005): 139–148.
Michaela, Pelican. “Ethnicity as a Political Resource. Indigenous Rights Movements 
in Africa.” In: Ethnicity as a Political Resource. Conceptualisations across 
 Postcolonial asymmetry 133
Disciplines, Regions and Periods, edited by the University of Cologne Forum 
“Ethnicity as a Political Resource.” Bielefeld: Transcript, 2015, 135–150.
Nipperdey, Thomas. Deutsche Geschichte, 1866–1918, vol. II: Machtstaat vor der 
Demokratie. Munich: Beck, 1998.
Pelz, Daniel. “Genozid-Gespräche mit Namibia Gehen in die Verlängerung.” Deutsche 
Welle, 28 July 2017. (http://www.dw.com/de/genozid-gespr%C3%A4che-mit-
namibia-gehen-in-die-verl%C3%A4ngerung/a-39873655; accessed 14 September 
2018).
Pogge von Strandmann, Hartmut. Imperialismus vom Grünen Tisch. Deutsche 
Kolonialpolitik zwischen wirtschaftlicher Ausbeutung und “zivilisatorischen” 
Bemühungen. Berlin: Ch. Links, 2009.
Polenz, Ruprecht. On occasion of a panel discussion “Entschuldigen? Entschädigen? 
Gemeinsam erinnern?” at the Deutsches Historisches Museum Berlin, 20 
March 2017. (http://www.inforadio.de/programm/schema/sendungen/forum/ 
201704/98426.html; accessed 19 August 2017).
Pool, Gerhard. Samuel Maharero. Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan, 1991.
Roos, Ulrich and Timo Seidl. “Im ‘Südwesten’ nichts Neues? Eine Analyse der 
deutschen Namibiapolitik als Beitrag zur Rekonstruktion der außenpolitischen 
Identität des deutschen Nationalstaates.” Zeitschrift für Friedens- und 
Konfliktforschung 4 (2015): 182–224.
Schilling, Britta. Postcolonial Germany: Memories of Empire in a Decolonized 
Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Schmidt, Dierk. The Division of the Earth: Tableaux on the Legal Synopses of the 
Berlin Africa Conference. Köln: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walter König, 2010.
Sobich, Frank-Oliver. “Schwarze Bestien, rote Gefahr”: Rassismus und 
Antisozialismus im deutschen Kaiserreich. Frankfort-on-Maine, New York: 
Campus, 2006.
Solarin, Adepeju Opeoluwa. Respect in Mediation: The Confluence of Restorative 
Justice and International Mediation Theories and Practices. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis. Freiburg/Br. 2017.
Statista. Statistiken zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) und Wirtschaftswachstum. 
(https://de.statista.com/themen/26/bip/; accessed 14 August 2017).
Teitel, Ruti. “The Transitional Apology.” In: Taking Wrongs Seriously. Apologies 
and Reconciliation, edited by Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2006, 101–114.
Trading Economics. Namibia—Bruttosozialprodukt. (https://de.tradingeconomics.
com/namibia/gross-national-product; accessed 14 August 2017).
United Nations. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous People, 
2007. (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf; accessed 
14 September 2018).
United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2016. 
Human Development for Everyone. New York, NY, 2016. (available at http://
hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf; accessed 
14 September 2018).
United States District Court Southern District of New York. Class Action Complaint. 
Civ. 17-0062, dated 05 January 2017.
van Laak, Dirk. Über alles in der Welt: Deutscher Imperialismus im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert. Munich: Beck, 2005.
134 Reinhart Kößler 
Veit, Alex. “Der Kreis ist weiß.” Jungle World (German weekly) 12 September 2001. 
(http://jungle-world.com/artikel/2001/37/25223.html; accessed 18 August 2017).
Wallace, Marion. A History of Namibia from the Beginning to 1990. London: 
Hurst, 2011.
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. III: Von der “Deutschen 
Doppelrevolution” bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges, 1849–1914. Munich: 
Beck, 1995.
Wolf, Reinhard. “Respekt. Ein unterschätzter Faktor in den internationalen 
Beziehungen.” Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen 15 (2008): 5–42.
Wolf, Reinhard. “Respekt und Anerkennung: Ein vernachlässigter Weg zum 
Frieden?” In: Handbuch Friedensethik, edited by Ines-Jacqueline Werkner and 
Klaus Ebeling. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017, 903–913.
Zeller, Joachim. “Genozid und Gedenken: Ein dokumentarischer Überblick.” In: 
Genozid und gedenken, edited by Henning Melber. Frankfurt/M.: Brandes and 
Apsel, 2005, 63–88.
Zimmerer, Jürgen. Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner. Staatlicher Machtanspruch 
und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia. Münster: LIT, 2001.
Zimmerer, Jürgen. “The Birth of the Ostland out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A 
Postcolonial Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermination.” 
Patterns of Prejudice 39, no. 2 (2005): 197–219.
Zimmerer, Jürgen. Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz: Beiträge zum Verhältnis von 
Kolonialismus und Holocaust. Münster: LIT, 2011.
7
Post-communist and post-colonial nationalism1
While tendencies of re-nationalization have been prominently dis-
cussed in research devoted to the postcommunist “nationalizing states” 
(Brubaker 1996), political scientists (apart from Beissinger and Young 
2002, and Morozov 2015) have not proposed many convincing postcolo-
nial approaches to post-communism. This applies even more to anti- and 
post-colonial nationalism, as diagnosed by Frantz Fanon (1991, 292) and 
described for “classical” post-colonial countries by Joshua Forrest (2006); 
in the study of the former Second World, this sort of explanatory model 
for nationalism is not only hardly an object of exploration (exception: 
Şandru 2012, 39–42), but nationalism itself is being promoted by scholars 
applying postcolonial categories. Among the varieties of post-communist 
nationalisms (Müller and Pickel n.d., 2), this sort of postcolonialist nation-
alism—the nationalist use of postcolonial theory in a post-colonial situa-
tion—is insufficiently researched.
In my chapter, I do not aim to refute Müller and Pickel’s optimistic pic-
ture, according to which re-nationalization in East-Central Europe is mit-
igated by Europeanization (Müller and Pickel n.d., 11–12), although the 
political development in Poland since autumn 2015 might well serve as 
counter-proof. The focus of my chapter is not socio-economic. What I pro-
pose here is the investigation of rhetorical claims and argumentative prac-
tices of “re-nationalization”—in postcolonially informed debates. In short, I 
endeavor to conceptualize postcolonial theory itself, or rather certain modes 
of appropriation of it, as programmatic promotion or subcutaneous practice 
of exclusive ethno-cultural nationalism. I argue that ethno-cultural nation-
alist trends, as they were falsely identified by Hans Kohn (1944) as essen-
tially linked with the East (cf. Dungaciu 1999; Götz 2017, 9), have recently 
happened to re-emerge in post-communist Eastern and East Central Europe 
(and by far, not exclusively there); more specifically, in Polish and Russian 
postcolonially inspired debates. In this way, I plan to detect a peculiar sort 
of simultaneously post-colonial and postcolonialist nationalism—encapsu-
lated in nationalist appropriations of postcolonial theory.2
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Post-colonial nationalism
Such discursive implementation of nationalist tropes of argumentation 
can, on the one hand, be semantically explicit or programmatic. The con-
finement of the scope of research to one nation must, however, not necessar-
ily be programmatic; it can happen performatively, out of lack of attention 
or mono-national academic specialization, “the reduction of the analytical 
focus to the boundaries of the nation state,” i.e. methodological national-
ism in the sense of Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002, 307). I will therefore 
distinguish between explicit and thus programmatic promotion of national 
exclusivity or exceptionality—nationalism in the proper sense of the word—
and performative or methodological accomplishment of a mononational 
focus or monolingual practice.
My own research focus will be comparative, bringing together the 
Russian and the Polish appropriation of postcolonial studies. Thus I 
go against the predominant national and/or linguistic isolation of East 
European postcolonial theory (counterexamples: Bakuła 2011; Sproede 
and Lecke 2011; Zarycki 2014; Smola and Uffelmann 2016), which per-
formatively accomplishes a methodologically nationalist episteme itself.3 
This goes along with Bogusław Bakuła’s postulate of “comparative stud-
ies of postcolonial discourses” and “postcolonial polycentrisms” (Bakuła 
2011, 141). Instead of any mononational focalization, I propose a parallel 
reading of Polish and Russian postcolonial discourses which will reveal 
considerable similarities and analogous problems, taking into consider-
ation their interaction and including also occasionally Ukrainian inter-
ventions. Since I have written about Russia’s internal colonization from 
another point of view before (Uffelmann 2012), and since speaking pro 
domo sua is never free of ambivalence despite all postcolonial justification 
of positionality,4 I remain brief with respect to this particularly Russian(ist) 
discussion. The same goes for my earlier research in nationalism inherent 
in Polish postcolonial studies as a memory practice (cf. Uffelmann 2013). 
The discourse to which I pay most attention here is the least described 
trend of Polish post-dependence studies. The latter forms an interesting 
test case because of its explicitly anti-nationalist program but broadly 
mononational performances. I attempt to demonstrate that here we deal 
with a peculiar desire for intellectual autonomy that lies on the border 
between explicit and methodological nationalism.
Methodologically speaking, my reading of theory does not aim at writing 
a (segment of) conceptual history, but at approaching theory as an arena 
for intellectual exchange, dialogical interaction, and agonality. For this pur-
pose, I structure my argumentation in several thematic steps, but within 
each step follow the same agonal mechanism, starting each time with exter-
nal criticism and then proceeding to an inspection of the proponents’ defen-
sive arguments. This will lead me to general conclusions about the usability 
of postcolonial theory for appropriations that apply anti-colonial strivings 
for the sake of national self-defense.
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Internalization as a nationalist gesture?
I start with an external critique of the concept of Russia’s internal colonization 
as being in itself colonialist and partially or implicitly even nationalist, more 
precisely, with Robert Geraci’s 2015 review of Alexander Etkind’s Internal 
Colonization: Russia’s Imperial Experience (2011), a book which draws on a 
series of Etkind’s earlier articles claiming the existence of an internal vector in 
Russian colonialism.5 Geraci accuses the Florence-based Russianist of apply-
ing “another nationalist myth” while deconstructing imperial nationalism:
Internal Colonization is no doubt inspired by a justifiable desire to 
show that not all empires share identical dynamics, and to explode the 
nationalist myth that empires empower and elevate their titular, core 
populations and exploit and harm only peripherial, minority peoples. 
But by purporting to counterbalance a perceived overemphasis on the 
plight of ethnic minorities in recent historiography, and insisting on the 
quantitative comparison of oppressions, the author seems to be feeding 
another, albeit reverse, nationalist myth.
(Geraci 2015, 357)
Practically, this is not an allegation of nationalism in the programmatic 
sense, but of a methodologically mononational confinement. In the very 
last sentence of his book review, Geraci argues in a way that comes close to 
the manner in which my chapter pays to interchanges between performa-
tive mononational confinement and programmatic nationalism, maintain-
ing that Etkind’s book might be “exploited apologetically,” i.e. by explicit 
nationalists: “The book, which has also appeared in Russian, may be ripe 
for exploitation by apologists for the imperial past in today’s Russian 
Federation and other post-Soviet countries” (Geraci 2015, 357).
In his book review, Geraci does not quote but is likely to be aware of ear-
lier critical attacks on Etkind’s ideas as conducted by Ukrainianists such as 
Vitaly Chernetsky or Tamara Hundorova (cf. Morozov 2015, 35). In 2007, 
Chernetsky wrote:
Paradoxically […] in his argument about Russia’s internal colonization, 
[…] Etkind’s frame of references is constituted by the events that took 
place and the phenomena that existed in Ukrainian and Belarusian ter-
ritory. Thereby Etkind perpetuates the aspects of Russian colonialist 
ideology that he apparently internalized to an extent that makes them 
invisible to him.
(Chernetsky 2007, 43, emphasis in the original)
Echoing Chernetsky’s point, Tamara Hundorova argued that Etkind “mini-
malizes the role of Russia’s external colonization” (Hundorova 2013, 34, 
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emphasis in the original). Andrzej Nowak, a historian from Cracow, voiced 
the same suspicion as early as in 2003 (see Zarycki 2014, 101). And Madina 
Tlostanova, in her 2014 book review, criticized Etkind’s “willingness to 
take out one small aspect—the internal colonization—and present it as the 
defining one” (Tlostanova 2014). The literary scholar of Polish origin Ewa 
Thompson reacted in a similar vein in 2009 when I, also in the name of 
Alexander Etkind, invited her to participate in the conference Vnutrenniaia 
kolonizatsiia Rossii [Russia’s Internal Colonization], which was to take 
place in Passau, Germany, in March 2010. Thompson replied (in an email 
to the author) that in her view, the investigation of internal colonial pro-
cesses serves as a “replacement topic” concealing Russia’s role as a perpe-
trator in terms of external colonization. With her refusal to participate, the 
accusations switch from methodological mononationality to the deliberate 
neglecting of other victims.
While disagreeing with the aforementioned critiques of Etkind’s theory, 
especially with Thompson’s stronger claim (for the defensive arguments 
which I co-authored with Etkind, see below), I find Geraci’s suggestions 
about possible “exploitation” worth empirical exploration.
What do the advocates for exploring the vector of Russia’s internal 
colonization have to say in their defense against accusations of colonialist 
apologetics and implicit nationalism? In our joint preface to the metatheo-
retical volume Tam, vnutri, Aleksandr Etkind, Il’ia Kukulin, and I reacted 
to the accusation of “replacing” external colonization and its victims with 
its internal equivalent by referring to the Russian historical power strategy 
of “indefiniteness of the borders” (Etkind, Uffelmann, and Kukulin 2012, 9) 
and the colonialist device of “non-distinction [“nerazgranichenie”] between 
the external and the internal” (Etkind, Uffelmann, and Kukulin 2012, 25). 
Even more explicitly, Stefan Rohdewald in his contribution to the same 
volume spoke of a strategic blurring in Russia’s “internal colonization of 
the external” (Rohdewald 2012, 527, emphasis in the original). The two 
vectors of colonial violence are not mutually exclusive but offer “space both 
for the victims and perpetrators of both external and internal colonialism” 
(Etkind, Uffelmann, and Kukulin 2012, 24).
Another defensive gesture in our preface concerned the parallel use of 
postcolonial rhetoric by radical nationalists such as Konstantin Krylov in 
his afterword to A.V. Govorunov’s Russian translation of Edward Said’s 
Orientalism: “Today Russian radical nationalists also use postcolonial 
rhetoric (cf. e.g. Krylov 2006), often—however not always—interpreting 
the imperialist discourse as a defensive strategy of the ‘oppressed Russian 
nation’” (Etkind, Uffelmann, and Kukulin 2012, 22).6
This delineation, however, did not preclude renewed nationalist appro-
priations as suggested by Robert Geraci: as soon as in one of the first book 
reviews of Tam, vnutri, Aleksandr Khramov stated: “It is not the first cen-
tury when state power is perceived as foreign, alien, and occupant [“inorod-
naia, chuzhaia i okupatsionnaia”] in Russia, and all of its endeavors as 
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colonial enterprises” (Khramov 2012). Toward the end, Khramov quotes 
Vladimir Pastukhov: “The conflict between the ‘occupants’ and the ‘popula-
tion’ is the concealed main social conflict within the contemporary Russian 
society. Today the primary goal is not democratization, but decolonization, 
a national-liberating movement” (Khramov 2012, emphasis in the origi-
nal). Khramov’s final pathetic desideratum goes: “The ‘people [“narod”] 
enter the revolution’” (Khramov 2012). The nationalist tendency inherent 
in this pathos is commented upon by Aleksei Savol’skii who, in the discus-
sion thread to the online publication of Khramov’s book review, detects in 
his words an appeal to a national revolution: “By thus trying to activate in 
the people what the author falsely called resentment, we will detect a new 
Horde [“novaia Orda”] of a different social and national character at the 
same place in the future” (Aleksei Savol’skii, in Khramov 2012).
Another nationalist reviewer of Tam, vnutri, Iaroslav Shimov (cf. Shimov 
2012), connects the Russian “colonial case” with the Polish postcolonial 
discourse by translating an article by Maciej Ruczaj, a Polish political scien-
tist working in the Czech Republic (Ruczaj 2016), from Polish into Russian. 
In this essay, Ruczaj refers to the political split in Polish society and to 
Thompson’s conservative use of postcolonial language as an appropriate 
description. Ruczaj’s essay culminates in the nationalist vote for a future 
“non-acceptance of the chronic disregard toward one’s own society (Ruczaj 
2016). This is echoed by Shimov in his “translator’s note”: Shimov finds 
the Russian “disregard to one’s own society” even worse and places his 
hope in those “who are able to view their country as a part of Europe, but a 
self-valuable part which deserves ‘clear-sighted,’ critical, but unconditional 
[“‘zriachaia,’ kritichnaia, no bezuslovnaia”] love” (Ruczaj 2016, emphasis 
in the original).
The advantage of the disadvantage
Can “unconditional love” for one’s nation really be “critical”? Should such 
inimical appropriation not discourage those students of forms of colonial 
oppression who try hard not to fall into nationalist traps? Is a “national rev-
olution” not a sort of “agency” that calls into question the critical potential 
traditionally ascribed to postcolonial theory (Quayson 2000, 9)? Does not 
such an appropriation also refute my earlier argument that, in comparison 
to teleological macro-theories such as modernization or differentiation, the 
notion of colonialism possesses the advantage of describing disadvantages—
colonial violence, cultural oppression, and deprivation of agency (Uffelmann 
2012, 54)—something one cannot so seamlessly take pride in? I venture 
today that my claim for the advantage of the disadvantage was shortsighted, 
at least if taken exclusively; there is a flip side to this coin: The advantage 
of the disadvantage (the fatal consequences of colonialism for the exploited 
and oppressed) cannot only be converted into a critical practice but also 
into the idealization of the victim. If I claim that a social group with which I 
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identify was “solely a victim” of colonization, without any complicity, I can 
remain on the positive side; by accusing somebody else of having colonized 
me or us, I praise myself and my group; if I identify the colonizer with the 
“other” or “alien” (which need not necessarily be external, as we can see 
from the nationalist appropriations of the theory of internal colonization), 
the “self” of my chosen group appears as purified or even sanctified. The 
claim that such a sanctification of the victim is an anthropological basic and 
global twist would fall into the trap of European colonial thought—it is a 
genuinely Christian idea—but one might argue that due to the export of 
the European model of civilization to other continents, the Christological 
sanctification of the victim became widespread; secular transpositions of 
Christological and hagiographic reevaluations of a victim’s suffering into 
his sanctification have entered the imaginaries of many cultures.
In the case of Polish and Russian postcolonial studies, the discursive availa-
bility of this (post-)Christological reflex can be taken for granted. This can be 
especially seen from Dariusz Skórczewski’s integration of postcolonial theory 
into Catholic metaphysics (Skórczewski 2013, 26; cf. Uffelmann 2014, 407). 
When it comes to accusations of the “other” as colonizer, another Polish 
declared Catholic, Ewa Thompson, used this trope in her influential 2000 
book Imperial Knowledge; in this book, she blamed Russian authors for being 
apologists for Russian colonial rule.7 Among the victims is the national group 
with which Thompson, the Polish emigrant in Houston, Texas, identifies. In 
her more essayistic articles, Thompson exposes Soviet communism as a vari-
ety of Russian colonialism and thus conceptualizes Polish post-communism 
as post-coloniality. According to the German geographer Ulrich Best, 
Skórczewski proceeds in Thompson’s footsteps; if we are to believe Best, the 
goal of Skórczewski’s use of postcolonial theory (he refers to Skórczewski 
2006, 108) is conquering a place for Poland in postcolonial discourse which 
Best understands as a nationalist gesture: “Skórczewski sees himself at the 
forefront of a struggle for the nation, against the disregard and discrimination 
of the (Polish) nation in the international field” (Best 2007, 67).
Apart from “communist occupation,” Thompson also detects another 
negative factor influencing the Polish post-colonial mentality: a subservi-
ent attitude toward other cultures. Here, the other cultures, however, are 
not the former colonial power Russia anymore but Western consumer-
ist cultures that did not contribute to Poland’s colonial exploitation. For 
Thompson, post-colonial Poles are in jeopardy of colonizing themselves via 
appropriating Western ideals, which would lead to a new dependence. To 
avoid a similar denationalizing identification with “the West,” Thompson 
recommends getting in touch with “the masses in Polish trams”: “I regard 
the identification with the intellectual classes of the West, at the cost of los-
ing identification with the masses in Polish trams, as a classical expression 
of the colonization of Polish minds” (Thompson 2005, 12).
Thompson’s negative description of pathos for intercultural openness 
and globalization as a symptom of a post-colonial mentality implies an 
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anti-Western resentment that in turn betrays a form of post-colonial nation-
alism. Skórczewski subscribes to Thompson’s assumption of the West as a 
“substitute hegemon” for the Polish post-colonial mind (2010, 315), while 
others, such as Tomasz Zarycki, locate this position on the right of the 
political spectrum (Zarycki 2008, 43–45; Zarycki 2014, 93).
Before, Zarycki Ulrich Best (2007) and Michalina Golinczak (2008) 
already offered initial interpretations of some of the nationalist tendencies 
in the debate (cf. Uffelmann 2013). Best comes close to my assumption of 
post-colonial nationalism when he links together a “post-colonial elite” and 
the “defenders of the nation”: “In the field of politics, the outlined Polish 
discourse is characterized by the classical discourse of a postcolonial elite 
which sees itself as defenders of the nation against colonial threats” (Best 
2007, 68). While Best’s clear-sighted early diagnosis was not received in 
Poland at all due to the methodological nationalism inherent to the Polish-
language navel-gazing of Polish postcolonial theory, the second critical read-
ing, by Golinczak, even if articulated in Polish, also passed largely without 
notice. In her intervention, we see another defensive gesture comparable to 
the defense in Etkind’s, Kukulin’s, and my editors’ preface to Tam, vnutri 
against Ukrainian accusations and nationalist appropriations. Golinczak 
felt threatened by Thompson’s nationalist “monopoly”: “Ewa Thompson 
accomplishes what Slavoj Žižek calls the ‘pseudo-psychoanalytical theater of 
the subject which cannot come to terms with his own traumas […]’ If it is 
true, as the scholar [Thompson] holds, that ‘Poland is haunted by the specter 
of permanent colonization,’ it is also true that Polish ‘postcolonial criticism’ 
is haunted by the specter of ‘Thompsonism’ [“widmo ‘thompsonizmu’”]. 
Thompson successfully monopolized the Polish postcolonial discourse. By 
basing her conceptions on Said and Bhabha, she propagates her own nation-
alist views” (Golinczak 2008, 111).8 In this respect, Best was less pessimistic, 
detecting two competing discourses: “A hybrid postcolonial literary discourse 
which criticizes nationalism is joined by a national postcolonial [“national-
postkolonialistischer”] one that emphasizes the nation” (Best 2007, 69).
Thesis I: Nationalist usability
With his alternative of two competing discourses, one critical of national-
ism and one applying postcolonial criticism for the sake of nationalism, 
Best opens the field for a necessary distinction. While postcolonial criti-
cism necessarily contains a critical dimension, it is of key importance to 
which objects this critique is applied. Among the earliest accusations of 
postcolonial theory was the assumption that postcolonialists work with a 
clear-cut binary of perpetrator and victim. In Polish postcolonial theory, 
scholars such as Aleksander Fiut and Bogusław Bakuła voted for seeing 
Poland in its imperial history also as a perpetrator but met resistance by 
those who, like Skórczewski, stressed Poland’s role predominantly as a vic-
tim (cf. Uffelmann 2013, 118). I thus propose bivectoriality as a litmus test 
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for distinguishing modes of appropriation of postcolonial theory: If a victim 
(be this Poland in the case of Thompson or the Russian “ordinary people” 
in Khramov) is kept clear of any role as perpetrator or accomplice, the criti-
cal potential provided by postcolonialism is reduced to monovectoriality. 
A second cue is the use of the concept of the “alien”: Is the “foreignness” 
of a colonizer essentialized or viewed as a construct produced in a colonial 
setting? Whenever the “alien” (be this the “Russian regime,” “communist 
occupants,” or “the West”) appears as given, this hints at an underlying 
nationalist binary. A third piece of evidence of nationalist appropriations is 
normative claims such as “unconditional love” (Shimov) or “contact with 
the people in the tram” (Thompson). Here the criticism inherent in postco-
lonial studies stops at a certain point and falls short of what Theodor W. 
Adorno posited as “negative dialectics” (Adorno 1970).
Adorno’s discursive strategy of constantly remaining on the critical side 
without switching to any positive counterweight should also make us cau-
tious when evaluating the aforementioned alternatives. It is a matter of 
choice whether one opts for bivectorial or monovectorial criticism. There is 
no Archimedean point from which one could judge one approach as intrin-
sically, theoretically correct. Since there is no essence of postcolonialism as 
being emancipatory, anti-authoritarian, and liberal, not even as “more main-
stream ways of carrying out postcolonial critique,” as Snochowska-Gonzalez 
posits in her article “Post-Colonial Poland—On an Unavoidable Misuse” 
(Snochowska-Gonzalez 2012, 711), it is unsubstantiated to denounce a cer-
tain use as a “gross misuse” and “hostile takeover” (Snochowska-Gonzalez 
2012, 711, 720). More convincingly and openly, Zarycki contrasts the use 
of postcolonial theory “on the conservative side” and “on the liberal side” 
(Zarycki 2014, 111). Thus the “liberal” Dorota Kołodziejczyk (2010, 34) 
is wrong if she ascribes Thompson’s use of postcolonial categories as being 
“in total opposition” to an allegedly “proper” model of postcolonial studies 
(Kołodziejczyk 2014, 137, see also below). Even if I side with Kołodziejczyk 
and her anti-nationalist and thus practically non-monovectorial ethos, and 
though my personal preference is a kind of negative dialects of postcolonial 
critique, I do not claim the right to denounce an alternative, affirmative, 
and particularistic instrumentalization of postcolonial studies as “misuse.”
In my view, more productive than gestures of denouncing the “other” is 
the question to what degree anti-nationalist uses of postcolonial theory are 
also structurally infected by nationalist schemes. Since Kołodziejczyk is one of 
the contributors to a Polish anti-nationalist approach called post-dependence 
studies,9 I redirect this critical question to her criticism of nationalism.
Post-dependence studies
Again, I begin with allegations, here by Ewa Thompson, whom we got to 
know as a representative of programmatic nationalism earlier. And indeed, 
Thompson is far from accusing the representatives of post-dependence 
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theory, for whom she coins the neologism “dependencists,”10 of a nationalist 
approach; rather the opposite: In her view, “dependence” is a notion too weak 
and harmless for describing the sort of oppression from which Poland had to 
suffer under the Soviet yoke (Thompson 2011, 294; Thompson 2014, 72–73). 
For her, “it is colonialism after all,” which she regards as the appropriate 
term. She adds the compelling observation that the “dependencists’” refusal 
to find the Polish situation strictly post-colonial amounts to an essentialization 
of a certain British model of “colonialism” as the “proper” one (Thompson 
2011, 292; Thompson 2014, 70–71). While Thompson’s allegation of missing 
fantasy and her plea for acknowledging the all-encompassing metaphoricity 
of the terms used in the humanities is worth reflecting, Thompson commits 
an act of essentialization herself, too—of the nation: “Proponents of depend-
ency theory do not take nationality issues into consideration […]. Nationality 
played a key role in the efforts of the colonizers on Polish lands and it can 
simply not be ignored. Between 1945 and 1989, Polish intellectual discourse 
was a discourse of a colonized nation [“skolonizowany naród”]” (Thompson 
2014, 74, emphasis in the Polish original). Hand in hand with this program-
matic nationalist argument, Thompson also accuses the “dependencists” 
[“‘zależnościowcy’”] of “full dependence […] on what happens and what is 
thought in ‘Anglophone research institutions’” (Thompson 2014, 77).
A contrary critique is uttered by Emilia Kledzik, who speaks of the 
“obtrusive nativism” of “postdependency research” (2015, 99). In the same 
direction goes the diagnosis made by the German Slavicist Mirja Lecke. 
Cautious of a too-metaphorical use of the notion of colonialism herself, she 
points rather to an anxiety of foreign influence inherent in the term post-
dependence: “Yet as conceptually prudent as this choice may be, the term 
‘post-dependence’ still implies the existence of a hegemon that deprived the 
country of its sovereignty, and it stresses the cultural effects of relations 
with this hegemon, mitigating the issue of foreignness” (Lecke 2016, 380). 
Incomparably stronger than Kledzik’s and Lecke’s critique is the allegation 
raised by Mieczysław Dąbrowski; in 2014 Dąbrowski accused post-depend-
ence studies of dehybridization and essentialization of distinct national 
cultures (Dąbrowski 2014, 107) in the spirit of post- or neo-Romanticism. 
According to the Warsaw-based scholar, post-dependence studies is a “dis-
course imitative in relation to the Polish Romantic discourse whose main 
feature is a national martyrology combined with a peculiarly comprehended 
heroism” (Dąbrowski 2014, 106). Dąbrowski also detects a mechanism of re-
evaluating (one’s own) suffering in the post-dependence talk comparable to 
Romanticism: “As is well known, the motif of undeserved suffering, oppres-
sion, and injustice which are usually adorned with an accent of moral victory, 
dominates in it [Romantic discourse]” (Dąbrowski 2014, 106). In 2017, he 
added the malicious comparison with the nationalist Law and Justice gov-
ernment ruling in Poland since 2015 (Dąbrowski 2017, 14). Thus, in the case 
of post-dependence studies, the criticism ranges from accusations of insuf-
ficient acknowledgment of the nation to post-Romantic neonationalism. 
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Which of them can be substantialized by statements of the advocates of 
“post-dependence”?
Both, to various degrees; my thesis is that there are two contradictory 
tendencies in the Polish post-dependence paradigm, one striving toward 
openness (A), the other one toward exceptionality (B). The first is most 
tangibly reflected in the anti-nationalist claims made by Kołodziejczyk, 
who—with Hanna Gosk—is one of the two most outspoken backers of 
this approach. Kołodziejczyk laments with implicit reference to the appro-
priation of postcolonial theory by Ewa Thompson: “In too many cases, 
the postcolonial perspective applied this way only helps intensify national 
historicism [“historyzm narodowy”] of a vividly conservative ideological 
program” (Kołodziejczyk 2014, 139). More explicitly so, Kołodziejczyk 
distinguishes between a correct and a false mode of application (as referred 
to earlier): “In a certain, very fundamental aspect, the author [Thompson] 
applies post-colonial categories in total opposition to the model elaborated 
in the post-colonial studies. According to her, post-colonialism serves—
being an institutionalized anti-imperial discourse—as a tool for re-vindi-
cation of the nation which, historically and literally, is still oppressed and 
colonized [“rewindykacja narodu jako wciąż ciemiężonego skolonizow-
anego”]” (Kołodziejczyk 2014, 137).
Put in more positive terms, tendency A, leading toward pluralization and 
openness, finds one of its expressions in terminological liberalism. It is again 
Kołodziejczyk who inserts the term post-dependence in what reads like an 
enumeration of synonyms: “post-communism, post-socialism and post-
dependence” (Kołodziejczyk 2010, 132). In Gosk we can also see an almost 
synonymic use of postdependence alongside postcolonial, held apart only 
by a slash when she speaks of “the postcolonial/postdependence discourse” 
(Gosk 2010, 85). The latter appears to be no more than a mere Polonization 
of the postcolonial paradigm for her: “postcolonial studies which I call post-
dependence studies for the Polish use” (Gosk 2010, 84). In line with this 
terminological vagueness is the even broader inclusion of other theoretical 
inspirations and thematic scopes, such as studies of sexual minorities, migra-
tion, multiculturalism, and many other issues in the mission statement of the 
website of the Centre for Post-Dependence Studies (Centre 2009; Centrum 
2009). A third vector of terminological liberalism applies to temporality—
the periods in Polish history after which a certain “post-condition” is to be 
detected. In only a few statements is  post-dependence confined to contem-
porary, post-1989 issues; striving for flexibility and a wider range, Gosk 
distinguishes between different varieties of post, “post-partition” and “post-
dependent” (Gosk 2008, 75). The website of the Centre broadens the histor-
ical terms even further, enumerating various historically distinct composites 
with post-, such as “post-partition, post-occupation, post-socialist social 
mentality” (Centre 2009; Centrum 2009). Klemens Kaps and Jan Surman 
acknowledge that Gosk “suggests changing the timeframes to strengthen 
their historical independence” (Kaps and Surman 2012, 21).
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While, as part of tendency A, Gosk freely “Polonized” the Anglo-
American or international postcolonial into postdependence, she also 
applied a tendency B when arguing that Polish realities “were neither strictly 
colonizing nor colonial in the understanding characteristic for at least the 
reality of the former British Empire” (Gosk 2008, 75). Appropriation turns 
into dissociation here. However, as Wojciech Małecki notes, the attempt 
at methodological “Polonization” remains if not an impossible, then an 
unfinishable project. According to the Polish literary theorist who contrib-
uted to the first “Post-dependence” volume, Kultura po przejściach, osoby 
z przeszłością. Polski dyskurs postzależnościowy—konteksty i perspek-
tywy badawcze [Culture after Transitions, People with a Past: Polish Post-
Dependence Discourse—Contexts and Research Perspectives], from 2011, 
the obsessive methodological concern with “dependence on the Anglo-
American hegemon” (Małecki 2011, 67) that Gosk detects in the humani-
ties leads to a dead end; there is no alternative other than to deal with this 
current state of affairs.
Something different from this global landscape of theory in the humanities 
is the “dependencists’” emphases of a certain “exceptionality of the Polish 
situation” (Gosk 2010, 13). The Centre defines its mission on its English 
website: “The rationale behind the network is to investigate the condition 
of post-dependence underlying the contemporary Polish society and culture 
specifically, and, in a broader perspective, defining the difference of Central-
Eastern Europe from its Western counterpart” (Centre 2009). In the brief 
introduction to the group’s first volume by Ryszard Nycz, who serves as the 
project group’s senior mentor, we find an even more defensive attempt at re-
nationalization, armed with a protective belt: According to Nycz, “without 
resigning either the universal and comparative dimension or the theoretical 
and methodological inspirations,” the study group’s activity “will above all 
lead to: / a. the identification of the symptomatic answers to the key oppres-
sive experiences of Polish history, social life, and culture [...]” (Nycz 2011, 
7–8, emphasis added). Przemysław Czapliński goes so far as to envisage the 
task of writing a “phenomenology of the Polish spirit” (Czapliński 2011, 44).
Who strives for re-nationalization and national-cultural exception-
ality obviously suffers from the same anxiety of “dependence” that s/he 
just attempts to describe on a meta-level. In Gosk’s view, there is a double 
deplorable dependence: “The unwanted world defined by dependence on 
Russia/the Soviet Union, now a relic of the past, and, to some degree, the 
increased fascination with the West that it drove, are the Other that con-
stitute a part of the collective identity of Poles—ex-subjects of a peculiar 
type of Eastern-Western domination” (Gosk 2014, 245). One cannot but 
find this turn from past Eastern dependence to actual Western dependence 
similar to what Thompson deplored in her journalistic essays.
Again, the historical dimension is doubled by the methodological one: 
A structurally analogous anxiety of something “other” or foreign leads 
Kołodziejczyk to strive for methodological “autonomy” of Polish studies: 
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“The category of post-dependence provides us with a certain level of 
theoretical autonomy” (Kołodziejczyk 2010, 38). Even if she hastens to 
open this Polish specificity for a comparative context, a movement away 
from mere supply of historical data to a pre-defined theoretical frame-
work remains palpable. What, according to the Wrocław-based Anglicist, 
seems achievable is “an autonomy which will allow accessing the compar-
ative, intersubjective territory of translation as an open, multidirectional 
space or dialogue with the postcolonial studies, but not supply studies 
on the margins of a theory defined somewhere else in the metropoles” 
(Kołodziejczyk 2010, 38).
Thus, despite their explicit anti-nationalist statements, the advocates of 
post-dependence studies share with their adversary Ewa Thompson a desire 
for national specificity, both an “originality of Polish culture [“oryginalność 
polskiej kultury”]” (Thompson 2014, 81; Thompson 2011, 301) and of 
Polish research in the humanities (cf. Gosk 2010, 13, footnote 11). The 
“dependencists’” own claims of “autonomy” from external theory cannot 
be excused with inattentive mononationality because they confess some sort 
of explicit, programmatic will for a certain nationally confined academic 
performance. This, however, should not lead to the misconception that 
in the case of post-dependence studies we are dealing with programmatic 
exceptionalism. This is made clear by the representatives of  post-dependence 
studies in stark anti-nationalist declarations.
Is metamartyrology still martyrology?
With colonialism, the choice of the term dependence shares the advantage 
of the disadvantage. Being a negative notion, it prevents direct positive 
affirmation of something valuable and national. But the negativist talk of 
post-dependence, which (in contrast to post-independence) acknowledges 
inevitable repercussions of dependence even after formal independence 
(Nycz 2011, 8), is not automatically free from positive re-evaluation of the 
disadvantage, from the sanctification of the victim. Hence it comes as no 
surprise that many contributors of the first post-dependence volume pro-
duced by the Centre for Post-Dependence Studies in 2011 struggled with 
the mechanism of ennobling the victim (Małecki 2011; Czermińska 2011). 
Hanna Gosk made a negative evaluation of Polish auto-martyrology, which 
sounds almost identical to what her former friend Mieczysław Dąbrowski 
accused her of (Gosk 2010, 19). Gosk, however, detected automartyr-
ology, not in the post-dependence method she proposed herself but in a 
post-dependent mentality left by various periods of “long-term dependence/
non-sovereignty” (Gosk 2014, 246). She regretfully diagnosed the “heroiza-
tion of […] defeats” (Gosk 2014, 246), which:
ennobles the vanquished, limits the possibility of criticizing their actions, 
and concentrates social efforts on commemorating martyrology, instead 
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of revising attitudes and actions that might have led to defeat. On the 
other hand, it redefines the status of the victim, transforming it almost 
imperceptibly into the hegemon of the dominant narrative, someone 
who imposes the terms, dictates the value, decides what is good, hon-
orable, proper, and what’s not. In this narrative, being the victim is a 
value in itself.
(Gosk 2014, 246)
It remains—and this is my final thesis—problematic when somebody con-
ceptualizes her-/himself or her/his culture as a victim of—former or continu-
ous—dependence because this twist is prone to methodological nationalist 
implications. Clearly, we must differentiate whether a postcolonially inspired 
argumentation falls into programmatic nationalism, is adjusted for the sake 
of “local autonomy,” or just performs methodological mononationality. 
While the latter can in a certain sense be correct for all-too narrowly con-
fined focalizations of Russia’s internal colonization as well as for Poland’s 
post-dependent situation with its continued navel-gazing, the meta-theory of 
Polish post-dependence studies suffers from anxiety of influence. Both traps, 
however, must be clearly distinguished from conservative and anti-Western 
appropriations of postcolonial theory such as Thompson’s, or nationalist-
revolutionary appropriations such as Khramov’s, which must both be called 
programmatic nationalism.
To conclude with a minimal normative note for postcolonial herme-
neutics, I see two challenges: (1) to again and again confine postcolonially 
inspired research to heuristic and negative dialectical use, which (2) allows 
preventing necessary local adoptions from falling into structural epistemic 
nationalism or methodological “autonomism.” When it comes to the recent 
resurrection of outmoded programmatic nationalism, I have no hermeneutic 
remedy to offer, alas.
Notes
1 I thank the Hanover panel’s discussant Maija Burima for her helpful remarks.
2 My distinction of (hyphenated) post-colonial nationalism in a temporal sense of 
nationalist movements occurring after a (quasi-)colonial situation and (hyphen-
less) postcolonial theory developed for describing the cultural repercussions of 
colonialism irrespective of the temporal or spatial position of the theorist reso-
nates more with Kaps and Surman (2012, 7) than with Ashcroft, Griffiths, and 
Tiffin (2000, 186–187).
3 This isolation is further enhanced by the non-reception of postcolonially inspired 
research in other languages than that of the country in question. This problem 
was addressed by Ryszard Nycz in his introduction to the English special issue of 
teksty drugie, “Postcolonial or Postdependence Studies,” where the Polonist calls 
for “tak[ing] over the external point of view and confront[ing] it with our culti-
vated internal image of ourselves” (Nycz 2014, 9). What Nycz does not recognize 
is the performative contradiction inherent in the fact that he is just introducing a 
volume containing texts by “leading Polish researchers” only (Nycz 2014, 11). I 
quote English translations from the special issue of teksty drugie irrespective of 
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their idiomatic quality without altering them. All other translations are mine if not 
stated otherwise.
4 Cf. Serge Elie’s self-reflection on his positionality, which “entails the adoption of 
an agonistic relationship with one’s milieu, which is similar to a permanent host-
guest relationship vis-à-vis one’s permanent or momentary place of dwelling” 
(Elie 2006, 68).
5 Cf. Etkind’s often-quoted formulation: “The main trajectories of Russian colo-
nization were not directed away from, but inside the metropolis [“ne vovne, no 
vnutr’ metropolii”]: not toward Poland or Bashkiria, but in the villages of the 
Tula, Pomorskie or Orenburg regions” (Etkind 2001, 65).
6 For more on Krylov’s use of Said’s theses for the sake of justifying Russian 
national self-defense, see Sproede and Lecke 2011, 59–60.
7 Snochowska-Gonzalez comprehends this as an Orientalizing gesture by 
Thompson herself: “For Thompson, Russia is the Orient exactly in the meaning 
[…] described by Said” (Snochowska-Gonzalez 2012, 712).
8 It should be argued against Golinczak’s conflation of Saidian and Bhabhian 
thoughts in Thompson’s reception, that it is much more Said—both in Thompson 
and in Krylov—who inspired Polish and Russian nationalist appropriations of 
postcolonial theory.
9 “studia post-zależnościowe.” In English this notion is rendered most often as 
“post-dependence,” but one finds also the unhyphenated “postdependency” 
(Gosk 2014, 245, footnote 15).
10 “zależnościowcy” (Thompson 2011, 292; the English translator opted for 
“‘dependence’ crowd” [Thompson 2014, 70], which appears to be quantitatively 
misleading).
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The second half of the nineteenth century has passed into the collective 
memory as a period of relative freedom and of economic and social devel-
opment. At the beginning of the twentieth century, more than one million 
Greek Orthodox lived in the Ottoman Empire. This “golden era” ended in 
1913 after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars, when the 
Young Turks started to apply exclusion policies that culminated in the ethnic 
cleansing of the Greek Orthodox in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace during the 
following years. This process was halted in Western Anatolia and Eastern 
Thrace during the Greek occupation of these regions. The 1919–1922 
Greco-Turkish war saw a series of atrocities by both sides, and the defeat of 
the Greek Army led to a huge refugee wave to Greece (see Llewelyn-Smith 
1998). The burning of the city of Smyrna (Izmir), which was inhabited by 
a Greek majority, marked symbolically the end of the Greek presence in 
Anatolia (Asia Minor). The Treaty for the Exchange of Populations between 
Greece and Turkey sanctioned the mutual ethnic cleansing of minorities in 
the two countries. These events, which resulted in the uprooting of about 
1.5 million people, are referred to in Greece as the “Asia Minor Disaster.”
During the 1960s, Greek films started to deal with the trauma of 
Anatolian refugees, and after 1974 several television series, based mainly on 
novels written by refugee authors, introduced to the broader Greek public 
the life of Greek Orthodox populations during the last years of the Ottoman 
Empire, including the atrocities they endured and their difficult period of 
resettlement in Greece (Papadopoulos 2013; Kaloudi 2001). If we consider 
from a distance the subject of the Ottoman Empire in Greek cinema and 
television, we can distinguish three phases: In the 1960s, film directors were 
dealing with the Anatolian Greeks as a previously subaltern group trying to 
get over its collective trauma and celebrate its newly acquired higher social 
and economic status. During the period after the Junta and the restora-
tion of democracy, through television, the broader Greek public incorpo-
rated the suffering of Anatolian Greeks and acknowledged the importance 
of the “lost homelands” for Greek culture. These series reflected the tense 
relations between Greece and Turkey after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, 
which indicated for many the perennial expansionist plans of Turkey. At the 
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beginning of the twenty-first century, the dominant element in the cultural 
products dealing with this subject was a nostalgia for the “Ottoman Belle 
Époque” and an effort to accommodate the traumatic experiences of the 
past with the détente between Greece and Turkey. The humanitarian aid 
and the rescue crews sent to Turkey by Greece after the 1999 earthquake 
created a propitious climate for the improvement of relations between the 
two countries. One of the by-products of this “earthquake diplomacy” was 
the emergence of a vivid interest in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. 
Gradually the collective image of Turkey started to shift from the “eternal 
enemy” to the closest representative of the exotic “Orient.” This does not 
mean that suddenly the problems between the two countries ceased to exist, 
but the new climate permitted a more nuanced view of the neighboring 
country and a re-evaluation of the shared past.
Kostas Koutsomytis was a prolific director of popular TV series who 
showed a keen interest in period dramas, trying to popularize history for 
the broader public. His long filmography, spanning almost four decades, 
illustrates the development of perceptions on the past. During his long 
career, he directed TV series that reflected opposing ideological perspectives 
on the past. A watershed separates The Unknown War, a series praising 
the Armed Forces that he directed during the colonels’ dictatorship, from 
Bloody Lands, aired in 2008. Between 2004 and 2008 he adapted three 
novels dealing with life in Anatolia during the early twentieth century that 
cast a nostalgic gaze on an era of harmonious ethnic cohabitation that was 
shattered by nationalism and foreign intervention. These TV series, aired 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century, reflect the Greco-Turkish 
rapprochement but also an idealization of the Ottoman “Belle Époque” era.
In the early 2000s, Koutsomytis’ series might be considered an offspring 
of the “heritage films” genre. These films are characterized by:
the nostalgic view of the past, putting an emphasis on the authentic 
representation, the transnational or transcultural character, the effort 
to create popular products of good quality that are often based in well-
known novels, portray famous personalities of the past, use rich settings 
and opulent costumes and adopt narratives accessible to the public or 
base the plot on romantic idylls.
(Chalkou 2017, 266–267)
Koutsomytis’ series show most of these characteristics and reflect the ten-
dency of “heritage films” to portray an idealized view of life in the past or 
in the European colonies of Asia and Africa. Since Greece was not a colo-
nial power, the “lost homelands” of Asia Minor and the diaspora Greek 
community of Alexandria in Egypt constitute the point of reference for the 
nostalgic gaze. This led to a commodification of the Ottoman past and the 
memory of the Asia Minor catastrophe by publishers, restaurants, tourist 
agencies, and TV stations (Özyürek 2007, 10). Svetlana Boym speaks about 
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the “‘inculcation of nostalgia’ into merchandise as a marketing strategy that 
tricks consumers into missing what they haven’t lost” (Boym 2001, 38).
The lifestyle of the upper and middle classes in these regions, as it is 
illustrated in these series, reflects that of Western Europe, thus incorporat-
ing these affluent Greeks into a pan-European upper class (Chalkou 2017, 
278).1 But there was also a political undertone. During the period of pros-
perity in the closing years of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-
first, Greek elites looked back on this period as a point of reference for their 
identity discourse. As Fred Davis has pointed out, “simple nostalgia” is “a 
positively toned evocation of a lived past” that implies a negative attitude 
toward the present or future revealed by a “belief that things were better 
[…] then than now” (Davis 1979, 18). Contrary to the perceived decadence 
of Greece marked by the hegemony of the ideas of the left, the Greek com-
munities in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt provide conservatives with an 
utopian vision of a stratified society where the lower classes were under 
the protection of the economic aristocracy but had limited influence in the 
affairs of their communities.
Niobe’s Children, adapted by Koutsomytis for Greek Public Television 
in 2004, follows this motif and is loosely based on Tasos Athanasiadis’ 
semi-autobiographical book. The author, the son of a banker, belongs to 
the minority of Anatolian Greeks who managed to come to Greece almost 
unscathed, carrying a part of their fortune. Thus his perception of events is 
totally different from those of other authors of his generation, who focus on 
the trauma of the Disaster and uprooting. And contrary to other Anatolian 
Greek authors, he dealt with his family’s experiences only in his last novel, 
Niobe’s Children, published in 1984. This distance from the events, along 
with his familiarity with recent scholarship on the last years of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Greco-Turkish War, permitted him to draw a multifaceted 
depiction of events.
The novel spans more than a decade and includes all the elements of 
most novels that deal with Asia Minor: the description of the blissful life 
in Anatolia, the rupture of the 1922 disaster, the integration of refugees 
in Greece. The novel focuses on a well-off family of Anatolian Greeks in 
the small city of Salihli to the east of Izmir between 1917 and 1922 and 
then in Athens until 1928. Although personalities such as Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and the King Constantine are present in the plot, the main pro-
tagonists of the novel are the common people of Salihli, where local rela-
tions often prevail over national or religious affiliation. The town thus, in 
a way, showcases the conditions that led to the destruction of the shared 
Anatolian world. In order to combine personal experience with a descrip-
tion of Anatolian Greeks’ collective fate before and after the “Disaster,” 
Athanasiadis includes in the narration the diary notes of his younger self 
and those of the merchant Tryfon Ioannidis. Thus, according to Panagiotis 
Mastrodimitris, Ioannidis’ notes “express the sentimental reaction of a 
mature man who in a systematic and logical way tries to understand the 
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new reality and find a position in it, while the monologue of Athanasiadis’ 
younger self’s reflects the unconscious reactions of the whole society around 
him” (Mastrodimitris 2003, 408–411 and passim). Moreover, Vangelis 
Athanasopoulos compares the three-voice narration to a musical composi-
tion in which motifs are mentioned by one of the narrators and developed 
by another, a sort of “theme and variations” contributing to a prismatic 
reconstruction of events (Athanasopoulos 1996, 10).
The book’s dominant motif is not suffering but the successful transplant-
ing of the refugees in Greece and their contribution in enriching Greek cul-
ture with their “cultural and psychological qualities” (Stavropoulou 2004, 
429). At the same time, for Athanasiadis, the experience of Anatolian 
Greeks acquires a broader humanistic content, representing the collective 
drama of people looking for roots and continuity (Mastrodimitris 1991, 
197). Paschalis Kitromilides refers to this concept as “refugeeism,” under-
lining that this narrative is one-sided and emphasizes the success story of 
a minority while many refugees languished for decades in shantytowns. 
Athanasiadis, by contrast, presents the Greek community of Salihli in both 
Anatolia and Greece as a corporatist utopia where the patricians are in 
charge and take care of the lower classes’ needs. The poorer members of 
the community are represented mostly as uneducated, base, and often lack-
ing in moral character. For this reason, they should accept the guidance 
of the entrepreneurial middle class without challenging its authority. He 
is unequivocally critical towards the Communist Party, which managed to 
gain the support of many refugees in Greece, but also towards the social 
establishment and royalists in Greece, whose claim to social status rests on 
heritage, not merit.
Following the pattern of the other Anatolian Greek authors, his atti-
tude towards the Turks is rather positive, emphasizing the multi-religious 
mosaic of an Anatolian city and describing how the cohabitation mecha-
nism collapsed as a result of nationalism. Interreligious solidarity on the 
local level is as important as national affiliation. The plot starts in 1917 
during World War I, a period of intense Ottoman propaganda against the 
Greek Orthodox. This does not seem to have an impact on local interethnic 
relations since, in the first chapter, a Muslim landlord notifies his friend 
Michalakis Sarris that the police will raid Christian houses looking for 
deserters. For people of the upper classes, the Others are not necessarily those 
belonging to a different ethnic or religious group but people of the lower 
classes. Even religious affiliation appears negotiable for some. The famous 
social bandit Çakici Efe (Çakırcalı Mehmet Efe) (Yeşilgöz and Bovenkerk 
2004, 221), equally venerated by Muslims and Christians as a protector 
of the poor, is shown as being baptized and choosing as a godfather the 
merchant Michalakis Sarris. Nationalist-minded Greeks are juxtaposed to 
people who believe that the Greek occupation is temporary. While not hid-
ing the atrocities that took place during the war, the author manages to 
present various positions towards the Other within each community. Unlike 
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other authors, Athanasiadis tried to avoid excessive representation of vio-
lence (Stavropoulou, Νέα Εστία 2004, 427). On the contrary, in his descrip-
tion of the approach of the Greek Occupation Army to Salihli, many Greek 
Orthodox seek refuge in the houses of Muslim or Jewish friends. These 
Greeks reciprocate by guaranteeing the safety of non-Greeks during the 
Greek administration. When the Turkish nationalist forces retake the city, 
the Muslim judge interferes to save from summary executions people who 
did not collaborate actively with the Greek forces. In the farewell discussion 
between the merchant Hadji-Leontis and the judge, the war is presented 
as a product of lust for power, and the role of Europeans in instigating 
ethnic strife is also underlined. On the other hand, Athanasiadis did not 
shrink from portraying Anatolian Greeks’ feelings of superiority towards 
the Muslim lower classes, which he summarized with the saying, “the Greek 
was the saddle and the Turk was the mule.” In the Anatolian Greek percep-
tion of the Late Ottoman social order, although the Ottomans retained the 
political and military power, it was the Greek Orthodox who constituted the 
most productive element of the Empire’s population (Athanasiadis 1999).
This viewpoint permeates the adaptation of Niobe’s Children for televi-
sion (2004). Ethnic conflict is also presented as a result of foreign powers’ 
interference. But contrary to the book, the script authored by the director 
and Vasilis Mavropoulos overemphasized the nationalistic mobilization of 
the two communities and the confrontation between Greeks and Turks. The 
series often used simplifications and distortions that perpetuated negative 
sentiments towards the Turks. But this simplification can be also attributed 
to the effort of heritage series to offer a plot accessible to the broader public, 
with simple characters and a clear distinction between “good” and “evil.” 
The dominant idea in the series is that ethnic violence was caused by the 
insinuation of external forces.
Moreover, the series makes a distinction between socially advanced, edu-
cated Greeks and backward Turks. Anatolia thus is presented as a land 
whose development is due to the entrepreneurial Christians, its rightful 
owners. The archaeologist Gaston Deschamps, in his travelogue about Asia 
Minor, praised the Greek Orthodox for taking back their ancestral heritage 
through their skills and wit (Deschamps 1894, 257). In an echo of colonial 
discourse, Anatolia is represented as a land that should be “redeemed” from 
the stage of abandonment.
The Disaster of 1922 puts an end to this effort, but the self-perception of 
upper- and middle-class Anatolian Greeks as a productive force continues 
to permeate the second part of the series, which takes place in Greece. The 
refugees were called upon to inoculate mainland Greece with their superior 
European values. The new refugee settlements and the industries founded by 
refugees reflect this vision of modernization. The local peasants play the role 
of backward indigenous inhabitants who are unable to exploit the land fully.2
In this respect, the relationship among the Anatolian Greek entrepre-
neur Manthos Keramidas, the banker Thanopoulos, and the local peasant 
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Mitrogrivas is evocative of the series’ ideological focus.3 Mitrogrivas gained 
ownership of his lands not by merit but through his patronage links to 
the palace. It is even insinuated that he was rewarded for his services as 
a thug during the National Schism between partisans of the Pro-German 
king Constantine and the liberal pro-Entente prime minister Eleutherios 
Venizelos. He is represented as uneducated, greedy, perverted, and unreli-
able. The fact that he is not trustworthy and tries to renegotiate an agree-
ment by asking for more money seems to undermine the legal foundation of 
economic activity in a modern state. Mitrogrivas grew up in a village where 
agreements depended on the notion of honor, which in turn depended on 
strong relations with members of his clan. He does not feel bound either to 
the banker or to the entrepreneur, who in his eyes are foreigners trying to 
take advantage of his ignorance. He therefore does not consider it a viola-
tion of his moral code to increase his profit by renegotiating the agreement.
By contrast, the cosmopolitan, educated refugee entrepreneur Keramidas 
is presented as the core of what we consider as the modern state, confident 
in his notions of progress, justice, and integrity. His perception of “word 
of honor” is incompatible with that of the premodern Mitrogrivas, who is 
bound to keep a promise only to the members of his group. Instead of keep-
ing the land idle, Keramidas aims at developing its resources, and trustwor-
thiness is essential in order to achieve his goal.
Both the primitive, untrustworthy Mitrogrivas and the cosmopolitan 
entrepreneur Keramidas are juxtaposed to the banker Thanopoulos, a 
representative of unproductive capital who only tries to speculate on new 
sources of profit. For him, the tragedy of the refugees is just a new business 
opportunity. Speculating that the Western powers will give loans to Greece 
for the settlement of refugees, he convinces Keramidas to broaden the scope 
of his activities and invest in housing construction. He is the necessary inter-
mediary between the Mainland and the Anatolian Greek, but both sides 
equally distrust him.
In one of the last scenes of the series, a prisoner of war who became private 
tutor to a Turkish officer’s wife leaves her a love letter on his release, accom-
panied by Rudyard Kipling’s “If,” commenting that Kipling is the author who 
best managed to penetrate the soul of Asia.4 This scene does not exist in the 
book, but it is evocative of the orientalist discourse the film evokes: although 
the Other who serve as a point of reference are the Muslims before 1922 and 
the Mainland Greeks thereafter, Anatolian middle-class Greeks are presented 
in both eras and places—in the Ottoman Empire and in twentieth-century 
Greece—as the European element with a civilizing mission to uneducated 
“indigenous populations” in need of guidance.5 At the end of the twentieth 
century, the series’ visually pleasing images reflect nostalgia not only for the 
Belle-Époque Ottoman Empire lifestyle but also for a class ethos that should 
serve as an example in a country that appeared to have lost its ancestral val-
ues. It permits us thus to reflect on relations of power and the shifting bounda-
ries of a colonial gaze outside the overseas European colonial possessions.
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This idealization of the Anatolian Greek entrepreneurial ethos is evident 
in all three Koutsomytis series, notwithstanding the different ideological 
perspectives of the authors on whose books they are based. In the Witches 
of Smyrna, a 2005 series based on Mara Meimaridis’ book of the same title, 
a widow moves with her children from Cappadocia to Smyrna. There, under 
the guidance of the goddess Astarte, in the guise of a wise Turkish woman, 
one of her daughters learns how to use magic to gain money and power. 
The book has been criticized as a pulp-fiction bestseller that overempha-
sized the importance of magic among common people in Smyrna. Although 
it expresses a naïve theosophical cosmology, the author manages to give 
an accurate image of social stratification in Smyrna and the daily interac-
tion of various ethnic and religious groups. Orientalist stereotypes about 
Turks and the traditional role of women are not absent, but the author 
also criticizes the hypocrisy of higher classes and the ruthlessness of people 
with power. Mega Channel’s decision to adapt the book for television was 
probably due to the vivid interest Greeks were starting to show for Turkey 
as the “Near Orient” of Greece. The series obviously shows the destruction 
of Smyrna, but the emphasis is rather on the charms of the cosmopolitan 
city and the use and abuse of special powers given to an Oriental woman, 
as such the character of Katina. Instead of focusing on the European culture 
of the Anatolian Greeks, it showcases the common practices that bound 
Christians and Muslims. Even the upper strata of Smyrna society share the 
fascination of commoners with apocryphal knowledge and sorcery. The 
Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Smyrna thus appear as Europeans com-
pared to the Muslims, but at the same time, they are acculturated in the 
local habits. Smyrna, in this respect, looks as a Westernized city when seen 
from the interior of Anatolia, but it is represented in Europe as a hybrid 
“Levantine” society where oriental charms frame local attitudes. In reality, 
these common cultural elements were not able to stop the fragmentation 
along ethno-religious lines that led to bloodshed.
The focus of the last series that Koutsomytis directed was the ethnic 
conflict in Anatolia during the first quarter of the twentieth century. The 
improvement of Greco-Turkish relations may have been the reason for the 
2008 TV adaptation of Dido Sotiriou’s novel Bloody Lands, translated 
into English as Farewell Anatolia. The book is based on the memoirs of 
Manolis Axiotis, a farmer from Kirkince (nowadays Sirince) near ancient 
Ephesus who served in the forced labor camps (Amele Taburu) and the 
Greek Occupation army and spent some time in a prisoner-of-war camp 
before settling in Greece. Since both Axiotis and Sotiriou were members of 
the Communist Party, they saw ethnic enmity in Anatolia, which finally led 
to the expulsion of Greek Orthodox populations, as a result of the interven-
tion of Western Powers and the interests of capitalist forces. As Sotiriou 
notes, “I was the first author to show that there are no evil Greeks and 
Turks, but only people who live well during peaceful times when the Great 
Powers don’t interfere, and how they are transformed into beasts when 
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the war erupts” (Sotiriou 2008, and interview, Monogramma 1982/2008). 
Sotiriou was interested in using a witness’s testimony to describe the refu-
gees’ collective experience and to underline that it was the Western Powers 
who cultivated enmity between Greeks and the Turks and were to blame for 
the atrocities and the uprooting of Asia Minor Greeks (Stavropoulou 2014, 
10). Moreover, as is common in heritage films, the series follows historical 
events through the gaze of a simple, uneducated Anatolian Greek whose 
viewpoint contests many elements of official history (Chalkou 2017, 271).
The script of Bloody Lands remained faithful to the author’s (or maybe 
Manolis Axiotis’) perspective. In the depiction of various scenes, Sotiriou 
is the more critical towards the Turks, maybe because the book was pub-
lished in the early sixties, whereas Axiotis’ memoirs appeared after the 
restoration of democracy. The script author Lia Vitali took many liberties 
and added the characters of the American consul, George Horton and the 
German general Liman von Sanders, as incarnations of good and evil, but 
Sotiriou herself believed that it was von Sanders who sent the Greeks to 
labor camps to complete the Berlin-Baghdad railway (Sotiriou 2008, and 
interview, Monogramma 1982/2008). Moreover, she mentioned that prop-
aganda brochures by the German Bank of Palestine were pivotal for inciting 
Turkish hatred against the Greek Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire (Bedlek 
2015, 114–115). But she underlined the peaceful coexistence in Anatolia 
and the strong bonds that united Muslim and Greek Orthodox populations. 
Contrary to the prevalent ideology of the “eternal enemy,” she presents 
the events that led to the disentanglement of populations as the rupture of 
a long and peaceful coexistence. The first scene of the series is evocative 
of this point of view. After the entrance of the Turkish nationalist army 
into Smyrna, Manolis Axiotis jumps into the sea to reach the ship carry-
ing his mother. The Turkish officer who tries to stop him is his childhood 
friend Şevket. Their mutual recognition triggers a flashback to explain how 
“brothers” have ended up as official “enemies.”6 Contrary to the traditional 
nationalist representations, in this series it is often a Greek who is treacher-
ous (Colakis 1986, 103). Quitting his first job with a Greek merchant in 
Smyrna who cheats the naïve Turkish agricultural workers, Axiotis points 
out that he himself is a victim of the rapacious Turkish state. On another 
occasion, the Greek foreman of an estate mistreats the peasants, contrary to 
the orders of the Turkish agha.
Moreover, although the role of the Great Powers is underlined, Greeks 
and Turks are not represented merely as pawns without agency. The 
series refers to atrocities committed by both sides during the war. In the 
last discussion that Manolis and his childhood friend Şevket have during 
the Greco-Turkish war, Şevket refers to the destruction of villages and the 
rapes and massacres of civilians by the Greek army, and Manolis sighs as 
he remembers his own murder of a prisoner.7 This sense of guilt permeates 
Axiotis’ memoirs, and he goes on to say that when he took part in the resist-
ance against the Germans, he realized to what extent he identified with the 
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prisoner that he killed during the Greco-Turkish War. Although this self-
reflection is influenced by the left’s position on the Asia Minor Campaign, 
it is important that it finds its way in a prime-time series that aired on a 
private TV station. Koutsomytis had lengthy discussions with Dido Sotiriou 
about turning her novel into a series, as was her wish. In the series’ closing 
scene, Sotiriou herself appears and reads the last phrases of the novel, send-
ing her regards to the people across the Aegean, asking forgiveness from 
the land for the bloodshed and saying farewell to Anatolia.8 This powerful 
scene, acknowledging the pain that both sides of the conflict caused and 
endured, but also sending a message of reconciliation, can be considered 
the culmination of the reconciliation policy between Greece and Turkey 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century. It also coincided with the 
debate about the sixth-grade history manuals that supposedly downgraded 
the suffering of Anatolian Greeks in an effort by “unpatriotic historians” 
to promote Greco-Turkish friendship to the detriment of “historical accu-
racy.” Following the withdrawal of the above-mentioned history manuals in 
2007, the then conservative government decreed the distribution of Farewell 
Anatolia to the high school students. This move, contrary to the hopes of 
its originators, didn’t calm the nationalists (Natsios 2007), and neither did 
the screening of the series. Sotiriou’s focus on ethnic cohabitation and her 
effort to criticize war did not reflect the memory discourse diffused by Asia 
Minor and Pontic Greek associations, which underlined ideas of perennial 
victimhood “under the barbarous Turkish yoke.”
The first years of the twenty-first century in Greece were a period of 
economic growth and convergence with Western Europe. At the same time, 
the rapprochement with Turkey permitted a reappraisal of the late Ottoman 
period and the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–1922. Kostas Koutsomytis’ series 
are a product of this process. All three of them conform to the conventions 
of “heritage films” and contribute to dispelling nationalistic stereotypes. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to discern the different ideological backgrounds 
of the novels they are based on.
Niobe’s Children reflects the ideals of a middle-class author who uses 
the “Anatolian Greek ethos” as an example of a corporatist utopia. One 
of the favorite conservative explanations of the 2008 Greek financial crisis 
was that the country, since the ascendance of the Socialists to power in 
1981, had become prey to populism: Law and order under the moderate 
conservative administration of Konstantinos Karamanlis had been replaced 
by a regime of politicians who tried to remain to power by praising the base 
sentiments of the people. This discourse appeared for the first time dur-
ing the recession of the late 1980s, which was accompanied by corruption 
scandals and eventually led to the fall of the Socialists from power. It should 
also be linked to the cataclysm of the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe. During that time, members of the traditional power elites, although 
largely a product of the post-war period, tried to appropriate the heritage of 
the diaspora and Ottoman Greeks to justify their claims. They thus tried to 
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dissociate themselves from the vulgar lifestyle of the nouveaux riches (“new 
fireplaces,” a term broadly used during that time) that appeared during the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) administration. Moreover, they 
claimed that the social policies of the Socialists had led the country into 
recession. The TV series, although aired during a period of affluence, repro-
duces this ideal of an “entrepreneurial ethos” as the core of national values, 
as well as a repudiation of lower classes’ political claims.
On the other hand, the Witches of Smyrna reflects the “New Age” ideas 
that penetrated Greece during the 1990s. The late Ottoman Empire served 
as a canvas for a love story that transcended the conventions of time. The 
focus was more on everyday life and sorcery than on historical events.
Koutsomytis himself considered Bloody Lands as the most important of 
these series, because of his admiration for Dido Sotiriou. The script digressed 
from the novel to conform to prime time series conventions and contained 
many historical inaccuracies. But by conforming to the spirit of the period of 
détente, it transmitted the message that Greeks and Turks could live peace-
fully if the Great Powers didn’t interfere in the affairs of the Middle East. 
Although the nationalist strategies of Greek and Ottoman-Turkish elites 
are presented, they are downplayed with the aim of underlining the idea of 
friendship between common people. In a way, the series presents the events 
at the beginning of the twentieth century as an example for future genera-
tions, and the final scene suggests the necessity of mutual forgiveness.
Watching these series with the hindsight of the Greek economic cri-
sis, the increasingly authoritarian tendencies after the failed 2016 coup 
in Turkey, and the bilateral problems between the countries allows us 
to reflect on the impact of this period of détente on mutual perceptions. 
Negative stereotypes persist and are used by nationalist circles in periods 
of crisis. But the multiplication of social contacts and the airing of Turkish 
series on Greek television led to a humanization of the Other. In both 
countries, the left has long promoted the idea that it is politicians who 
create the enmity between the two neighboring peoples. But during the 
last 15 years, even moderate conservatives have realized that Greeks and 
Turks share common cultural elements, and they have at times acknowl-
edged that Greeks were not only victims. We cannot be certain to what 
extent this rapprochement can withstand a major Greco-Turkish crisis. 
But it proves that popular culture may contribute to shaping public atti-
tudes and modify long-standing stereotypes.
Notes
1 See Niobe’s Children 2004, episode 1 (https://youtu.be/o5Pg8hBCPIw, last 
accessed 21 August 2018).
2 See Niobe’s Children 2004, episode 37 (https://youtu.be/Ql3tOb3cZfk; accessed 
21 August 2018).
3 I thank Sophia Lalopoulou for her insightful comments on the relationship 
among these three characters.
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4 See Niobe’s Children 2004, episode 37 (https://youtu.be/kecynIYx8No; accessed 
21 August 21).
5 Two Turkish women who helped one of the heroes escape from captivity decide 
to settle in Greece and get baptized, recognizing the new prosperity due to 
Anatolian Greeks and the superiority of progress represented by Christians.
6 See Bloody Lands 2008, episode 1 (https://youtu.be/OyWt2b6KRBo; accessed 
21 August 21).
7 See Bloody Lands 2008, episode 21 (https://youtu.be/uCrBEJjUxTk; accessed 21 
August 21).
8 See Bloody Lands 2008, episode 21 (https://youtu.be/rhpAIBkASyA; accessed 21 
August 21).
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The starting point of my reflections on postcolonialism and its old and new 
discontents is the idea that postcoloniality should be regarded as a condi-
tion, a certain human existential situation which we have often no power of 
choosing. While decoloniality is an option, consciously chosen as a politi-
cal, ethical, and epistemic positionality and an entry point into agency. The 
postcolonial condition is more of an objective given, a geopolitical and geo-
historical situation of many people coming from former colonies. The deco-
lonial stance is one step further, as it involves a conscious choice of how to 
interpret reality and how to act upon it. It starts from a specific postcolo-
nial situation, which can fall into the traditional sphere of interests limited 
to the British and French colonies, focus on a more typically decolonial 
Central and South American configuration, or even go beyond both locales 
and venture into the unconventional imperial-colonial histories of Central 
and Eastern Europe, the Ottoman Sultanate, or Russia. A mere description 
of a postcolonial predicament or an analysis of its present outcomes in a 
concrete locale, then, must lead to the next step of developing an active and 
conscious ethical, political, and epistemic position whose goal is to decolo-
nize thinking, being, perception, gender, and memory. So it is not enough to 
call a scholar postcolonial. It is crucial to take into account from the start 
not only our given objective positions but also who and what we chose to be 
in our profession and in our life. This understanding of the postcolonial and 
decolonial realms is rather unorthodox as, instead of stating for the ump-
teenth time the rather obvious differences in their origination and their links 
to various types of colonialism in India and Africa and in the Americas, I try 
to divorce them from their respective genealogies of knowledge and see how 
relevant these theories are when tested in quite different geopolitical regions 
such as Eurasia or Central and South-Eastern Europe.
The distinction between the condition and the option sheds some light 
on the main postcolonial flaw in the eyes of decolonial thinkers. It cannot 
be fixed with a mere addition of the new voices and geopolitical experiences 
(such as the post-Soviet, the post-Ottoman, or the post-Austrian-Hungarian) 
to the postcolonial choir. The postcolonial and the decolonial discourses 
refer not only to different locales but also to different modes of thinking and 
The postcolonial condition, the  
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being in the world, although they frequently overlap with each other: The 
decolonial thinkers are quite often postcolonial people and the postcolonial 
scholars in their majority share the decolonial agenda. Still, there are spaces 
and conceptual tools within each of these discourses that remain opaque for 
the other, and areas which demonstrate their limitations when applied to 
a different local history such as the post-socialist postcolonial regions and 
experiences.
What is needed is a radical rethinking and clarification of theoretical 
and methodological grounds on which the imperial and colonial classifica-
tions are made, to problematize the predominantly descriptive and formal 
approach of the postcolonial studies, in the sense of assessing phenomena 
of completely different orders based on their formal affinity, such as being 
empires or colonies, yet often remaining blind to correlational structural 
and power asymmetries. Along with the Western liberal principle of inclu-
sion (of the old and new others), which has repeatedly demonstrated its 
paternalistic inadequacy, or maybe instead of it, a different principle should 
be formulated. It should be based on a revision of the very architecture 
of power, knowledge, being, gender, and perception. It is necessary not to 
build into the existing system by merely expanding it with new elements, 
as postcolonial studies has mostly been doing, but rather to problematize 
this system as such and offer other options as the decolonial thought has 
attempted to do in the last two decades.
Global coloniality and the postcolonial condition
The decolonial thought offers a number of categories and ideas which 
could take the imperial-colonial complex in its diachronous and synchro-
nous dimensions out of its postcolonial impasse. This refers particularly 
to the concept of the global coloniality (Tlostanova and Mignolo 2009), 
which is not the same as colonialism or postcolonialism. Colonialism is 
a historical phenomenon, while coloniality (Quijano 2000, Maldonado-
Torres 2007) is its outcome in which we all reside. Decolonial option does 
not accentuate the historical description of (neo)colonialist strategies but 
rather the long-lasting ontological, epistemic, and axiological traces left 
after any colonialism seems to be a matter of the past. The global colonial-
ity (of power, of being, of perception, of gender, of knowledge, of memory) 
is always manifested in particular local forms and conditions, remaining, 
at the same time, a connecting thread for the understanding of dissociated 
manifestations of modernity.
Coloniality is an overall design or optics determining relations between 
the world, the things, and the humans. Its control is realized through a natu-
ralized objectifying principle of perception and interpretation of the world, 
of other human and nonhuman beings, of manmade objects, and of knowl-
edge. The main tools of modernity/coloniality in both Western liberal and 
Socialist versions are vectorial time and progressivist teleology; the absurdly 
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rationalized management of knowledge and subjectivity; the sanctification 
of technological development; the cult of the future and the dismissal of the 
negatively marked tradition, particularly if this is a spatially alien past, with 
regular lapses into exoticism and antiquarianism.
The concept of coloniality allows drawing the Ottoman Sultanate and 
the Russian Czarist and Soviet empires into the modern/colonial matrix, 
while at the same time provincializing and humbling the Anglophone post-
colonial studies through downsizing them to their specific geopolitical and 
corpopolitical experience. Significantly, the decolonial thought is not doing 
this in order to occupy itself a central place as a champion of the new uni-
versalist Truth but only to draw the attention to the optional nature of any 
theoretical discourse.
Revisiting the logic of coloniality and the limits 
of postcoloniality
Ten years ago, together with Walter Mignolo we co-authored a book chap-
ter on the logic of coloniality and the limits of postcoloniality (Mignolo and 
Tlostanova 2007), where we tried to explain that the postcolonial discon-
tent stems from its too close (and not seen as a problem) link with moder-
nity as a set of particular epistemic assumptions. In decolonial view, this 
leads to the ultimate failure of postcolonial critique attempting to use the 
methodological tools of the master in order to dismantle his house, to para-
phrase Audre Lorde (Lorde 1984, 112). Since it is indeed impossible, the 
postcolonial theory stops at the level of changing the content but not the 
terms of the discussion.
The delocalized universalism of postcolonial theory in launching terms 
that stem from particular local histories but are then subsequently presented 
as applicable to any context is discordant with decolonial pluriversality 
(Mignolo 2013)—a coexistence and correlation of many interacting and 
intersecting non-abstract universals grounded in the geopolitics and corpo-
politics of knowledge, being, gender, and perception, reinstating the expe-
riential nature of knowledge and the origin of any theory in the human 
life-world. Pluriversal critique targets not the concrete constellations of 
race, gender, and class but rather the aberration of the universal as such. 
And this goal is usually beyond the interests of postcolonial scholars.
What is at stake here is the degree of postcolonial and decolonial 
involvement in de-automatizing of and delinking from the Western epis-
temic premises, naturalized cognitive operations, methodological clichés 
and disciplinary divisions, and consequently, attempts to build a differ-
ent conceptual apparatus to launch or set free an alternative world per-
ception. The postcolonial critique of the (neo)colonialist Western tactics 
in the past and in the present is usually framed in the very terms of the 
Western post-structuralist, neo-Marxist, post-Lacanian or affect theories, 
or at least with some curtsey to the West as an uncontested producer of 
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disembodied universal knowledge. This leads to a reproduction of mono-
topical hermeneutics (Mignolo 1995, 13), with its privilege of control-
ling knowledge and meaning from the position of sameness and through 
inventing its otherness. Hence the postcolonial discourse still interprets 
the (post)colonial other for the same, in a language that the same is able 
to understand and share.
In decolonial terms, this syndrome is called the “hubris of the zero point,” 
which, according to S. Castro-Gómez, is a specific Eurocentric positional-
ity of the sensing and thinking subject, occupying a delocalized and disem-
bodied vantage point which eliminates any other possible ways to produce, 
transmit, and represent knowledge, allowing for a world view to be built on 
a rigid essentialist progressivist model:
The co-existence of diverse ways of producing and transmitting knowl-
edge is eliminated because now all forms of human knowledge are 
ordered on an epistemological scale from the traditional to the  modern, 
from barbarism to civilization, from the community to the individual, 
from the orient to occident. […] By way of this strategy, scientific 
thought positions itself as the only valid form of producing knowledge, 
and Europe acquires an epistemological hegemony over all other cul-
tures of the world.
(Castro-Gómez 2007, 433)
As a result, the Western monopoly on knowledge production and distribu-
tion and the disciplinary matrix of the modern/colonial knowledge remain 
intact even if postcolonial theorists offer considerable reinterpretations 
of the initial Western critical concepts and theories. An interesting exam-
ple is the postcolonial theory of affect as envisioned by Sara Ahmed, who 
offers a radical and powerful critique of Eurocentrism, racism, heterosex-
ism, sexism, yet always formulates it within the accepted terms of the affect 
theory with its essentially Western instruments and assumptions (Ahmed 
2014). This postcolonial strategy facilitates a dialogue with the mainstream 
Western theories by remaining within the same hermeneutical horizon and 
hence brings an easier and more successful institutionalization, yet at times 
may inadvertently reproduce coloniality of knowledge.
Decolonial option performs a different epistemic operation. It does not 
start with Lacan or Butler, slightly modifying their theories to make them fit 
the analysis of the post/neocolonial reality, but rather focuses from the start 
on the genealogy of decolonial thinkers and their epistemic tools (Marcos 
2006, Kusch 2010, Adorno 2000). Then, instead of postcolonial version 
of affect emerges a decolonial geopolitics and corpopolitics of knowledge, 
being, and perception (Tlostanova and Mignolo 2012) and a decolonial 
aesthesis (Mignolo 2011, Tlostanova 2017) that focus on who produces 
knowledge, from where, and why, and never starts with applying the estab-
lished theories to some new postcolonial material.
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The postcolonial disciplinarity and the decolonial antidote
Even in their most critical versions, postcolonial studies remain within 
the established disciplinary mode in which a study presupposes a firm 
subject/object division. Their successful and quick institutionalization has 
required a sacrifice of choosing the side of the studying subject, not the 
studied object. The institutional disciplinary frame coded by the word 
“studies” does not presuppose by definition, putting theory and life-world 
on the same axis and practicing decolonization in our everyday writing, 
thinking, and activism. This does not mean that postcolonial theorists 
neglect the corpopolitics and the geopolitics of knowledge and percep-
tion, or that they do not take radically decolonizing positions as activists- 
cum-theorists. It just means that their discipline does not require or pre-
suppose this kind of move on their part and it becomes a matter of a per-
sonal decolonial choice.
A successful institutionalization also means a necessity to defend one’s 
disciplinary territory and compete with other disciplines, which can be a 
stumbling point between the better and longer institutionalized postcolonial 
studies, and the decolonial option, which makes a point out of its refusal 
to institutionalize. Similarly to post-structuralism, postcolonial studies still 
deconstruct modernity from within, whereas the decolonial option is from 
the start speaking from Dusselian exteriority as an outside created from 
the inside (Dussel 1993) and often from a position of an absolute other of 
modernity, or the Fanonian “wretched of the earth” (Fanon 1963).
Decolonial option does not offer a self-sufficient single truth proclamation 
(being an option among other options), and it does not describe phenomena 
from a detached and objectified vantage point. By contrast, any “studies” 
do not have a choice but to be defined by contrast with other disciplines and 
promote their own universal truth. Institutionalization leads to disciplinary 
decadence as a proliferation of disciplines and their losing links with reality 
(deontologization), in Lewis Gordon’s formulation (Gordon 2006), and a 
compliance with the coloniality of knowledge in trying to secure a more sta-
ble position for one’s scholarly group within the existing epistemic matrix 
of modernity/coloniality.
The post-Soviet experience disrupting and complicating 
the postcolonial theory
As a trained Americanist, back in the 1990s I worked on a book on the 
US multiculturalism which introduced me to the postcolonial theory, non-
Western feminism, critical race theory, and other discourses that provided a 
necessary language for the representation of my then indistinct anticolonial 
sensibilities. My interest was both theoretical and personal, as I am a post-
colonial racialized other in the Russian/Soviet/post-Soviet empire. Reading 
postcolonial books, I recognized many similar complexes and deadlocks but 
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also creative possibilities with which me and other ethnically non-Russian 
post-colonial Russian citizens were struggling at the time.
However, our experience has always remained somewhat opaque and 
untranslatable into the postcolonial language. For instance, the Soviet 
empire represented itself as already a postcolonial and liberating federation 
in relation to the non-Russians who were invariably pictured by the Soviet 
historiography as previously suffering in the “prison for the peoples”—the 
Czarist empire. One of the favorite rhetorical devices of the Soviet propa-
ganda was to contrast itself with Czarist Russia, carefully hiding the evi-
dence of their close connection and continuity (Sahni 1997). On the surface, 
the USSR was promoting theatrical multiculturalism and other forms of 
affirmative action and advocated creolization instead of the racial/ethnic 
segregation (which was an important argument in its juxtaposition with the 
demonized West). Needless to say that most of it was a cardboard mockup, 
hiding racism, Orientalism, progressivism, structural inequality, and other 
familiar modern/colonial vices, but also its own specific and often contra-
dictory features. Among them, the most prominent one is Russia’s drasti-
cally different attitude to different colonies in accordance with the degree of 
their closeness to Europe, which is connected with the inferiority complex 
of Russia itself as a second-rate, forever-catching-up empire of modernity.
The latter is important as it allows to formulate a crucial concept of 
the imperial difference parallel to the colonial differences better investi-
gated in decolonial thought (Boatca 2010, Tlostanova 2014). Starting from 
the emergence of the world system, a global imperial hierarchy came to 
being. Within it, several imperial leagues were formed and transformed in 
the course of time. In the post-Enlightenment modernity, several formerly 
powerful empires were pushed to the position of the South of Europe and 
hence to internal imperial difference. The Ottoman sultanate and Russia 
became the external imperial difference, as they were rooted in different 
(from the core European) religions, languages, economic models, and eth-
nic-racial classifications. Both internal and external imperial others were 
never allowed to become equal to Great Britain, France, or the US today. 
These markers continue to affect the global geopolitical relations, classi-
fying people very much according to the original modern/colonial human 
taxonomy.
The second-rate empire of Russia is reduced in its rank from the semi-
periphery to an ultimately peripheral status today. It follows the rule of 
regressive turning of imperial difference into colonial one. A second-rate 
empire, in the imaginaries of the winning rivals, is regarded as a colony, 
soon starts to realize this status, and react in aggressive and negativist ways 
both in relation to its stronger imperial rivals and the weaker colonial oth-
ers. Imperial difference in itself is an evidence of the agonistic and rigidly 
hierarchical nature of modernity/coloniality. At its core, there is an implied 
and delocalized reference point which was originally in the heart of Europe 
and today is shifted to the US. The rest of the people are taxonomized along 
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the human scale of modernity in accordance with their proximity to this 
vantage point. Some are assigned a status of the forever-catching-up agents 
or even voluntarily define it as their goal. Others are placed into the absolute 
otherness and withdrawn from history and modernity.
The postcolonial theory does not offer any major category comparable to 
imperial difference since it traditionally focused on the British and French 
empires as the winners of the second modernity, but it is generally stronger 
in nuances due to the fact that it grew out of literary criticism, historically 
meticulous analysis of the concrete case studies, deconstructivism, and the 
post-Lacanian psychoanalysis (Spivak 1999, Bhabha 2004). Therefore, it is 
often advisable to work with decolonial concepts on a more general level 
(including the categories of the internal and external imperial differences, 
the geopolitics and corpopolitics of knowledge and of being, voluntary epis-
temic and affective self-colonization), and with postcolonial tools (canoni-
cal counter-discourse, mimicry)—on applied and descriptive levels. Both 
can fill each other’s gaps and omissions.
Particularly complex, fruitful, and also falling out of the standard post-
colonial model is the intersection of the postcolonial and post-Soviet expe-
riences, as the Soviet modernity had its own coloniality as a darker space 
for the non-Russian territories and people. Many of these groups are post-
socialist and postcolonial others at once who will always be excluded from 
the European/Western/Northern sameness into exteriority, yet due to a 
colonial-imperial configuration will never be able to belong to any locality 
—native or acquired. Such groups are often products of a specific Soviet 
creolization detached from any mono-ethnic cultural belongings, born and 
brought up in the Russian (imperial) linguistic continuum and within the late 
Soviet intelligentsia culture oriented towards the West. The imperial same-
ness inside the USSR and Russia has continued to exoticize and demonize 
them as a colonial other on many levels. Yet the binary opposition of ethnic 
culture fallen out of time and the modern and progressive dimension which 
could be only Russian/Soviet or Western/global does not hold anymore.
The postcolonial, post-Soviet others may easily turn to be not only noto-
rious singers of their native land—according to the old Soviet Orientalist 
model—but also decolonial critics, cunningly subverting both local anti-
quarian and global mainstream models, mocking the contemporary versions 
of docile Ariels as opposed to rebellious Calibans. There are more and more 
people who refuse to be assimilated Ariels or much less archaic singers of 
their native land. Both of these extremes dangerously seal one into a narrow 
ethnic identity, which many post-Soviet, postcolonial people reject due to 
the multiplicity of their ethnic roots, the Soviet educational Russification, 
and the impossibility to look for these roots in the family or social envi-
ronment. The postcolonial, post-Soviet other survives without the Russian/
Soviet mediation of modernity, reaches directly for the Western/global 
sources, or turns to various de-Westernizing (Mignolo 2012) models and, 
in some cases, to the Global South today—in quest of decolonial discourses 
172 Madina Tlostanova 
that are missing in the rhetoric of the catching-up ex-empire. Such a com-
plex positionality certainly falls out of the postcolonial dichotomous divi-
sion into the colonizers and the colonized.
The failed Soviet modernity/coloniality and its aftermath could not be 
sufficiently interpreted through the traditional postcolonial lens, which is 
too often marked by the typically modern/colonial delocalized universal-
ism. The complexity of the post-socialist-postcolonial intersection needs its 
own discourse and its own critical optics overlapping but not coinciding 
with either postcolonial high theory or more applied postcolonial studies. 
Importantly, this discourse would have to take into account the wider than 
colonialism dependence and postdependence relations in modernity, stem-
ming from the critical analysis of modernity as such not as an objective 
reality but, first of all, as a set of epistemic conditions and patterns created 
to justify and maintain its order.
Post-socialist feminist trajectories are particularly sensitive to the geopoli-
tics of knowledge in the core of neocolonization of the post-socialist reality 
and subalternization and “housewifization” of its women, in Liliana Burcar’s 
terms (Burcar 2012, 108), which is linked to the urge to make women once 
again, or rather, back into a naturalized super-exploited class. This “back 
into” is significant, as it allows a glimpse into a difference between postcoloni-
alism and post-socialism. It stems from the failure of the Soviet modernity—a 
losing cousin of the Western capitalist liberal one. Consequently, the willing 
and reluctant practitioners of this failed modernity were instructed on how to 
become fully modern (in the only remaining neoliberal way), and therefore, 
fully human. In a sense, it was a recolonization of a society that was previ-
ously colonized by a different modernity/coloniality yet made to believe that 
it was a liberating and decolonizing power.
According to Boris Groys, “the post-Communist subject travels his route 
not from the past to the future, but from the future to the past; from the end 
of history […] back to historical time. Post-Communist life is life lived back-
ward, a movement against the flow of time” (Groys 2008, 154–155). When 
the socialist modernity failed, we were told to go back to the usual established 
course, speed, and most importantly, direction of history, and to the camou-
flaged but recognizable mild progressivism as opposed to a radical Soviet one. 
Such nuances and paradoxes are unimaginable in postcolonial narratives. And 
no matter how hard the academics have been trying to establish dialogues and 
alliances between the postcolonial and the post-socialist discourses, so far our 
success was modest. Reflecting on the reasons for this lacking dialogue may 
help us better understand the evolution of the postcolonial discourse vis-à-vis 
other important shifts in the global epistemic architecture.
The schematic juxtaposition of postcolonial and post-socialist trajectories 
shows that there are many intersections between the two, but they take place 
at different moments and are triggered by different reasons, leading never-
theless to similar results and even possible coalitions because ultimately, 
they manifest different reactions to the same phenomenon of coloniality. 
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The development of postcolonial and post-socialist discourses reminds us of 
a musical counterpoint; in many ways, the two discourses coincided, but it 
happened at different historical moments and in different political contexts, 
which prevented them from hearing each other. The early postcolonial dis-
courses were largely leftist, anti-capitalist, and still progressivist without 
questioning the universalized Western norms of education, human rights, 
democracy, and women’s emancipation. Post-socialist trajectory, on the 
contrary, was marked by an almost emotional rejection of everything social-
ist and a fascination with Western knowledge, at a time when postcolonial 
scholars still largely rehearsed the leftist anti-capitalist discourses and at 
least indirectly opted for socialism. Later, a number of post-socialist activists 
and scholars started reinterpreting the socialist legacy in a less negative way, 
criticizing the Western infiltration of the post-socialist academia, NGOs, 
and other bodies of knowledge production. It happened at the point when 
postcolonial thinkers developed their anti-Western modernity discourses, 
and objectively the two positions intersected, although the traditions they 
had in mind were completely different and they did not hear each other then 
just like they still do not hear each other today.
One more concept which can serve as a medium connecting various 
un-freedom conditions and ways of their conceptualizing, going beyond 
the postcolonialist agenda, is the concept of “post-dependence” (Nycz 
2014) if we rethink its original Central European meaning formulated at 
the intersection of the postcolonial, secondary Eurocentric, post-imperial, 
 post-socialist, and other complexes. “Post-dependence” can be also a 
pluriversal term applicable to many situations such as the post-apartheid, 
post-dictatorship, or post-Fordism, as it does not focus exclusively on ide-
ology and class (as in the case of post-socialism), or on race, colonialism, 
and Eurocentrism (as in the case of postcolonial discourse). The common-
ality of the experience of traumatic dependence should not be formulated 
exclusively from the Western/modern position anymore. Yet the imperial-
colonial complex cannot act as the universal common denominator either. 
The  post-dependence condition stems from the nature of modernity, yet it is 
not always unproblematically connected with its darker colonial side. It can 
be also a trauma of the imperial difference, as in the Russian case, or of a 
secondary European positionality of Eastern Europeans who have been long 
multiply dependent on various empires and today are slowly re-entering 
Europe, struggling to accept the affinities of their experience with the Global 
South. It is crucial not to withdraw into any local standpoint experience of 
oppression but to create conditions for an alter-global vision and coalitions 
against all modern/colonial forms of dependence instead.
Toward the deep coalitions?
In today’s situation of the global conservative and essentialist backlash and 
the alarming revival of nationalist and neoimperial discourses, it is high time 
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we forgot about discrepancies between the postcolonial studies and decolo-
nial option and look at possible intersections and eventual coalitions which 
could help us oppose something positive to the global defuturing tendencies. 
Perhaps the division into the postcolonial and decolonial approaches would 
be even eventually softened.
The opposition of colonialism versus coloniality can become a source of 
future dialogues, as we are all now in the situation of the global coloniality, 
which affects not only the colonized and the subaltern but also, increasingly, 
the people in the Global North and in the semi-periphery, who used to think 
that colonialism was not their problem and now discover that their lives 
are becoming increasingly dispensable within the architecture of the global 
coloniality. This is a unifying drive for postcolonial and decolonial theorists 
and activists to build alter-global alliances and intersectional coalitions for 
the future struggles for a different world marked by a genuine interest in a 
far-away other and, eventually, a world where no one would be an other 
anymore, where there will be other economic options than neoliberal global 
capitalism, other ways of thinking than Western, and other ways of com-
municating with nature than exploitation.
Initial differences between the postcolonial and decolonial discourses 
had to do with different types of colonialism in the Americas and in Asia 
and Africa. These configurations led to accents on indigeneity in decolonial 
case and on subalternity, migrations, and creolization in postcolonial case. 
However, today the original links between the metropolis and its colonies 
are no longer so obvious and visible in the directions of migration waves. So 
it is wrong to claim that postcolonial studies focus on migrations whereas 
decolonial thought deals with indigenous populations of the settler colo-
nies who do not migrate. Equally the markings of regional and historical 
affiliations of the postcolonial and decolonial scholars are not relevant, and 
researchers who are postcolonial in their origination and decolonial in their 
views can be found in many different regions of the world—Southeast Asia, 
the post-Soviet space, or Eastern Europe (Kalnačs 2016).
This is particularly true in the case of decolonial and postcolonial fem-
inists. We exist in a complex intersectionality not only with mainstream 
Western feminism but also within our own respective postcolonial and deco-
lonial groups. Hence an important internal critique of the dogmatic hetero-
normative male version of decolonial option in María Lugones’s works 
(Lugones 2008), hence the problematizing and nuancing of various post-
colonial assumptions in the works of women of color feminists (Minh-ha 
1986, Barlas 2002, Oyěwùmí 1997). At the same time, both approaches 
face the problem of choosing the tactical allies in our struggles, and often it 
is a hard choice between feminist and postcolonial or decolonial agendas. 
Generally, in both discourses, it is the feminist group which comes up with 
the most promising, less dogmatic, and dialogically open ideas, allowing for 
freer collaborations with other critical discourses of modernity and looking 
for alliances instead of concentrating on differences and opacities.
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Can there be a dialogue between the postcolonial studies and the deco-
lonial option as the two parallel versions of the imperial-colonial criti-
cal discourses? Such a dialogue could bring rethinking into the agenda of 
human subjectivity and political agency, knowledge production, gender, 
ethics, and perception. This dialogue is needed on many levels—from the 
tactical importance of re-building coalitions along the South-South and 
South-semi-periphery axes for a more successful struggle against neocolo-
nialism, racism, Eurocentrism, sexism, heterosexism, and other xenopho-
bic manifestations of modernity, to efforts to multi-spatially understand 
the intersecting concepts in both discourses signifying similar things but 
having different genealogies. Among them, the postcolonial concept of the 
“subaltern,” whose origin can be traced from A. Gramsci to G. Spivak, 
and partly synonymic decolonial concept of the “wretched of the Earth,” 
which echoes the lyrics of The Internationale but is used in decolonial 
option clearly in its Fanonian sense.
We all have to survive in the Western-oriented academy, in the increas-
ingly neoliberal university where institutionalization remains the only way 
of legitimation. Yet such moves do not come without certain losses and 
among them a political collaboration with the neoliberal Global North and 
a necessity to speak its language in order to remain legitimate and be consid-
ered safe. A decolonial refusal to institutionalize then is crucial as a realiza-
tion of the principle of living and acting in accordance with the ideals we 
defend. And if our aim is to decolonize knowledge and being, then it is not 
recommendable to turn decolonial option into a “studies,” as it would only 
add to ubiquitous disciplinary decadence.
Yet this radical refusal to institutionalize obviously forecloses a number 
of administrative, financial, and other possibilities and may lead to isolation 
and a lack of legitimation of decolonial scholars. As a minority trickster 
who has spent many years inside a highly repressive academic system, I 
claim that it is almost always possible to infiltrate, undermine, and destabi-
lize such systems from within. Having learned like a Caliban to speak the 
colonizer’s language, the trickster uses this power not to curse but rather to 
overcome the colonizer intellectually, existentially, and affectively, opening 
new vistas for both the docile Ariels complying with theatrical multicultur-
alist rules and the indignant Calibans, striving to forcefully come back to the 
reservation of irrecoverable past. In the present conditions, the best strategy 
for critical imperial-colonial discourses is a negotiation, a cunning sneaking 
of the radical emancipating ideas into the institutionalized structures. Such 
a skillful balancing is possible only when we have access to more opportuni-
ties. In this respect, decolonial option has to learn from postcolonial studies.
We are at the stage when postcolonial and decolonial discourses are more in 
need of a dialogue than further differentiation and mutual exclusion, of effec-
tive strategies for shaping the open and flexible “deep coalitions” (Lugones 
2010) of resistance which are always in the making. One of the mechanisms 
for the organization of this opposition is critical border thinking shared by 
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both postcolonial and decolonial discourses and first formulated in the works 
of Chicana predecessors of decolonial feminism (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983, 
Anzaldúa 1999). Critical border thinking as a product of a complex and 
dynamic interaction with modernity from the position of exteriority, of living 
in hostile environments yet reinstating one’s epistemic rights, leads to an itin-
erant, forever open and multiple positionality, marked by transformationism, 
shifting identifications, and a rejection of either/or binarity, turning instead 
to a non-exclusive duality which is to be found in contemporary models of 
conjunctive logic, in many indigenous epistemologies of the Global South, and 
in diasporic trickster identifications overcoming the previous Ariel-Caliban 
dichotomy in ironic forms of activism. It is necessary to advance an open criti-
cal basis, taking into account the existing parallels between various echoing 
concepts and epistemic grounds of postcolonial and decolonial discourses, and 
find a trans-disciplinary language for expressing oppositional being, thinking, 
and agency across transcultural and trans-epistemic pluriversal spaces.
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Part III
Towards a multidirectional 
approach to the postcolonial

10
Not too long ago, in a discussion with colleagues at my home university, I 
outlined a project that would bring together a range of fields similar to those 
represented in this volume. One of the first questions I was asked about this 
project was whether “former colonized people” were amongst the scholars 
involved. This was another manifestation of the “normalization of the post-
colonial perspective” (Göttsche 2012, 185), a normalization that reflexively 
generates, amongst other things, time and again exactly this kind of ques-
tion. However, there was no simple “yes” or “no” answer in this case—the 
case of a project that brought together scholars from Western, East-Central, 
and South-Eastern Europe. Even though I would not necessarily go so far 
as to insist on the term “former colonized people” or “colonialism” for that 
matter, the answer could have been “yes.” Amongst the scholars involved 
were several whose ancestors have been affected by other types of imperial 
rule than that of the Western colonial and imperial powers.
With this introductory anecdote, I have already addressed some of the 
main issues this chapter will discuss: First, I will call concepts and assump-
tions about postcolonialism and post-imperialism, as developed in the field 
of postcolonial studies, into question, and second, I will outline reflections 
and ideas for a fresh start. In my view, this fresh start must go beyond a 
rethinking or revising of the foundations of postcolonial thought. At the 
same time, I will occasionally draw attention to the apparent normality of a 
“postcolonial view” (Lützeler 1995), as touched upon above. A few words 
in advance, since critique of postcolonial premises is often misunderstood or 
even perceived to be a retrograde defense of colonialism: My critique aims 
at a reductive discursive framework. This chapter is, of course, not meant 
as an attempt to relativize any kind of colonial wrongdoings. Focusing on 
other areas and carving out alternative concepts does not mean that colonial 
and neocolonial discourses of power, as prioritized by mainstream postco-
lonial scholarship,1 do not exist. There is no possible justification for colo-
nial violence or exploitation, of either the colonial subject or the natural or 
cultural resources of colonized peoples. One of the merits of postcolonial 
scholarship is that it has emphatically drawn attention to the tremendous 
injustice of colonial endeavors. In this respect, the most welcome aspect of 
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the current normalization of the postcolonial perspective includes—simply 
put—the fact that unlike 60 or 70 years ago, insight into these injustices and 
into the monstrosity of colonialism is being widely discussed. Discussions 
of colonial atrocities have not only reached academic discourse but also a 
wider public. As an article in the German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau 
put it ten years ago, “who would nowadays, in all seriousness, cast the 
crimes of colonialism into doubt?” (Freitag 2007). Indeed, the “normaliza-
tion of the postcolonial perspective, in a sense, necessitates a critical glance 
at colonial domination” (Göttsche 2012, 185). Having said this, in order to 
illustrate why I will nonetheless highlight the problematic sides of postcolo-
nial thought, I would like to use an argument developed in a quite different 
context. The Russian anarchist and philosopher Pjotr Kropotkin was faced 
with a set of objections which are, in a sense, similar to those I may face.
In the late nineteenth century, Kropotkin published his theory of “mutual 
aid as a factor of evolution” as an alternative concept to Darwin and to 
what political ideology made out of Darwin’s biological theories. Opposing 
the normalization of a social Darwinist view amongst his contemporaries, 
Kropotkin pointed out in the introduction of his study:
It may be objected to this book that both animals and men are repre-
sented in it under too favourable an aspect; that their sociable qualities 
are insisted upon, while their anti-social and self-asserting instincts are 
hardly touched upon. This was, however, unavoidable.
(Kropotkin 1902)
From today’s perspective, his following explanation reads like a Foucauldian 
insight avant la lettre. Kropotkin’s theory brings to mind Foucault’s idea 
that “the discourse” not only “makes it possible to construct the topic in 
a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be con-
structed” (Hall 1992, 201; my emphasis). Or, as Kropotkin himself put it:
We have heard so much lately of the ‘harsh, pitiless struggle for life,’ 
which was said to be carried on by every animal against all other ani-
mals, every ‘savage’ against all other ‘savages,’ and every civilized man 
against all his co-citizens—and these assertions have so much become 
an article of faith—that it was necessary, first of all, to oppose to them 
a wide series of facts showing animal and human life under a quite dif-
ferent aspect.
(Kropotkin 1902)
Kropotkin by no means denies that there was ample evidence for the theory 
of “survival of the fittest,” “the (financially) fittest,” or for that matter, the 
“might is right”—but he was only too aware of the power of discourse. He 
therefore realized the importance of a, in Judith Butler’s terms, “reiterative 
and citational practice” (Butler 1993, 2). A practice necessary to create an 
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alternative discourse and thereby present an argument in “oppose to” what 
has already become “an article of faith” in an existing discourse.
Returning to the thesis of this chapter, to the “articles of faith” in post-
colonial studies that I consider to be problematic, I will begin to analyze 
the contradictions within the field. Let me start to unravel these “articles 
of faith” by pointing to a central contradiction which is, strangely enough, 
rarely discussed. On the one hand, the mainstream postcolonial view con-
ceives postcolonialism to be a global phenomenon. On the other hand, as 
documented extensively in the introduction to this volume, the majority of 
postcolonial approaches are in time and space confined to a part of the globe 
and its history. Indeed, as a glance at the Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial 
Studies of 2013 illustrates, this idea is actually still prevalent in the field of 
mainstream postcolonial research (Huggan 2013). The same goes for an 
already established reference in postcolonial studies. The collection of Key 
Concepts implies that postcolonialism mostly concerns Western Europe and 
its former colonies (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2013). In exclusion of 
any other empire, mainstream postcolonial studies has managed to establish 
and normalize colonialism as a mere Western European issue: and there are 
to this date hardly any constructive debates about the possibility of going 
beyond this marked-out area. This persistent self-confinement to “the his-
tory and legacy of Western colonialism” (Young 2016, 5) entails, in my 
view, severe errors in reasoning. This is one of the reasons why I would 
argue that the current normalization of the postcolonial view has two sides, 
a most welcome one and one that is deeply problematic.
The focus on the temporal and spatial dimension of Western colonialism, 
with its tremendous power imbalance, on the racial, political, and social 
hierarchies imposed by European colonizers on non-European people, may 
have made it indeed appear natural to develop an overall unidirectional 
discursive framework of any colonial issue. This very framework, however, 
seems to turn certain phenomena which have been observed in this con-
text erroneously likewise into merely unidirectional phenomena. Take, as 
an obvious example, the so-called “logic of coloniality,” which is consid-
ered by many to be a mere Western logic or, as some would have it, an 
Enlightenment logic. Many implications and consequences of this very con-
struct are nowadays “articles of faith” and part of the apparent normality of 
a “postcolonial view.” If we pick out the field of difference and identity as 
developed in mainstream postcolonial studies, one could say without undue 
generalization that one of the most important implications of this specific 
“logic of coloniality” is that it translates—in the colonial as well as in our 
contemporary neocolonial context—“differences into values” (Mignolo 
2011, xxvii and passim). Again, this is not to question the dreadful impact 
that ideas of superiority and inferiority had on colonized people or the role 
these ideas played in justifying the economic exploitation of one group by 
another. However, on a conceptual level, it would make more sense to 
stop at the observation that the colonizing powers exercised the option of 
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turning differences into values in favor of their own group and to the det-
riment of colonized people. Instead of blending the normative-ideological 
and the conceptual, acting on the assumption of a Western “logic” that 
creates this phenomenon in the first place. After all, the observation that 
people translate differences into values can likewise be made on the other 
side of the colonial divide. Colonized people—and this is perfectly under-
standable as a response to devaluation by the colonial rulers—were likewise 
inclined to insist on their otherness and “cast these differences as synonyms 
of ‘cultural superiority’” (Narayan 1997, 402). In particular, with regard 
to India (Narayan 1997, 401f.), but also other areas colonized by Western 
powers such as Egypt or the Maghrib (Ahmed 1992),2 some scholars argued 
that colonized people conversely increased the value of their own culture. 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s well-known study, Provincializing Europe, is another 
rich source in this respect.3 While these studies do not address the question 
how this reverse translating of differences into values could possibly fit into 
the relevant postcolonial “article of faith,” they provide invaluable source 
material for a widening of the mainstream postcolonial horizon.
A related unidirectional concept of mainstream postcolonial studies is 
certainly the idea and notion of “othering.” This idea of “othering” “was 
coined by Gayatri Spivak for the process by which imperial discourse creates 
its ‘others’” (Ashcroft et al. 2013, 188; cf. Spivak 1985, 252 and passim) 
for the processes of differentiation by which the presumed superior culture 
of the colonizer experiences a clear upward revaluation. The culture of the 
colonized is marked as inferior and uncivilized. The necessity to unthink this 
concept becomes immediately clear when applied to the just outlined similar 
but reverse phenomena, where colonized Indian people cast cultural differ-
ences as synonyms of their own cultural superiority: They are “othering” 
the colonizers. One could likewise cite cases of “reverse othering” from the 
East-Central European imperial and colonial contexts. In these cases, one 
could argue that, for instance, many Baltic people thought of themselves as 
culturally superior to their Soviet occupiers. Given the fact that the concept 
of “othering”—time and again repeated by scholars as well as journalists 
and other opinion-makers—by now seems to be naturalized and publicly 
accepted, it seems to be high time to reflect on the reductionism that this 
very concept constitutes.
Another example, from the unidirectional discursive framework of main-
stream postcolonial studies, is Edward Said’s Orientalism. It seems to be no 
coincidence that a critique of the unidirectionality of postcolonial concepts 
first appeared in the context of a critique of Said. A few scholars from out-
side the fields of postcolonial thought discussed this one-way concept from 
various angles. It was, to my knowledge, Sheldon Pollock, a scholar of South 
Asian studies, who in an article of 1993 introduced the attribute unidirec-
tionality to the debate along with suggestions for an  alternative concept of 
multidirectionality. Pollock particularly directed attention towards the pos-
sibility “that ‘orientalist constructions’ in the service of colonial domination 
 Unthinking postcolonialism 185
may be only a specific historical instance of a larger, transhistorical, albeit 
locally inflected, interaction of knowledge and power” and suggested “to 
consider the possibility that the movement of orientalist knowledge may be 
multidirectional” (Pollock 1993, 76f). While Pollock underlined that “[w]
idening the scope of orientalism to include discursively similar phenomena 
is not meant as an attempt to relativize and thereby detoxify European colo-
nialism,” he strongly argues that it is “precisely by expanding our anal-
ysis that we may be able to isolate a certain morphology of domination 
that many such discourses share.” Pollock refers to discourses that tend 
to “naturaliz[e] cultural inequality” by “invoking higher knowledge,” dis-
courses which create “the idea of race and concurrently legislat[e] racial 
exclusivity, assert linguistic hierarchy and claim superiority for the language 
of the masters,” and so forth (Pollock 1993, 78).
In 2000, the historian Katherine Fleming, a specialist in the modern his-
tory of Greece and the broader Mediterranean context, resumed the discus-
sion of the idea of an intrinsic multidirectionality of Edward Said’s allegedly 
unidirectional concept. Fleming resumed this discussion in relation to the 
Balkans. Acknowledging the work of historians who focus on “the adop-
tion of ‘orientalist’ rhetoric by both East and West,” Fleming states that, 
due to the way it sheds light on different variations of orientalist discourse, 
“Orientalism loses much of its unidirectionality (as a discourse imposed by 
the West on the East) and becomes instead embedded and internalized in 
East and West alike.” And, just like Pollock, she believes that by insisting on 
the multidirectionality of orientalist discourse one gets much closer to what 
she calls “the nature […] of that discourse” (Fleming 2000, 1224). I would 
even add here that with a consequent broadening of the scope, the term and 
concept of “Orientalism” as such does not make much sense anymore. That 
goes, likewise, for other terms and concepts based on the unidirectional 
discursive framework of postcolonial studies. From this follows that there is 
a need not just to revise or rethink these postcolonial “articles of faith” but 
to unthink them and create new ones which mirror the multidirectionality 
of the phenomena in question. In this case and for the time being, one could 
provisionally describe the phenomenon just discussed as “a general princi-
ple of construction of cultural identity” (Polaschegg 2005, 38).
Many of the postcolonial “articles of faith” which I would consider prob-
lematic4 seem to be indeed derivatives of the overall unidirectionality of post-
colonial thought (in the outlined sense). An important objective in this regard 
should therefore be, in my view, the broadening of the postcolonial horizon, 
not only in cases of reverse “turning differences into values” and reverse “oth-
ering,” such as the examples just cited, but more general also. The objective 
would be a shift in terms of a “genuinely comparative and global discussion 
of colonialism and empire” (Berman 2011, 172) that would go beyond the 
time and scope usually being considered. I already touched upon the so-called 
successor states to the Soviet Union. It is obvious that the postcolonial model 
of a Western imposition on, or the exploitation of, a non-Western “other” 
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does not apply to this case. Many years of research on post-Soviet postcoloni-
alism—widely ignored by the postcolonial mainstream—brought forth illumi-
nating findings on the experience of people affected by other types of imperial 
rule than that of the Western colonial and imperial powers. Of interest for 
including of, say, the Baltics in the discursive framework of postcolonialism, 
are not least the reversals of the imperial or colonial situation, most notably 
the role reversal of “Europeans” vs. “Orientals.” According to postcolonial 
approaches, the customary colonial opposition is that of a civilized metropolis 
and a barbaric or primitive periphery. Many people in the Baltic countries, 
by contrast, considered themselves European and their Soviet occupiers “bar-
baric,” echoing the widespread stereotype of “Russian cultural inferiority” 
(Uffelmann 2013, 112).
While post-Soviet postcolonialism is already—if rather parallel to instead 
of part of postcolonial scholarship—a well-established and prolific field, 
other imperial powers such as the Ottoman Empire seem to be completely 
ignored in the postcolonial mainstream. This goes back as far as to the very 
beginnings of postcolonial scholarship, or more precisely, to Edward Said. 
Said casts the Ottoman Empire, at least for the time period he investigates, 
in the role of a mere victim of Western imperialism or colonialism (Albrecht 
2019). What is more, there is evidence that there are mainstream postco-
lonial scholars who seem to consider its discussion even detrimental and 
strive to deliberately exclude it from the debate. In this spirit, an article in 
the Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies, instead of closing the actu-
ally identified research gap of a missing discussion of the Ottoman Empire 
in postcolonialism, insists that “there are good reasons” for the omission of 
this and other Islamic empires (Sayyid 2013, 127; for a critique, cf. Albrecht 
2019). However, this view certainly did not prevent a small but seemingly 
growing number of historians of the Ottoman Empire from discovering the 
unknown territory of postcolonial thought. On the contrary, as the histo-
rian Vangelis Kechriotis summarized in his 2013 article, “Postcolonial criti-
cism encounters late Ottoman studies”: “Postcolonial criticism has inspired 
late Ottomanists in various ways” (Kechriotis 2013, 41).
The wide research field of Ottoman Studies seemingly underwent a num-
ber of changes over the decades. As the historian Norman Naimark sum-
marized in 2002, for a long time there was (and to some degrees still may 
be) a certain tendency towards polarization, depending on the background 
of the respective scholar:
Historians of the Ottoman Empire tend to paint a rosy picture of the 
minority peoples within its borders. By contrast, historians of the sub-
ject peoples—Serbs or Bulgarians, Greeks or Armenians—tend to do 
the opposite, they emphasize the brutality of the Ottoman yoke and 
the inevitable victories of their respective national movements or, in the 
case of the Armenians, the inevitable tragedy that engulfed the nation.
(Naimark 2002, 18f.)
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Since then, further changes in Ottoman historiography could be observed. 
In the latter camp in particular, there is a tendency in some areas to coun-
ter the earlier nationalistic view in turn with a somewhat euphemistic 
delineation of Ottoman rule. There are still traces of this euphemistic view 
to be found: A 2012 study of the Muslim-Christian Coexistence and its 
Destruction in Late-Ottoman Anatolia, for instance, received severe criti-
cism in this regard as an “ideologically contaminated” book that brings to 
the fore almost exclusively the harmonious aspects of the everyday coexist-
ence of these groups (Zelepos 2014). At present, however, a more balanced 
approach seems to prevail, at least outside of Turkey’s official presentation 
of history (Reinkowski 2011; Seufert 2008, 21). The authors of an article 
on “Dilemmas of Ottoman Legacy” may capture this state when they write 
that: “It is tempting to view the Ottoman mosaic of ethnic and religious 
communities as an instance of ‘multiculturalism’ avant le mot.” Yet by the 
same token, they emphasize that great caution is needed here: “Just as the 
‘Turkish yoke’ is a creation of a modernist and nationalist historical para-
digm […], ‘multiculturalism’ in the Ottoman Empire is also subject to the 
same fallacy of trying to narrate the past with today’s lexicon” (Yilmaz and 
Yosmaoglu 2008, 682f.).
As for the relation of Ottoman Studies to Postcolonial Studies, about the 
turn of the twenty-first century, a small group of nineteenth-century histori-
ans began to sound out the usefulness—or perhaps uselessness—of postco-
lonial thought for Ottoman Studies (Kechriotis 2013). They were surprised 
about the lack of interest in the Ottoman Empire in the field of mainstream 
postcolonialism. As Selim Deringil put it in 2003: “Although it covered a 
huge geography until its last days, and its study presents fruitful challenges 
to any student of colonialism and postcolonialism, the nineteenth-century 
Ottoman empire has been largely ignored by the literature covering these 
issues” (Deringil 2003, 313).5 At present, some still refer to the “Ottoman 
Empire’s uncomfortable positionality in postcolonial studies” (Mikhail and 
Philliou 2012, 739) and tend to be cautious in their assessment of whether 
or not a postcolonial approach is of use. There seem to be, broadly speak-
ing, two different approaches to this question. Some strive to theorize the 
late Ottoman Empire as an imperial power with colonial aspirations, such 
as Vangelis Kechriotis—who points out that “nineteenth-century historians 
[…] have reversed the argument and tend to include the Ottoman Empire 
not among the states that were subject to colonization but among the colo-
nizers” (Kechriotis 2013). Selim Deringil, likewise, assumes “that sometime 
in the nineteenth century” the Ottomans, although quite different from the 
British or French, “adopted a colonial stance toward the peoples of the 
periphery of their empire” (Deringil 2003, 313). Other scholars question 
the Ottoman Empire’s comparability with Western powers, and disapprove 
of the various imaginative linguistic acquisitions from the history of coloni-
alism—“the Ottoman civilizing mission” (Herzog and Motika 2000, 151), 
“the Ottoman man’s burden” (Makdisi 2002a, 782), or “Ottoman 
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orientalism” (Makdisi 2002a; Makdisi 2002b). These scholars insist that 
“the fundamental elements of modern colonialism” (Türesay 2013, xvi) are 
taken into account. Still under discussion is also the reverse approach to 
the Ottoman Empire as a victim of the Western powers’ drive for expan-
sion; that is, the approach Edward Said introduced to the debate. From the 
perspective of German history, for example, it seems to be obvious that the 
Wilhelmine Empire strived for “German dominance in Ottoman space”—a 
kind of dominance that some would call “a colonial empire in all but name” 
(Krobb 2014, 10; see also MagShamhráin 2009, 146). Florian Krobb, in a 
recent article, points out that “Germany’s official policies towards Turkey” 
at that time “showed traits of informal imperialism” (Krobb 2014, 5). 
Krobb borrows a term coined by two historians of the British Empire, John 
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, in an influential 1953 article on economic 
history (Gallagher and Robinson 1953). The economic historian Şevket 
Pamuk, while he likewise discusses the concepts of “formal colony” and 
“informal empire,” underlines in this context “the inability of any European 
power to transform the Ottoman Empire into a formal colony or incorpo-
rate it into its informal empire” because “no single [European] power was 
able to exclude its competitors from the Ottoman Empire” (Pamuk 1988, 
132f., 147, 132f.).
My own interest in and advocacy of incorporating the Ottoman Empire 
into the postcolonial debate stems from a culture studies background and 
does not include the ambition to solve unresolved questions in the field of 
historiography. While a culture studies approach likewise does not, in my 
view, permit any kind of ahistorical lines of argument, the kind of ques-
tions posed in this field are certainly different. Scholarship in the wide 
field of memory studies, for example, is not so concerned with whether 
or not the Ottoman Empire could be described as a colonizing power but 
rather with how it was and is perceived by various interest groups. In this 
respect, the legacy of centuries of Ottoman rule at the latest since the Fall 
of Constantinople 1453 in contemporary post-Ottoman countries is cer-
tainly highly interesting. The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the 
Middle East, to cite the title of a study of the mid-1990s (Brown 1996), 
for example, was followed by a related publication in 2011 on the Cultural 
Impact of Ottoman and Habsburg Rule in Southeast Europe (Sindbaek and 
Hartmuth 2011). These are simultaneously studies that provide highly inter-
esting material, material that could be exploited in the field of postcolo-
nial studies.6 One of the well-known key premises of memory studies is the 
assumption that we reconstruct the past from the perspective of the present 
and, according to our present-day needs—that memory is the “past made 
present,” so to speak (Terdiman 1993). Ever since this fundamental insight 
by Maurice Halbwachs in the early twentieth century, it has become almost 
a matter of common knowledge that memory is an issue of our contempo-
rary concerns. While historians may insist that, for instance, “the ‘Turkish 
yoke’ is a creation of a modernist and nationalist historical paradigm” 
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(Yilmaz and Yosmaoglu 2008, 683), scholars in the fields of cultural mem-
ory studies are interested in the motives and the purpose of dealing with the 
past. These scholars are interested in topics such as the “political choice” 
of what is remembered, how it is remembered, and what is not remembered 
(Irvin-Erickson, La Pointe, and Hinton 2013, 2).
A culture studies approach to the Ottoman Empire from a postcolonial 
perspective—or to the Soviet Empire, for that matter—naturally includes a 
reconceptualizing and re-theorizing of “the postcolonial.” It should begin 
with the identification and redressing of the conceptual roadblocks of the 
unidirectional discursive framework in postcolonialism. Both research on 
the Ottoman Empire and on the Soviet Empire provide invaluable tools, 
and not just for the deconstruction of mainstream postcolonial premises. 
These tools may also help to generate a genuine multidirectional approach 
(in the sense outlined earlier on) that will meet the challenges of the many 
commonalities and diversities of imperial and colonial experiences and lega-
cies. As a working assumption, the Ottoman Empire or the Soviet Empire 
may be understood—here I am following in parts the anthropologist Sarah 
Green—as political orders which used to organize the various ethnic and 
religious groups differently (or similarly), compared to other political 
orders, as political orders which would engender different (or similar) pat-
terns of imperial experience (Green 2005, 147). What is highly interesting 
about the Ottoman and Soviet versions of imperialism for the discussion 
of postcolonial premises is the different basic constellations of rulers and 
ruled. Unlike in Western colonialism, it was, for instance, not European 
Christian colonizers against non-European, non-Christian colonized people. 
The majority of those “ruled” by the Ottomans “were of the same religion” 
as the rulers (Türesay 2013, x). What we are looking at in the Ottoman 
Empire’s European areas is predominantly “Christian subordination to 
Muslim rule” (Kechriotis 2015, 70). As Vangelis Kechriotis put it, what is 
necessary here is reflection on “the implications” of these reverse situations 
of imperial rule “for thinking about […] domination” and about what he 
calls “the Ottoman version of colonialism” (Kechriotis 2015, 70). Several 
other reverse situations of imperial rule come to bear in this regard. To men-
tion one more example: When Greece started its War of Independence in 
1821 and several years later became, in Christine Philliou’s words, “the first 
independent successor-state to the Ottoman Empire” (Philliou 2008, 670), 
the Greek people, as Gregory Jusdanis put it, “sought freedom in, rather 
than from Europe” (Jusdanis 2011, 110).
What else may be of epistemological value in the envisioned broadening of 
the postcolonial horizon? In my view, Sheldon Pollock and Katherine Fleming 
show us the way with their suggestion of what Pollock calls a “morphol-
ogy of domination” (Pollock 1993, 78) and Katherine Fleming describes as 
“the nature” of the “Orientalist discourse” (Fleming 2000, 1224). Although 
I am not necessarily in favor of these terms and descriptions as such, I think 
that they point to an area where, first, postcolonial questions extend far into 
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our present-day concerns—for instance to issues of multicultural societies—
and, second, the need for a multidirectional approach to imperial or colonial 
pasts and a post-imperial or post-colonial present becomes most apparent. 
Certainly, the fact that a wide range of completely new case studies becomes 
conceivable in the first place points to a necessity for a fresh look at “the 
postcolonial.” Examples in the field of literary culture studies are certainly 
the numerous authors from successor-states to the Soviet and Ottoman 
Empires—for instance, the Baltics, the Middle East, or the Balkans—who 
have yet to be discovered from a wider postcolonial perspective. One of many 
obvious examples is the Greek author Níkos Kazantzákis, who grew up on 
the island of Crete—Ottoman-occupied Crete, to be precise (Albrecht 2019). 
A short comparative glance at Kazantzákis’ novel Freedom or Death of 1953 
and Chinua Achebe’s seminal postcolonial novel Things Fall Apart of 1958 
may, in conclusion, indicate the potential of new case studies and the kind of 
new question that can be posed in a wider postcolonial horizon. I am aware, 
though, that the epistemological value of literary texts is obvious to literary 
scholars but in need of explanation to anybody else. Two sentences in this 
respect seem to be advisable at this point. The advantage of literature as a 
source of knowledge about historical, political, and social realities and on 
how these realities are being experienced is that writers may ask for causes 
and effects different from those considered in academic and public discourse, 
and ideally provide alternate visions. Literary texts are ideally, as Jan Philipp 
Reemtsma puts it, what “in the field of sociology is likewise considered to be 
a legitimate means of insight: thought experiments” (Reemtsma 2007). In this 
sense, just like scholars in the humanities and social sciences, writers may also 
be capable of rethinking, exploring, and deconstructing ideologies or prem-
ises otherwise taken for granted. Therefore, they may be able to introduce 
new insights into the postcolonial debate. Chinua Achebe certainly did this 
with his writing; the potential of Níkos Kazantzákis in that respect has yet to 
be explored.
Achebe’s novel Things Fall Apart is set in colonial Nigeria of the 1890s; 
Kazantzákis’ Freedom or Death on the island of Crete at about the same 
time, when Crete was still part of the Ottoman Empire. A culture studies 
question would not be whether Nigeria or Crete could be designated as col-
onies—Nigeria certainly was, Crete maybe or maybe not. Moreover, Crete 
can certainly not stand for the entire Ottoman Empire. Rather, as historian 
Pinar Şenişik put it, what distinguished Crete “from the other provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire” was resistance on a very large scale and “the high 
frequency of its revolts” (Şenişik 2011, 232). Ottoman rule in other parts 
such as Anatolia or the Balkans brought out different forms of resistance or 
collaboration. However, a culture studies question could be, for instance, 
what kind of rationale does the author Chinua Achebe develop in his novel 
in order to explain the phenomenon of “things falling apart”? Achebe is 
certainly famous for his depiction of the social cohesion of the Igbo soci-
ety—the specific way this society “holds together,” so to speak, before it 
falls apart. What are the conditions under which a tightly woven social 
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fabric can actually “fall apart” in the colonial encounter? And, why does the 
Greek writer Kazantzákis, despite the fact that he describes power hierar-
chies very similar to that in Achebe’s novel, think that the Cretan society did 
not fall apart? Kazantzákis depicts harsh discrimination of the population 
of Crete by the Turkish rulers of the island, rebellion and suppression of the 
revolts, violence on both sides, and certainly the potential for a falling apart 
of the Cretan society because of the imperial situation. A comparison of the 
two novels suggests that the difference arises from the relational constella-
tion of ruler and ruled: According to Achebe, British colonization brought 
major cultural differences to colonized Nigeria. In Kazantzákis’ setting, the 
culture and societies of Ottomans and Greeks—both patriarchal, both shar-
ing similar values—are, with the exception of religious beliefs, basically very 
much alike. It is this kind of insight that a discussion of post-colonial or 
post-imperial writers, in particular if they are major writers like in this case, 
can contribute to a wider postcolonial debate.
It is these kinds of questions, against the backdrop of an entire new set 
of comparative studies, that a wider postcolonial approach will be able to 
discuss. The potential of new objects of investigation in the field of liter-
ary culture studies alone is obvious. So is the scope of possible new com-
parisons of the familiar postcolonial texts, say, from and about India or 
Africa with as yet unfamiliar post-Soviet or post-Ottoman texts. To name 
an example that the recent 70th anniversary of the partition of India and 
Pakistan in 1947 brings to mind: No postcolonial taboo should prevent 
scholars from comparing texts about the partition of India and the popula-
tion exchange after the end of British rule, with texts about the dissolution 
of the Ottoman Empire with its population exchange in Turkey and Greece. 
These texts include displacement and extinction of Anatolian ethnic groups 
and the Armenian genocide. On the whole, what will come in view with a 
widening of the postcolonial horizon are “recurring political, intellectual 
and cultural practices” as well as “ideological constructions and similar 
functioning mechanisms” (Kołodziejczyk and Şandru 2016, 2). They will all 
show the necessity to exceed the unidirectional discursive framework set by 
mainstream postcolonial studies and the need to strive for a multidirectional 
approach to post-colonial and post-imperial phenomena. However small the 
input of the respective case study may be, these kinds of new comparisons 
and juxtapositions have a contribution to make. This change is necessary if 
we want to sound out the idea of “the postcolonial” as an explanatory tool, 
for the understanding of today’s post-imperial and post-colonial world.
Notes
1 For my use of the term “postcolonial mainstream,” cf. the explanatory note in 
the introduction to this volume.
2 Unlike Narayan, who explicitly points to it, Ahmed rather implicitly confirms 
this phenomenon of reverse inferiorization.
3 For a discussion, see Albrecht 2008, Chapter 4.1 on “Universalismus und 
Gender.”
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4 Cf. Albrecht 2019, 2017a, 2017b, 2014a, 2014b, 2013, 2012a, 2012b, 
2011, 2010.
5 As Deringil likewise pointed out, ignorance can also be observed in “the Subaltern 
group” who “completely ignores that there existed a major non-Western sover-
eign state whose destinies were in many ways intertwined with the destinies of 
India” and adds in a footnote: “Witness the fact that there is no mention of the 
politics of pan-Islamism in Subaltern Studies vols. 1–10 (1982–1999)” (Deringil 
2003, 314f.).
6 A likewise interesting very recent endeavor was a conference at the Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity (MPI-MMG), Ambivalent 
Legacies: Memory and Amnesia in Post-Habsburg and Post-Ottoman Cities 
(Göttingen, 26–28 April 2017), hosted by the Max Planck Research Group, 
“Empires of Memory: The Cultural Politics of Historicity in Former Habsburg 
and Ottoman Cities.”
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Can we consider Greece a postcolonial nation? Does it make sense to 
include Balkan, Baltic, and Caucasian countries into the postcolonial fold? 
What do we gain by expanding the definition of postcolonialism to study a 
host of nations from Albania to Azerbaijan? These questions have invited 
spirited and controversial responses since they have to do with the concep-
tual boundaries of both empire and postcolonialism along with the practice 
of comparison itself (Albrecht 2019; Türesay 2013).
The disciplinary boundaries of the field are related to the methodologies 
used by its practitioners. Asking whether Greece is a postcolonial nation is 
another way of asking whether Greece constitutes an object of the field’s 
comparative outlook. For this reason, I propose here that reflection on the 
borders of postcolonialism should be accompanied by a reconsideration of 
comparison itself. I will consider, therefore, the question of Greece’s post-
coloniality by rethinking how we compare. I will approach this topic by 
juxtaposing a chronicle of Cuzco’s destruction written by an Amerindian 
author alongside descriptions of the fall of Constantinople composed by 
three Greek historians.
But is postcolonialism prepared for such unorthodox comparison? I begin 
with Jan C. Jansen’s and Jürgen Osterhammel’s recent Decolonization. A 
Short History, which defines decolonization as a process which dissolved 
the intercontinental European empires in the global south between 1945 
and 1975, and which delegitimized the idea of foreign rule (Jansen and 
Osterhammel 2017, 1–2). Although the authors provide a brief overview 
of previous anticolonial movements in the Americas, they ignore the Greek 
War of Independence of 1821—indisputably the earliest national struggle in 
the world, that is, the first fought against rule of an alien power. With the 
exception of Haiti, the wars of independence in the Americas were by con-
trast struggles of Europeans and their creole descendants against European 
powers. Jansen and Osterhammel rightly point out that these conflicts left 
untouched the idea of empire itself and the right of Europeans to conquer 
people they regarded as inferior (Jansen and Osterhammel 2017, 21). But 
Jansen’s and Osterhammel’s omission of Greece is not just a historical lapse 
but a limitation of their comparative methodology (Therborn 2017).1
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From Cuzco to Constantinople
This absence of Greece represents a greater tendency of postcolonial stud-
ies to see the world divided between Europe and its former colonies. The field 
is still indebted to the center-periphery model of empire thinking, a model that 
regards communication, travel, and commerce moving from Europe to its 
former colonies and vice versa. Rarely does it direct its focus to countries that 
were not colonized by England, France, Spain, Portugal, or Holland. Even 
Elizabeth Buettner’s exemplary look into the consequences of decolonization 
on European societies still focuses on these countries. Her laudable claim that 
we can’t really understand the process of postcolonialism by focusing on it 
from the perspective of one national tradition is limited by her historical and 
geographical conception of empire (Buettner 2016). Postcolonialism, in other 
words, continues the tendency of other humanistic disciplines like world lit-
erature to favor Western nations and their colonial Others as objects of analy-
sis. Moreover, it privileges direct currents of political, mercantile, and cultural 
traffic at the expense of implicit or possible ties. In short, it encourages critics 
to compare what is acceptable, predictable, sanctioned, making them hesitant 
to imagine incongruous comparison.
I propose my comparison of the sack of Constantinople with the destruc-
tion of Cuzco in this context. Why undertake the juxtaposition of seemingly 
unrelated documents, institutions, and historical events? Why risk removing 
objects of analysis from their historical and cultural contexts? Traditionally 
scholars have tended to compare societies that share a historical or geo-
graphical relationship, the place of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, for 
instance, or the German appropriation of classical Greece. They have justi-
fied such an analysis by referring to the perceived equivalence of the socie-
ties or the historical, political, and cultural links between the two cultures.
Increasingly, however, some literary critics compare institutions or con-
cepts that seem incommensurable. Borrowing insights from anthropology, 
world systems theory, translation studies, and comparative religion, they 
are rethinking the idea of comparison (Felski and Friedman 2013). They 
place side-by-side elements from divergent areas and eras and bring together 
individuals, ideas, nations that hitherto had not had contact (Berman 2016).
There are many reasons to do this:
 1) Incongruous comparison challenges accepted disciplinary bounda-
ries such as those of postcolonialism while promoting the interaction 
among scholars from various academic subjects.
 2) It brings attention to the inevitable incommensurability in all compari-
son. All comparisons, even of related things such as of the Odyssey 
and the Aeneid or German and French modernist poetry, necessitate 
the removal of objects from their social or cultural context and their 
placement in another. Something will be always lost in this process as 
no comparison is perfect or trouble-free.
 3) It tempers the presumed universality of our own particular perspec-
tive by directing attention to the cultural centrism (i.e. chronocentrism, 
198 Gregory Jusdanis 
Eurocentrism) in all thinking. In so doing, incongruous comparison 
defamiliarizes the self-other dichotomy by emphasizing the presence of 
the other in the self and the self in the other.
 4) Incongruous comparison undermines the practice of regarding the 
Other as a way of elucidating the Western. In the past, as Chinua 
Achebe has argued, critics used Africa as a trope to understand Europe 
rather than accepting it on its own terms, with its own validity (1989).2
 5) Finally, this type of comparison enables us to view ideas, epochs, and 
societies from unique vantage points, to draw out unorthodox impli-
cations, and to direct attention to situations that might have escaped 
our notice.
The first American?
I would like to test this type of comparison by turning to a remarkable 
but little-known figure, Garcilaso de la Vega el Inca, the author of Royal 
Commentaries of the Incas [Los comentarios reales de los Incas] (1609).3 
Born in Cuzco to a conquistador father (Garcilaso de la Vega) and an Inca 
princess (Palla Chimpu Ocllo) in 1539, seven years after the first encoun-
ter between the Incas and Spaniards, he is one of the original Americans; 
that is, a product of the cultural mixing between colonizers and indigenous 
peoples. Moreover, he was one of the first to see Latin America as a multi-
ethnic continent, a depiction that eventually inspired the final rebellion by 
Túpac Amaru against Spanish rule 40 years before Bolívar proclaimed the 
independence of Peru.
Growing up in Cuzco, he learned from his maternal relatives’ stories 
about Inca society and rule, speaking in Quechua with them. “I often 
heard as a child from the lips of my mother and her brothers and uncles 
and other elders about” Inca history (I, 40). At the age of 21, he left Peru 
for Spain in 1560 to receive a formal education, never to return. Aspiring 
to capture this society now in permanent change, he used the insights of 
his mestizo heritage to write about the rise and fall of Inca society. Indeed, 
he ended his second volume with the hope that it be received as great a ser-
vice “to the Spaniards who won the empire as to the Incas who formerly 
possessed it” (II, 1487).
His Comentarios was the first text to be published in the Old World 
by a person of Amerindian descent and the first to incorporate indigenous 
elements in Western discourse, striving to reconcile Inca experience with 
European history, native religion with Christianity, oral narrative with 
humanism, Quechua with Spanish. No other writer before him reflected 
so systematically on the representation of the Indian in European discourse 
(Zamora 1988, 3, 37). Needless to say, until Garcilaso and indeed much 
afterwards, the native perspective was excluded from European writing 
about the continent. The Comentarios appeared as a revisionary work that 
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startled readers, forcing them to see the world from unexpected perspectives. 
Having written in Spanish and within Spanish discourse on the Americas, 
he tried to negotiate his own position (Ross 2008, 136–137).4 Garcilaso 
himself captured this shifting of perspective, saying that in a round world, 
“there is no certain way of knowing which provinces are the antipodes of 
which others” (I, 11).
Though not formal history today, his study should be seen as a rhetorical 
work, aiming to persuade Western readers that Inca society had a cultural 
legitimacy and that its destruction by Spain was unjust. Garcilaso’s chief 
argument was that the pagan Incas played a privileged role in world history, 
paving the way for the arrival of Christianity in South America. As children 
of the sun, they brought monotheism and civilization to the “savage” tribes 
of the area.
Garcilaso began his work with an assertion that must have shocked 
contemporaneous readers: “I am an Indian” and write “like an Indian” 
(Garcilaso I, 5). He had to assert his ethnic identity and his capacity for 
logical judgment because in his time and for much afterwards, indigenous 
peoples were rejected as morally and intellectually inferior to Europeans.
Writing against this prejudice, Garcilaso wanted to place the Inca state in 
the context of world history, to demonstrate that his forebears were authen-
tic human beings capable of building monumental works and of administer-
ing an empire stretching from southern Colombia to northern Argentina. 
Inca history merited the attention of readers (MacCormack 1998, 26).
Recognizing the suspicion his text would arouse among Spanish read-
ers, he wrote it in the manner of a testimony, much like the accounts of 
conquistadors, such as Bernal Díaz’s Historia verdadera de la conquista de 
la Nueva España (1568). “I was brought up among these Indians […] and 
I frequented their society until I was twenty.” His relatives spoke to him 
about the history, religion, and political administration of Inca society. He 
also observed much himself. “I experienced and saw with my own eyes a 
great deal of their idolatry, festivals, and superstitions which still had not 
altogether disappeared in my own time,” having been born only eight years 
after the conquest (I, 50).
In offering the native perspective for the first time, Garcilaso had entered 
into a public dispute raging in Spain since Columbus’s arrival in the new 
world between two distinct representations of indigenous Americans and 
their capacity for rational judgment. This controversy eventually led to the 
holding of the famous Valladolid Council of 1550/51. Called by Charles V 
just 30 years after the siege of Tenochtitlan, the capital of the Aztec Empire, 
this council was the first and only time a colonizing nation ever organized a 
formal inquiry into the justice of empire. The question it posed: Was it law-
ful for the King of Spain to wage war on the Indians before preaching the 
faith to them and subjecting them to his rule (Hanke 1959, ix, 38)? Unlike 
the Muslims in Spain who knew Christianity and rejected it, the native peo-
ples of America had no experience of the Catholic faith. Spain’s encounter 
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with these idolaters, therefore, raised the question about their treatment 
(Reséndez 2016, 5).5
Garcilaso was influenced by Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484–1566), one 
of the chief speakers at the Council and a profound critic of Spanish injus-
tices in Latin America, and Blas Valera (1544–1596), a person of mixed 
descent like himself, who wrote Historia Occidentalis in Latin, which was 
burned during the English sack of Cadiz in 1596. Valera argued that Incas 
had understanding of true God and of Christianity, and king Atahualpa’s 
conversion to Christianity demonstrated that he was among Christ’s elect 
(Hyland 2003).
From these writers, Garcilaso learned that to succeed with his narrative, 
he had to make Inca society not only less exotic but also religiously accept-
able. He maintained that the Incas were monotheists, worshiping the Sun, 
whom they called “God our Lord,” Pachacánac, meaning, “him who gives 
life to the universe” (I, 70). “The God of the Christians and Pachacánac 
were one and the same” (71). The Spaniards, however, had not realized 
that the Incas had introduced monotheism to the idolatrous people and thus 
prepared the way for the Gospel in the Andes. This claim allowed Garcilaso 
to make the wider argument that Incas and Spaniards misinterpreted each 
other. The Incas could not fully understand that their life was theologically 
an error. By the same token, the Spaniards, ignorant of Quechua, were mis-
informed about Inca society (I, 51).
As a comparative text, the Comentarios sets one society next to another, 
pleading for empathy among Spanish readers while also disrupting their 
Eurocentric point of view. But Garcilaso interpreted Inca society for Spanish 
readers rather than the other way around. As such, he is one of the first colo-
nized intellectuals who, versed in languages of the colonizer and colonized, 
and who, having discovered the belatedness of his own society, sought to 
chronicle and restore his indigenous history. He was stirred to safeguard the 
shared culture that survived. “I myself, moved by the desire to preserve the 
few shreds of the ancient traditions of my country that have survived, lest 
they should completely disappear” (417). There is a direct line here from 
Garcilaso to the postcolonial intellectuals of the twentieth century.
In order to persuade his readers, he wrote not only in Spanish but also 
adopted the principles of humanism and its celebration of classical learning. 
To make the foreign society graspable, he often made parallels to European 
history, seeing Cuzco as another Rome: “Cuzco fue otra Roma.” Indeed, 
he took pains to describe the glories of Inca architecture he remembered 
from his youth. The most impressive was the Temple of the Sun, which was 
“adorned with incredible riches” and contained “vast treasures.” The build-
ing was so “incredible,” Garcilaso says, that he could not “dare to describe 
it” (I, 180). Overall, the Incas “made marvelous buildings, fortresses, tem-
ples, royal palaces, gardens, storehouses, roads and other constructions 
of great excellence, as we can see today from the remaining ruins.” When 
Pizarro’s scouts visited the city ahead of their leader, they too were “filled 
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with admiration at the majesty of Cuzco and the splendor and wealth of its 
temples and palaces, though these were already much diminished owing to 
the recent wars between the Incas” (II, 702).
Sorrow for the destruction of Inca civilization suffuses Garcilaso’s text. 
His mother’s visiting relatives always fell into stories about “the origins of 
the Inca kings, their greatness, the grandeur of their empire, their deeds and 
conquests […] From the greatness and prosperity of the past they turned to 
the present, mourning their dead kings, their lost empire, and their fallen 
state” (I, 41). They ended these sessions in tears.
What really tormented Garcilaso was how quickly the state fell. Given the 
might and majesty of the empire, he wondered, how could it have crumbled 
so abruptly in the face of so few foreigners (I, 575)? He asked his maternal 
uncle this very question. “Inca, how is it that as this land is naturally so rough 
and rocky, and you were so numerous and warlike, and powerful enough 
to gain and conquer so many other provinces and kingdoms, you should so 
quickly have lost your empire and surrendered to so few Spaniards?” His 
uncle repeated the prophecy that had widely circulated about the imminent 
arrival of unknown foreigners and how the king, Huayna Cápac, “had bid-
den them obey and serve the Spaniards since they would prove superior to 
them in everything.” Turning to the young Garcilaso in anger, the uncle 
said that these final commands of Huayna Cápac “were more effective in 
overcoming us than the arms your father and his companions brought to 
this country” (I, 578).
Prophecies of impending doom were useful for Garcilaso to explain the 
defeat of the Incas, as they were for the Byzantines and for the Aztecs. There 
also occurred a man-made catastrophe. The sudden death of Huayna Cápac, 
who had extended the range of the empire, resulted in a bloody civil war 
between his two sons who struggled for succession, with Atahualpa situated 
in the northern empire with its capital in Quito and Huáscar in the capi-
tal city, Cuzco. This internecine war weakened the empire just as Pizarro 
and his men were approaching Peru. Ultimately Atahualpa was the victor, 
but not before committing unspeakable atrocities against his opponents, 
having Huáscar and many members of his royal household butchered. But 
Garcilaso’s mother and her brother, who belonged to the Huáscar house-
hold, managed to escape these cruelties (I, 620).
By a diabolical coincidence, Francisco Pizarro and his 150 men reached the 
Andes just at the point when Atahualpa was making his way to Cuzco. Having 
heard of the civil war between the two brothers, Pizarro sought to exploit this 
discord just as Cortés had done in Mexico, from whom he learned about his 
military successes during their meeting in Spain. He sent two ambassadors to 
Atahualpa who, incredibly, agreed to see Pizarro in at Cajamarca. When the 
Spaniards arrived in the square of Cajamarca, they laid out plans to capture 
the king despite being surrounded by a hostile army.
Atahualpa never attacked this small band of men, allowing them to pass 
through his territory in a route guarded by forts and towers. We will never 
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understand why he spared them or why he met them. Yet, we have to bear 
in mind that Atahualpa was at a semiotic disadvantage, not knowing how to 
interpret the new arrivals. The Inca king knew nothing about the newcom-
ers, neither their culture nor the reason for their mission. Pizarro, on the 
other hand, had knowledge of Inca society, detailed information about the 
civil war, and also the successful strategy used by Cortés in Mexico City, 
not to mention horses and superior arms. This epistemological and techno-
logical superiority contributed to the Spanish victory. Pizarro, like Cortés 
before him, demonstrated that the conquest of knowledge inevitably led to 
the conquest of empire (Todorov 1984, 252).6
There are many dramatic accounts of this fateful encounter, based on 
various sources.7 I wish to focus on Garcilaso’s description of Fray Vicente 
de Valverde’s address to Atahualpa:
“It is proper that you should know, most famous and most power-
ful king, that it is necessary that Your Highness and all your subjects 
should not only learn the true Catholic faith, but that you should hear 
and believe the following.”
Then he added that Atahualpa should submit his empire to the authority 
of King Charles V and be his vassal and also “receive and believe the faith 
of Jesus Christ, our God, and scorn and utterly repudiate the abominable 
superstition of your idols” (II, 680–681).
According to Garcilaso, Atahualpa was receptive to the priest’s message, 
making reference to the prophecy and his father’s request that they submit 
to a more powerful people. Indeed, Atahualpa wanted to know more about 
Jesus Christ and did not utter the statement ascribed to him by Spanish 
historians, which read: “You believe that Christ is God and that he died: 
I worship the Sun and Moon, which are immortal. And who told you that 
your God was the maker of the Universe” (II, 688)? Garcilaso likewise 
rejected Fray Vicente’s account that Atahualpa put the Bible to his ear, 
found it did not speak, and cast it on the ground, causing the friar to shout: 
“Christians, the Gospels have been dashed down! Justice and vengeance on 
these Indians!” (II, 688). Nor did he accept Atahualpa’s response: “I am free 
and owe tribute to no one; nor do I intend to pay it, for I recognize no supe-
rior” (II, 689). According to him, after the battle which led to the death of 
5,000 Indians, the cross still lay where the friar had left it. “And the Indians 
[…] worshipped it in the belief that the piece of wood had some great divin-
ity and power from God, and in their ignorance of the mysteries of our Lord 
Jesus Christ, they begged its pardon for having offended it” (II, 689).
At the end, the Spaniards captured Atahualpa and held him prisoner. 
Despite the princely ransom they received, they tried, convicted, and executed 
him for the murder of his brother and for conspiring to kill Spaniards. “With 
the death of the two royal brothers and enemies, Huáscar and Atahualpa, 
the Spaniards remained absolute lords of both their kingdoms, for there was 
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no one to resist them or oppose anything they tried to do thereafter. With 
the death of the Incas, the Indians of both parties were like sheep without 
a shepherd” (II, 721). The war between the two brothers, Garcilaso said, 
brought about the total destruction of their empire, “facilitating the entry 
of the Spaniards and making it possible for them to win Peru with such ease 
[…] But our Lord God took pity on these gentiles and permitted the discord 
between the two brothers to rise so that the preachers of His Gospel and 
Catholic Faith might enter the more easily and with less resistance” (II, 723). 
As soon as the “sacraments of our holy Mother, one Church, Roman, 
Catholic, Apostolic, entered Peru, the demons that used to deal so familiarly 
with the heathen, lost the power of speech in public” (II, 699). In the eyes of 
the Andean people, rapid victory by Spaniards over Atahualpa was a sign of 
their invincibility and almost divinity (Stern 1993, 27).
Pizarro marched towards Cuzco and crowned Tupac Hualpa, the younger 
brother of Huáscar, as the new Inca ruler, but he died shortly thereafter, most 
likely of small pox. Pizarro then installed the young Manco Inca, another 
son of Huayna Cápac, as puppet emperor. The Spaniards entered Cuzco on 
November 15, 1533, facing little resistance. Jubilant at their accomplish-
ment, they marveled at the city’s architectural splendors, all the time sacking 
and looting one of the great cities of the world (Hemming 1970, 132).
Humiliated by his insolent treatment and angered by the injustices the 
Spaniards committed against the population, Manco Inca turned against 
them. Having escaped from captivity, he assembled an army of 100,000 
men to attack Cuzco. Manco Inca and his forces reached Cuzco, showering 
the Spaniards with bows and arrows. Pizarro with his two brothers and 200 
others fought back against the 2,000 Incas, finding themselves outnumbered 
by a determined enemy. The Spaniards believed that they would perish, but 
at that very moment of their plight, Garcilaso writes, “our Lord was pleased 
to favor his Faithful with the presence of the blessed apostle St. James, the 
patron of Spain.” The Incas were terrified at the appearance of this knight 
who turned towards them, making them flee. And when the Incas attacked 
the Spaniards on the other side, he rushed to their defense. The Spaniards 
fought on, killing scores of Incas (II, 802).
Unrepentant Manco Inca struck again. On the night of the attack, his 
followers arrived with their weapons ready. But as they were about to fall 
upon the Spaniards, another miracle appeared, this time the Virgin Mary 
herself, holding Jesus in her arms. “When the infidels beheld this marvel 
they were astonished. They felt a dust fall into their eyes” which prevented 
them from seeing. So they retreated (II, 803). Although Manco was routed, 
he organized a second revolt in 1538. Insurrections spread more widely a 
year later in wide swaths of Peru and Bolivia, but they were all crushed with 
savagery. “No one could say that they Inca empire went down without a 
struggle” (Hemming 1970, 255).
That the Inca state was subdued does not mean that Andean culture was 
assimilated into Spanish colonial society. Defeat did not spell obliteration. 
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What took place is a syncretism of local and Christian practices that gave rise 
to a creole fusion, different from both aboriginal and Spanish cultures. Native 
peoples survived and adapted to colonial conditions (Adorno 2008, 37).
Constantinople
A number of contemporaneous accounts by Greeks and foreigners describe the 
siege of Constantinople on May 29, 1453. I will refer to three Greek histori-
ans, Kritovoulos (1410–1470), Michael Dukas (1400–c1462), and Laonikos 
Chalkokondyles (1430–1470). Kritovoulos wrote one of the most vivid and 
accurate descriptions in his biography of Mehmed the Conqueror (1432–
1481), which he translated into Turkish. Though not present at the siege, 
Kritovoulos visited the city afterward and witnessed the devastation and spoke 
to survivors. Eventually, he came into the service of Mehmed (1432–1481) as 
governor of the island of Imbros. While mourning the loss of Constantinople, 
Kritovoulos wrote favorably about the Sultan’s accomplishments, finding him 
in “no way inferior to Alexander.” Indeed, he dedicated the tome to Mehmed, 
“by the will of God, Kritovoulos, servant of servants” (Kritovoulos 1954, 3).
Like Kritovoulos, Laonikos Chalkokondyles placed the sack of 
Constantinople in the wider context of Ottoman expansion, though 
he treated the siege incidentally rather than as the climactic event of the 
Byzantine Empire.8 By taking this perspective, he became the first Christian 
author to describe Islam as a living culture and view Muslims on their own 
terms rather than as a theological error (Kaldellis 2014, 101). His history 
is a fusion of Herodotus’s ethnographic openness and Thucydides’ severe 
style. But whereas Herodotus dealt with the victory of the Greeks over Asia, 
Chalkokondyles covered the victory of Asia over Greece (25). Having been 
given a copy of Herodotus’ Persian Wars by his teacher Plethon (1355–
1452), Chalkokondyles wrote “what he imagined Herodotus would have 
written about Islam” (Kaldellis 2014, 102). It is remarkable that a Greek/
Christian author could be capable of such empathic thinking, that is, to see 
the world from someone else’s perspective.
He began in the declarative Thucydidean manner: “Laonikos, the 
Athenian, has written here, in the form of a history, the events that come to 
his attention during his lifetime, both those that he witnessed and those he 
heard about” (Chalkokondyles I 2014, 3). But he narrated his history from 
a Turkish vantage-point, using Turkish textual and oral sources, intending 
to write about the fall of the Greeks and the rise of the Turks to a great 
power, “greater than that of any other powerful people to date” (3).
Kritovoulos too started in a grand mode: “Kritovoulos the Islander origi-
nally of the inhabitants of Imbros, wrote this history in the belief that events 
so great and wonderful […] should not remain unrecorded” (9). At the same 
time, he feared that his Greek readers might condemn him for celebrating 
the accomplishments of their Turkish oppressor rather than grieving their 
enslavement (12).
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Turning specifically to the siege, Kritovoulos described the apprehension 
in Constantinople, with the residents marveling at the fort Mehmed was 
constructing on the European side of the Bosporus as well as at his army of 
400,000 men. Days before the sack of May 29, 1453, a range of inexplica-
ble events took place, such as earthquakes and irregular movement of stars. 
The last Byzantines were facing their impending doom.
Unlike the Incas, however, the Byzantines had known of the Ottomans 
for centuries, as they had been losing increasing territory to their Muslim 
foe. There was neither semiotic nor technological imbalance as in the case 
of the Incas and Spaniards. There was tactical disadvantage, however, with 
Byzantine defenses weakened and finances dwindling. The Byzantines could 
no longer pay their Hungarian master cannon-maker, who crossed over to 
the Turks. The sight of a huge cannon being transported in January 1453 
by 30 wagons towards the city terrified its residents. And in March, the 
forces appeared before the gates (Michael Dukas in Melville Jones 1971, 
71, 77). On April 5, Mehmed began to attack the city’s walls with cannons. 
Eventually, he ordered that the artillery be brought in front of the Middle 
Wall and fired (Kritovoulos 1954, 46). At one point, the section of the wall 
with the tower in the middle collapsed, and the tower by the gate of Saint 
Romanus tumbled to the ground, “so that the besiegers and the besieged 
were left looking at each other (Dukas in Melville Jones 1971, 88).
Although the residents repaired the walls, they became despondent at 
apparitions of doom: “divine signs and portents of the terrors that were 
very soon to come to the city.” In order to seek God’s favor, they organized 
a procession on the city’s ramparts, with the “Icon of the Mother of God.” 
But suddenly the icon slipped from the hands of its bearers. “And when eve-
rybody shouted immediately, and rushed to raise up the icon, it sank down 
as if weighted with lead” (Kritovoulos 1954, 58). The next day a dense 
fog descended, which faithful took to mean the departure of the “Divine 
Presence,” leaving the city “in total abandonment and desertion” (59).
Meanwhile, outside the walls, Mehmed spoke to his men about the opu-
lent prize they were about to capture (Kritovoulos 1954, 60). He prom-
ised them the opportunity to pillage the city uninterruptedly for three days 
and enumerated what they could take as booty—women, girls, and boys. 
He then had fires lit outside the walls. “The light of the fires shone more 
brightly than the sun through the city […] the surface of the water glittered” 
(Dukas in Melville Jones 1971, 93).
On May 29, Mehmed ordered the trumpets, flutes, and cymbals to sound 
for battle. The final assault began. “What happened then was what usu-
ally happens in such upheavals; as each person tries to save himself with 
no discipline or order.” As the Janissaries rushed through the city, plun-
dering and slaughtering, some Greeks tried to save themselves by running 
into the Hagia Sophia, the largest building to survive from classical antiq-
uity. “The city was full of slayers and the slain, pursuers and the pursued” 
(Chalkokondyles 2014, 195, 197).
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With more emotional language, Kritovoulos lamented how “hapless 
Romans were destined finally to be brought under the yoke of servitude 
and to suffer its horrors”9 (70). He described the bravery of the Byzantines, 
who were heroes in battle. But their valor went to naught. Once the walls 
were breached, the Turks stormed the city. “A great slaughter occurred” as 
the troops rushed through the streets, “stealing robbing, plundering, killing, 
insulting, taking and enslaving men, women, and children” (72). Tursun 
Beg, the secretary to Mehmed and an eyewitness, said that every Turkish 
“tent was filled with handsome boys and beautiful girls.” Each soldier pil-
laged so rapaciously that “many were delivered from poverty and made 
rich” (1978, 37).
“And the desecrating and plundering and robbing of the churches,” 
Kritovoulos asks, “how can one describe it in words” (73)? He depicts the 
burning of holy books, trampling of relics, and the overturning of the altars 
from the foundations. The entry into Hagia Sophia proved difficult to com-
prehend. Dukas could not find the right words to express his horror at the 
desecration of the Holy Altar. “My tongue cleaves to my throat.” Yet he 
described how the “savages began directly to break up the sacred images, 
stripping them of their decorations and ornaments, and tearing the furnish-
ings from the Holy Table” (in Melville Jones 1971, 99).
When Mehmed finally entered the city after the three days of plunder, he 
was moved: “What a city we have given over to plunder and destruction” 
(76). Kritovoulos himself was affected deeply by the devastation, calling it a 
great blow, “a disaster the like of which had occurred in no one of the great 
renowned cities of history,” such as Troy, Carthage, Rome, and Jerusalem 
(72). He personally lamented the loss of the imperial capital, “its goods sum-
marily disappeared, and it was deprived of all things: wealth, glory, rule, 
splendor, honor, brilliance, of population, valor, education, wisdom, religious 
orders, dominion—in short, of all” (80). Even Chalkokondyles in his dry, 
restrained mode, characterized the end of the Byzantines as a tragedy.
That, then, is what happened regarding the Greeks of Byzantium. Their 
calamity seems to be the greatest that ever took place throughout the 
world in its excess, suffering, similar to the fall of Troy: in fact, whole-
sale destruction was the penalty that the Greek suffered at the hands of 
barbarians for what they did to Troy.
(207)
Dukas compared the arrival of Mehmed at Constantinople to that of 
Nebuchadnezzar at the gates of Jerusalem and ended his account by citing 
Jeremiah’s lament for his city (in Melville Jones 1971, 80, 106).
One of those Greeks who witnessed the capture and who suffered 
the consequences was George Sphrantzes (1401–1478), a courtier in the 
Byzantine palace and later historian. He did not provide details about the 
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siege other than to say that 4,773 Greek defended the city, along with 200 
foreigners. But he was taken prisoner and “suffered the evils of wretched 
slavery. Finally, I was ransomed September 1, 6962 (1453) and departed 
for Mistra” (1980, 70). His wife and children, however, passed into the 
hands of elderly Turks who did not treat them badly, but the Sultan found 
out about his children’s beauty and bought them for himself. At the end, the 
Sultan executed his son and confined his daughter to a harem (12).
Mexico City and Cuzco suffered similar fates. Yet we don’t have descrip-
tions of these events through the eyes of the defeated, as we do in Kritovoulos 
and Dukas. Las Casas, for his part, spared no details of bloodied corpses, 
the burning alive of frightened peasants, of babies smashed on the ground. 
Garcilaso, despite his superior literary prowess, never described the horror 
his family must have felt as the Spaniards desecrated the Temple of the Sun. 
Dukas, on the other hand, tried to place us in the shoes of the Greeks: “Let 
us consider the state of mind of the defenders who were thinking of ways of 
keeping their city [out] of the hands of Nebuchadnezzar” (in Melville Jones 
1971, 73).
The Muslim conquest
Strange as this may seem, many Byzantines preferred Ottoman to Catholic 
occupation, believing paradoxically that they could preserve their faith 
under Muslim rule better than under their co-religionists. Fearful of Catholic 
proselytization, many accepted the impending doom as a lesser of two evils. 
When Gennadius (c1400–c1473), the philosopher and theologian who 
would later be invested by Mehmed as Patriarch of Constantinople, saw 
the Ottoman troops storm the walls, he said that he preferred the Turkish 
turban ruling the city over a cardinal’s hat. Although originally in support 
of the union with Rome, Gennadius turned against it when he got back to 
Constantinople. Disappointed at the lack of military assistance from their 
co-religionists, he said, “miserable Greeks who trust the strength of the 
Franks.” Others around him shouted: “We need neither aid nor Union from 
the Latins” (Dukas in Melville Jones 1971, 81, 74).
This position might seem irrational. But the Byzantines remembered the 
Latin sack of Constantinople in 1204, an event that sapped its defenses and 
set up a period of political decline. Although the Byzantine Empire regained 
its power, it became a weakened and poorer state. By the thirteenth cen-
tury, its authority in the Aegean Sea had ceded to Venice on the western 
shores and Genoa on the east, with the Latins having appropriated not only 
these territories but also commerce (Inalcik 1994, 271–272). So, when the 
Ottomans had arrived in Thessaly in the fourteenth century, they found a 
territory devastated by foreign invasions, civil wars, and black death. By 
1453 the Byzantine Empire, impoverished, powerless, and underpopulated, 
had been reduced to the City itself (Greene 2015, 2, 22).
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Yet upon the capture of the City, Mehmed chose it as his new capi-
tal, repopulating it with Muslims, Christians, and Jews. He repaired the 
walls and constructed new fortresses. Kritovoulos says that he showed 
great benevolence and pity to the Byzantine prisoners (Kritovoulos 
1954, 95). Although he executed many Byzantine nobles, he incorpo-
rated others who had converted to Islam into his administration. Within 
a short period of time Greeks gained positions of privilege and influence. 
Indeed, the prominence of Byzantine families like the Kantekouzenoi and 
Paleologoi caused resentment among Muslims of the city (Greene 2015, 
22, 25). By 1477 the Greek Orthodox percentage of the population had 
reached 25 percent.
In order to stabilize the Orthodox population and continue the Ottoman 
practice of organizing the population in millets (self-governing religious 
communities), Mehmed appointed Gennadius Patriarch of Constantinople, 
granting him complete authority over his flock. Among the privileges he 
conferred upon him were the right to collect taxes from his community, to 
appoint hierarchs, authority of family law, and control over church prop-
erty (Greene 2015, 29).
After the shock of conquest, the Greek population increased in the coun-
tryside. In central Greece, for instance, it quadrupled between the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries despite the conversions taking place during this time 
(Greene 2015, 7). To be sure, elite families were absorbed, thus disappear-
ing as a separate ethno-religious group. Sometimes conversions occurred 
on a large scale, as peasants seeking economic security and advancement 
turned to Islam during the sixteenth century (Greene 2015, 73).
In contrast to the indigenous peoples in the Americas, the Greeks under 
Ottoman rule were able to preserve their religious institutions and cultural 
identity as Greeks, separate from their Muslim overlords. The attachment 
to Greek language and to Hellenism was strong among a sizable number of 
Byzantines and was only strengthened under Ottoman rule (Greene 2015, 49). 
Although cultural interchange occurred between the two ethno-religious 
groups over the centuries, the resulting society was not the creole fusion of 
Spanish and indigenous elements. There remained after the four centuries 
of Ottoman rule a society sufficiently distinct in language and culture from 
the Muslim polity.
The Greek War of Independence of 1821 was called partly in the name 
of this national uniqueness. Of course, nationality did not exist at the end 
of the eighteenth century either in Greece or elsewhere. But the Greek elites 
were able to rouse peasants to revolt by exploiting their economic and polit-
ical grievances and their sense of ethnic and religious difference. Decades 
earlier, these intellectuals were able to delineate the boundaries of a distinc-
tive culture in terms of language, history, religion, and the classical past. As 
a result, the Greek War of Independence was a national struggle for self-
rule, the first to be fought against a foreign foe.
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Points of comparison
 1. The Inca Garcilaso had to legitimate himself as an Amerindian author 
before Spanish readers and to demonstrate the efficacy and integrity of 
Inca culture. The Greek authors, on the other hand, conscious of their 
place in the grand Hellenic tradition going back to Herodotus, did not 
have to prove that they were human, Christian, or capable of organizing 
a great civilization. Moreover, they composed in their native language, 
with Kritovoulos translating his text into Turkish. They didn’t consider 
themselves culturally disenfranchised by their Ottoman enemies and 
indeed may have felt superior to them. By writing their histories, they 
were in fact granting legitimacy to their Ottoman rulers, incorporating 
them into Greek historiography.
 2. While Garcilaso had to strain to include Inca culture in the course of 
world history, the place of the Greeks was never in question. Indeed, 
Kritovoulos and Chalkokondyles were both confidently aware of the 
long tradition of Hellenism, Greek historiography, and Orthodox 
Christianity. When they compared the sack of Constantinople with the 
siege of Rome, they effortlessly placed the assault in the context of 
world history. Garcilaso’s comparisons decontextualized Inca history. 
When he said that Cuzco was a new Rome, he sought to grant to the 
Incas historical gravity and civilizational authority.
 3. Feeling torn between his two national patrimonies, Garcilaso claimed 
that Spaniards and Incas mutually misinterpreted each other. The Greek 
historians made no such arguments. On the contrary, the Byzantines 
and Ottomans had been part of each other’s world for centuries, aware 
of each other’s presence.
The Incas, on the other hand, had no way of identifying the origins 
of the Spaniards nor understanding their intentions, their language, 
world view, or technology.
From their perspective, their encounter with the Spaniards was 
an astonishing event. Out of nowhere they witnessed men who had 
beards, wore strange clothes, rode large, unknown animals, mastered 
thunderbolts, and communicated through white cloth. Originally the 
Incas perceived the appearance of the Spaniards as the return of their 
own gods (Wachtel 1977, 16, 21).
 4. The Incas and Byzantines observed omens of impending doom—earth-
quakes, unnatural movement of stars—and understood national trag-
edy as a product of divine intervention. In Garcilaso and Kritovoulos, 
Christian saints either abandoned or aided Christian combatants. In both 
cases, the loss of Constantinople and of Cuzco were interpreted by the 
Christians as acts of divine will, punishment of the Orthodox for their 
errant ways and of the Incas for their idolatry.
 5. Garcilaso was motivated to write his history in part to preserve the mem-
ory of Inca culture. For the Incas, the murder of the Inca king meant the 
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death of the son of god. The gods were robbed of their power, and the 
new priests showed the old religion to be meaningless (Wachtel 1977, 
26, 30). Kritovoulos and Chalkokondyles felt little sense of loss nor the 
need to save an endangered society.
 6. While we have accounts of the Greeks as victims of imperial violence, 
Garcilaso does not place us in the shoes of Incas observing the desecra-
tion of their temples. He was always torn between his indigenous, Inca 
loyalties and his conviction of Christianity as a true religion, never being 
able to reconcile these warring sides of his soul. Neither Kritovoulos nor 
Chalkokondyles shared such dilemmas, nor had they converted to Islam.
 7. We have ultimately a different sense of empire. Of course, it is impossible 
to make definitive distinctions. Generally, we can say that an empire is “a 
large composite and differentiated polity linked to a central power by a 
variety of direct and indirect relations, where the center exercises politi-
cal control through hierarchical and quasi-monopolistic relations over 
groups ethnically different from itself” (Barkey 2008, 9). The Ottoman 
Empire represented the sprawling, multi-ethnic polities of antiquity and 
the medieval period, whereas the Spanish Empire pointed to a new sys-
tem, linked to capitalist modes of production and the concept of race.
The modern definition of empire as a “relationship of domination 
and subordination between one polity (metropole) and one or more 
territories (colonies) that lie outside of its boundaries yet claimed as its 
legal procession” (Abernethy 2000, 19) does not completely apply to the 
Ottoman or Holy Roman Empires. Nor did these empires make a clear 
distinction between core and periphery populations and core and periph-
ery elites. The Ottoman Empire consisted of multiple, overlapping forms 
of control, such as the millet system, the Ottoman bureaucracy, and the 
administration, which gave rise to varied forms of identity (Barkey 1997, 
105). It managed its multiethnic diversity through cooption of elites, 
indirect system of rule, and through a policy of toleration which should 
not be celebrated as an early example of liberal multiculturalism since the 
Empire strived for neither equality nor democracy.
Modern empires, then, pursue domination. Unwilling to make cultural 
concessions to its colonies, they expect subject peoples to acculturate. 
Quite often they have a missionary zeal, either to civilize or proselytize 
(Osterhammel 1996, 4, 15). The Ottoman Empire, by contrast, did not 
regard its colonies as territorially distinct. We can’t really speak of colo-
nies per se. When Greeks formed their state in 1832, most of the Greek 
population was in the Ottoman Empire, and even by 1922 a sizable por-
tion remained in Asia Minor. The Empire benefited from control over its 
territories, but this occupation was too loose to be described as colonial 
(Türesay xvii).
Moreover, it had few ambitions beyond the Mediterranean. When 
the English and French arrived in the area, however, they connected 
it to wider world of commercial exchange (Greene 2009, 4–5). Their 
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empires, like Spain’s settlements in the new world, required advanced 
systems of bureaucratic organization on a grand scale for which there 
was no medieval precedent (Osterhammel 1996, 29). They extracted 
resources and maintained civilizational differences between metropolis 
and native peoples.
 8. While Ottomans wrecked many buildings, they spared the most sub-
lime, the Hagia Sophia, converting it into a mosque. The Parthenon, 
having been used as a church during the Byzantine period, functioned 
as mosque with the arrival of the Turks. The Spaniards, on the other 
hand, systematically destroyed the monumental structures of Mexico 
City and Cuzco, leaving only foundations upon which they built their 
own edifices. Few Amerindian cities survived the Spanish conquest 
intact (Lavrin 2008, 288).
 9. In his rebuilding of Istanbul, Mehmed favored the Greeks. After the 
conquest, Greeks became a dominant economic force in the commer-
cial life of the empire. Istanbul had a sizable Greek population with rich 
Greek financiers who had amassed huge fortunes. In time, the Greeks 
were the prevailing ethnic group in Ottoman foreign policy, serving as 
interpreters and higher officials (Inalcik 1994, 209).
 10. The Ottomans had no concept of race in the modern sense (Türesay 
xvii). Conquered peoples could hold high positions within the 
Ottoman administration. In contrast, the Europeans subjected a con-
cept of race upon the captured populations of the Americas, mak-
ing firm distinction between whites, the indigenous peoples, and the 
enslaved Africans.
 11. In both Greek and Latin American folk traditions, the defeat led to 
new national myths of rebirth and rebellion. The Incas experienced the 
Spanish conquest as a cataclysmic event. The execution of Atahualpa, 
for instance, became the subject of poems, dances, and places, and to 
this day “The Death of Atahualpa” is performed in Peru and Bolivia 
(Wachtel 1977, 33). After initial setbacks, Incas rebelled, first in insur-
rections led by Manco Inca and decades later by Túpac Amaru.
In the Greek case, the death of the Emperor Constantine resulted 
in his becoming a popular figure in Greek folklore, an emblem of 
enslaved Greeks and avenger who would return and reclaim the 
empire. This myth attached itself to Mediterranean notions of death 
and resurrection and blossomed into nationalist aspirations of restor-
ing lost dreams of empire (Phillipides and Hanak 2011, 214). The 
recapture of Constantinople remained a constant theme in popular 
and learned discourse, and prophecies of retaking the city exercised a 
powerful influence on people, especially after the eighteenth century 
(Herzfeld 1982, 129).
 12. While Garcilaso claimed that Incas prepared way for Christianity, Greeks 
felt that Ottomans were sent to protect Christianity from Catholics. 
Christianity proved intolerant in South America. Early explorers 
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expressed revulsion at the worship of idols and demanded their destruc-
tion. Priests marched hand in hand with the conquistadors. After the 
Reconquista of Spain from the Moors, Spaniards were convinced they 
were the vanguard of the chosen, called by God to conquer and convert 
infidels (Castro 2007, 20).
The Ottoman Empire was, of course, Islamic, and promoted con-
version. And large swathes of the population in Anatolia, on Crete, 
and certain parts of the Balkans assimilated to Islam. But there seems 
to be agreement that this process was gradual and the result of weak-
ening Christian institutions; the desire of Christian elites for social 
prestige, advancement, and political advantage; and due to the need 
of many peasants to avoid the onerous taxation imposed on non-Mus-
lims (Barkey 2008, 85; Greene 2009, 40). Moreover, the Ottomans 
imposed the practice of Devshirme, the levying of Christian boys who 
were taken into Muslim families, raised as Muslims, and often directed 
to the Janissary forces. It has been disputed whether boys were taken 
by force or voluntarily given by parents seeking social and economic 
benefits. While the issue will never be settled, it seems that it involved 
a combination of both. By the time the practice was abolished in 
1695, approximately 200,000 boys had been converted in this manner 
(Barkey 2008, 123–124).
 13. Conquistadors were attracted to the Americas by dreams of unparal-
leled riches which would enable their social advancement in America 
and Spain (Stern xxvii). Fortunes made in the New World could be 
shipped home to buy titles and land (Spalding 1984, 113). They 
came with religious zeal and an even greater lust for gold and silver. 
The Ottomans, of course, strove to extend their empire, collect trib-
ute, and to loot cities not willing to submit to their authority of the 
Sultan. But they had not developed a systematic system of extracting 
resources from the conquered territories. The Spaniards, on the other 
hand, pointed the way for the system of colonialism that would define 
world relations.
In order to understand this difference between medieval and modern 
empires, let us compare the mining of silver. In the six centuries between 
1250 BCE and 350 CE, 40,000 to 50,000 tons of silver had been mined in 
the Mediterranean world. By contrast, Peru’s mines produced 40,000 tons 
in one-third of the time. This unparalleled sum was made possible by rich 
mines but primarily by the exploitative system employed by the Spaniards to 
unearth this valuable resource (Stein and Stein 2000, 21, 27).
So, to return to the initial probe of the paper, perhaps we should reformu-
late the question of Greece’s postcoloniality. Instead of wondering whether 
Greece can be compared to traditional postcolonial nations, we should 
ask what we could gain from such a comparison. For by expanding the 
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boundaries of empire, we are in a sense broadening the scope of possible 
inquiry. If comparison between self and other lay at the heart of the colonial 
project from the initial arrival of Europeans in the Americas, comparison as 
a scholarly methodology continues to inform postcolonial writing.
I have argued that we should rethink comparison, moving beyond the 
center/periphery, north/south, east/west axes so central to thinking on 
empire. We have much to gain by going from Manila to Montevideo with-
out having to pass through Madrid or Miami. Indeed, it would be valuable 
and liberating to connect Cuzco and Constantinople analytically, even if not 
a single person had actually traveled between these two cities directly.
Notes
1 As a corrective, see Gören Therborn’s Cities of Power: The Urban, the National, 
the Popular, the Global (2017). Although it offers a breezy, roller coaster ride 
through the urban history, it examines the city as a nexus of national, global, and 
local forces without privileging any particular region.
2 For my own response to Achebe, see http://arcade.stanford.edu/blogs/
looking-africa-looking-ourselves.
3 Part one dealing with history of Incas was published in Lisbon and part two deal-
ing with conquest appeared posthumously in Cordoba in 1616–1617.
4 He was often praised for his beautiful Spanish, people being amazed that an 
Indian could write so elegantly.
5 Spain banned the enslavement of native peoples in the Americas in 1592 but the 
law was unenforced. Andrés Reséndez estimates that 2.5–5 million aboriginal 
peoples had been enslaved on the entire continent between 1492 and the nine-
teenth century.
6 Monika Albrecht discusses a literary reconstruction of this encounter between 
Cortés and Montezuma, a travelogue, “Orchideen und Aasgeier,” by the Swiss 
writer, Max Frisch. In this fictional recreation, Frisch has Cortés reconsider why 
he would attack such a developed civilization with majestic architecture. Frisch 
concludes that it’s greed for gold. He concludes that it was not just superior 
semiotic knowledge of the Other that enabled the conquest but superior arms 
and this lust for riches. (Frisch 1976, 208. Albrecht 2008, 168).
7 See Hemming 1970 for a summary of the events leading to the capture of the king.
8 He began writing his Histories in the 1450s and finished them a decade later.
9 He refers to the Byzantines as Romans because the Byzantines saw themselves as 
heirs of the Roman Empire.
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Despite the prominent role of scholars from India and the Arabic world 
in anglophone postcolonial theory, postcolonial research in modern lan-
guages has often focused on transatlantic connectivities and the relationship 
of individual overseas countries with individual European states and North 
America. The synergies between postcolonial studies and slavery studies, as 
reflected prominently in the concept of the “Black Atlantic” (Gilroy 1993), 
have tended to reinforce this selective approach to the global history of 
colonialisms and their legacies. International historical research and some 
strands of literature in various languages, however, have recently acceler-
ated the exploration of the equally dynamic historical connectivities across 
the Indian Ocean—before, throughout, and after the age of European impe-
rialism—which underlines the significance of South-South relations. Since 
the days of Egyptian antiquity, and thanks to mastery of the Monsoon 
winds, East Africa, the Arabic world, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, and 
to some extent China have been linked through a history of trade— ranging 
from natural produce to gold, ivory, and slaves—as well as the move-
ment of people, cultural practices, ideas, and religions. These connections 
led to some of the oldest diasporas in human history and to cosmopolitan 
cultural exchange, in particular between legendary harbor towns such as 
Zanzibar, Kilwa, Mombasa, Mascat, Bombay, Goa, Calicut, and Canton 
(Guangzhou) (see Karugia 2017; Schulze-Engler 2014). Recent research has 
rectified the colonial narrative of European superiority by showing that—
well into the eighteenth century and, locally, such as in the case of Zanzibar 
and Madagascar, into the late nineteenth century—the Portuguese, French, 
British, Dutch, and German ventures of the early modern period merely 
added new competitors to a well-established Indian Ocean infrastructure. 
Only in the course of the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did politi-
cal crises in India and the imperial turn of European colonialism rewrite the 
political map of the Indian Ocean. But even at this stage, European colonial 
occupation and exploitation continued to build on the established infra-
structure of the Indian Ocean universe (see Hawley 2008a; Alpers 2014; 
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Pearson 2015; for Zanzibar and Madagascar see Campbell 2005; Nicolini 
2012). The use of existing Arab-Swahili caravan routes, including relevant 
expertise and labor, by European colonial pioneers such as Richard Burton, 
Henry Morton Stanley, or Oscar Baumann, and later also by the German 
and British military and administration, are a prominent case in point. As is 
the fact that British East Africa and British relations with Zanzibar, in the 
nineteenth century the hub of a trading network stretching into the African 
interior and all the way to the Congo, were administrated from British 
India, building on the long-established role of Indians in the commerce, 
administration, and finance of the Arab-Swahili economy (see Mangat 
2012, 1–63). At the same time, there is an older history of African immi-
gration to Western India and Sri Lanka, which accelerated with the spread 
of Islam (see Oka and Kusimba 2008, 208–209) and is still reflected today 
in the distinct culture of the so-called “Sidi,” the descendants of African 
slaves in India, and other African diasporic communities that have recently 
attracted postcolonial attention.1
Both anglophone world literature and contemporary German literature 
engage with this multi-layered history of the Indian Ocean universe, often 
combining the postcolonial memory and critique of European imperialism 
with the validation of Indian Ocean history and its cosmopolitanisms. This 
case study focuses on four authors and novels which combine the literary 
representation of Indian Ocean connectivities with the critical memory of 
German colonialism in today’s Tanzania: Abdulrazak Gurnah’s Paradise 
(1994), Ilija Trojanow’s Der Weltensammler (The Collector of Worlds, 
2006), Hans Christoph Buch’s Sansibar Blues (2008), and M.G. Vassanji’s 
The Magic of Saida (2012). Gurnah (*1948) and Vassanji (*1950) both 
come from the Indian diaspora in East Africa but moved to the UK and 
Canada respectively; Bulgarian-born German author Trojanow (*1965) 
has lived in Kenya, India, and South Africa, amongst others, before more 
recently moving from Germany to Austria; Buch (*1944) is a well-traveled 
German pioneer of the “postcolonial gaze” (Lützeler 1997), with particular 
experience of the Caribbean and Africa. All four authors thus share cosmo-
politan experiences reflected in their novels, and their narratives all work 
with advanced postcolonial poetics. Their Afrasian prisms of postcolonial 
memory are both similar and different in the way they portray the experi-
ence of German colonialism in East Africa and they all encourage re-con-
ceptualizations of postcolonial critique from an Indian Ocean perspective.
My case study therefore combines two objectives: On the one hand, 
it aims to promote comparative postcolonial literary studies, placing the 
rediscovery of colonialism in contemporary German literature (see Göttsche 
2013) in context, reading prominent sources in conjunction with anglo-
phone novels on the same theme. On the other hand, it asks how the novels’ 
critical rereading of German and European colonialism from the perspec-
tive of Indian Ocean narratives relates to recent criticism of established 
postcolonial theory by scholars working on the Indian Ocean as a space 
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of Afrasian interactions. John C. Hawley, for example, has suggested “that 
the Indian Ocean world offers a philosophical challenge to the hegemony of 
Western modernity” (Hawley 2008b, 5); he sees the history of interaction 
between Africa and India, in particular, as an example of “mutual exchange 
on economic and cultural levels that continues to run parallel to the cur-
rent dominance of the West” (Hawley 2008b, 10), opening up “alterna-
tive universalisms” and “the notion of a globalization from below (from 
the global south, in one imaginary, from subalterns, in another)” (ibid., 8). 
Comparing conditions across the Black Atlantic with those across the 
Indian Ocean, Isabel Hofmeyr, South African scholar of African literature, 
has taken this line of inquiry one step further, reading the Indian Ocean as 
a “complicating sea” and “a method” that questions “our ideas of colonial 
and postcolonial histories, which tend to be turned into binary stories of 
colonizer versus colonized, white versus black” (Hofmeyr 2012, 584, 587; 
also see Hofmeyr 2007), an approach unsuited for the multi-layered condi-
tions of Afrasian interaction. In addition, she argues, “[t]he Indian Ocean 
[also] requires us to take a much longer perspective” than one focused 
on the period of European colonialism and subsequent decolonization; 
it necessitates “a revision of older ways of thinking about diaspora” and 
warns against “the pitfalls of both anticolonial and colonial approaches” 
(Hofmeyr 2012, 589, 587). Critical self-reflection has noted the dangers of 
“Indocentrism” and “romanticising Indian-African interactions” (Schulze-
Engler 2014, 160) in cosmopolitan conceptualizations of the Indian Ocean 
universe. Gaurav Desai has suggested more cautiously that “Indian Ocean 
exchanges and African-Asian interactions […] alert us both to the possi-
bilities of interracial and interethnic collaborations as well as the potential 
derailment of such alliances” (Desai 2013, 25). Beginning, like others in the 
field, with Amitav Ghosh’s travel narrative, In an Antique Land (1992), 
and concluding with Vassanji’s first novel, The Gunny Sack (1989), Desai 
sees such postcolonial literature negotiate “the pressing competing claims of 
indigeneity and diaspora, of secularism and religious belief, of hybridities 
and discourses of purity, of ethnic identities and political goals, and of (neo)
liberal democracies and socialist aspirations” (Desai 2013, 25). It is along 
the lines of tensions such as these that the novels analyzed here remember 
East African experiences of (German) colonialism in the context of deeper 
Indian Ocean history.
Abdulrazak Gurnah’s Paradise: Reconstructing the Swahili 
universe in the heyday of European imperialism
Abdulrazak Gurnah’s acclaimed novel Paradise (1994) is at one level a post-
colonial Bildungsroman of its young protagonist, the Swahili boy Yusuf 
from the East African interior, who is “pawned” at the age of 12 to a rich 
Arab merchant from one of the coastal trading centers “to secure his father’s 
debt to the merchant” (Gurnah 2004, 47). Employed in the merchant Aziz’s 
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town shop as assistant to the shop manager, an older Arabic youth who 
also works off his father’s debt and acts as his mentor, Yusuf is then taken 
to one of Aziz’s business partners in the African interior for a year before 
being asked to join a second, much larger trading mission to the Western 
shore of Lake Tanganyika, which ends in life-threatening failure. Back with 
his mentor Khalil in the town shop, he undergoes a dangerous ‘éducation 
sentimentale’ with Aziz’s wife and her slave-like servant, Khalil’s adopted 
sister, before refusing the merchant’s offer to become his personal assistant 
and supposedly joining the German askari soldiers instead, the emblems 
of colonial imperialism. Moving beyond older interpretations that saw 
Yusuf’s final move as a desperate “trading [of] one form of subservience 
for another” (Jacobs 2009, 87), Nina Berman makes a convincing case for 
reading Yusuf’s break with the system of bondage in which he grew up as a 
self-emancipatory choice in line with many other Africans at the time who 
saw collaboration with the Germans as an opportunity, even if in hind-
sight this does not seem like a politically or historically wise form of agency 
(Berman 2013).
At a second level, the novel uses the teenager’s introduction into the 
Swahili universe for the historical account of a decisive turning point in 
East African history in the early twentieth century, the heyday of European 
imperialism: the decline of the nineteenth-century Swahili-Arabic trading 
system and its Indian Ocean infrastructure under the influence of European 
imperialism, which requires local Africans, Arabs, and Indians to reposi-
tion themselves in a regional economy now operating in a global context. 
Yusuf’s coming of age as he leaves the merchant Aziz and his world coin-
cides with the outbreak of the Great War, and readers know that the down-
fall of German imperialism will lead to British rule rather than a return to 
pre-colonial conditions. At a third level, the novel is a postcolonial response 
to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899), unfolding a rich tapestry of 
intertextual references that includes the Quran, the Bible, and Swahili litera-
ture of the colonial period, amongst others (see Mustafa 2015a and 2015b).
One of the most intriguing features of Paradise as a historical novel is the 
fact that the German presence, and indeed Germans and other Europeans, 
are largely absent from the narrative (see Berman 2013, 54), and yet the irre-
versible transformation of the Swahili world under the impact of European 
imperialism is a major theme. There are two occasions where German offic-
ers and their askari troops intervene forcefully in the story: at the critical 
point when Aziz’s trading caravan has been taken captive, brutally attacked 
and plundered by a defiant chief in the African interior who rebels both 
against the slave trade and German rule before being forced to release his 
captives by a superior German army contingent; and at the end, when a 
German officer, marching into the coastal town with his askari, is cast as a 
specter of living death with “the face of a cadaver” behind a “smile” that is 
“a fixed grimace of deformity,” anticipating the violence of World War I in 
its “ugliness” and “cruelty” (Gurnah 2004, 245). This episode is indicative 
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of the representation of the Germans throughout the novel as particularly 
brutal in the way they implement what is seen as European “ferocity and 
ruthlessness” (72): They are “afraid of nothing” (79), merciless (76) and 
delight in inflicting “punishment” (115).
Although those involved in the East African trade network make some 
distinctions between the “Mdachi” (the Germans; Gurnah 2004, 176) and 
other European nations—e.g. preferring the Germans and the English to 
the Belgians (91)—, it is noteworthy that the characters typically speak 
of Europeans as a whole. This is clearly part of the novel’s postcolonial 
critique of European imperialism (rather than comparing individual sys-
tems of colonial rule). For example, the characters note that the Europeans 
“take the best land without paying,” impose taxes and forced labor, and 
“build […] a lock-up” first, “then a church, then a market-shed” to impose 
their system of violent rule and exploitation (72). One of the Arab-Swahili 
shopkeepers in the African interior, originally from Zanzibar, notes that 
“[t]hese Europeans are very determined, […] they will crush all of us,” since 
“[t]hey want the whole world” (86–87). Gurnah uses this trader to insert 
later debates about decolonization into the novel when he criticizes European 
racism (“In their eyes we’re animals,” 87) and anticipates that Africans and 
Arabs will “lose everything, including the way we live” in the process of 
colonization—to the point where colonial narratives (“their story of the 
world”) would be adopted by the indigenous youth, reducing Swahili cul-
ture to the rejected legacy of slave trading (87). This sharp mind is equally 
critical of Swahili conditions, however, e.g. comparing Yusuf’s bondage to 
the merchant Aziz to “slavery” (89). The sense of melancholy in the novel’s 
memory discourse that resonates in the title Paradise does not imply an 
uncritical celebration of the nineteenth-century Swahili universe portrayed 
at a point of historical crisis. Berman has noted that Gurnah avoids celebrat-
ing Indian Ocean cosmopolitanism in favor of a detailed and uncompro-
mising account of “material conditions” and “practices of socio-economic 
interaction” at the time (Berman 2013, 52).
Indeed, despite the virtual absence of the Germans from most of the 
story as focalized through the protagonist Yusuf, the irreversible transfor-
mation of East Africa under European colonial rule is one of the principal 
concerns of the characters. References to the construction of the railway 
which is about to link the coast with Lake Tanganyika (Gurnah 2004, 131), 
the use of “line-construction gangs” (6), the imposition of German “law” 
(170) that is not understood, the banning of tribute payments on the cara-
van routes (176), the ban of guns (171), and trade with rhino horns (189) 
are some of the more specific references to the way European rule changes 
existing infrastructure. On a larger scale, merchants such as Aziz find it 
increasingly impossible to maintain their trading system with the African 
interior. A reference to “Hamed bin Muhammad, who was also called 
Tippu Tip” (131), whose memoirs Gurnah clearly used along with other 
Swahili sources (Mustafa 2015a), recalls the days not many decades earlier 
222 Dirk Göttsche 
when Arab traders working on behalf of the Sultan of Zanzibar “buil[t] lit-
tle kingdoms for themselves” in central Africa (Gurnah 2004, 130). Now, in 
the early twentieth century, the Germans’ infrastructure bypasses previously 
crucial market towns (131) and the merchants have to take greater risks to 
find places that are not “already under the shadow of European power” 
(119). Smaller traders find that “[e]verywhere they went now they found the 
Europeans had got there before them” (71–72), compromising traditional 
trade. Aziz’s failed second caravan expedition into today’s Congo illustrates 
the historical turning point. This is also reflected in the motif that this time, 
unlike previously, Aziz is “forced to borrow a large amount of money from 
Indian creditors on the coast, which was not his usual practice” (109). The 
failure of his expedition takes him to the brink of bankruptcy, underlining 
the suggestion that the days of the Arab-Swahili caravan trade are over.
Portraying a culture that is at the point of disappearing, Gurnah’s Paradise 
provides rich detail on the Indian Ocean world in East Africa on the eve of 
World War I. This includes various vignettes of Arab-Swahili shop life and 
an account of Aziz’s career as initially a small trader between Zanzibar 
and the coast who went on to marry a rich widow and expand his business 
into the African interior. While the focus is on Arabs and Africans, there 
is also a range of references to the role of Indians in East Africa’s society 
and economy, and to the social diversity of the Indian diaspora. The Indian 
financiers of the Arab-Swahili economy remain at the margins of the story, 
admired in the portrait of a rich Indian wedding (Gurnah 2004, 50–51) 
but also confirming the stereotype of the “moneylending and cheating” 
Indian (74). On the other hand, the novel’s outspoken critic of what he calls 
“Gujarati scum” (74) is himself an Indian immigrant, a Sikh mechanic who 
becomes one of Yusuf’s mentors. This Sikh sends his earnings back to his 
family in India, underlining continuing ties across the ocean. Yusuf’s father, 
an African whose late first wife was from an Arab family in Kilwa, worked 
“in an ivory warehouse belonging to an Indian merchant” in Bagamoyo 
(14) before taking over a shop in the interior and remarrying. From the 
perspective of a perceptive African chief, on the other hand, who registers 
that the Arab-Swahili “caravan trade is finished,” Indians appear as allies of 
European imperialism: “The Europeans and the Indians will take everything 
now” (176). The prestige of the Indians is also visible when, for example, 
Yusuf’s father wants his son to “play with the children of the Indian store-
keeper” rather than with other African boys who are seen as “savages” (6, 
34, and passim) by the Arab-Swahili traders. There is clearly a complex 
racial and social hierarchy at work in the East African space portrayed.
According to the “civilized people” from the coast (Gurnah 2004, 13), 
the uncivilized “places” of the interior are “brought to life by trade” across 
the caravan infrastructure (119). Gurnah thus creates symbolic equiva-
lences between the European colonizers and the Arabs who preceded them 
(Mustafa 2015b, 234). Indeed, the description of “Uncle Aziz the seyyid” 
on his caravan expedition into the African interior casts this Arab merchant 
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as equal with, and similar to, the European explorers in his relation of pre-
sumed superiority over the African world around him: “Despite everything, 
he managed to look untroubled, said his prayers five times a day at the 
appointed hours, and almost never wavered from his appearance of amused 
detachment” (Gurnah 2004, 117). Yusuf’s comparison at the end of the 
novel of Aziz and “[t]he white man” in terms of their “superiority” over 
Africa (237) underlines this parallelism. Such “assumptions of superior-
ity” and patterns of “othering” are “not restricted to the Arab, Indian and 
Mswahili traders, however; they permeate all social groups in the novel” 
(Jacobs 2009, 85). Paradise portrays a fractured and fragile socio-cultural 
universe in which emerging European colonial rule reorganizes existing 
identities and conflicts. In the case of Aziz and his class, Gurnah’s Paradise 
highlights the irony of a privileged position that is about to be compromised 
by European rule rather than the role of the Arab traders as precursors of 
Europe’s colonial expansion foregrounded in Buch’s and Trojanow’s nov-
els, discussed below. In the eyes of the rebel African chief who destroys 
Aziz’s caravan, the Arab-Swahili trading system has only “brought evil into 
our world”: “You have made slaves of us and swallowed up our world” 
(Gurnah 2004, 160). In the broader context of the novel’s postcolonial 
memory discourse, this criticism of Arab hegemony reads like a direct echo 
of the Arab-Swahili traders’ complaints about European imperialism; there 
are obvious parallels between both systems of exploitation and rule, which 
represent “competing modernities” (Mustafa 2015a, 21), and Indians have 
a stake in both.
At the same time, there is an analogy between this historical critique of 
internal East African power relations and the novel’s Swahili Bildungsroman. 
Cast as an exceptionally handsome boy whose beauty stuns all those he 
meets as the promise of a better world, Yusuf nevertheless fails to develop 
his sense of purpose. Weary of the ties of bondage and the world of trade 
in which he grows up, the young adult sees all those around him “stuck in 
one smelly place or another, infested by longing and comforted by visions 
of lost wholeness” (Gurnah 2004, 175)—a reference to the novel’s leitmotif 
of “paradise.” The melancholy element in the novel’s portrait of East Africa 
at the onset of World War I thus echoes in the protagonist’s growing iden-
tity crisis. Symbolically dismissed from Aziz’s walled garden, the novel’s 
Garden of Eden, and abused by Aziz’s wife in his affection for her maid, 
Yusuf takes the novel’s critique of colonial exploitation to the more general 
level of rejecting the commodification of human interaction seen not only 
in the novel’s erotic episodes but also in the young characters’ bondage and 
the system of investment and debt sustaining Aziz’s trading empire. In his 
“shame and anger,” Yusuf therefore accuses the Swahili world around him 
of turning “even simple virtues into tokens of exchange and barter” (236). 
In terms of the novel’s discourse of postcolonial memory, the protagonist’s 
disappointing choice of German military employment underlines the way in 
which Gurnah combines the validation of the Swahili universe at a critical 
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point in its history with a nuanced critique of its internal tensions and fric-
tions. The melancholy of the novel’s title is not nostalgic; it relates Indian 
Ocean history in East Africa to the history of European colonialism and 
global modernization, as well as to a history of exploitation and capitalism 
in which the Arabs (and their Indian financiers in the background) have as 
much of a stake as the Europeans.
M.G. Vassanji’s The Magic of Saida: The postcolonial 
memory of Indian Ocean histories and identities
The memory theme, which is implicit in Gurnah’s Paradise, moves to the 
main stage of a metafictional narrative in Vassanji’s novel The Magic of 
Saida (2012), which interlinks the postcolonial memory of German rule in 
today’s Tanzania and of wider East African history from the later nine-
teenth century to the present with the personal memories of protagonist 
Kamal Punja, a successful medical doctor from Canada who returns to his 
native Kilwa on the southern coast of Tanzania to reconnect with his African 
roots. Kamal retraces his childhood friend and teenage lover, the titular 
Saida, and rethinks his identity as a cosmopolitan postcolonial migrant in 
the novel’s memoryscape, which straddles East Africa, India, and Canada. 
As the son of an African mother, a descendant of Matumbi slaves, and 
an Indian medical doctor who soon “abandoned” (Vassanji 2012, 26) his 
African family to return to India, Kamal is torn throughout his life between 
the African-Swahili identity, language, and culture of his early childhood in 
Kilwa and the Indian language, identity, and culture that he was forced to 
develop when his mother sent him to live with his Indian uncle in Dar es 
Salaam in 1963 at the age of roughly 12. There he successfully graduated 
from the Indian school in 1970 and went on to study medicine in Kampala 
before fleeing Uganda for Canada with his wife-to-be, another East African 
Indian, in 1972 at the height of Idi Amin’s anti-Asian outrage. The protago-
nist reflects his own story as a “difficult” and “unfinished” dual “conver-
sion,” first “from African to Asian—more precisely, Indian,” and then “into 
a Canadian” (215). Twice “transformed” (271) and yet always an outsider 
and “half-caste” (194) seen as Indian by the Africans and as African by the 
Indians, the protagonist is thus ideally placed to enable the novel to reflect 
about the relationship between Indians and Africans in the Swahili universe 
and the development of this multicultural society from pre-colonial times 
through to the present.
Like some of the recent German novels about colonialism, such as 
Stephan Wackwitz’s Ein unsichtbares Land (An Invisible Country, 2003) 
or Christof Hamann’s Usambara (2007), Vassanji’s The Magic of Saida 
bridges the growing historical gap between the colonial past and the post-
colonial present through a combination of family history and metafiction. 
In three of the novel’s four parts, and in the prologue, Vassanji adopts a 
framework narrative that uses the Tanzanian publisher Martin Kigoma, an 
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African with a keen interest in Swahili history and culture, as the narrator 
who tells the protagonist’s story based on what Kamal tells him in a number 
of friendly meetings first in hospital, then in cafés in Dar es Salaam. In the 
final part, this first level of the story, set in the present, coincides with the 
second, Kamal’s account of his return to Kilwa in search of Saida, when 
the protagonist and the narrator jointly revisit the site of what now turns 
out to have been his final encounter with an aged and mysterious Saida, 
whose “African truth drug” (Vassanji 2012, 191) caused the medical cri-
sis that put him in hospital. The third level of the story is the account of 
Kamal’s life, of Swahili culture in pre- and post-independence Kilwa, of 
Indian diasporic culture in Dar es Salaam, and of deeper East African his-
tory since the nineteenth century. This historical theme moves center stage 
in the second part, “…of the coming of the modern age,” in which the 
protagonist takes the role of narrator, engaging with German colonialism, 
Indian emigration to East Africa, and the history of African slaves in India, 
the Sidi, whose patron saint is said to have called upon Kamal’s ances-
tor to emigrate to Zanzibar and Kilwa. This historical account crucially 
also includes the life of the intellectual mentor of Kamal’s childhood, the 
Swahili teacher, poet, and historian Omari bin Tamim, who is also Saida’s 
grandfather. Omari’s “historical magnum opus” (176), an account of the 
African experience of German colonialism and African resistance against 
it, composed in traditional Swahili utenzi verse, provides the chapter title 
and punctuates the narrative in extracts that introduce the African voice (in 
English translation) to the novel’s postcolonial memory discourse as this 
discourse seeks to “reconfigure the past” from the “fragments” of Afrasian 
history (132) that the narrators (the Tanzanian publisher and Kamal Punja 
as narrator of the historical chapter) collect.
The fact that Omari’s start on his “final work,” the “poetic history” that 
“relate[s] how we came to be what we are on this eastern coast of Africa” 
(11–12), also opens the first chapter of The Magic of Saida, i.e. the liter-
ary reflection of how postcolonial identity and the global Indian diaspora 
came to be what they are today, is emblematic of the novel’s metafictional 
poetics of postcolonial memory. The opening, “Kilwa was all history” (11), 
underlines the author’s well-established “obsession with historical truth and 
the quest for origins” (Vassanji 2014, 307), i.e. the central significance of 
“history and memory” (Sayed 2014, 295) in his writing. The role of the 
Indian Ocean universe as a central theme is obvious from the start as Omari 
embarks on his Swahili epic using “fine paper from Syria,” a “pen from 
Europe and the ink from India,” while “a framed certificate in the strange 
letters of the German language” on his wall anticipates the theme: the criti-
cal memory of German colonialism (Vassanji 2012, 12). Kilwa is portrayed 
as a “small but ancient entry point into the [African] continent” (135) that 
“saw its heyday in the nineteenth century trading ivory and slaves” (18), 
“gum,” “grain and even wild animals” (28). It was an “important place” 
(28) as the starting point of caravans that also attracted trade in “Gold 
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from Rhodesia! Silk from India! Perfumes from Arabia!” (34). While the 
modern Kilwa is described as a provincial town that has “completely los[t] 
itself” (65), the novel’s memory discourse recovers the cosmopolitanism of 
the town’s former glory that still resonates in Kamal’s youth: The poet-
historian Omari’s ancestors are said to have come from Baghdad (44), and 
the Swahili trader Lateef, who assists the returnee in his search for Saida, 
retraces his lineage to immigrants from Persia who came with Kilwa’s “first 
sultan” “many centuries ago” (22, 34). The significance of the port in the 
Sultan of Zanzibar’s sphere of influence also brings the protagonist’s pater-
nal ancestor to Kilwa, an ambitious young Indian from Gujarat who goes 
out to Zanzibar in the 1870s to make his career and become the chief assis-
tant to Tharia Topan, the Sultan’s “customs master” (127) and an influ-
ential historical example of Indians funding the Swahili caravan trade (see 
Mangat 2012, 19–22). Kamal’s ancestor Punja Devraj is then sent by the 
Sultan of Zanzibar to Kilwa as his “new ambassador and customs collec-
tor” (Vassanji 2012, 131) at the very point when the Germans take over 
control of the town. As “a respected Indian trader and honorary Swahili,” 
Kamal’s ancestor is “convinced” that the patron saint of the African Sidi in 
India “had sent him to Africa […] to help his people, the Africans, resist the 
onslaught of the Europeans” (139). He becomes involved in a local upris-
ing and is hanged by the Germans. The narrator notes the “singular irony, 
that those leading the fight against the foreign invasion on the east coast 
of Africa were eminent traders of slaves too” (139), since the Sidi in India 
were of course themselves the descendants of African slaves. On a later trip 
to modern-time India in an unsuccessful attempt to retrace his father, the 
protagonist feels, when visiting Somnath and its shrine of the patron saint 
Siddi Sayyad, that “everyone […] looked completely African”: “He could 
have been in Kilwa, the young men chatting in Swahili” (279).
The Indian Ocean world and Afrasian exchange are thus central to the 
historical memoryscape of The Magic of Saida, and Zanzibar, as its eco-
nomic and political hub but also as the mythical place where “[m]en of all 
races mingled” (Vassanji 2012, 126), plays a crucial role. Like Gurnah’s 
Paradise, Vassanji’s novel explores the multiple links and frictions between 
the various ethnicities, religions, and groups in East Africa. Although a 
third-generation member of the Indian diaspora in Kilwa, Kamal’s father, 
for example, still saw his marriage to an African from a family of slaves as 
a “fall from Indian respectability—having gone local, fathered a half-breed, 
an outcaste whom he could never call his own back in Gujarat” (29). There 
is clearly an analogy here with European colonial discourse and its racist 
trope of “going native.” Combining the theme of Afrasian migration with a 
critique of slavery, the novel also registers the Indian sense of cultural supe-
riority that echoes European colonial attitudes.2 Late nineteenth-century 
East Africa seemed to offer a career to Indians, and Zanzibar in particu-
lar was viewed as “the spice island of opportunity” (125), just as colonial 
space overseas did for Europeans; European racism in the perception of the 
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colonized is replicated in the Indians’ racist perceptions of black Africans. 
To complicate matters further, both Indians and the Swahili of the coast see 
those in the African interior as “barbarians” (52). There is “crude racism” 
(232) at work in the way Indian kids treat the young Kamal at school (for 
looking too African), and the expulsion of Asians from Idi Amin’s Uganda 
is marked as “cynical reverse racism” (261); racism is not restricted to the 
attitude of the Germans and British towards their colonial subjects. At 
the same time, there are individual Germans and British during German 
and British colonial rule who are portrayed as “friend[s] of the African” 
(175), while Omari, the celebrated chronicler of African resistance against 
German colonialism in Kamal’s youth, turns out to have collaborated with 
the Germans and appropriated his late brother’s superior poetry, passing it 
off as his own. This makes his heroic Swahili epic an act of personal atone-
ment for past sins written in the spirit of his brother whom the Germans 
hanged as an anti-colonial activist in the very tree where Omari eventu-
ally takes his own life.3 The novel’s multi-layered universe has no place for 
a simple distinction between European colonizers and colonized Africans. 
It is concerned throughout with questioning established stereotypes and 
complicating ideological narratives. As the narrator notes: “Nothing was 
straightforward” (261).
Further examples of this postcolonial poetics include the references to 
the role of Sufi Muslims in Arab resistance against German colonial rule 
(Vassanji 2012, 132) and the distance between different groups within the 
Indian diaspora, e.g. Hindu and Muslims such as the “Shamsi community” 
(214) to which Kamal’s Indian family belong. The publisher-narrator takes 
historical lines of inquiry from the colonial period through to the era of 
decolonization and the present. In a telling episode from Kamal’s youth, 
learning “the rudiments of Arabic writing” (56) with its “wonderful letters, 
written from right to left, in books that began at the back made him feel 
a part of a world he had been denied” by his European-style school train-
ing (57). The cultural divide between Arab-Swahili (Oriental) and Western 
culture is marked as a burden of colonial history and transcending it as per-
sonal enrichment enabling cultural empowerment. Vassanji’s postcolonial 
poetics break with the binary logic still prevalent, e.g., in Edward Said’s 
Orientalism (Said 1978), and works towards an “intercultural hermeneu-
tics” (Genetsch 2007, 191).
This refinement of postcolonial identity discourse goes hand in hand with 
the reconstruction of forgotten colonial history and its legacies. It is tell-
ing that one of the novel’s most important lieux de mémoire (and its first 
setting) is the square in Kilwa near an “old German monument” which 
was at the heart of Kamal’s childhood world but which the returnee now 
finds “forlorn amidst a dump and parking space” (Vassanji 2012, 14). The 
novel’s objective of reconfiguring the past from the fragments of history and 
memory brings together personal history (the protagonist’s) and the broader 
history of the Indian Ocean world, as seen from an East African perspective. 
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In this sense, the novel follows in the footsteps of the Swahili epic at its his-
torical center, even if the memory discourse of The Magic of Saida is post-
colonial and cosmopolitan and moves beyond the anti-colonial politics of 
memory of the 1960s seen in Omari’s magnum opus.4 Reflecting about dif-
ferent stages in the history of East African memory is part of the novel’s self-
reflexive approach to a postcolonial rereading of the Indian Ocean universe.
Hans Christoph Buch’s Sansibar Blues: The Swahili universe 
in the postcolonial memory of German colonialism
In German literature, interest in East Africa from an Afrasian perspective 
is largely part of the rediscovery of colonialism as a theme that emerged 
during the later 1990s and found wider public resonance in the context 
of the centenary in 2004 of Germany’s colonial war against the Herero 
and Nama in South-West Africa, which is today seen as genocidal (see 
Zimmerer and Zeller 2003/2008). While the critical memory of German 
colonialism in novels about South-West Africa and Namibia therefore typi-
cally involves a politics of memory interlinking the memory of colonialism 
with the dominant German memory discourse about National Socialism 
and the Holocaust (see Göttsche 2016), novels about German East Africa 
and Tanzania, especially those from the popular end of fiction, often blend 
a critical postcolonial perspective, which has become normalized since the 
1990s, with persistent tropes of exoticism, a sometimes naive fascination 
with East African multiculturalism, and occasional returns to colonial myth 
(see Göttsche 2013, 115–165). Zanzibar plays a prominent role in this cor-
pus since the court of the Sultan of Oman and Zanzibar, and the significance 
of Arabic culture more widely, allow for a blending of the traditional literary 
discourse about Africa with popular Orientalism. Both discourses combine 
with contemporary interest in multiculturalism and transnationalism when 
it comes to contemporary German literature’s fascination with Emily Ruete, 
born Princess Salme of Oman and Zanzibar (1844–1924), who scandal-
ously married a merchant from Hamburg and later published her memoirs 
to foster dialogue between the Occident and the Orient (for an annotated 
translation, see Salme 1993). She features in several of the contemporary 
German novels remembering colonialism in Africa (see Göttsche 2017).
Hans Christoph Buch’s Sansibar Blues oder: Wie ich Livingstone fand 
(Zanzibar Blues, or how I found Livingstone, 2008) stands out against the 
more popular novels in the field for undercutting African exoticism and 
Orientalism and trying to give a voice to African and Arabic experiences of 
colonialism through a metafictional poetics working with surviving sources. 
Using irony and humor to put colonialism, neocolonialism, and existing 
stereotypes in critical perspective, the novel switches between four narrative 
strands which combine to cover the history of Zanzibar, its Indian Ocean 
role, and its African hinterland, as well as German involvement there, from 
the 1850s to the present day. The contemporary chapters and the author’s 
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epilogue act as a meta-reflexive framework that ties the three biographi-
cal narratives together in order to demonstrate “daß und wie die koloniale 
Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart fortwirkt” [the fact that, and how, the 
colonial past continues to affect the present] (Buch 2008, 224).
While the first strand is basically an account of the author’s own travels 
to Zanzibar, the second one explicitly bridges the gap between past and pre-
sent by telling the life of a fictional East German diplomat, the illegitimate 
son of Duke Adolf Friedrich zu Mecklenburg-Schwerin, a former gover-
nor of colonial Togo and the childhood mentor of this character-narrator 
who is sent into the political turmoil of newly independent Zanzibar after 
the Socialist revolution of 1964. The novel suggests uncanny continuities 
between German imperialism and the effectively neocolonial involvement 
of the German Democratic Republic in Zanzibar, while the diplomat’s 
subsequent marriage to the Asian-looking niece of the last ruling Sultan 
of Zanzibar (Buch 2008, 39), who follows him back to the GDR with her 
children, creates a symbolic link between the historical multiculturalism 
of the Indian Ocean universe and contemporary German transcultural-
ism. The same is true more obviously for the third strand, Emily Ruete’s 
account of her life based on an adaptation of her own publications, her 
Memoiren einer arabischen Prinzessin (Memoirs of an Arabian Princess, 
1886), and her posthumous Briefe an die Heimat (Letters Home, 1999) 
(Ruete 1999a and 1999b). However, the most extensive engagement with 
Indian Ocean narratives in East Africa comes in the final strand, the novel’s 
account of the life of the legendary Zanzibari slave trader and ivory dealer 
Hamed bin Mohammed, better known as Tippu Tip, in which Buch works 
with Heinrich Brode’s biography of 1905 (rather than with Brode’s prin-
cipal source, Hamed bin Mohammed’s Swahili autobiography, published 
in German translation in 1902/03; see Brode 1905 and bin Mohammed 
1902/3). In both cases, Buch’s rereading of these Arab-African sources com-
bines retelling with reworking of his source material as he mixes extensive 
unmarked quotations with very loose adaptation involving condensation, 
fictionalization, and dramatization that sadly often reduces complexity for 
rhetorical effects (see Göttsche 2013, 206–220). Buch’s metafictional style 
also blends narrative with essayism in the way it deliberately blurs the line 
between the voices of the character-narrators (Ruete and bin Mohammed), 
their mediators (such as Brode), and the author himself, who therefore leaves 
the reader with the impression of looking over his shoulder as he works his 
way into the source material, rather than listening to an “authentic” his-
torical voice. The historical maps and photographs framing the text, and 
the excerpts from colonial sources in the epilogue,5 underline the novel’s 
metafictional postcolonial memory discourse, which addresses the historical 
portrait of Zanzibar from the perspective of German colonial history and 
its forgotten African context while also reflecting ironically (although not 
always critically) on the stereotypes of traditional German discourse about 
Africa and the Orient.
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Buch’s interest in exploring Afrasian interactions is evident from the very 
start. Zanzibar is introduced as a commercial and cultural hub in the Indian 
Ocean presented as “ein Kreuzungspunkt der Kulturen wie das Mittelmeer” 
[a crossroads of cultures such as the Mediterranean] that saw Chinese, 
Indians, and Persians arriving, “vielleicht auch Griechen und Römer” 
[perhaps also Greeks and Romans], and certainly the Portuguese, French, 
Germans, English, and Americans (Buch 2008, 10). As the author’s alter ego 
moves through the streets of Zanzibar, and indeed through East Africa, “auf 
den Spuren eines untergegangenen Kolonialreichs” [following the traces of 
a colonial empire that has passed into history, i.e. the German Empire] (11), 
he also explores Zanzibar’s cosmopolitanism as a place where “everyone” 
has been (10, 203), a center of the “Dreieckshandel zwischen der  arabischen 
Halbinsel, Afrika und Indien” [the trading triangle between the Arabic pen-
insula, Africa and India] (152), hence the historical key to power in East 
Africa. As the novel’s Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the representative of 
German imperialism, notes, “wer Sansibar besitzt, hält ganz Afrika in der 
Hand” [he who owns Zanzibar has all of Africa in the palm of his hand] 
(143). Fascination with Indian Ocean cosmopolitanism and the particular 
interest in German colonialism combine with two further characteristics of 
Sansibar Blues: a recurring and somewhat problematic insistence on conti-
nuities between the colonial past and the postcolonial present, between past 
and present atrocities deplored in the reference to the African American 
blues in the title of the novel; and a focus on the pioneering role of the 
Arab-Swahili trading system in Central Africa, which anticipates European 
colonization but also paves the way for European imperial rule superseding 
the caravan trade. This is where historical analysis of Sansibar Blues is clos-
est to Gurnah’s Paradise and Vassanji’s The Magic of Saida.
In the Ruete strand, Buch draws on Ruete’s own detailed and often 
ethnographic account of life in Zanzibar and at the Sultan’s court. Buch’s 
adaptation highlights the intensity, sensuousness, and lively chaos of 
African-Oriental culture and the multiculturalism and multilingualism of 
Zanzibar. Moving beyond the relevant passage in Ruete’s autobiographi-
cal account, the novel underlines Indian Ocean connectivities for example 
by suggesting that “Arabisch, Persisch, Türkisch, Tscherkessisch, Hindi 
und Urdu” [Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Circassian, Hindi and Urdu] were 
spoken in the palace, “ganz zu schweigen von den Sprachen Ostafrikas” 
[not to mention the languages of East Africa], while the young Salme was 
reading Homer’s Odyssey “in italienischer Übersetzung” [in Italian transla-
tion] (Buch 2008, 47). The narrator compares this cosmopolitanism with 
the Palais des Nations in Geneva, also noting that Zanzibar saw the same 
sort of “Reibereien zwischen den Völkerschaften, Religionen und Kulturen” 
[frictions between the ethnic groups, religions and cultures] as the later 
League of Nations, including racialized “Mißgunst und Neid” [envy and 
jealously] between Caucasian Asians (such as Ruete’s mother), Arabs, and 
black Africans (48). The historical themes of this strand of the novel include 
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the role of India in the succession crisis that followed the death of Ruete’s 
father, Sultan Said, in 1856, and saw her younger brother Bargash move 
into exile in Bombay (56–57). There are vignettes of Zanzibar’s planta-
tion economy, as well as references to the communication system spanning 
the Indian Ocean and East Africa (57), and to Ruete and her son’s use by 
Bismarck as an “Instrument einer imperialistischen Strategie” [instrument 
of an imperialist strategy] (169) in Germany’s naval threat to Zanzibar in 
1885 forcing the Sultan to accept German control of the East African main-
land (168–169). Buch’s humorous appropriation of Ruete’s voice, which 
goes along with anachronistic insertions of later historical knowledge and 
twenty-first-century views, becomes particularly problematic where he 
distorts historical fact—e.g. suggesting that Ruete traveled from Aden to 
Germany on a boat via Cape Town (153), when the historical Ruete clearly 
took the traditional Arabian route via the Red Sea and Egypt—or attrib-
utes potentially racist prejudice to her—the people of Aden are supposed to 
be “schwarze, weiße und braune Teufel” [black, white and brown devils] 
(151)—which the historical Ruete was keen to avoid in her own writing 
(Göttsche 2013, 212).
The motif that Tippu Tip is said to have lived next door to Princess 
Salme (Buch 2008, 50) provides the link to the novel’s portrait of Hamed 
bin Mohammed, alias Tippu Tip, with a broader representation of Swahili 
culture and infrastructure in East Africa. Buch’s Tippu Tip presents himself 
as the descendant of pioneering Arab immigrants, who is fluent in Arabic, 
Swahili, Kirundi, and Lingala (89) and uses Zanzibar’s Indian financiers, in 
particular the influential Taria Topan (Mangat 2012, 19–22), to take the 
Swahili caravan trade into the African interior to a new level. Echoing the 
racist European colonial gaze in his disregard for the “Schensis” (Buch 2008, 
191), the black Africans, he even manages to set up his own central African 
kingdom (“mein innerafrikanisches Reich,” 196) in the Congo region—
motifs already found in Gurnah’s Paradise. At the same time, he also sup-
ports the European colonial explorers such as “Stanley und Livingstone, 
Cameron, Emin Pascha” in their expeditions across the African interior. 
Probably inspired by the subtitle of Brode’s biography—“Lebensbild eines 
zentralafrikanischen Despoten” [Portrait of a Central African despot] 
(Brode 1905)—, Buch’s Tippu Tip is a politician as much as he is a mer-
chant, and proud of his place in history, keen for example to stress that it 
was he, rather than any of the vocal Europeans (“vorwitzige Europäer”), 
who first discovered the sources of the Nile (Buch 2008, 70). Buch adapts 
a wealth of episodes from bin Mohammed’s memoir (as mediated through 
Brode’s biography) but moves beyond his source material in also making 
his Tippu Tip a keen chronicler and critical commentator of East African 
and Zanzibari history in the later nineteenth century. For example, when 
returning to Ujiji on the Eastern coast of Lake Tanganyika several years 
after retrieving David Livingstone there in 1871, he notes the growth of 
Swahili commerce which now sees Arabs, Indians, and Europeans barter 
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with African traders on the local market and Arabic dhows cruise the lake 
(196). The novel is clearly fascinated with East African cosmopolitanism.
On a larger historical scale, Sansibar Blues casts the Berlin confer-
ence of 1884/85 as a decisive turning point initiating the gradual demise 
of the Swahili universe in the African interior—much earlier therefore 
than suggested in Gurnah’s Paradise. Much to Tippu Tip’s regret, Sultan 
Bargash of Zanzibar fails to preempt the Europeans’ hold by also claim-
ing “Territorialbesitz” [territorial ownership] (Buch 2008, 201) on the East 
African mainland at this point when the European empires are engaged in 
their “scramble for Africa.” Carl Peters and his infamous “protection trea-
ties” with local African chiefs are presented as direct and ultimately success-
ful competition to Tippu Tip’s hold on the African interior (201–202). When 
Sultan Bargash, having been to Europe and impressed by European power, 
fails to support Tippu Tip in his endeavor to secure control of his Congo 
“kingdom,” the merchant knows that “all was lost” (“daß alles verloren 
war,” 203). Even though the Belgians make Tippu Tip their local governor 
in the Congo Free State (210), continuing the pattern of building European 
imperial rule on existing Arab-Swahili infrastructure, the historical tide has 
turned. The end of the Tippu Tip strand sees him in Zanzibar, fighting, like 
Gurnah’s Aziz, for what little remains of his former wealth and power. In 
his old days, Tippu Tip is supposed to have told his German biographer 
Brode that “der Vormarsch der westlichen Zivilisation sei nicht mehr auf-
zuhalten und der Aufstand des Mahdi eine sinnlose Verzweiflungstat” [the 
advance of Western civilization could no longer be stopped and the Mahdi 
uprising was a pointless act of despair] (208). This emblematic figurehead 
of the nineteenth-century Arab-Swahili world is thus ultimately portrayed 
as a figure of historical transition: Initially taking Zanzibar’s influence to a 
new level, he also becomes a facilitator of European colonial penetration 
and rule. On the one hand, Sansibar Blues shows how European colonial-
ism developed in the footsteps of existing infrastructure; on the other hand, 
it suggests that the Europeans superseded it by installing their own system 
of trade and power. This narrative is in keeping with the melancholy title 
of the novel, but it also fails to acknowledge the history of anti-colonial 
resistance and African, Arab, and Indian agency explored in Gurnah’s and 
Vassanji’s novels.
Ilija Trojanow’s Der Weltensammler: Recovering Afrasian 
interactions in the rereading of European colonialism
In his best-selling novel Der Weltensammler (The Collector of Worlds, 
2006), Ilija Trojanow takes the well-established postcolonial strategy of 
critically rereading colonial sources one step further than Buch. This novel 
is a metafictional account of British colonial officer and explorer Sir Richard 
Burton’s (1821–1890) missions to India as an officer in the British East 
India Company, his hadj to Mecca in the guise of a Persian Muslim, and his 
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expedition, together with John Hanning Speke, to the supposed sources of 
the Nile in East Africa in 1857/58. Based on a “contrapuntal reading” (Said 
1994, 78) of Burton’s own publications, Trojanow focuses on Burton’s 
obsession, in his Indian and Arabic missions, with full immersion in the 
non-European cultures and languages of the countries through which he 
traveled. However, his “collection of worlds” then turns openly imperial 
in the final, East African part, which clearly indicates a colonial mindset 
for which Africans, unlike Indians and Arabs, did not rank as equals with 
Europeans. One of the most striking elements of Trojanow’s postcolonial 
metafiction is the introduction of fictional Indian, Arabic, and East African 
counter-voices which frame Burton’s story and put imperial ambitions and 
perceptions in critical perspective.
The Indian Ocean universe is again a prominent theme. The three main 
parts of Der Weltensammler, devoted to Burton’s travels to British India, 
the Arabic peninsula, and East Africa, respectively, set out the geography of 
the Indian Ocean, and there are references to the “Sidis” as “Descendants of 
slaves from East Africa” (Troyanov 2009 = E, 170; “Nachfahren von Sklaven 
aus Ostafrika”; Trojanow 2008 = G, 204)6 in the Indian part and to the 
Arabic trade with African slaves in the Arabic part (G 253; E 213). However, 
it is the final, East African part of the novel that really develops the theme. 
As he stands in the shallow water of the shore in Zanzibar, recalling his mis-
sions to India and Arabia and preparing for his expedition into the African 
interior, Trojanow’s Burton casts an imaginary gaze across the Indian Ocean 
“to the ports of Bombay and Karachi, the bays of Khambhat and Suez, the 
Arab Ocean” (E 312–313; “zu den Häfen von Bombay und Karachi, zu den 
Buchten von Khambhat und Suez, zum Arabischen Meer,” G 366). In addi-
tion, there is the life and perspective of Sidi Mubarak Bombay (1820–1885), 
the former Yao slave from the Central African interior who became Burton’s 
guide—although his narrative in the novel is of course entirely fictional given 
the lack of sources. This co-narrator of the East African part acts as the 
African counter-voice in the novel’s poetics of transcultural multi-perspectiv-
ism, complementing Burton’s Indian servant and his highly literary scribe in 
the first part, and the Ottoman Empire’s multi-stranded inquiry into Burton’s 
penetration of the sacred sites of Islam in the second. Defying expectations 
of one homogenous non-European “other” that would replicate the bina-
ries of colonial discourse, and turning the postcolonial rereading of colonial 
history into “contrapuntal writing” (Domdey 2009, 53), all these counter-
narratives are marked by “internal pluralism” (ibid., 52). In the case of the 
East African part, the novel portrays an indigenous oral culture of memory as 
Sidi Mubarak Bombay, now an old man in Zanzibar, recalls the adventures of 
his life and tells them to an audience of family, grandchildren, and neighbors 
for whom the age of the caravan trade and European colonial exploration has 
already become a thing of the past.7
There are elements of a transcultural Bildungsroman in the story of Sidi 
Mubarak Bombay’s life, which serves to map out the cultural universe of 
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the Indian-Arabian-East African hemisphere. Violently taken into slavery 
at such a young age that he even lost his name to “the languages of slave-
taking, Arab and Kiswahili” (E 398; “in den Sprachen der Versklavung 
[…], auf Arabisch und auf Kisuaheli,” G 463), and reflecting the stages 
of his life in his adopted name, Sidi Mubarak Bombay is sold to India, is 
emancipated after the death of his Indian master, returns to East Africa, 
to which he now brings the knowledge of Hindi, and makes his career as a 
guide in the Arab-Swahili caravan system, historically serving expeditions of 
Richard Burton, John Hanning Speke, Henry Morton Stanley, and Verney 
Lovett Cameron; in Der Weltensammler he is also cast as guide to the 
notorious German colonial pioneer Carl Peters (E 306–307; G 358–359). 
In Trojanow’s novel, his transcultural cosmopolitanism echoes and indeed 
eclipses Burton’s own vision of cross-cultural metamorphosis (Bay 2009, 
135, 138). If Trojanow’s Burton has to learn that despite his attempts to 
assume Indian and Arab identities, he will “never learn what it’s like to be 
one of us” (E 177; “du wirst nie erfahren, wie es ist, einer von uns zu sein,” 
G 212), his African chronicler is cast as someone using his role as a guide to 
European explorers to search for his identity and the central African roots 
of which enslavement deprived him. Sidi Mubarak Bombay thus serves 
to draw attention to the forgotten theme of Indian Ocean slavery, its dif-
ferences from the transatlantic slave trade—individuals’ status could shift 
over time between slavery, indentured labor, and liberty—and the history 
of Africans in India. In his role as Burton’s guide and African counter-nar-
rator of European colonial achievement, he also helps the novel to subvert 
the colonial myth of discovery by showing, as Buch’s Tippu Tip does in 
Sansibar Blues, how European explorers followed in the footsteps of the 
slave and ivory traders, “the real explorers of the mainland”: “Wherever 
we went, they had been already” (E 393; “die wahren Entdecker des 
Festlandes waren die Sklavenhändler. Überall, wo wir hinkamen, waren sie 
schon gewesen,” G 457). The European colonizers fully depended on their 
local guides and traders and the existing pre-colonial infrastructure, in this 
case the Arab-Swahili economy of the caravan trade. In ironic comments 
on the Europeans’ infatuation with being the first to charter “virgin” terri-
tory in the African interior, Sidi Mubarak Bombay, for example, recalls an 
Arab expedition that crossed central Africa from East to West well before 
the Europeans, making contact with the Portuguese in Benguela and turn-
ing self-styled explorers such as Stanley and Cameron into mere “strag-
glers” (E 337; “Nachzügler,” G 393).
Further expanding the theme of the Indian Ocean universe, Zanzibar, 
the setting of the oral African counter-narrative, is introduced as the center 
of the Afrasian slave trade as Mubarak the boy is sold to an Indian ivory 
dealer in Zanzibar’s market square (G 363). The fact that this merchant 
takes him across to Bombay, “to the city where he was born” (E 310; “in 
die Stadt seiner Herkunft,” G 363), rather than using him on his plantations 
in Zanzibar, reflects the mobility of skilled and affluent Indian migrants 
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across the Indian Ocean. This echoes the theme of East Africa as an Indian 
career, rather than a diaspora, in Vassanji’s The Magic of Saida. The brief 
account of Mubarak’s “third life” in Bombay is then used to raise aware-
ness of the “life of Sidis” (“Leben als Sidis”); there, the African slaves who, 
unlike Mubarak, stayed on, took Indian wives and formed an African dias-
pora in India despite initially being “as unfamiliar” (“so fremd”) with one 
another as with the Indians around them (E 315; G 369). Sidi Mubarak 
Bombay is then said to support Burton by direct appointment by the Sultan 
of Zanzibar (E 337, G 394). Like any Arab or Swahili merchant, Burton is 
shown to rely for his expedition on approval from the Sultan and his offi-
cials, as well as on provisions from Indian traders (E 323–327, G 378–382). 
In the town of Kazeh, he benefits from the communication system estab-
lished by the local Arab merchants, one of whom welcomes the British as a 
boost to their “business” despite the need to adapt to the rules of emerging 
European colonialism by shifting from the slave trade to other goods (E 382; 
“Unser Geschäft wird leichter werden,” G 445). This assessment contradicts 
the impact of European colonialism discussed in Gurnah’s Paradise, but it 
relates here to an earlier period before the European “scramble for Africa” 
fully took hold.
At a critical point on the journey, Burton’s expedition is assisted by the 
faster caravan of an Arab trader who is nevertheless cast as the embodiment 
of “cruelty and terror” (E 370; “Grauen und Schrecken,” G 431). This is 
one of the few points in Der Weltensammler where the novel also considers 
the internal frictions of East Africa’s multiethnicity at the time. The racism 
underpinning the Arab slave trade is clearly exposed and the novel gives a 
sense of the hierarchies and stereotypes involved in the way different groups 
within East Africa see each other and relate to one another. Despite the 
inclusion of an East African voice, however, the focus is on the postcolonial 
critique of European imperialism rather than an exploration of the compli-
cations in the interaction between African Arabs, Indians (who only fea-
ture marginally), and various groups of Africans, the focus of Gurnah’s and 
Vassanji’s novels. Trojanow’s postcolonial rereading of Burton’s colonial 
missions makes a significant contribution to drawing the unfamiliar Indian 
Ocean universe to the attention of his German readers, but Gurnah and 
Vassanji go much further in mapping out its internal complications before, 
during, and after the colonial era.
Conclusion
Moving beyond Atlantic connectivities and North-South relations to also 
consider the history of the Indian Ocean universe and its very different pro-
file of colonial conditions clearly enriches the field of postcolonial literary 
studies. Addressing German colonialism in East Africa with reference to the 
deep history of interaction and exchange across the Indian Ocean, the four 
novels discussed in this case study present a very different historical scenario 
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from those engaging with the transatlantic history of European colonialism, 
and they all offer scope for the rethinking and reframing of more established 
tropes of postcolonial criticism. Gurnah’s Paradise, Vassanji’s The Magic 
of Saida, Buch’s Sansibar Blues, and Trojanow’s Der Weltensammler all 
remember and critique German colonial involvement in East Africa from 
the perspective of Indian Ocean narratives with their deep history and con-
tinuing legacy, which puts European imperialism in perspective while still 
charting its violent and transformative impact. Moreover, the novels vali-
date Indian Ocean cosmopolitanism while also registering the internal fric-
tions of this universe in East Africa and reflecting on the impact of German 
and British imperialism on the transformation of East African society from 
the days of the Arab-Swahili caravan trade through German and British 
imperial rule to the postcolonial world today. All four novels underline 
the multi-layered conditions of a social universe marked by competition 
and interaction between various groups of Africans, Arabs, and Indians 
in the Arab-Swahili infrastructure of Zanzibar and its African hinterland, 
on which European colonial involvement builds until the Germans and the 
British eventually suppress and supersede the traditional power structures. 
This transformation, however, is not complete, and it does not happen with-
out fierce opposition from local Africans, Arabs, and Indians who lay the 
foundations for decolonization decades later—a process conceived very dif-
ferently in Buch’s Sansibar Blues (in which colonial and postcolonial times 
are linked through an unfortunate history of violence) and Vassanji’s The 
Magic of Saida, which retraces as a history of local agency, competing poli-
tics of memory, and the transferal of regional cosmopolitanism to the global 
stage of postcolonial migration. Comparative reading indicates that the two 
German authors combine the introduction of their German readers to the 
unfamiliar Indian Ocean world with a focus on the critique of German and 
European colonialism, while the two anglophone writers, both East African 
Indians by origin, explore the internal structure and development of East 
African multiculturalism in much more detail and for a different, potentially 
global, anglophone audience.
The novels’ representation of the Indian Ocean universe in East Africa 
before, during, and after German colonialism also echoes some of the 
concerns raised in recent Indian Ocean research that seeks to challenge or 
expand the conceptual framework and geographical reach of postcolonial 
criticism. Gurnah and Vassanji in particular suggest echoes and analogies 
between European colonial perceptions, attitudes, and policies, and those 
of the Indians and Arabs in East Africa—analogies that force postcolo-
nial critique to expand its remit beyond the European globe. The role of 
Indians and Arabs as a third group—or rather: a set of diverse groups—
within the imperial society of late nineteenth- and twentieth-century East 
Africa also complicates older accounts of colonialism based on binary nego-
tiations between colonizers and colonized. Finally, the novels in question 
suggest certain structural affinities between the multi-layered conditions 
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of colonialism in East Africa resulting from its Indian Ocean connections 
and the super-imposed colonialisms of the Baltics, of regions of the for-
mer Habsburg Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. Advanced postcolonial 
theory may wish to take these more complicated conditions as its starting 
point rather than treating them as an exception to a framework based on 
transatlantic history and British or French colonialism. Such rethinking of 
the postcolonial frames of reference arguably requires comparative analysis, 
and comparative literature has an important part to play in the advance-
ment of comparative postcolonial studies.
Notes
1 See the case studies in Hawley (2008a, 203–288).
2 Schulze-Engler (2014, 174) cites a similar example of the Indians’ perceived 
“civilising mission” being reflected in Vassanji’s novel The Book of Secrets.
3 See in more detail on the novel’s politics of memory Göttsche (2018).
4 See in more detail Göttsche (2018).
5 These sources (Buch 2008, 229–241) are excerpts from Alfred Brehm’s 
Reiseskizzen aus Nord-Ost-Afrika (1855), Hans Meyer’s Ostafrikanische 
Gletscherfahrten (1890), and news coverage of the court case about Carl Peter’s 
colonial atrocities.
6 Page numbers in this section refer to Ilija Trojanow, Der Weltensammler: Roman 
(Munich: dtv, 5th ed. 2008 [1st ed. 2006]); Iliya Troyanov, The Collector of 
Worlds, trans. William Hobson (New York: Harper Collins, 2009). The German 
original is referenced using the letter G, the English translation using the letter E.
7 See Göttsche (2013, 196–206) for a fuller analysis.
Bibliography
Alpers, Edward A. 2014. The Indian Ocean in World History. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Bay, Hansjörg. 2009. “Going Native? Mimikry und Maskerade in kolonialen 
Entdeckungsreisen der Gegenwartsliteratur (Stangl; Trojanow).” In: Ins Fremde 
schreiben: Gegenwartsliteratur auf den Spuren historischer und fantastischer 
Entdeckungsreisen, edited by Christof Hamann and Alexander Honold, 
117–142. Göttingen: Wallstein.
Berman, Nina. 2013. “Yusuf’s Choice: East African Agency During the German 
Colonial Period in Abdulrazak Gurnah’s Paradise.” English Studies in Africa, 
56, no. 1: 51–64.
Bin Mohammed, Hamed. 1902/3. “Autobiographie des Arabers Schech Hamed bin 
Muhammed el Mujerbi, genannt Tippu Tip. Transcribirt und übersetzt von Dr. 
H[einrich] Brode.” In: Mittheilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu 
Berlin, 3. Abt.: Afrikanische Studien 1902: 175–277 and 1903: 1–55.
Brode, Heinrich. 1905. Tippu Tip: Lebensbild eines zentralafrikanischen Despoten: 
nach seinen eigenen Angaben dargestellt. Berlin: Baensch.
Buch, Hans Christoph. 2008. Sansibar Blues, oder Wie ich Livingstone fand: Roman. 
Frankfurt/Main: Eichborn.
Campbell, Gwyn. 2005. An Economic History of Imperial Madagascar, 1750–1895: 
The Rise and Fall of an Island Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
238 Dirk Göttsche 
Desai, Gaurav. 2013. Commerce with the Universe: Africa, India and the Afrasian 
Imagination. New York: Columbia University Press.
Domdey, Jana. 2009. “Interkulturelles Afrikanissimo: Postkoloniale Erzählverfahren 
im Ostafrika-Kapitel von Ilija Trojanows Der Weltensammler (2006).” Acta 
Germanica: German Studies in Africa, 37: 45–65.
Genetsch, Martin. 2007. The Texture of Identity. The Fiction of MG Vassanji, Neil 
Bissoondath and Rohinton Mistry. Toronto: Tsar publications.
Gilroy, Paul. 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Göttsche, Dirk. 2013. Remembering Africa: The Rediscovery of Colonialism in 
Contemporary German Literature. Rochester, NY: Camden House.
Göttsche, Dirk. 2016. “Afrika-Diskurs und Geschichtspolitik in neueren deutschen 
Namibia-Romanen.” In: AnOther Africa? (Post-)Koloniale Afrikaimaginationen 
im russischen, polnischen und deutschen Kontext, edited by Jana Domdey, Gesine 
Drews-Sylla and Justyna Gołąbek, 65–86. Heidelberg: Winter.
Göttsche, Dirk. 2017. “Gegenwartsliteratur.” In: Handbuch Postkolonialismus 
und Literatur, edited by Dirk Göttsche, Axel Dunker and Gabriele Dürbeck, 
297–312. Stuttgart: Metzler.
Göttsche, Dirk. 2018. “History or Memory? Postcolonial Politics of Memory in 
Bernhard Jaumann’s Der lange Schatten and M.G. Vassanji’s The Magic of 
Saida.” In: Memory and Postcolonial Studies: Synergies and New Directions, 
edited by Dirk Göttsche. Oxford, Bern: Peter Lang, 2019, 45–74.
Gurnah, Abdulrazak. 2004. Paradise, [1st ed. 1994]. London: Bloomsbury.
Hawley, John C., ed. 2008a. India in Africa—Africa in India: Indian Ocean 
Cosmopolitanisms. Bloomington, Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
Hawley, John C. 2008b. “Introduction: Unrecorded Lives.” In: India in Africa—
Africa in India: Indian Ocean Cosmopolitanisms, edited by John C. Hawley, 1–5. 
Bloomington, Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University.
Hofmeyr, Isabel. 2007. “The Black Atlantic Meets the Indian Ocean: Forging New 
Paradigms of Transnationalism for the Global South—Literary and Cultural 
Perspectives.” Social Dynamics, 33, no. 2: 3–32.
Hofmeyr, Isabel. 2012. “The Complicating Sea: The Indian Ocean as Method.” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 32, no. 3: 
584–590.
Jacobs, J. U. 2009. “Trading Places in Abdulrazak Gurnah’s Paradise.” English 
Studies in Africa, 52, no. 2: 77–88.
Karugia, John Njenga. 2017. “Interaktionsraum Indischer Ozean.” In: Handbuch 
Postkolonialismus und Literatur, edited by Dirk Göttsche, Axel Dunker and 
Gabriele Dürbeck, 160–164. Stuttgart: Metzler.
Lützeler, Paul Michael, ed. 1997. Der postkoloniale Blick: Deutsche Schriftsteller 
berichten aus der Dritten Welt. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1997.
Mangat, Jagjit Singh. 2012. A History of the Asians in East Africa, ca. 1886 to 1945. 
Jersey: Founthill Trust [= repr. of Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969].
Mustafa, Fawzia. 2015a. “Swahili Histories and Texts in Abdulrazak Gurnah’s 
Paradise.” English Studies in Africa, 58, no. 1: 14–29.
Mustafa, Fawzia. 2015b. “Gurnah and Naipaul: Intersections of Paradise and 
A Bend in the River.” Twentieth-Century Literature, 61, no. 2: 232–263.
Nicolini, Beatrice. 2012. The First Sultan of Zanzibar: Scrambling for Power and 
Trade in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Ocean. Princeton, NJ: Wiener.
 Afrasian prisms of postcolonial memory 239
Oka, Rahul C., and Chapurukha M. Kusimba. 2008. “Siddi as Mercenary or as 
African Success Story on the West Coast of India.” In: India in Africa—Africa 
in India: Indian Ocean Cosmopolitanisms, edited by John C. Hawley, 203–229. 
Bloomington, Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
Pearson, Michael, ed. 2015. Trade, Circulation, and Flow in the Indian Ocean 
World. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ruete, Emily, geb. Prinzessin Salme von Oman und Sansibar. Leben im Sultanspalast: 
Memoiren aus dem 19. Jahrhundert, edited by Annegret Nippa. Berlin: Philo, 
1999a.
Ruete, Emily, geb. Prinzessin Salme von Oman und Sansibar. Briefe nach der Heimat, 
edited by Heinz Schneppen. Berlin: Philo, 1999b.
Said, Edward W. 1978. Orientalism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Said, Edward W. 1994. Culture and Imperialism. London: Vintage.
Salme, Sayyida [= Emily Ruete]. 1993. An Arabian Princess between Two Worlds: 
Memoirs, Letters Home, Sequels to the Memoirs, Syrian Customs and Usages, 
edited with an introduction by E. van Donzel. Leiden: Brill (= Arab History and 
Civilization: Studies and Texts, vol. 3).
Sayed, Asma. 2014. “The Book of Life: A Brief Biography of M.G. Vassanji.” In: 
M.G. Vassanji: Essays on His Works, edited by Asma Sayed, 295–306. Toronto, 
Buffalo, Lancaster, UK: Guernica.
Schulze-Engler, Frank. 2014. “Africa’s Asian Options: Indian Ocean Imaginaries 
in East African Literature.” In: Beyond the Line: Cultural Narratives of the 
Southern Oceans, edited by Michael Mann and Ineke Phaf-Rheinberger, 
159–178. Berlin: Neofelis.
Trojanow, Ilija. 2008. Der Weltensammler: Roman, 5th ed. [1st ed. 2006]. 
Munich: dtv.
Troyanov, Iliya. 2009. The Collector of Worlds, trans. William Hobson. New York: 
Harper Collins.
Vassanji, M.G. 2012. The Magic of Saida. New York: Vintage.
Vassanji, M.G. 2014. “So as Not to Die.” In: M.G. Vassanji: Essays on His Works, 
edited by Asma Sayed, 307–326. Toronto, Buffalo, Lancaster, UK: Guernica.
Zimmerer, Jürgen, and Joachim Zeller, eds. 2003. Völkermord in Deutsch-
Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen. 
Berlin: Ch. Links; English Translation: Genocide in German South-West Africa: 
The Colonial War (1904–1908) in Namibia and Its Aftermath, trans. Edward 
Neather. Monmouth/Wales: Merlin, 2008.
13
The title of this essay is inspired by a personal memory. This happened some-
time before Perestroika, in the early to mid-1980s, in the Pelgurand part of 
Tallinn, in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic of the USSR. We lived 
within the carefully guarded borders of a stagnating Soviet empire. Our part 
of Tallinn was inhabited predominantly by Russian-speaking, Soviet-era 
settlers, so the Russian language was heard everywhere around us.1 On our 
way home from school, we feared trouble from gangs of Russian youths. 
Russian-speaking soldiers were visible everywhere, and they guarded the 
seashore in the evenings.2
This day we were sitting, my best friend Kerstin and I, on the sandy 
seashore close to the 1960s-era, five-story, prefabricated apartment build-
ing where we both lived. This shoreline was commonly called “a beach,” 
though Estonians never went swimming there, since the bay was much pol-
luted in those days. This beach, just a few hundred meters from our house, 
was generally considered “Russian territory”—a place that did not belong 
to our home zone and where we hardly ever went.
This day, however, we were sitting there together, in the grassy stretch 
between the sea and the first row of prefab apartment buildings. Occasionally, 
people would pass by, and, at one point, two soldiers sat down beside us 
and started a conversation. They had the day off, they said. They offered 
us candy, which tasted exotic. I had never seen such candy before, a yellow 
sugar coating around an almond—quite tasty. Our conversation did not 
succeed very well, however, since my friend and I were limited by our rudi-
mentary Russian and, most of all, Kerstin urged that we get up and leave.
I, however, was much intrigued by this encounter. I had frequently seen 
soldiers marching by in their orderly lines, impersonal and always somewhat 
frightening with their military gear, guns clearly visible by their sides. I had 
seen them marching into the movie theater, I had seen their cars patrolling the 
seashore (a different seashore), I had seen them walking with fierce-looking 
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dogs, and I had had a few unpleasant face-to-face encounters. Now I saw sol-
diers that had a day off, and they were friendly and sociable, eager to establish 
human contact. This did not fit into my tidily packaged set of expectations, 
the set of cultural imaginaries that circulated in our cultural zone, with more 
or less established, though never fully articulated, unofficial value-systems. 
According to this set of imaginaries, these soldiers were supposed to be hos-
tile towards us. They were there to make sure that we would obey “Russian 
rule,” as we called it, and to prevent our escape to what we imagined as “the 
free world.” Could it be that these soldiers actually carried their roles like they 
carried their guns and uniforms—something one might put aside at the end of 
the working day? Could people simply shake off their previous identities and 
switch from hostile to sociable once they were off-duty?
These same questions of the potential limits of collective subjectivization 
also inform the present study. Can the colonizer take a day off? How stable 
are positions of “the colonizer” and “the colonized”? What happens when 
these terms lose their substance and are revealed—at least in some respect—as 
fluid categories, perhaps only incidentally related to actual human identifica-
tory commitments? In order to address such questions, we have to first turn 
towards the discursive foundations of colonial relationships in the Soviet-era 
Baltics. Over the past two decades, questions of Soviet (post)colonialism have 
found plenty of scholarly interest,3 so this essay leaves aside questions of the 
functionings and developments of Soviet colonial strategies on a large scale. 
Instead, I will focus on a particular aspect of Soviet colonial rule, the forma-
tion of colonial subject positions in the Baltic states. To limit the field of 
inquiry, I will focus my attention on Estonia, but general patterns and local 
imaginaries were quite similar across the three Soviet-era Baltic republics, 
and especially between Latvia and Estonia. I will first examine the ideologi-
cal deployment of the colonial trope of the great Russian nation; I will then 
proceed to other aspects of Soviet colonial discourses, with a special interest 
in the ways these shaped—or failed to shape—Soviet-era subjectivities. This is 
what most interests me in this essay: the clashes, inconsistencies, and failures 
in the process of shaping colonial subjectivities in the Soviet-era Baltics.
I drink to the health of the most outstanding nation
On May 24, 1945, Stalin proposed a toast at a victory banquet organized in 
honor of Red Army commanders:
“Comrades, permit me to propose one more, last toast.
I would like to propose a toast to the health of our Soviet people, and 
in the first place, the Russian people. (Loud and prolonged applause 
and shouts of ‘Hurrah.’)
I drink in the first place to the health of the Russian people because 
it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations which make up the 
Soviet Union […]
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I propose a toast to the Russian people not only because it is the 
leading people, but also because of its clear mind, stable character and 
patience.”
(Boobbyer 2000, 132–133)
Stalin’s speech, heroizing Russians as the greatest nation in the USSR, offers 
a superb starting point for investigating not only the spread and rhetorical 
buildup of Soviet colonial discourses, but also the methods of construct-
ing and disseminating colonial subject positions more generally. As we see, 
Stalin uses the occasion of the festive victory banquet to certify the position 
of the Russian nation as “the leading people”; in a typical instance of colo-
nial rhetoric, he declares that Russian people are essentially more worthy 
than other nations of the USSR, in this way naturalizing Moscow’s rule 
over the different borderlands of the Soviet Union. Russians, we hear, are 
“the most outstanding nation,” the ones with “clear mind, stable character 
and patience.”4 Such a rhetorical gesture positioned all other nations within 
the Soviet bloc in a subordinate position, one less outstanding and lacking 
in such clear minds, stable characters, and patience, and who should thus 
gratefully accept the guidance of the great Russian nation.
Stalin’s message reached all corners of the Soviet empire. These words 
were published in newspapers along the Eastern shores of the Baltic sea, 
areas inhabited primarily by Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, which 
by 1944 had been annexed by the USSR and where one might find already 
underway the establishment of a newly superimposed ideological and socio-
economic model—commonly referred to by the locals as “Russian rule,” 
denoting it as a foreign imposition. To be more precise, Soviet armed forces 
had entered these areas already in 1940—the Soviet takeover at that time 
included setting up a puppet government, a secret service network, and con-
trol over the media, with some economic restructuration and massive waves 
of arrests and deportations (Tannberg 2005b, 274; Zubkova 2008, 256). 
Yet the three-year German occupation had put these processes on hold. In 
1944–1945, when the Soviet army returned, the tasks related to the estab-
lishment of Soviet control over the Baltics were enormous: these included 
not only restructuring the entirety of Baltic society with their systems of 
government, education, economy, culture, and media, but also overwriting 
local values and worldviews. Indeed, much of the reorganization of Baltic 
societies in the late 1940s, even apart from a comparatively straightforward 
restructuring of the economy to serve the interests of the empire, served the 
aim of establishing new social modes of interpreting the role of Baltic peoples 
in their society, establishing a new understanding of the social geography of 
the Baltic world, one where the center of gravity would be situated not in 
one’s own homeland, but rather in Moscow, and where the decision-making 
role of Moscow would be taken for granted and the superiority of Russian 
culture would be accepted as natural. What makes the Baltic case especially 
interesting in the context of postcolonial studies is its lateness in history, 
the perhaps impossible effort of Soviet rule to overwrite already developed 
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national consciousnesses, and the accompanying clash between the formerly 
developed modes of Western modernity and the Soviet effort to overwrite 
these with Soviet versions of modernity. The Stalinist regime succeeded quite 
quickly, from its position of military domination, in severing longstanding 
Baltic economic connections with Scandinavia and Western Europe, but the 
reconfiguration of people’s worldviews and values was a far more difficult 
task, one that never fully succeeded. In the Baltics, the main source of incon-
sistencies and inner dissonance in colonial subjectivities was the tension 
between Soviet colonial discourses, distributed by colonial power structures 
through official media channels and further spread through different social 
networks, and local cultural imaginaries, which to some extent internalized 
and to a certain extent resisted the interpretive patterns offered by colonial 
discourses. At the same time, further discursive dissonance abounded: Both 
Soviet colonial discourses and the local cultural imaginaries were vague and 
fluctuating sets of beliefs and value-systems which were in a constant pro-
cess of alteration and extension—and which included unreconciled incon-
sistencies and incompatibilities among their subthemes.
Estonian media, by 1945, was already fully under the control of the 
Soviet propaganda machine, and Stalin’s toast to the great Russian nation 
was printed in wide-spaced font on the front page of the widely circulated 
daily newspaper. The short text appeared under a portrait of Stalin, next 
to a general overview of the glorious victory banquet—which included a 
long list of other toasts also offered at the banquet, in honor of different 
Russian politicians and generals (Stalin 1945, 1). A year later, the toast 
was republished in the more substantial format of a book, in a collection 
of Stalin’s writings (Stalin 1946). By that time, Estonians had also heard 
that the Armenian artist A. Nalbandyan was working on a large canvas, 
To Russian people (Comrade Stalin proposes a toast to the health of the 
Russian people) (“Ettevalmistusi üleliiduliseks kunstinäituseks” 1946, 4).5
Stalin’s famous toast was effective in its brevity—this was a poem of 
a kind, an articulation of a single thought, without much development. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, these few phrases started to serve, together 
with Lenin’s and Stalin’s lengthier writings, as markers of symbolic author-
ity among texts written by other less-known ideologists, following the dom-
inant logic of enunciation in the Soviet era: Since Stalin (or Lenin, or Marx, 
or Gorky) has said x or y, then, under that authority, we can accept the fol-
lowing as true about z. For example, in 1951, Stalin’s toast came to frame a 
quasi-scholarly discussion about methods in teaching Russian culture.
In the article “Questions of Russian culture within the framework 
of school programmes on the history of the USSR” (Vene kultuuri aja-
loo küsimused NSV Liidu ajaloo koolikursuses), written by “prof V.N. 
Bernadski” and published in the Estonian journal Nõukogude Kool [Soviet 
School], the author states, with the indisputable voice of authority, that 
“in the Communist education of Soviet youth, the study of Russian culture 
is of special importance” (Bernadski 1951, 160). As Bernadski goes on to 
explain, the importance of Russian culture is twofold: First of all, Russian 
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culture has had an “immeasurable importance” in world history. In addi-
tion, it plays an “immense role” in the present day and age, as the Russian 
nation was the main founder of the first socialist society. Bernadski sup-
ports his claim with reference to Stalin’s toast of May 24, 1945, and he 
moves on to propose that
The study of developments in Russian culture in a Soviet school will 
help elucidate the historical role of the great Russian nation. Getting 
to know Russian culture in the schools of our fraternal Soviet republics 
will cultivate a love and respect towards the Russian nation.
(Bernadski 1951, 160)
Over the course of the next pages, Bernadski maps out the main achievements 
of the Russian nation. Russian scientists, we learn, are leading the way in 
many very important fields in science and, in technical innovation, Russian 
art is of indispensable importance to art everywhere—indeed, “the slogan ‘We 
must learn from the Russians!’ echoes back from all corners of the world” 
(Bernadski 1951, 167). Bernadski ends his 10-page paean with Stalin’s words, 
exactly repeating the quote he had introduced at the beginning of the article, 
about the Russian nation as “the most outstanding nation of all the nations 
which make up the Soviet Union” (Bernadski 1951, 169).
The sentiment and rhetorical moves of Bernadski’s article had plenty 
of company in the Baltic media of this period; in the same journal issue, 
the next article was entitled “Comrade Stalin about the vocabulary of lan-
guage” (Seltsimees Stalin keele sõnavarast), and the article culminated with 
an encouragement for Estonian linguists to work on the basis of Stalinist 
ideas so that the Estonian language might likewise evolve into a rich and 
developed language (Kask 1951, 169–176). Over the Stalinist years, we 
find many variations and further articulations on the same general topic of 
Russian superiority. Indeed, this topic was commonly exhibited across the 
Sovietized media, with an emphasis on the backwardness of local cultures in 
relation to the great Russian culture. The dominant tone and theme of such 
statements was always similar: The glorious Russian nation is leading the 
way towards the best possible future (i.e., the best according to the stand-
ards of the hegemonic Soviet power).
One striking example comes again from the Estonian newspaper, Postimees, 
a lengthier piece by “prof. V. Lebedev” entirely devoted to the topic of Russian 
greatness, an article entitled “The great Russian nation—the most outstand-
ing nation in the USSR and its leading force” (Suur vene rahvas—Nõukogude 
Liidu silmapaistvaim rahvus ja juhtiv jõud). Here, the familiar trope is devel-
oped in three directions: First of all, the whole idea of Russian greatness is 
explained in detail. Russians, we hear, are characterized not only by limitless 
bravery but also by selflessness and readiness to sacrifice their lives for the idea 
of liberty. Next, this topic is developed into the theme of the great Russian 
nation selflessly helping other, underdeveloped nations of the USSR,
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it helped all the other nations of the USSR to overcome their centuries-
long misery and their state of backwardness […] In carrying out its 
Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policies, the Russian nation extended its 
brotherly hand to the formerly backward nations of our land in order 
to realize their economic and cultural ascent.
(Lebedev 1945, 2)
The third theme elaborated in the article is gratitude: All nations of the 
USSR are properly thankful for the selfless help of the Russian nation: 
The workers of Belorussia are “endlessly thankful” for their liberation, 
the Ukrainians happily confirm their love and reverence to the “most out-
standing nation” of the USSR, and indeed, “each Soviet citizen” is proud 
of the Russian nation who shows the way for all other nations of the USSR 
(Lebedev 1945, 2).
To conclude this first excursion, we have looked at some rather clear exam-
ples of Soviet colonial rhetoric, aimed at positioning the Russian people as 
the leading force, as the main actor in the field of history, now stretching out 
its helping hand towards the backward nations, who in their turn are deeply 
grateful for this act of generosity. Indeed, the Soviet civilizing mission included 
typically colonial ideas of enlightening the “natives,” of helping to move other 
peoples up the ladder of civilization, and the Soviet mission was justified, again 
in a very typically colonial mode, by the superiority of the colonizing soci-
ety. The specifically Soviet colonial understanding of progressive values was 
certainly different from those of earlier, nineteenth-century imperial powers: 
Here, the idea of progress included not only moving closer to Western norms 
of civilized life (which was certainly part of it, especially in Central Asia), but 
it was also based on the Marxist assumption that capitalism will progress into, 
one could say, a more “civilized” communist society. Again, as was typical for 
colonial conquerings, the local peoples were given little power to make their 
own voices heard, little regard was given to whether they actually acknowl-
edged and supported the specific idea of progress imposed by the new occu-
pying power. What makes the Soviet case especially complex is the way its 
rhetoric of friendship and equality sits side by side with its “civilizing” rhetoric.
Of course, the whole situation abounds in paradoxes, some of which 
are well known from other colonial enterprises, though some also have a 
specifically Soviet character. Certainly, the discourse of a colonial civiliz-
ing mission, imposed upon the subject ethnicities or nations, always invites 
questions of sincerity: Surely some of its advocates sincerely believed in the 
benevolence of their ideas and actions, yet how many and to what extent? 
In the case of the Baltic annexations, one can easily track the other side of 
this same discourse: Stalin and his confederates also openly discussed the 
geopolitical urgency for Soviet control of the Baltic lands, the usefulness of 
having access to the Baltic sea, and the strategic importance of controlling 
these territories (Zubkova 2008). Thus, another mode of Baltic discourse 
was primarily and openly belligerent.
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Enemy, you must obey!
In 1940, Kratkii russko-estonskii voennyi razgovornik (A short Russian-
Estonian military phrasebook) was printed in Moscow (Kratkiy Russko-
Estonskiy Voyennyy Razgovornik 1940). The book runs just over a hundred 
pages—too short, it would seem, for courtesies such as “hello,” “goodbye,” 
“thank you,” “please,” and “excuse me,” which are not included at all. Here 
is the full list of expressions introduced in the opening two pages:
Do you understand Russian?
Understand. Don’t understand.
Do you speak Russian?
Respond!
Respond only “yes” or “no.”
Speak more slowly!
Tell the truth!
If you don’t know, say “don’t know.”
You cannot not know!
You must have heard!
You must have seen!
You don’t speak the truth!
(Kratkiy Russko-Estonskiy Voyennyy Razgovornik 1940, 7–8).
These phrases not only direct wartime Russian military personnel through 
a potential conversation, they also recognize or establish a set of expecta-
tions. The commander of a Red Army unit, looking into this phrasebook, 
orients himself towards an oppositional encounter. Indeed, the booklet 
stages a mismatch, an unwanted meeting, where one side tries to lie or hide 
the truth, and the other side has to force information from the liar. In the 
collection of several hundred phrases, intended for interactions both with 
Estonian-speaking soldiers and with local inhabitants, one finds just a sin-
gle relatively friendly phrase: “Don’t be afraid of the Red Army soldiers.” 
Otherwise, neutral questions (for example, “Where does this road lead to?” 
or “Is the road paved?”) are overwhelmed by the demands and threats that 
set the overall tone for the book.
While a phrasebook may be of little use in producing intelligibility from 
an actual dialogue, the phrases in this book do prepare the ground for any 
interactions to come. The authors and their intended readers are positioned 
in an imaginary dialogue with a person of a different nationality. The 
encounter is staged as one of opposition, and a coercive tone is established 
prior to any actual encounter; the Russian soldier is not assigned the posi-
tion of a benevolent big brother or a liberator; rather, an aggressive stance 
is adopted, as if between parties understood to be enemies. It comes as no 
surprise that this part of Soviet colonial discourse did not make it into the 
Soviet-controlled Baltic media.
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The same aggressively oppositional perspective also emerges from 
reports about the attitudes of Russian-speaking soldiers in Estonia. General 
Shcherbakov describes in his 1944 report how Red Army soldiers, amazed by 
the general prosperity of the Estonian countryside, presumed that Estonian 
farmers were German allies or even German settlers (Siilaberg 2010, 1434). 
As the Harju region committee of the Estonian Communist (Bolshevik) 
Party announced in October 1944, the crimes of Red Army soldiers— 
robberies, rapes, lootings, terrorizing the local farmers—had brought a 
halt to all normal life in the countryside, since people were afraid to move 
around or even to show up at work (although intrusions into farm homes 
were also frequent) (Siilaberg 2010, 1448–49). According to Ardi Siilaberg’s 
archival research, the highest-priority problem that needed to be addressed 
by the new Soviet governing bodies in the countryside was in fact the undis-
ciplined marauding of the Red Army soldiers (Siilaberg 2010, 1449). Such 
behavior does not, to put it mildly, comport with discourse of the benevo-
lent and brave Russian nation. As a result, the incoming Russian-speaking 
soldiers were both feared and despised among the local populations (who, 
for that matter, had already experienced massive arrests and mass deporta-
tions from the Soviets in 1940 and 1941).
In the Russian imaginaries, the association of Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians with fascism persisted throughout the Soviet years, and fashisty 
(fascists) was among the common curse words used by Russian-speakers for 
Estonians in situations of conflict (Ladõnskaja 2013). The association was 
further strengthened by Soviet film industry, where fair-skinned Baltic actors 
were frequently assigned the roles of evil Germans in the many stereotypical 
war movies of the Soviet era. The Estonian actor Tõnu Aav, Latvian Uldis 
Lieldidz, Lithuanian Algimantas Masiulis, and Laimonas Noreika were 
among the most common Baltic evil” faces in Soviet movies; Algimantas 
Masiulis even earned the nickname of the “fascist of merit” [teeneline fašist] 
of the Soviet Union (Liiviste 2008). For typical Soviet filmgoers, there was 
certainly something suspicious about the blend of “cultural manners and 
refinement with sadism and cynicism,” as the film scholar Peter Rollberg has 
characterized the roles played by Laimonas Noreika (Rollberg 2016, 530)— 
how were these Baltic actors able to portray the evil Germans with such 
psychological complexity? And how could one reconcile the prevailing dis-
courses of a benevolent Soviet civilizing mission in the Baltics with the deep 
Russian hatred for their ultimate enemy, the “fascist”?
To add to these conflicts of deed and discourse, discursive confusions in 
the Baltics stemmed also from the uneasy relationship between Western and 
Soviet modernity and from Russia’s longstanding feeling of backwardness 
in comparison with the more developed West:6 It was hard—and it became 
still harder over the coming years—to position the communist model as 
the highest, when the capitalist West was plainly more technologically 
developed and could showcase much wealthier lifestyles. The annexation 
of Latvia and Estonia produced a visible split between the Soviet colonial 
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rhetoric of Russian/Soviet superiority and the local material circumstances. 
This split was especially striking for the first Soviet representatives arriving 
in 1940, before the ravages of the war. Vladimir Derevianski, commissioner 
of the Soviet Communist Party in Latvia, was amazed by the quality of 
Latvian goods and services and sent to Moscow detailed reports (with draw-
ings); he sincerely suggested that the Soviets might profitably learn from 
the Latvians how to produce quality goods and services (Zubkova 2008). 
Especially in the post-Stalin years of relative stability, the sandy beaches and 
a (relatively) Western atmosphere made the Sovetskaya Pribaltika or the 
Soviet Baltics attractive sites for Soviet tourism: The Latvian resort town 
Jurmala had not been seriously damaged by the war and it received its first 
vacationers as early as 1945. By 1959, approximately 107,000 tourists, 
mostly from Moscow and Leningrad, visited yearly. Two sanatoriums were 
later built for top party officials, and the USSR Council of Ministers’ lei-
sure home was completed there in 1971 (Laakkonen and Vasilevska 2011). 
Likewise, the Estonian resort towns of Narva-Jõesuu and Pärnu began to 
attract thousands of Soviet tourists once they recovered from the devasta-
tion of the war.7 Russian artists and art lovers came to be inspired by the 
post-Stalin art scene in the Baltics (Rosenfeld 2002, ix–xi).
Mismatches and discursive confusions
What, we might ask, becomes of the positions of the colonizer and the colo-
nized in such a situation, where the claims of the civilizing mission suffer a 
mismatch not only with the local sense of a developed cultural identity but 
also with the technological and commercial superiority of the local culture, 
with the presence of Western-style historical landmarks, and, in later years, 
also with a more vibrant art and music scene than was permitted in the 
highly controlled metropolis?
We should also take into account another, quite different social factor, 
the massive influx of Russian-speaking war-time and postwar refugees: In 
Estonia alone (with a postwar population of just over one million), about 
20,000 Russian-speaking refugees per year arrived in the postwar years 
(Mertelsmann 2005, 53). Such a chaotic, unorganized, and massive flow of 
culturally different peoples was certainly alarming and added significantly 
to postwar crime and chaos, but war refugees, squatting in half-ruined 
houses and begging or stealing to survive, hardly conform to anyone’s typi-
cal images of the colonizer.
One must consider rather carefully the respects in which it does (and 
doesn’t) make sense to deploy categories of colonizer and colonized in the 
Soviet Baltic context. Yet the colonial matrix of Soviet rule was clearly man-
ifest, in the overall reconstruction of Baltic societies and so consequently in 
peoples’ everyday lives: The Russian-speaking Soviet military was visible in 
the public spaces and significantly restricted the movements of the locals; 
education systems and programs of study were reorganized according to 
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the models prescribed by Moscow; and, in very different areas of decision-
making, decisions were either made in Moscow or required confirmation by 
Moscow (Zubkova 2008, 12).8 The local economies were restructured and 
new industries built prioritizing Moscow’s interests, not the Baltics’, result-
ing in serious pollution and environmental devastation at the industrial sites 
(Smurr 2009). Publishing houses had to receive approval from Moscow 
for their annual plans (Tamm 2012), and, in order to become a member 
of a creative union, the portfolio of a candidate was sent to Moscow for 
approval (Helme 2002, 6–16). Baltic films had to be approved in Moscow 
before their release (Trossek 2007), the prices of consumer products were 
set in Moscow … in short, all this created a common understanding in the 
local imaginaries of living under a “Russian rule,” as indeed it was widely 
referred to in everyday parlance (Mertelsmann 2005).
Nevertheless, in important respects, applying the label “colonizer” to 
each of the new-arriving Russian-speaking settlers in the Baltics seems more 
to hinder rather than help understanding. We might, therefore, more pro-
ductively understand “colonizer” and “colonized” as structural positions 
that refer to the subject’s location within the colonial matrix of power.9 
Such positions get actualized in certain situations but might be deactivated 
in some others. Certainly, no social category can definitively position a sin-
gular human being, but we can see how these categories can indicate one’s 
position in relation to a certain set of shared values and ideas. While soldiers 
are marching in their uniforms, some of them might form verses in their 
heads or think about a recent letter from home. Yet, collectively, these sol-
diers form a category that each of them might not necessarily approve of: 
In the Baltic borderlands they function as representatives of “Russian rule.” 
The soldiers themselves were not even necessarily Russian—some might have 
been recruited from Central Asia, others from Ukraine, and many of them 
might themselves feel uneasy in relation to Soviet rule. Even so, structurally 
speaking, they fulfill the function of the colonizer and are experienced as a 
hostile occupying force by the local population. In a similar way, Russian 
settlers arrived at the Baltic shores for any number of reasons—many came 
in search of a better life,10 many were sent against their own wishes. Russian 
graduates of Leningrad and Moscow universities, for example, would have 
preferred to stay in Leningrad and Moscow, close to their friends and fami-
lies, in their own cultural comfort zone (Waldstein 2007, 561–596; Annus 
2018, 192–193).11 Yet, en masse, Russian-speaking settlers functioned as 
colonizers in the eyes of the locals, for whom the great influx of Russian-
speakers felt culturally threatening. These soldiers of course also functioned 
as colonizers in the political sense, forming military forces at the disposal of 
the colonial regime.
Do we then need to clearly distinguish between structural roles and 
human subjectivities? It is not certain, however, that one can abstain from 
internalizing structural positions as part of one’s self-identity. Even if one 
could somehow shake off one’s role in the system after working hours, still, 
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even after working hours, one remained lodged within the larger field of 
cultural imaginaries. For the local inhabitants, cultural imaginaries included 
memories and habits, customs and traditions that retained a communal 
connection with the pre-Soviet era—for newcomers, such a mental link to 
the local cultural zone was missing. For local inhabitants, pre-Soviet lay-
ers of memory, combined with the horrors of the Stalin years, created a 
certain counterbalance to official Soviet discourses, so that the Soviet civi-
lizing rhetoric and the trumpeting of Russian superiority were commonly 
laughed at. Milder versions of the local critique of the Soviet civilizing mis-
sion made their way even into mainstream publications of the late Soviet 
era: In the novel Ma langesin esimesel sõjasuvel (I Died in the First Summer 
of the War, 1979) by Juhan Peegel, the Red Army commissar Dobrovolsky 
gives a speech to the Estonian soldiers who had just entered his command. 
Dobrovolsky explains (with the help of a translator) that, as the armed forces 
of the former Estonian republic are now integrated into the Red Army, so 
consequently “officers are no longer allowed to beat their soldiers” (Peegel 
1979, 22). The first-person narrator, a former soldier in the Estonian armed 
forces, comments: “We all listened to this talk in great amazement, since 
none of us had ever seen or heard of such a thing—an officer laying hands 
on a soldier” (Peegel 1979, 22).
Local inhabitants might have been astonished by the new Soviet dis-
courses, but, for the new Russian-speaking settlers, official media often 
functioned as their most important source of information. Certainly, 
Stalin’s idea of the great Russian nation was a self-flattering one, and one 
could easily identify with the role of bringing progress, especially as the new 
settlers were often recruited for building and/or working in new factories. 
Surely setting up new factories meant bringing progress! Yet such factories 
generally belonged to the all-Union system, with raw materials and work-
ers imported from other parts of the empire and the final products being 
shipped out again, contributing to the local culture mostly an unwelcome set 
of problems: industrial pollution, uneven development, and a heavy influx 
of migration (Arman 1962, 3–16; Grava 1993, 9–30). Nonetheless, the dis-
course of the Soviet enlightenment retained its popularity among Soviet-era 
settlers well into the post-Soviet years. Kevin Platt describes his findings 
from interviews with Russian-speakers in post-Soviet Latvia,
a common explanation and legitimization of the Russian presence in the 
area revolves around the work of cultural and social construction that 
Russians are thought to have carried out in building Latvian society, 
industry, and such others. Discussions of Latvian educational policies, 
which impose education in Latvian on Russian children, are most often 
couched in terms of the relative inferiority of Latvian civilization by 
comparison with Russian civilization, which possesses “universally rec-
ognized world-wide significance.”
(Platt 2014, 137)
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One finds ample evidence of similar attitudes among Russian-speakers in 
Soviet-era Estonia. In Estonian life stories, these might surface in the form 
of recollections about a Russian teacher who explained to her Estonian 
students that they “did not have anything here” before the arrival of 
Russian aid (Hvostov 2011); or in references to Russian retail ladies and 
taxi drivers who would demand that Estonian customers need to govorit’ 
po-chelovechesku—to speak like a human being, meaning “to speak in 
Russian” (Tammer 2004); one also finds a variety of jokes at the expense of 
Russians who mistake all Latin script languages for German and thus not 
worthy of their attention (Tammer 2004).
Should we conclude, then, that whatever the possibility of shedding one’s 
structural position as a colonizer, Russian speakers in the Baltics generally 
internalized the colonial discourse of Russian superiority vis-a-vis Baltic 
cultures? Yet we should not forget the prevailing discourse of the Baltics as 
belonging to the West, a discourse which certainly undercut the discourse of 
Russian superiority. Could one subscribe both to the idea of the Baltics as 
more Western and believe that Russians were the leading people who stretch 
out their helping hand to those in need? There is no easy way to smooth over 
such contradictions—one is forced to contend with inconsistencies in the for-
mation of colonial subject-positions. Certainly, the paradoxes of colonial sub-
jectifications pertained also to the “colonized” parts of the colonial subjects: 
The ethnic Estonians and Latvians both objected to the official value-systems 
and internalized parts of them—they considered the new Russian settlers 
uncultured and unmannerly, loud and prone to excess drink, but they also 
visited Moscow and Leningrad as cultural meccas and/or as destinations for 
shopping for consumer products (Vahing 2006; Berg 2012).
Each concept, whether political or critical, is to a certain extent self-
deconstructive. Colonial discourses and colonial subject-positions belong 
to such imaginary entities which are both treacherous and unavoidable: 
treacherous, because these simplify the complexity of potential subject-posi-
tions, and unavoidable, since we need to use certain categories to organize 
critical thought. The way to deal with the danger of producing simplifying 
conceptualizations, as I have tried to show in this essay, is to draw atten-
tion also to inner inconsistencies and deconstructive instances embedded in 
ideological constructions.
Notes
1 The proportion of ethnic Estonians in Estonia dropped from approximately 
94% in 1945 to 62% in 1989, and of ethnic Latvians in Latvia from 80% in 
1945 to 52% in 1989 (Kasekamp 2010, 155).
2 The Baltic military district (including Kaliningrad) stationed about 250,000 sol-
diers. In Estonia, by 1991, the military units of the Soviet Army were distributed 
across 800 different geographical locations and occupied a total area of 87,147 
hectares—all in a country with a population of about one and a half million 
(Plakans 1995, 162; Tannberg 2005a, 259).
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3 Some recent examples include Annus (2018); Novoye Literaturnoye Obozreniye 
vol. 144, no. 2; Tlostanova 2017; Kalnačs 2016; Şandru and Kołodziejczyk 2016; 
Smola and Uffelmann 2016, 2017; Journal of Baltic Studies 47, no. 1 (2016); 
Pucherová and Gáfrik Platt 2014; Turoma and Waldstein 2013; Ştefănescu 2013; 
Mazierska, Kristensen, and Näripea Platt 2013.
4 Colonial discourse tends to generate paradoxes: We might recall that Stalin him-
self was Georgian by birth—and not Russian. Though he treated Georgians pref-
erentially as compared to other Soviet non-Russian ethnicities and nationalities, 
as the leader of the USSR he identified with Russians.
5 The artist was Dmitry Arkadievich Nalbandyan; the newspaper editors, not 
yet accustomed to using patronymics, have mixed up the first name and the 
patronymic.
6 Russian feeling of backwardness vis-a-vis more developed West is a topic often 
addressed in Russian and Soviet studies, see Etkind (2011); Tlostanova (2012); 
and Morozov (2015).
7 One should not forget, however, that sites of difference were also found elsewhere 
in the Soviet borderlands—Lviv, for example, was famous for its excellent café life; 
and Armenians would claim their relative closeness to “Western” cultures thanks 
to the generous support from the vast Armenian emigré communities. The most 
popular resort towns in the USSR were Yalta and Sochi by the Black Sea.
8 According to Zubkova’s data, during the period of 1944 to 1952, the Orgburo 
and Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party made 871 
decisions about the Baltic republics, across very different fields of Baltic life.
9 I have developed this idea more fully in Annus (2018, 172–203).
10 See examples in Aarelaid-Tart (2012, 93).
11 Many Russian-speaking Jewish intellectuals, for example, ended in Estonia when 
they could not find employment in Russia.
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Introduction
Recent research trajectories in the field of postcolonial studies have tended 
to cover an ever larger geographical area, and in doing so, have discovered 
new aspects for analysis. This has led scholars away from the initial exclu-
sive focus on European empires and their possessions overseas or, in other 
terms, away from the First and the Third World. Postcolonial studies is by 
now, more or less, unanimously looked upon as a research field dealing 
with issues on a global scale. In addition to inter-continental relationships, it 
takes into account intra-continental aspects. This approach has contributed 
to the growing significance of discussions of European internal colonialism, 
as well as opening up a space for tackling the role of the Russian empire, 
and in the twentieth century, also including the Soviet Union’s function in 
creating and stimulating colonial discontents.
These scholarly developments have been inspiring for a researcher like 
me, who happened to be born in Latvia, a Baltic country that had lost its 
independence during WWII, and re-established it only in the late twentieth 
century, after half a century of Soviet (and, for a short but significant period 
of time, also Nazi) rule.
The June 1940 occupation of Latvia by Soviet troops was only one 
consequence of the secret Soviet-Nazi agreement known as the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact, which was signed in 1939. This agreement dealt with a 
hypothetical (soon to become real) division of territories in East-Central 
Europe according to the zones of interest of two great colonial powers. In 
itself, a reminder of the late fifteenth-century Treaty of Tordesillas that 
divided the yet-to-be-colonized lands in South America, a newly discov-
ered continent in the Western Hemisphere. The Soviet-Nazi declaration 
of shared interests revealed two, unfortunately quite obvious, truths in 
a nutshell. First, ungrounded territorial requests by empires, both in the 
West and in the East, were still a living reality of the twentieth century; 
secondly, for the Baltic littoral (and for Poland), this particular treaty 
meant the continuation of the decades or centuries-long presence of for-
eign rulers.





Latvian multiculturalism and post-
colonialism
In the context of the discipline of postcolonial studies, the Baltic litto-
ral made its first appearance in the early twenty-first century. The ground-
breaking publication was that of Baltic Postcolonialism, a 2006 book edited 
by the Lithuanian exile scholar Violeta Kelertas that emerged through a close 
co-operation of established researchers whose academic affiliations were 
predominantly located in the West (Kerlertas 2006a). The solid academic 
background of the contributors secured an excellent contextualization of 
this inquiry into Western scholarly discourses. Baltic Postcolonialism laid a 
strong foundation for all subsequent attempts in the field, notwithstanding 
certain doubts in the Baltic community, which was not necessarily immedi-
ately open to the treatment of its experience in postcolonial terms. In her 
introduction, the editor takes a clear stand in this regard, stating that
“totalitarianism” never defined the Baltic case. […] The rich the-
ory developed around postcolonialism offers a more contemporary 
approach to analyzing the situation in the Baltic States and provides 
many useful insights in dealing with the past. Meanwhile the present 
remains contradictory (corruption, crime, disappointment in democ-
racy) and an excellent example of postcolonialism, in spite of the Baltic 
countries now having achieved membership in the European Union.
(Kelertas 2006b, 3)
Violeta Kelertas made an excellent choice, including an article by David 
Chioni Moore, that had already been printed several years earlier (Moore 
2006). The author was one of the first to indicate the absence of the Post-
Soviet sphere from the field of postcolonial studies, and more specifically, 
to position the three Baltic States in postcolonial contexts. The authority of 
Moore, and later also of Gayathri Chakravorty Spivak (Spivak 2006, 828) 
alongside other prominent postcolonial scholars, was of substantial support 
in opening doors for postcolonial investigations of the post-Soviet sphere.
The history of the Baltic littoral, however, reaches far beyond most recent 
political contexts and includes painful relations both with the East and the 
West. Even after the re-establishment of the independence of the Baltic 
countries, where Western neocolonialism started to manifest itself quickly 
in the guise of global capitalism and neoliberal economics, this dynamic 
hasn’t changed much. Further complicating the situation in the governing 
structures of the new states is the continuing presence of some elites cor-
rupted in Soviet times and also former collaborators of that regime.
The above description fits into the larger picture and provides a common 
background for most of the territory of East-Central Europe (a term we will 
return to later). The post-Soviet condition as the shared fate of the region has 
resonated into the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. In a powerful 
recent study, the Romanian scholar Bogdan Ştefănescu persuasively argues 
that postcolonialism and post-communism can be considered “siblings 
of subalternity.” According to Ştefănescu, “an ideological description of 
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postimperialist identities, whether postcolonial or postcommunist, should, 
therefore, look for structural relationships between colonizer and colonized, 
rather than to the particulars of colonization” (Ştefănescu 2013, 39).
In her book Worlds Apart? A Postcolonial Reading of post-1945 
East-Central European Culture, Cristina Şandru notes a split of cultural 
consciousness between Western and East-Central Europe, which has con-
tributed to the problematic attitudes and “Western practices of othering 
and peripheralisation, compounded by an uneasy recognition of these terri-
tories’ essential (though backward) Europeanness” (Şandru 2012, 22). The 
tension described has led to the rise of two mutually contrasting positions 
of East-Central European postcolonial scholars in their relation toward the 
West. One category of scholars, presumably the dominant, has been keen 
to claim that the area has always formed a substantial part of European 
modernity (Pucherová and Gáfrik 2015, 21). At the same time, and from 
a different perspective, such an approach has been linked with accusations 
of self-colonization. The neocolonial presence of Western powers in East-
Central Europe has been the object of this criticism, at times conceived in 
rather strong language and terms (Kovačević 2008).
Whatever their positions, the majority of scholars tend to share the dom-
inating self-evaluation of East-Central European communities and intel-
lectual elites alike. That position is focused on “the experience of former 
second-rate Europeans from Eastern Europe who for centuries have been 
multiply dependent on various empires and today slowly and painfully are 
re-entering the European world and wider, the global world” (Tlostanova 
2017, 16).
Summarizing the above opinions, it seems evident that if one wants to 
study an individual (and, more specifically, an intellectual) in post-Soviet 
space, it is necessary to recognize the potential overlap of postcolonial and 
post-communist discourses, as well as to pay due attention to each par-
ticular location. Thus, it is almost mandatory within the terms developed 
by postcolonial studies and post-Soviet studies to ask about the locus of 
enunciation.
In this chapter, I develop the following main points and concerns that 
relate to the issues at stake. First, I look at the importance of regional contex-
tualization of the countries of East-Central Europe from a comparative per-
spective. I argue that the area being discussed has throughout the centuries 
been characterized by a multinational milieu where, despite social inequali-
ties, different national and social groups existed side by side, even if they 
did not necessarily reach a mutual consensus. Second, I discuss the specific 
features of the Soviet colonial empire and its statist version of modernity. 
However, in my approach, I avoid an interpretation of the Soviet experience 
in terms of exceptionalism and look for comparative perspectives instead. 
Third, I proceed with the problem of marginalization of the local popula-
tion, a process that took place from 1940 on, and discuss to what extent 
it changed the structure of society in the Baltic littoral. In the fourth part, 
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I more specifically pay attention to literature as a source of multidirectional 
memory. The primary example here is the work of contemporary Latvian 
author Inga Ābele, with a special focus on her most recent novel, Duna 
(Drone), published in 2017. I will demonstrate, through a close reading 
of excerpts from the text, the attempt of the author to represent a kind of 
post-war milieu that is totally alienated from the local population, both in 
historical perspective and from the viewpoint of a contemporary author 
who tries to recover deeper layers of collective memory. An important part 
of this recovery consists of the need to engage in a multidirectional interpre-
tation and understanding of past events.
Regional contexts of postcolonial East-Central Europe
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the Baltic experience is 
gradually becoming more and more integrated into the constantly expand-
ing field of postcolonial studies. It is certainly important to position the 
Baltic case in a wider East-Central European perspective.
The most elaborated discussion of the societies and cultures of East-
Central Europe has been provided by the multi-volume project of the his-
tory of literary cultures edited by Marcel Cornis-Pope and John Neubauer. 
In their discussion of the choice of what term to use for the region, the edi-
tors aptly remark that “Mitteleuropa is both linguistically and ideologically 
oriented towards the German cultures, [while] ‘Eastern Europe’ suggests 
Russian hegemony” (Cornis-Pope and Neubauer 2004, 4). The same logic 
is then developed further:
For our purposes the unifying feature of East-Central Europe is the 
struggle of its peoples against the German and Russian hegemonic 
threats. In this sense, the region is a liminal and transitional space 
between the powers in the west and the east, a long but relatively nar-
row strip stretching from the Baltic countries in the north to Macedonia 
in the south.
The concept of this wide-ranging book is clearly the discovery of many 
overlapping layers of various (social and ethnic) experiences that are con-
currently shared by each local population. Specific regions of East-Central 
Europe have been discussed in numerous other investigations that come to 
similar conclusions with regard to the multi-ethnic and multicultural char-
acter of this territory (Cornis-Pope and Neubauer 2004, 6).
Analyses of ethnic and cultural diversity have also been undertaken 
in the context of the Baltic littoral. Including not only the history of the 
three major cities, Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn, but also in minor locations 
and rural areas. For example, Riga as a multi-ethnic metropolis has been 
dealt with from the viewpoint of different national groups (Oberländer 
and Wohlfahrt 2004), while early twentieth-century Vilnius has provided 
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a fascinating terrain for studies of the co-existence of a number of literary 
cultures (Kvietkauskas 2007).
After World War II, scholars in exile were equally keen to discuss the 
Baltic littoral, not only as a stage of important historical events but also as 
an area of constant migration and multicultural encounters. This was also 
done for ideological purposes in order to provide a counter-narrative to the 
dictates of the Soviet communist ideology, according to which the Soviet 
rule in 1940 should be looked upon as the beginning of history for the Baltic 
nations. If there had ever been any previous developments, they had to be 
directly linked to the importance of contacts with the eastern neighbors.
Thus, it is noticeable that in the course of and after WWII, and with 
the overwhelmingly dominating rhetoric of “the great Russian nation,” an 
ideological rupture on a scale previously unknown in the area occurred. 
Already in 1939, after the Soviet-Nazi pact defined separate spheres of 
imperial interest, almost all the local population of Baltic Germans, who 
for centuries had lived in Latvia and Estonia, and whose families had their 
historical roots there, left for Germany in order to escape the upcoming 
military confrontation between the two political powers. Further conse-
quences can be seen as a result of Soviet nationalities policies. Here it is 
sufficient to say that in the post-war reality a new group in society was cre-
ated, a pseudo-unit of a “Russian-speaking community,” predominantly 
consisting of new settlers (of different nationalities). Using their knowl-
edge of the Russian language as a marker, this group was ideologically 
opposed to the local population. Traces of this oppositional approach 
have remained so permanent that they are still alive in the Baltic littoral 
almost 30 years after independence. The presence of “Russian speakers” 
in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, along with their self-proclaimed politi-
cal necessity to defend their interests, remains a major rhetorical tool con-
stantly employed by Russian state propaganda.
Thus, despite the fact that scholars who research East-Central European 
countries have sufficient arguments to claim that the area has always 
formed a substantial part of European modernity, an undeniable imprint 
has been left by Russia’s territorial, as well as ideological and political, 
claims and ambitions. Followed (in the twentieth century) by the Soviet 
Union, an empire torn apart by its own internal contradictions that in an 
apt phrase by Madina Tlostanova, has been stuck in a deadlock of being 
“a paradigmatic second-class empire” with an explicit inferiority complex 
and politics which “reflect and distort the Western originals” (Tlostanova 
2012, 135–136).
One of the aims of this chapter is to detect the painful consequences of 
the Russian/Soviet imperial policies as well as imprints of coloniality which 
have been left in the Baltic littoral while simultaneously keeping an eye on 
the fact that, in cases when the Baltic peoples have been exposed to different 
forms of expansionism originating in the West, Russian influence should 
neither be overestimated nor isolated from other historical developments.
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The Soviet colonial empire and its ideology of modernity
In this section, I proceed with a brief discussion of the compatibility of 
Soviet and Western narratives of progress, with a special focus on the con-
cept of Soviet modernity. Michael David-Fox, who has devoted a book-
length investigation into the topic of Soviet modernity and ideology, points 
out that from a scholarly point of view there have been two dominant 
approaches. Some researchers have argued that the development of Russia 
in the twentieth century, leading to the establishment of the Soviet Union 
and the rise of the ideology of communism, has shown a unique path, while 
others insist on the comparability of the Soviet case: “The binary oppo-
site of uniqueness was the equation of the Soviet order with other socie-
ties, which for convenience I refer to here as generic or ‘shared’ modernity” 
(David-Fox 2015, 2). Further reflecting on the idea of shared or multiple 
modernities, David-Fox comments on the contradictory nature of the his-
torical developments in Russia itself, reminding us that the early attempts 
at Europeanization, promoted by Peter the Great, have been passionately 
confronted with the concept of the unique nature of Russian identity that in 
the nineteenth century formed a fierce opposition to the ideas of so-called 
Westerners. This tension also helps to explain why twentieth-century com-
munist ideology, even if constantly employing the rhetoric of progress and 
liberation, was itself tormented by the wish to catch up with developments 
in the West while struggling with its own subalternity complex. This situa-
tion made Soviet policies in the Western borderlands it controlled even more 
straightforward in order to secure a sufficient level of control. The ill-fated 
Soviet nationalities policies certainly contributed to the relentless, even if to 
a great extent silenced, opposition of the local population in the Baltic litto-
ral. This was one of the principal failures of the regime and one that proved 
the attempted Soviet version of modernity to be unsustainable.
On the imagined road to progress and leading toward the triumph of com-
munism, the Stalinist era was one of the most outspoken periods of transfor-
mation. As David-Fox asserts, “Stalin’s Soviet Union, with its state ownership 
of the economy, ban on private property, takeover of autonomous organi-
zations, and massive and relentless, if rampantly inefficient and bumbling, 
bureaucracy developed perhaps the most intrusive state and authoritarian 
‘high modernist’ ideology of all” (David-Fox 2015, 5). A major failure, how-
ever, was the incompatibility of the interests of the state, on the one hand, 
with the improvement of conditions on the level of personal lives, on the 
other. Despite officially enforced optimism, it was the lack of individual 
involvement and initiative that contradicted the statist version of modernity 
promoted by the imperial rulers. In the Baltic littoral, and to a proportionally 
much greater extent than in other parts of the Soviet Union, this led to an 
economic decline when compared to the pre-war situation in the independ-
ent states. Eventually, the failed mobilization of people resulted in a political 
disaster that helped determine the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.
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In accordance with the popular disagreement with the Soviet version of 
modernity, we can identify the lack of consensus with the official rhetoric of 
the regime among local populations as one of the most important causes of 
the decline of the Soviet project. This kind of inner discord, despite the grow-
ing awareness of the temporary inevitability of the regime and the necessity 
to adapt oneself to the existing conditions of everyday life, remained a con-
stant feature of the Soviet period (Annus 2018, 99).
On a psychological level, disagreement with Soviet power always 
remained in place and generated feelings that can be attributed to colo-
nial sensibilities. This can be shown by contemporary discussions on the 
nature of Soviet hegemony in the Baltic littoral. In her 2012 article, Epp 
Annus convincingly demonstrates that the temporal sequence of events was 
of vital importance in establishing a long-term presence of foreign rule. The 
initial occupation was followed by consecutive measures that strengthened 
the colonial matrix of power despite the paradoxical reality that colonial 
relations were imposed on modern twentieth-century nation-states (Annus 
2012, 35–38). Thus, the concept of coloniality proves to be even more pain-
ful than that of occupation, still more frequently in use. Kevin M.F. Platt 
notes that contemporary politicians would prefer the term occupation. He 
argues that “the Latvian historical discourse of ‘occupation’ may be seen to 
oppose an alternate discourse of colonization” (Platt 2013, 139). The con-
sequences of the occupation of the independent Baltic countries proved to 
be even more dramatic in the long term as the effects of the colonial matrix 
of power inscribed their lasting effects on the minds and bodies of the local 
population. It is possibly for this reason that “Soviet colonialism” remains a 
term less frequently approved of and used by the Baltic communities.
Simultaneously, it is exactly the understanding of the processes of global 
coloniality as inextricably linked to modernity that might help Baltic socie-
ties to avoid an interpretation of their experience from a narrowed stand-
point and provide it with a wider perspective.
The marginalization of the local population as the loss of place
In the 1930s, the Soviet government crystalized its future plans where one 
of the most prominent roles was ascribed to the restructuring of the earlier 
image of cities. “Architecture’s central role in Stalinist culture has its own 
logic in that building and spatial organization lie at the heart of Marx’s 
account of society: the base-and-superstructure model. This potential was 
picked up in Bolshevik Party rhetoric about ‘building communism’” (Clark 
2003, 4). The process was promoted from 1931 on, when the Party ple-
num in June discussed a plan for rebuilding many major Soviet cities, and 
in the center of this undertaking stood Moscow as the legitimate example 
while it “was not merely a model; it was also the seat of power” (Clark 
2003, 6). This kind of development did not take into account local specif-
ics, to which the plan to rebuild Vilnius, developed in 1940 and 1941, also 
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testifies: “Its principal aim was to rid Vilnius of its old-town core, with its 
irrational, narrow, serpentine streets, including the old Jewish quarter. In 
this instance, the layout of the city was described as ‘semi-feudal,’ and the 
‘chaotic, haphazard arrangement’ of buildings was blamed on ‘bourgeois 
Poland’” (Davoliūtė 2016, 54).
Even if these plans never materialized, they demonstrate how little appre-
ciation of the uniqueness of the local environment was apparent in the 
minds of the ideologues and builders of Soviet modernity. The effect that 
was aimed at by such an approach (and finally indeed reached by other 
means that included the construction of new Soviet suburbs in major cities 
and the complete destruction of the traditional way of life and housing in 
the villages) is comparable to the feelings of alienation that were created by 
war-torn landscapes, as well as by the experience of exile people forced to 
flee from their native environment. This is how human geographer Edmunds 
Valdemārs Bunkše describes this latter aspect, from the perspective of war 
and exile: “Since I was dispossessed of my homeland at an early age, my life 
has been dominated by a conscious awareness of home and homelessness, 
of being on the road both literally and metaphorically” (Bunkše 2004, 6). 
He goes on to comment on his childhood memories: “I experienced enough 
fear, anxiety, and loss, enough armies (four), enough shelling, bombing, 
strafing, and shooting (including a bullet wound at the age of seven) for 
them to be a permanent part of my being—tissues, nerve endings, psyche” 
(Bunkše 2004, 6).
The Latvian art historian Jānis Kalnačs has recently completed a pains-
taking examination of the process of the appropriation of flats in Riga that 
were abandoned when their inhabitants were forced to flee under the threat 
of Soviet occupation at the end of WWII. Kalnačs makes a telling remark 
in an interview, that he would like to encounter a single flat in Riga where 
the same family would have lived for several generations, and that to his 
knowledge there is no such place (Nagle 2018, 28). The experience of utter 
destruction was made even more painful by the fact that Sovietization in 
the Baltic littoral overlapped with the devastating impact of Nazi rule; the 
Soviet occupation came first, and its later steps were partially preceded (and 
partially overshadowed) by Nazi atrocities (Davoliūtė 2016, 52). The war 
and exile in the Baltic littoral resulted in destroyed cities that to a considera-
ble extent were void of local people. The consequences of these tragic events 
initiated the feeling of inescapable and painful loss, described by Cristina 
Şandru in East-Central European perspective in terms of the need to recover 
the lost layers of experience: “One other thing that postcolonial and post-
communist cultures share is the experience of trauma and the predominance 
of the retrospective look, an almost obsessive calling to account of the past, 
in all its forms; their major tonality is the confessional, with undertones of 
nostalgia or anger” (Şandru 2012, 31).
The projections of post-war Soviet architecture in the Baltic littoral, as part 
of “building communism,” were inevitably confronted by the reality of writing 
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from the ruins in a metaphorical as well as a direct sense. Taking into consid-
eration the more than complicated responses to the question, “what does it 
mean to write and remember from the site of a ruin?” (Rothberg 2009, 135), 
I see the problem of marginalization of the local population, caused by mul-
tiple destructions, in the context of the necessity to recover multidirectional 
memory. This recovery solely can bring together different manifestations of 
oppression in the area (including the Holocaust) and also ask, what did it 
mean for local people of different nationalities in the Baltic littoral to start 
their life again from scratch, and thus also to write from the ruins?
The following observation by Michael Rothberg, drawn in another con-
text, seems also fully applicable to our case: “It is not simply that [André] 
Schwarz-Bart’s experience as the son of Holocaust victims opens him to the 
suffering of others—although this is certainly true—but also that a recogni-
tion of the other’s suffering opens up a new way of thinking about his own 
historical location” (Rothberg 2009, 139).
Literature as a source of multidirectional memory
The growing intensity of the quest for truth in the Baltic littoral is well docu-
mented by the often-repeated observation that history has become a popular 
topic, and there is a particular interest in twentieth-century history. In this 
context, it is important to note that recent Latvian fiction, moving beyond 
the limits of national memory, pays tribute to the multilingual society of 
Latvia and reflects on the diversity of everyday experience. Several impor-
tant texts, among them Duna (Drone), the most recent novel of celebrated 
prose writer Inga Ābele (born 1972), tackles events linked to the experience 
of WWII and its aftermath of occupation, war, and suffering, and the effects 
on people. Through the experience of time and space, an intriguing inter-
play between forgetting and remembering is established.
As Katerina Clark notes of the Soviet Union, “[t]he entire country was 
organized in a hierarchy of spheres of relative sacredness, a cartography 
of power. It was the task of socialist realism, whether in art, in film, or 
in literature, to present the public with its landmarks and its route maps” 
(Clark 2003, 8). The political power paradoxically enough had its impact 
on the flow of time and partially on the landscape. However, through the 
act of remembering not only are the lost threads of individual lives being 
recovered, but this process evolves in the same locations, bringing together 
different layers of experience. As pointed out by Aleida Assmann, “what 
time has made invisible through removal and destruction is still mysteri-
ously retained by place” (Assmann 2013, 294). Writing more specifically 
from the perspective of postcolonial studies, Madina Tlostanova stresses 
the recovery of space as one of the most important issues for postcolonial 
societies: “Rediscovering and re-inhabiting a certain space and the return of 
spatiality is an important tendency of contemporary cultures” (Tlostanova 
2015, 32–33.).
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Contemporary Latvian authors who focus on the traumatic experience 
of the past provide various frames of reference. Trauma is one of the driv-
ing forces in re-appreciation of passing time, which in this case “does not 
propel the disappearance but (re-)emergence of memory” (Assmann and 
Shortt 2012, 6), and this also refers to the evaluation of culture left behind 
by Soviet ideology. In the officially promoted art form of socialist real-
ism, “[t]he positive hero encapsulates the cardinal public virtues, and his 
or her career over the course of the novel symbolically recapitulates the 
nation’s progress toward communism, thereby legitimating the status quo 
and affirming that Soviet society is on the correct, Marxist-Leninist track” 
(Clark 2003, 3). For the Baltic cultures of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century, there has been an obvious necessity to challenge and 
overthrow such narrative patterns.
Clearly, contemporary literary practices have moved beyond the stage of 
“writing back” to metropolitan cultures. However, the question of choice of 
literary form, especially when historical issues are at stake, is still relevant. 
One of the principal tasks in this process, as clearly put forward by John 
McLeod, is to dispute the view that looks at “colonial people and places 
as essentially devoid of any meaningful history, culture, and creativity of 
their own” (McLeod 2013, 452). In the context of Latvian culture, this task 
has been consciously undertaken by the recent series of historical novels 
which deal with twentieth-century experience. The specific dates and events 
tackled by the authors cover the uprising of 1905 in the Russian empire, 
the events of the Great War, the creation of the independent republic of 
Latvia in 1918, the authoritarian regime of the second half of the 1930s, the 
Soviet occupation in 1940, which was almost immediately followed by mass 
deportations of the local population, and the ascent of Nazi rule in 1941. 
Several novels deal with the traumatic events of Soviet rule after World 
War II. Of crucial importance for this undertaking is the fact that, while 
born during the Soviet era, all the authors have experienced the transition 
from one regime to another and are able to provide a critical evaluation of 
both previous and present (post-Soviet and neocolonial) reality. Discussions 
about these texts also cross generational boundaries, and readers of the 
series include people who do not usually pay serious attention to fictional 
texts. This is not only additional proof that this series contributes to a seri-
ous discussion on matters of history and memory but also an indication that 
Latvian society recognizes the necessity for such an evaluation.
In the final part of this chapter, I discuss some characteristic aspects of 
one of the novels in the series Duna (Drone), written by Inga Ābele. This text 
has two narrative paths that link contemporary and historical experience.
The novel begins with the first-person female narrator, who is look-
ing for a witness of past events personally related to her family story, and 
meets an elderly man. Their conversations, evolving after a grudging initial 
response from the new acquaintance, who is unwillingly confronted with 
painful memories of his past, gradually lead to a partial recovery of the lost 
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experience. An album with old drawings, introduced by the narrator as a 
link between the two people, provides the connection that stimulates a revi-
talization of their memory archive.
The main focus of the novel is post-WWII Riga. At the very beginning 
of the narrative, the protagonist’s long walk through streets that are well-
known to him introduces scenery that by the late 1940s had almost com-
pletely changed its appearance. Old houses are filled with new inhabitants. 
There is an overwhelming presence of war invalids on the streets. These are 
predominantly new settlers, people who have been involved in the warfare—
which was declared a patriotic duty—who now are completely uprooted 
and left without sufficient support to lead a decent life. An encounter with 
a group of such people, at St Peter’s church in Riga that has been partially 
destroyed during the war, provides a telling example of the situation. The 
church interior is almost empty at night, and a group of invalids settled 
there are warming themselves by a fire. This is a situation that is in complete 
contrast to the previous functions of the building. It doesn’t provide any 
perspective for the outcasts of society, nor for potential believers who might 
be willing to attend the sacred place. Local people have left their homes, or 
in the case of those who stayed, have been completely alienated from the 
environment.
The Riga racehorse track serves as one of the principal metaphors in the 
novel and acquires various important meanings. First, it is one of the land-
marks of the pre-war city of Riga, known as a bustling and vital place with 
numerous cultural and leisure opportunities. A significant part of the narra-
tive is made up of stories about the former glory of this place. Eventually, as 
the author remarks in the Afterword to her novel, the Riga racehorse track 
was shut down in 1965, and, from then on, a disruption in time continued 
(Ābele 2017, 420). As I strolled through this area in my childhood, there 
was only a huge empty and abandoned place of no use for any purposes. 
In the twenty-first century, new construction has begun that transforms the 
environment beyond recognition.
Second, people encountered in the novel as employees of the race track 
share memories of the pre-war period. Irrespective of their different ethnic 
backgrounds, the majority of them embody ethic norms characteristic of the 
society of the independence period. They are characterized by a true affec-
tion for the horses that goes far beyond their professional duties.
Third, the Stalinist era is clearly distinguished by the arrival of new 
people and changing relations on all levels. The very first encounter in 
the novel that relates to the events of 1949, when the historic narrative 
starts to develop, reveals a meeting of the protagonist with two unfamiliar 
people who are impatiently waiting for him at the sidelines of the horse 
race. They introduce themselves with important keywords that make an 
immediate sharp cut through the unpleasant foggy air of the early spring 
morning. One of them declares his links to the KGB, while the other works 
at the Department for Agriculture and has been given the task of making 
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himself familiar with the situation in Latvia. He comes from Moscow, and 
this reminder of the intrusion of the imperial center is enough to create an 
immediately chilly atmosphere, not expressed in words but rather revealed 
by the sudden awareness of the protagonist that a new timeline has entered 
the race course.
The events of the novel unfold in the weeks leading up to a mass-scale 
deportation of the Baltic people, that was carried out simultaneously in all 
three occupied countries on March 15, 1949. In order to demonstrate the full 
extent to which the rupture of the Soviet occupation has changed the lives of 
the local population, the narrative also covers earlier historical events.
It is obvious that the current rise of historical fiction in Latvia is closely 
linked with a re-evaluation of history after the restoration of independence 
of the Baltic States in 1991 and with the recent political changes in East-
Central Europe. After the initial period of applying postmodernism to liter-
ary theory and practice, especially during the 1990s, a gradual return of 
interest to social and political issues, and among other themes to the re-
interpretation of history and memory, has acquired a growing importance.
Conclusion
The analysis attempted here has followed recent trajectories in the field of 
postcolonial studies and noticed that it constantly becomes increasingly 
inclusive, allowing for a comparative approach to a number of experiences 
formerly treated in mutual isolation. In the context of East-Central Europe, 
and more specifically the Baltic littoral that has been the focus of this exami-
nation, these scholarly developments lead to at least two important observa-
tions. First, there is a new stimulus to look at Baltic literatures from a broad 
comparative perspective, one that lifts them out of isolation and engenders 
previously unnoticed connections. Second, in tracing the development of 
societies in the Baltic littoral and in the process of discovering hidden lay-
ers of experience, it gradually becomes possible to evaluate the lively and 
multicultural nature of earlier encounters in the area. This helps to look far 
beyond contemporary social tensions that are rooted in the relatively recent 
ideological dictates of the colonial center.
Thus, postcolonial studies remains a fertile research terrain. One that, 
on one hand, has yet to come to terms with the swift expansion of its own 
development, and on the other, could appreciate the ever more widening 
scope of potential discoveries and conclusions that remain fascinating and 
enable truly global visions.
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Part IV
Yet another major challenge

15
In recent years, postcolonial and other scholars have articulated various 
elements of a critique of the Anthropocene discourse which has mostly 
centered on its universalistic implications (Baucom 2012, 2014; Emmett 
and Lekan 2016). As a result, the Anthropocene discourse has been 
significantly elaborated and differentiated. This chapter differentiates 
between five Anthropocene narratives and sketches a distinct critique of 
each of them from the perspective of postcolonial studies and ecocriti-
cism. The Anthropocene hypothesis interprets human agency as a geo-
logical force that fundamentally affects all aspects of the Earth system, 
in particular through anthropogenic climate change, species extinction, 
and land use change. Therefore, as has been articulated in the fields of 
ecocriticism and environmental humanities, it is important for a post-
colonial critique to include an ecological perspective (DeLoughrey et al. 
2015; Heise et al. 2017).
My point of departure is the observation by the historian Dipesh 
Chakrabarty that as human agency has transformed the Earth system, 
“humans now exist in two modes […]: as a geophysical force and as a 
political agent” (Chakrabarty 2012, 14). Elaborating on this double bind, 
Chakrabarty argues that globalization and climate change challenge us “to 
think human agency over multiple and incommensurable scales at once” 
(ibid.) and that we therefore need the historical insights of enlightenment, 
postmodernism, and species thinking disjunctively. Chakrabarty concludes 
that “the idea of the human needs to be stretched beyond where postco-
lonial thought advanced it” (ibid., 15). Following Chakrabarty’s line of 
thought, the postcolonial perspective needs to reflect on the human condi-
tion against the background of global spatial scales and deep time: It needs 
to reflect without losing sight of the different impacts of “environmen-
tal violence” (Nixon 2011, 8) on different groups or communities across 
the world and the different voices that respond to the challenges of the 
Anthropocene.
Another important point of departure is Chakrabarty’s earlier, much- 
discussed article, “The Climate of History: Four theses,” in which he pro-
poses a “negative universal history” in the face of the global climate crisis 
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which raises the question of a “human collectivity” (Chakrabarty 2009, 
222). The article’s suggestion of a “new universalism” received many critical 
responses, including the RCC journal special issue, “Whose Anthropocene. 
Revisiting Dipesh Chakrabarty’s ‘Four Theses’,” which articulates the need 
to redefine the “onto-existential status” of anthropos (Emmet and Lekan 
2016, 10). As “ecocriticism and postcolonialism have every reason to be 
suspicious, if not necessarily dismissive of humanism, which has been rou-
tinely attacked for practising a selective universalism that disguises specific 
race, class, gender” (Huggan and Tiffin 2010, 206), it is important to pay 
attention to “multiple fractions of humanity” and “diverse communities,” 
recalling the tools of social sciences (McAfee 2016, 72).
Keeping in mind that the postcolonial approach requires an “always cul-
turally situated” understanding of knowledge and experiences of ecology 
(DeLoughrey et al. 2015, 9), this chapter applies a postcolonial and ecocriti-
cal perspective to critically assess five different strands of the Anthropocene 
discourse. The first section briefly explains the perspectives of postcolonial 
ecocriticism and the broader field of environmental humanities. The second 
section introduces the Anthropocene concept and distinguishes five narra-
tives of the Anthropocene. The third section provides a critical discussion 
of these narratives, from the perspective of postcolonial ecocriticism and 
environmental humanities.
Postcolonial ecocriticism
Mutual engagement between the fields of postcolonialism and ecocriticism 
has been a surprisingly recent occurrence. Four reasons have been suggested 
for the long span of “mutually constitutive silences between environmental 
and postcolonial literary studies” (Nixon 2005, 235): (i) While scholars of 
postcolonialism have “foregrounded hybridity and cross-culturation,” eco-
criticism has “historically been drawn to discourses of purity: virgin wilder-
ness, and the preservation of ‘uncorrupted’ last great places” (ibid.); (ii) 
while postcolonialism is concerned with displacement, mobility, and dias-
pora, ecocriticism turns to the ethics of locality and “Heimat,” stressing the 
“sense of place,” and appears more open to the literatures of indigenous cul-
tures than postcolonial studies; (iii) while postcolonial studies has “tended 
to favor the cosmopolitan and the transnational” (ibid.) and defined itself as 
“urban-metropolitan” (Mackenthun 2015, 85), earlier ecocriticism concen-
trated on the pastoral and wilderness as the national emblem of US identity 
(Heise 2015a, 21). This identity also inspired the bioregionalism movement 
which advocates rootedness in a certain place and “remains [often] inside a 
spiritualized and naturalized national frame” (Nixon 2005, 236) (iv). While 
postcolonial studies are strongly concerned with the “marginalized past: 
history from below and border history” (ibid., 235) and excavate colonial 
and migrant memory, the (earlier) ecocriticism often seemed ahistorical and 
“subordinated to the pursuit of timeless, solitary moments of communion 
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with nature” (ibid.). Conversely, Pablo Mukherjee (2010) has accentuated 
the complex interdependencies of environmental conditions and social, his-
torical, and cultural factors, emphasizing the link between space and cul-
tural diversity.
Another equally controversial strand of this field is the discussion on envi-
ronmental and climate justice in regards to the North-South divide. It harks 
back to the environmental justice movement present in the US since the 
late 1970s, which—although not a postcolonial project in the first place— 
rapidly spread across the globe. Its continuing influence has been visible, for 
example, in the climate marches during the climate summit in New York 
City (2014) and Paris (2015) and in the now globally organized Peoples 
Climate Movement.2 The environmental justice movement draws attention 
to the fact that people of color, the poor, and other minorities often live 
in polluted environments and aims to improve their living conditions by 
“creating multi-racial, multi-class, and transnational coalitions” (di Chiro 
2016, 375). The practice in industrialized nations of locating nuclear reac-
tor plants on reservations or properties of indigenous people has produced 
concepts such as “radioactive colonialism” or “environmental racism” 
(cf. Mackenthun 2015, 81).
Another important aspect of postcolonialism is its attempt to decolo-
nize the relationship with nature. Val Plumwood has criticized the enduring 
construction of the “Other”—be it land, be it human or nonhuman popu-
lations—as part of the Eurocentric hegemonic system. The dualism of the 
colonized “Other” exaggerates differences by radical exclusion, homogeni-
zation and stereotyping, polarization, assimilation, and instrumentalization. 
This “centric structure imposes a form of rationality” and “insensitivity 
to the Other’s needs, agency and prior claims” (Plumwood 2003, 59–60); 
it construes humans as the only agents in the world; thereby conceiving 
indigenous land mostly as inferior, silent, and empty (Plumwood 2003, 65). 
In contrast, postcolonial environmentalism aims for a re-conceptualization 
of nature through alternative concepts of wilderness, attention to property 
relations, to indigenous knowledge and practices, and through renaming 
and empowering the local place and “more-than-human sphere as major 
constituents of identity and meaning” (Plumwood 2003, 67). Postcolonial 
ecocriticism also connects the notions of indigeneity with an understanding 
of land not as an object of exploitation but as a “protagonist in its own 
right” (Banerjee 2016, 194).
In times of globalization, ecological thought has further developed by 
“decentering environmentalism” and diversifying its scope to create a 
“transnational ethics of place” (Nixon 2005, 243). Many scholars in this 
field have emphasized that environmentalism can no longer be limited to 
immediate nature experience and the local, that it should be expanded 
to what Ursula Heise calls “eco-cosmopolitanism” in which a “sense of 
place” is inter-connected with a “sense of planet” (Heise 2008, 61–62) to 
include issues of ecojustice. The first wave of eco-cosmopolitanism brought 
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a perspective of comparative cultural theory into environmental thought 
and highlighted the diverse social and cultural understandings of human-
nature-relations. More recent eco-cosmopolitanism has broadened its lens 
to include multispecies ethnography (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010), and the 
multispecies justice movement, in order to make room for the stories, rights, 
and cultures of humans in different geopolitical spaces and social institu-
tions as well for the rights of nonhuman species (Heise 2015a, 28).
The extension of the field of ecocriticism to eco-cosmopolitanism 
is relevant for a critique of the Anthropocene discourse. If we follow 
Chakrabarty’s suggestion of stretching the human as a political agent in 
postcolonial thinking to the human as a geological force, we need to com-
plement the postcolonial critique of the Anthropocene with an ecocritical 
analysis. This inter alia allows us to connect the local and the global, cultur-
ally situated knowledge and universal concerns without reducing the one to 
the other. A recent volume explores how postcolonial thinking is “integral” 
to global ecologies and the environmental humanities as a wider field of eco-
criticism (DeLoughrey et al. 2015, 2). The editors emphasize that postco-
lonial-informed environmental humanities are not only “‘interdisciplinary, 
transnational, and comparative’” but also “self-reflexive in [their] engage-
ment with histories and knowledges of ecological difference” (DeLoughrey 
et al. 2015, 3). Concerning the global nature of environmental crises which 
“require collective response,” they stress the need to consider the “posi-
tionality of such claims” (DeLoughrey et al. 2015, 6), “emphasize tensions 
between different forms of knowledge,” and “focus attention on how power 
relations affect environmental decision[-]making and practices at multiple 
scales, from domestic to the global” (DeLoughrey et al. 2015, 10). The fol-
lowing narrative analysis of the Anthropocene discourse takes up these con-
cerns and enables a reflexive ecocritical and postcolonial critique.
 Narratives of the Anthropocene
The Anthropocene concept originates from Earth system analysis and 
conceptualizes anthropos as a planetary geophysical force (Crutzen and 
Stoermer 2000; Crutzen 2002). The Anthropocene connects current action-
oriented time horizons with deep history and deep future. An important 
part of discussion in the natural sciences is the periodization of the new 
geological epoch. After different suggestions of chronostratigraphical mark-
ers (around 8,000 BC, around 1610 due to the consequences of European 
colonialism, and late eighteenth century with the invention of the steam 
engine and the following industrial revolution) in recent years, the time 
around 1950 and the following Great Acceleration is seen “as stratigraphi-
cally optimal” (Zalasiewicz et al. 2015, 196). While official recognition of 
the new geological epoch by the authoritative Geological Society London 
is still pending, further meanings of the Anthropocene have already been 
established: It refers to the changes in the Earth systems and it marks a 
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“threshold” in the relations between human and nature (Hamilton et al. 
2015, 3). For example, at least 75 percent of the inhabitable Earth sur-
face has been transformed by humans into “anthromes,” “anthropogenic 
biomes” (Ellis 2011, 1010).
Beyond geology and natural sciences, the Anthropocene idea has been 
influential in various fields of science, from social economy and science and 
technology studies to law and political sciences, from architecture, urban 
studies, and archeology to philosophy, history, literary studies, and the arts. 
Its broad resonance in media, exhibitions, and the public sphere shows that 
the originally geological concept also functions as a “cultural concept” which 
“blurs established boundaries on many different levels between science and 
the public as well as the sciences and the humanities” (Trischler 2016, 318). 
In this respect the Anthropocene can serve as an inter- and transdisciplinary 
concept, bridging different discourses and disciplines (Dürbeck 2015).
The Anthropocene concept has been presented as a narrative from the 
beginning, as a story with protagonists, a plot with cause-effect relation-
ships, a spatial and temporal structure that serves the purpose of the founda-
tion of meaning. The protagonist is the entire human species, a geophysical 
force that leaves a footprint on the planet which will still be detectable in 
the sediments, for example by radioactive isotopes, even after hundreds of 
thousands of years (Steffen et al. 2015, 81). Narratives are “central cultural 
forms of expression, which contribute significantly to culture’s self-interpre-
tation and the construction of meaning” (Erll and Roggendorf 2002, 79). 
The narratives of the Anthropocene provide orientation in light of an enor-
mous complexity of causal relationships, feedback loops, and unintended 
side-effects of human activities. In a large body of scientific and journalistic 
texts, five narratives of the Anthropocene can be distinguished (Dürbeck 
2019): (i) the disaster narrative, which considers the Anthropocene as the 
sum of environmental depletion; (ii) the court narrative, which blames the 
developed countries in the Global North and the neoliberal socioeconomic 
system as generators of global environmental destruction, proposing terms 
like “Technocene,” “Capitalocene,” or “Plutocene”; (iii) the narrative of the 
Great Transformation, which advocates for efforts to mitigate the causes of 
environmental destruction along with reasonable adaptation to Earth sys-
tem changes, using novel technologies and higher environmental efficiency; 
(iv) the (bio-)technological narrative, which propagates technocratic inter-
ventions such as geoengineering and ecomodernist ideas; and finally, (v) 
the reflexively oriented interdependency narrative of nature-culture, which 
presents the Anthropocene as an opportunity to rethink mankind from a 
posthumanist perspective.
These five narratives articulate divergent political, economic, ethical, and 
anthropological interests and values while at the same time displaying many 
overlapping elements and motifs. Strategically, the Anthropocene narratives 
propose certain measures to address the global climate crisis and to stay 
within “planetary boundaries” (Rockström et al. 2009). In a reflexive sense, 
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Anthropocene narratives question established human self-understanding 
and reassess dominant epistemological categories (e.g. the subject/object 
or the nature/culture dichotomies). At a structural level, the Anthropocene 
appears as a “meta-narrative” (Dürbeck 2019) that interprets anthropos as 
a geophysical force, has a deep-time dimension, adopts a planetary perspec-
tive on global environmental change, assumes that nature and culture are 
inseparable, and calls for humanity’s responsibility.
 Postcolonial ecocriticism and narratives  
of the Anthropocene
From the perspective of postcolonial ecocriticism, the cultural Anthropocene 
discourse must not fall behind established levels of reflexivity in “a world 
of difference” (O’Brien 2001, 140). Contra this standard, a key question is 
to what extent the shift from “infra-human concerns” for the struggle of 
freedom to a “trans-human category of species” (Baucom 2014, 125) can 
integrate a “culturally differentiated, historically nuanced understanding of 
human-environmental relations” (DeLoughrey et al. 2015, 9). This section 
sketches, in a stylized manner, how a postcolonial ecocritical analysis of 
the five Anthropocene narratives can unveil different degrees of openness 
and reflectedness towards cultural differences, the positionality of interests, 
questions of ecojustice, implicit reproductions of power structures, experi-
ences of environmental violence, and rupture.
Ambivalence in the disaster narrative
Numerous scholars describe the Anthropocene as a “message of almost 
unsurpassable moral-political urgency” and diagnose an “apocalyptic 
logic” in the discourse (Sloterdijk 2015, 25, 36). Humanity, for example, 
is characterized as a “‘planetary killer, concerned only with its own short-
term survival’” (cf. Chakarabarty 2009, 210). The “Collapse of Western 
Civilization” (Oreskes and Conway 2014) appears unavoidable. Philosopher 
Claire Colebrook questions the human capability to overcome anthropocen-
trism and “myopia of the future” (Colebrook 2014, 203), which she attrib-
utes to the managerialist approach dominant in climate change discourse. 
Stories of anthropogenic devastation and species extinction are often articu-
lated in a melancholic language and use metaphors of illness (“sick planet”) 
and decay (the Earth covered by mold). Thus, the disaster narrative has an 
alarming effect and a precautionary function for its audiences. Contra to 
this pessimistic view, prominent voices from the natural sciences often por-
tray humans as masters of the Earth by deploying green technological and 
economical solutions.
From the perspective of postcolonial ecocriticism, one should first ask 
which audiences are actually addressed by the catastrophic outlooks and 
from which position. The disaster narrative is usually directed at Western 
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audiences; it names and shames globalized industry, technology, and capital-
istic systems and calls for fundamental cultural change, focusing on strategic 
purpose. Certainly, warning against a disastrous future also has a reflective 
mode, questioning the established human self-understanding. Given its mostly 
Western audience, the disaster narrative often unreflectively reproduces a 
center-periphery hierarchy. In reality, the effects of climate and environmental 
change in the rich countries of the global North (the center) are foregrounded, 
while the impact on the poorer and vulnerable countries in the Global South 
(extreme weather events such as droughts, storms, and devastating floods, 
environmental pollution, over-fishing, resource decline, etc.) appear more 
remote and are pushed into the background. From a postcolonial and ecocrit-
icism perspective, the disaster narrative appears ambivalent: while it problem-
atizes ecological violence, it neglects differential vulnerabilities. The disaster 
narrative tends to neglect issues of environmental justice, when for example 
the impacts of global environmental change hit the poor in the Global South, 
particularly women in rural areas (Huggan and Tiffin 2010, 52, 56), much 
harder than the main culprits. The effect is a strong global discrepancy of both 
CO2 emissions and burden sharing of climate change (Althor et al. 2016). 
Postcolonial ecocriticism calls attention to the implicit reproduction of power 
structures that emphasizes the agency of the Global North and neglects the 
voices in the global periphery. It calls for a more prominent inclusion of the 
disaster experienced and the agency at the periphery, a more multi-perspecti-
val narration, and a more differentiated consideration of audiences.
Differentiating humanity in the court narrative
When humans collectively are considered a geological force that changes the 
climate and the Earth system, an important question is, “who is the ‘we’ of 
this process?” (Chakrabarty 2012, 10). In recent years, a controversy has 
emerged in political science, philosophy, and cultural theory about ques-
tions such as: Who has caused the environmental destruction? Is the whole 
of humanity in the dock? Who is the judge? In this context, philosopher 
Peter Sloterdijk speaks of a “Eurocene” or a “Technocene” in order to mark 
Western industries and their “technocratic elites” (Sloterdijk 2015, 27) as 
the main culprits of the damage done in the Anthropocene. Since industri-
alization has been historically linked to the modern capital system and the 
“advanced capitalist countries or the North […] were responsible for 72.7 of 
the CO2 emitted since 1850” (Malm and Hornborg 2014, 64), several schol-
ars speak of the “Capitalocene” (e.g. Bonneuil and Fressoz 2015, 222–252). 
Donna Haraway also uses the term “plantationocene” (Haraway 2015, 
159), as the advent of the Europeans in the Americas set in motion a mas-
sive transformation of the continent (cf. Lewis and Maslin 2015). Discourse 
critics, on the other hand, accuse the proponents of the Anthropocene them-
selves of representing only a minority of male, white, Western upper-class 
agents, and characterizes them as the “(M)Anthropocene” (di Chiro 2017).
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When proponents of the Anthropocene Working Group speak of “plan-
etary stewardship” (e.g. Steffen 2015, 94), it is therefore necessary to dif-
ferentiate more clearly who is responsible for the damages. Chakrabarty, 
among others, has pointed to the globally different per capita emissions, 
which have been established as a principle in multilateral law, that con-
stitute a “common but differentiated responsibility for global warming” 
(Chakrabarty 2015, 153). Thus, speaking of humanity as a collective sub-
ject can serve “to conceal one’s own interests” (Chakrabarty 2015, 154) 
and disguise equity issues (Malm and Hornborg 2014). In response, Will 
Steffen et al. have conceded: “Treating the humans as a single, monolithic 
whole […] ignores the fact that the Great Acceleration […] has been almost 
entirely driven by a small fraction of the human population” (Steffen et al. 
2015, 91). Therefore, a distinction should be made between the environ-
mental damage caused by the OECD countries, the BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, South Africa), and others (ibid., fig. 2). However, 
China and India are quickly catching up, and “China has become the 
world’s largest economy and its worst polluter with per capita greenhouse 
gas emissions surpassing the EU average” (Spangenberg 2014, 1). Against 
this backdrop, it is noteworthy that the Anthropocene discourse seems to 
not be equally present across the globe. For example, in most of Asia, the 
Anthropocene discourse has not been picked up despite the fact that vast 
land transformation occurred in China much earlier than in the Western 
hemisphere (Bergthaller 2018).
From a political science perspective, the idea of mankind as a collec-
tive actor is far from universal but arises from specific sociocultural con-
ditions. Accordingly, Eva Lövbrand et al. have called for a re-politization 
of the Anthropocene and emphasize that the manifold changing possibili-
ties of different societies and economies demand different responses as well 
as attention for conflicting interests and different social-political dynamics 
(Lövbrand et al. 2014, 7–9). Philosopher Rosi Braidotti argues that the idea 
of humanity as a collective agency appears abstract and monolithic because 
it disguises plurality and diversity and makes “crucial differences invis-
ible—in particular structural discrimination and injustice” (Braidotti 2016, 
36–37). In this regard, postcolonial criticism has pointed to the fact that 
anthropos as a geological force is still “in each instance, the product of spe-
cific political, social, cultural, and economic realities” (Quason 2012, 369).
Embedding the Anthropocene discourse in different cultural experiences 
also means reconstructing (historical) power relations that underpin scien-
tific, economic, technological, and political interests. In this context, it is 
remarkable that the Anthropocene discourse “occurred primarily within 
particular social, cultural, and political contexts (Euro-Australo-American 
academic environmental studies and environmental politics)” and has not 
“gained any epistemic or political traction […] [in] environmental justice/
climate justice organizations and social movements” (di Chiro 2016, 364). 
This skepticism about the underlying universalism of the Anthropocene 
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concept sheds more light on the potential neglect of unequal power relations. 
Consequently, postcolonial ecocriticism should disentangle the ambivalent 
rhetoric of a planetary stewardship which backgrounds the decentered, 
bottom-up activities of diverse groups who support “regenerative poli-
tics based on life-enhancing political strategies” and proactively organize 
“a just transition toward renewable energy, local economies, and socially 
and ecologically sustainable communities.” (ibid.). In sum, a postcolonial-
ecocritical analysis of the court narrative draws attention to the different 
polluters and the differentiated responsibilities for planetary environmental 
destruction. And, it calls for acknowledging different bottom-up solutions 
from diverging groups, communities, and societies, without subverting them 
to the measures of a collective “planetary steward.”
Expertocratic hegemony in the narrative of the Great 
Transformation and the (Bio-)Technological narrative
According to these two narratives, the global environmental crisis can still 
be managed if action is taken quickly and the business-as-usual approach 
is overcome. The Anthropocene is understood as an ethical-political chal-
lenge, to create a viable future for coming generations through a “plan-
etary stewardship.” Two different options to address climate change are 
discussed: an integrated technical-ecological-economic-social moderni-
zation (a “Great Transformation”) and a more techno-centric develop-
ment model. The Great Transformation narrative envisions a mixture of 
“mitigating” the root causes of environmental degradation and “measures 
of reasonable adaptation” using improved technologies with higher envi-
ronmental efficiency, complemented by reduced consumption if necessary 
(Steffen et al. 2007, 619). This narrative adopts the long-established dis-
course on ecological modernization (Spaargaren and Mol 1992). Despite 
some differentiation of the responsible culprits and the victims and 
calls for solidarity and “fair burden sharing” (Schellnhuber and Huber 
2013, 7), the narrative accepts and reproduces the capitalist-technolog-
ical innovation process and its extension to the Global South. Similarly, 
the “Stockholm Memorandum,” signed by the third Nobel Laureate 
Symposium on Global Sustainability, has propagated a “mind shift for a 
Great Transformation,” aiming at a more equitable world, affordable food 
for all, and reducing human pressure on the Earth system. This should be 
achieved by “strengthening Earth system governance” and “enacting a 
new contract between science and society” (The Stockholm Memorandum 
2011, 784); the core of these claims has been integrated into the United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of 2015. From a post-
colonial perspective and focusing on culturally situated knowledge, this 
narrative raises urgent questions about who exactly will be the stewards of 
the Earth, who will rule the “Earth system governance,” what will count 
as legitimate science, and who will represent society?
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Furthermore, postcolonial ecocriticism has broadly discussed connections 
between economic growth and imperialism. Western ideologies of develop-
ment are often associated with “top down forms of economic management, 
neocolonialist imperatives of global corporate commerce and a postcolonial 
version of ‘ecological imperialism in which the forced march to industriali-
sation’ has had disastrous cultural, as well as ecological, effect” (Huggan 
and Tiffin 2010, 52). Indian historians like Ramachandra Guha and envi-
ronmental thinkers and activists like Vandana Shiva are very critical about a 
forced industrialization in formerly colonialized countries like India, suspect-
ing this would cause an “erosion of social structures” (Huggan 2008, 67). 
Even environmentalism appears often as “a part of a system of global mana-
gerialism” (Clark 2011, 122), e.g. eco-tourism or nature reserve manage-
ment. From this point of view, a Great Transformation should facilitate 
many small transformations which are not dominated by transnational 
agencies or multinational corporations but are decentered and take into 
account the “differences between human groups and local cultural con-
cerns” (Clark 2011, 120).
In contrast, the (bio-)technological narrative, while partly a continuation 
and radicalization of the Great Transformation narrative, promotes large-
scale and intensive interventions into the Earth system, such as geoengineer-
ing. The (bio-)technological narrative offers an array of exciting engineering 
plots, involving, for example, the stimulation of plankton growth through 
iron sulfate emissions into the oceans, or countering global warming by 
spraying sulfur sulfate into the stratosphere to reduce solar radiation (e.g. 
(Crutzen 2006)). Due to possible large-scale side effects, however, geo-
engineering is highly controversial (e.g. Steffen et al. 2011, 858). Equally 
ambivalent are the ideas of the so-called “Green movement 2.0.” For exam-
ple, The Ecomodernist Manifesto (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015) promises “a 
good, or even a great Anthropocene” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015, § 2), with 
prosperity for everyone, universal energy availability through highly efficient 
solar and nuclear power, high resource-use efficiency, and improved nature 
conservation. Two of the manifesto’s 18 authors, Michael Shellenberger and 
Ted Nordhaus, known for proclaiming The Death of Environmentalism 
(2004), are co-founders of the industry-oriented US Breakthrough Institute. 
In favor of modernist high-tech solutions, the manifesto excludes any kind 
of small-scale efforts and older sustainable technologies. Furthermore, this 
techno-optimistic vision suggests a problematic “decoupling [of] human 
development from environmental impacts” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015, § 6). 
However, the environmental humanities have demonstrated that human 
cultures, societies, and histories cannot be decoupled from nature in any 
coherent conceptual or viable practical way (Niemann 2017, 253). From 
the perspective of postcolonial ecocriticism, ecomodernist visions also lack 
attention to the plurality of societies and culturally diverse communities, 
ignoring small-scale agency and local movements as important elements of 
sustainable pathways into the future. Instead, critics accuse this narrative of 
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reproducing the “gendered, racialized, and dichotomous constructions of 
nature and society underlying dominant Euro-American thinking from early 
on” (di Chiro 2016, 368).
The “Green Revolution 2.0” discourse for sustainable agriculture of the 
future fluctuates between ideas that resemble the Great Transformation 
narrative and more bio-technological visions. It contains various stories 
on how to provide food security for 9–10 billion people on a limited 
planet through, inter alia, sustainable intensification, protein substitutes, 
technically modified seeds, and novel types of food, e.g. laboratory meat. 
Higher crop yields, reduced post-harvest losses, and improved market 
access should contribute to food security and poverty alleviation that 
would mainly benefit farmers in developing countries (Lynch 2007, 494). 
Critics claim that a technology-led strategy could lead to renewed eco-
nomic, social, and ecological inequality, but this would be through con-
centrated market power and control over the food system being given to 
only a few firms and research institutes which would possess the patents 
and control the prices (e.g. Pingali 2012). Furthermore, “western” agricul-
tural regimes could be “inappropriate to fragile and vulnerable environ-
ments” (Plumwood 2003, 64).
A different strand of criticism of the Anthropocene narrative targets a 
neo-Promethean approach towards nature, which is blamed for perpetuat-
ing current destructive trends affecting economic, social, and environmental 
systems (Rose et al. 2012, 2–5). Others criticize that, by suggesting that 
the evil in the world—such as the climate crisis and other economic, eco-
logical, and environmental vulnerabilities—can be overcome through (eco-)
Promethean control of society and the environment by technocratic means, 
the technological narrative is structured as a “theodicy” or, in a secularized 
version, as an “anthropodicy” (Hamilton 2015, 233). On the other hand, it 
has been problematized that neither the concept of hubris nor the counter-
concept of humility were adequate to meet the challenges of the planetary 
environmental crisis (Niemann 2017, 250).
Addressing the discourse of modernization and emancipation, the histo-
rians of science Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz have pointed 
out that the Anthropocene narrative often appears as a “story of awaken-
ing” (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2015, xiii, 72) in which humans have destroyed 
nature unknowingly and now have the Earth system sciences to understand 
and correct their mistakes. Bonneuil and Fressoz argue that the story should 
be told differently:
Far from a narrative of blindness followed by awakening, we thus have 
a history of the marginalization of knowledge and alerts. […] Our plan-
et’s entry into the Anthropocene did not follow a frenetic modernism 
ignorant of the environment but, on the contrary, decades of reflection 
and concern as to the human degradation of our Earth.
(Bonneuil and Fressoz 2015, 76)
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By ignoring this historical evidence, the “story of awakening” would play 
an ideological role in order to present Earth system scientists as the new 
“heroes” (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2015, 79) who lead humanity from dark-
ness to light. Its compatibility with dominant economic interests in the great 
acceleration made the “story of awakening” not only “hegemonic,” as it 
represents “the world as a totality to be governed” (Bonneuil and Fressoz 
2015, 48), but also re-established an old-fashioned idea of the heroism of sci-
entific work with a “geocratic” approach (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2015, 93). 
This analysis uses core arguments of postcolonial critique to reveal the 
downside of a Western managerialist perspective which propagates green 
technologies and resource-efficiency to reconcile environmental protection 
with economic growth but tends to overlook the potential re-affirmation 
of (neo)colonial power hierarchies implied in particular in the large-scale 
ecomodernist measures. In this respect, postcolonial ecocriticism can draw 
attention to the hidden inequalities and power relations in narratives of 
economic development and technological transformation which neglect var-
iegated knowledge traditions, context-specific practices, and control over 
resources through property rights.
Differentiations in the interdependency narrative of nature-culture
Narrating anthropos as a geophysical force at global scale casts doubt on 
the established dichotomy of humans as subject and nature as object. In the 
Anthropocene narrative, “nature” or the natural world becomes anthropo-
genic, a product of human activity at planetary scale. While critical theo-
rists have bemoaned alienation from nature, environmentalists like Timothy 
Morton speak of an ecology without nature. Bill McKibben proclaims The 
End of Nature (1989) in the sense that humans as a global force manipulate 
nature through scientific methodologies, industrial capitalism, and colonial 
expansion. Other theorists have proposed the concept of nature-culture 
(Latour 1993; Haraway 2003) to highlight the interconnectedness between 
humans and the nonhuman world, as well to question the artificial bounda-
ries between human-subject and nature-object.
Against this backdrop, the Anthropocene concept is presented as an 
opportunity to rethink humankind from a posthumanist perspective and 
to conceive anthropos as a “part of networks of distributed actors” that 
“also include animals, plants, substances and objects” (Heise 2015b, 40). 
Similarly, Bruno Latour argues that “the point of living in the epoch of 
the Anthropocene is that all agents share the same shape-changing destiny” 
(Latour 2014, 17). Far from implying that nature and society are reconciled, 
asserting an interdependence of all species raises the question: “What might 
it mean for a multispecies aggregate to act upon the world?” (Tsing 2014, 
230). The concept of distributed and multispecies agency refers also to 
issues of multispecies justice and to a redefinition of human attitudes toward 
nature by finding responsible ways of living within agential networks and 
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with limited natural resources. Donna Haraway, for example, calls for a 
non-anthropocentric “becoming-with” of humans and nonhuman “intra-
active entities-in assemblages,” including “myriad temporalities and spati-
alities” for which she has coined the neologism “Chthulucene” (Haraway 
2015, 160). Here, the (re-named) Anthropocene narrative takes a reflexive 
turn by not only questioning established human self-understandings but 
also by rethinking the “ontological exceptionality of the human” (Rose 
et al. 2012, 2). Focusing on the network of humans and other agents is 
linked to an object-oriented ontology in the tradition of phenomenology 
and new materialisms (Oppermann 2016).
Rethinking the Anthropocene, recent studies in environmental humanities 
respond to the scientific, ethical, and political challenges of the global eco-
logical crisis in a cross-disciplinary manner (Iovino and Oppermann 2016). 
Key topics are the politics of Earth, issues of vulnerability and resilience, 
nuclear disaster and environmental justice, climate change and terraforming 
(deLoughrey et al. 2015), the domestication of Earth, multispecies commu-
nities, inequality, decline, and resilience (Heise et al. 2017). Thus, scholars 
from e.g. anthropology, history, the arts, literary and media studies con-
tribute to the interdependency narrative by engaging with ecological issues 
of multispecies networks at different and shifting scales of space and time. 
From the perspective of postcolonial ecocriticism, it is important to main-
tain the differences between the specific claims of climate justice, (binary) 
interspecies justice, and multispecies environmental justice and to analyze 
to what extent these are instilled with power relations between humans, as 
well as between humans and nonhuman agents.
To summarize, a narrative approach to the Anthropocene discourse reveals 
five distinct narratives that merit specific analysis. A postcolonial and ecocriti-
cal analysis of these five narratives exposes a number of tensions and com-
plications: (i) apart from the interdependency narrative, the Anthropocene 
narrative tends to reproduce asymmetrical center-periphery relations, for 
example in marginalizing environmental violence at the periphery. (ii) The 
court narrative and to a lesser degree the Great Transformation narrative 
emphasize differential responsibility for environmental degradation and 
its impacts. (iii) The (bio-)technological narrative ascribes agency, mainly 
to transnational corporations and science, within global managerialist sys-
tems and propagates large-scale solutions. In contrast, parts of the Great 
Transformation narrative also include diverse and decentral institutions and 
social movements which are engaged in small transformations, bottom-up 
solutions, and integral development. (iv) The (bio-)technological narrative, 
with its anthropocentric, Neo-Promethean, and techno-optimist storyline 
triggers counter-stories of new economic, social, and ecological inequalities; 
it legitimates the implicit “hegemonic” power relations. (v) Only the interde-
pendency narrative articulates a reflexive perspective through multi-perspec-
tive and multi-directional stories that portray humanity as part of multispecies 
agential networks that blur time-honored nature-culture dichotomies.
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Overall, Anthropocene narratives tend to disguise, overlook, or obscure 
cultural differences and the multiple systems of representation of the 
human-nature relation. A postcolonial and ecocritical analysis of the 
Anthropocene discourse exposes tensions between the purported univer-
salism of planetary stewardship, based on the collective responsibility and 
capability of an imagined humankind and an asymmetric diversity of inter-
ests, resources, values, concerns, and vulnerabilities. This perspective can 
help to explain the various constraints of the Anthropocene discourse. For 
example, a relative neglect and othering of the marginalized, such as indig-
enous communities, contaminated neighborhoods, or impoverished peo-
ple, might explain why the Anthropocene concept has not been adopted 
in the “world of environmental justice politics” and “climate activism” (di 
Chiro 2016, 371, 373). Postcolonial-ecocritical analysis also shows that 
the call for differentiated responsibility, if linked to ecological moderni-
zation of (bio-)technological narratives, not only serves to acknowledge 
historical accountability but is also easily associated with an unquestioned 
acceptance of technocratic solutions. Therefore, it could be used to legiti-
mate a leading role of already powerful corporate and state actors in their 
implementation. In contrast, embracing the postcolonial and ecocritical 
analysis could help to enhance the reflexivity of the Anthropocene dis-
course by critically assessing which stories, experiences, representations, 
and vocabularies matter (cf. Feindt and Weiland 2018). The Anthropocene 
narratives are an important medium for conveying ideas about a viable 
future; it therefore matters who is included, who is assigned agency, and, 
of course, who narrates.
Notes
1 This chapter draws on results from the research project, “Narratives of the 
Anthropocene in Science and Literature,” which is funded by the German 
Research Foundation (DFG) under grant number DU 320/8-1.
2 Cf. https://peoplesclimate.org/our-movement/ (accessed 04 November 2018).
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